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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) held that every statement could be understood as 
the answer to a question. If that is so, then the following enquiry can be read as a response to 
a question which Gadamer himself raised in a work published in 1957, “Was ist Wahrheit?”: 
“Is science (Wissenschaft) really the final authority and the only bearer of truth, as it claims 
for itself?”1 Gadamer is suspicious of such a claim and is inclined to answer in the negative. 
The modern conception of truth and science, which he traces to Descartes, pertains to certainty, 
domination, and scientific method, and represents a break with the prior centuries of western 
history.2 After Descartes, the mark of the true became certainty, understood of course 
according to a particular set of standards.3 However, Gadamer questions whether science as 
such possesses the resources to justify its own procedures, and the interpretive element 
necessary in order to arrive at truth.4 
Moreover, Gadamer suggests that there are types of truth which exceed the bounds of 
a univocal form of enquiry.5 The questions pertinent to religion, philosophy, and related 
disciplines are not answerable by a purely scientific approach,6 nor do they admit of the 
possibility of a complete and final answer.7 As evidence for this assertion, one need only look 
to the experience of human life. Gadamer concurs with Jaspers when he states that science 
ceases to be useful and compelling with respect the questions occasioned by the 
Grenzsituationen of human existence, for instance, the fact of our mortality.8 In addition to the 
type of content involved, the modality of communication is different: here it is envisioned as 
holistic, as persons speak to one another in terms of “I and Thou.”9 Though Gadamer contrasts 
this type of knowledge (Art Commercium von Existenz mit Existenz) with the more scientific 
form of knowing (Erkenntnis durch zwingende Beweise), he rejects as superficial the simple 
positing of a counterpart (Gegenbegriff) of Existenzswahrheit to designate the latter.10 
Gadamer wishes to find a more sophisticated approach to considering different types of truth.11 
Ultimately Gadamer pursued a line of enquiry according to which all understanding involved 
interpretation, the idea of hermeneutical universality. In this respect, Gadamer turns the tables 
on the Cartesian dispensation: no longer is it a question of the Geisteswissenschaften being 
                                                          
1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” in Idem, Gesammelte Werke, Band 2: Hermeneutik II 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 44-56, here 45: “Ist die Wissenschaft wirklich, wie sie von sich beansprucht, die 
letzte Instanz und der alleinige Träger der Wahrheit?” 
2 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 47-8. 
3 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 48. 
4 Cf. Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 48. See also Donatella Di Cesare, “Hermeneutics as 
Philosophy,” in Idem, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, trans. N. Keane, Studies in Continental Thought 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 176-88, here 177. 
5 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 49. Gadamer also suggests a distinction between truth and 
certainty. Ibid., 48. 
6 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 45. 
7 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 51. 
8 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 54. 
9 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 54. 
10 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 54. 
11 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 54. 
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dependent on the natural sciences. Rather, all science is seen as dependent upon 
hermeneutics.12 
The foregoing ideas are more fully articulated in Gadamer’s massively influential 
Wahrheit und Methode (WM), published in 1960. In this respect Gadamer is addressing a 
question which assumed great importance in the 20th century, namely the place of 
interpretation with respect to the empirical sciences, and whether the findings of the latter are 
completely exhaustive of truth. R. Bernstein situates Gadamer’s WM with respect to two other 
monographs that appeared at roughly the same time, namely P. Winch’s The Idea of a Social 
Science and Its Relation to Philosophy13 in 1958 and T. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions14 in 1962. Together the respective monographs by Winch, Gadamer, and Kuhn set 
in motion a series of questions and discussions concerning the human sciences broadly 
understood.15 One of the key motivations for these separate enquiries was “Cartesian Anxiety” 
and its aftermath.16 Bernstein also situates Gadamer’s reaction against the Enlightenment17 
within the context of the influence of Heidegger. Despite this influence, however, Gadamer 
takes his thought in an original direction in his critical response to the “Cartesian persuasion,”18 
which Bernstein characterises in the following way: 
 
The idea of a basic dichotomy between the subjective and the objective; the conception 
of knowledge as being a correct representation of what is objective; the conviction that 
human reason can completely free itself of bias, prejudice, and tradition; the ideal of a 
universal method by which we can first secure firm foundations of knowledge and then 
build the edifice of a universal science; the belief that by the power of self-reflection we 
can transcend our historical context and horizon and know things as they really are in 
themselves […].19 
 
Gadamer thinks that this approach to the world misses something fundamental about what it 
means to be human, and hence what it means to know. However, he also wants to maintain a 
robust sense of truth, but not understood according to post-Enlightenment criteria. As 
Bernstein suggests, Gadamer wants to present an alternative to objectivism and relativism.20 
 The growing awareness in the early 20th century of the difficulties present in the 
“Cartesian persuasion” constituted a motivation to look to sources in earlier times for 
inspiration. One of these was Augustine of Hippo (354-430), who proved to be a valuable 
                                                          
12 Cf. Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 40. 
13 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 34. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its 
Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958). 
14 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, revised 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Press, 
2012). 
15 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 41. 
16 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 34. 
17 R. Dostal has demonstrated how Gadamer’s “anti-Enlightenment” stance should be understood in a 
much more nuanced way, and especially how he seeks to retrieve some of Kant’s ideas. See Robert Dostal, 
“Gadamer, Kant, and the Enlightenment,” Research in Phenomenology 46 (2016): 337-48. 
18 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 36. 
19 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 36. 
20 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 37. 
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resource for figures such as Jaspers, Arendt, Husserl, Ricoeur, Heidegger, and even Gadamer 
himself.21 These thinkers were not motivated so much by a nostalgia for a past age, but rather 
by an interest in Augustine’s own thought in the hopes of answering pressing questions of their 
own time. One of the fundamental ideas of Augustine’s understanding of reason is that of a 
distinction between different types of knowledge. As a result, Augustine became a major 
source for a return to thinking about “practical philosophy.”22 
 The locus classicus for Augustine’s distinction between two different types of 
knowledge, scientia and sapientia, is located in the twelfth book of De trinitate, in which he 
describes sapientia as the knowledge of eternal things (aeternarum rerum cognitio 
intellectualis) and scientia as the knowledge of temporal realities (temporalium rerum cognitio 
rationalis).23 The former term is often translated as wisdom, whereas the latter could be 
translated as science or knowledge. However, these respective translations do not adequately 
capture the content present in Augustine’s own thought. Moreover, Augustine’s distinction 
should not be taken in the sense of the aforementioned ad hoc posit, but rather in terms of a 
hierarchical ordering of knowledge. As scholars such as C. Harrison have noted, Augustine 
does not oppose the material and the spiritual, but sees them as integrally related.24 Sensibilia 
are essential to our ascent; but we pass through them, we do not stop there.25  Augustine sees 
no opposition between the corporeal and the spiritual; rather, he sees them in a relation of 
degrees of being, and closely linked with one another.26 In other words, our access to eternal 
truths is mediated through physical realities. Indeed, it is in and through scientia that we attain 
to sapientia. This position suggests that the sapiential dimension of which Augustine speaks 
in trin. entails an element of discernment and interpretation. According to M. Svensson, in 
trin. 12, Augustine presents sapientia as a way of knowing that which organises knowledge: 
“es a la sapientia a la que se attribuye la función de vigilar, de vigilar precisamente sobre la 
scientia.”27 In other words, knowledge is not simply a matter of recording facts, but much 
more requires a capacity to parse, analyse, and assimilate data within a broader field of 
meaning. 
Interestingly, the debates between the empiricists and the rationalists in the late 19th 
century reflected something of this dynamic.28 For the former, “fact” was deemed ultimately 
definitive of truth,29 whereas the latter camp, which included scientists such as Claude Bernard 
and Nikolay Strakhov, was appalled by what they saw as the “unscientific nature of raw 
empiricism.”30 Rationalists maintained that enquiry must be based on theoretical principles, 
and that these should provide guidance in disclosing the meaning contained within data.31 
                                                          
21 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 25 (n. 2). 
22 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 80. 
23 trin. 12.15.25, CCSL 50, p. 379; cf. Söhngen, “Wissenschaft und Weisheit,” 102. 
24 Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of St. Augustine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 66. 
25 Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 34. 
26 Holte, Béatitude et sagesse, 325. 
27 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 93; cf. Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the 
Philosophical Roots,” 73.  
28 Anna Schur Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact’ and ‘Understanding Nothing’: Dostoevsky and the 
Scientific Method,” The Russian Review 65.3 (2006): 417–438. 
29 Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact,’” 419. 
30 Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact,’” 430. 
31 Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact,’” 426, 427. 
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Ultimately, the empiricist model only allows one to collect more and more facts, but offers 
little by way of truly understanding or making sense of them.32 That is, an empiricist approach 
to enquiry tends to diminish if not dismiss the place of theory, resulting in a focus, if not a 
fixation, on particular facts, to the exclusion of the broader framework in which they should 
be understood.33 In addition, as figures such as Gadamer and Kuhn would later argue, the very 
discernment of a fact requires the operation of a more basic intellectual faculty.34 
 Thus far we have some warrant to believe that a compelling critique of the specifically 
modern approach to knowledge could be made on the basis of “practical reason,” invoking 
Augustine’s distinction between two different forms of knowledge. However, this may be too 
hasty. Svensson is not convinced that Augustine’s thought on sapientia is best described in 
terms of practical reasoning, even if there are elements of this present.35 For example, 
Augustine sees it as proper to the work of sapientia (in particular one’s conscientia), and not 
scientia, to produce outward actions.36 This is quite different, Svensson notes, from practical 
knowledge.37 Practical reason constitutes a part but only a part of the entire dynamic of the 
acquisition of wisdom in Augustine.38 The practical and the theoretical work together to realise 
the fullness of wisdom, which itself requires purification.39 The healing of the soul from the 
wounds of sin integrates both moral and intellectual aspects, which are related reciprocally.40 
Similarly, G. Van Riel also notes that Augustine’s understanding of sapientia admits 
essentially of both theoretical and practical aspects.41 
Moreover, a reading of sapientia in terms of practical reason does not do justice to the 
fact that Augustine ultimately grounds his account of this idea in his overall theological vision, 
namely the fact that Augustine identifies sapientia with Christ. According to L. Cilleruelo, the 
question of reason is the primary question for Augustine, not something “merely” ethical or 
psychological.42 In other words, Cilleruelo suggests that Augustine’s understanding of reason 
is one aspect of his understanding of ontology, metaphysics, i.e., creation and God.43 
Augustine sees the drama of knowledge as reflective of a much more basic truth, namely the 
creation of man in God’s image, the subsequent fall of man and the darkening of the human 
intellect, followed by Christ’s healing, re-creative activity in virtue of the Incarnation. As J. 
Lössl writes, uera religio “is at the same time philosophy and religion, which is true wisdom 
(sapientia), wisdom incarnate.”44 Svensson also reads Augustine’s conception of scientia with 
respect to man’s first sin, according to which Adam attempted to detach scientia from any 
                                                          
32 Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact,’” 429. 
33 Kaladiouk, “On ‘Sticking to the Fact,’” 419. 
34 Cf. Kuhn, Structure, 122-3; Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” 154; GW 2, 
228. 
35 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 82, 90. 
36 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 98. 
37 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 98. 
38 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 82, 90. 
39 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 98. 
40 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 101; cf. Parsons, Augustine and Freud in 
Dialogue, 63; Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 23. 
41 Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 389. 
42 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 18. 
43 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 18. 
44 Lössl, “The One,” 101. 
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higher norm or knowledge, to become a ruler unto himself.45 As Svensson notes, the fall “da 
lugar a una scientia autónoma respecto de la sapientia–que quiere gobernar sola.”46 Reason 
and knowledge are integrally linked with issues of pride, sin, creation, and salvation, and these 
are inherently theological topics. This also implicates other aspects of the Christian life, such 
as biblical, ecclesial, and liturgical dimensions. It also implies that the acquisition of 
knowledge is ultimately a matter of a personal, holistic encounter.47 
 That being said, I think that an enquiry into sapientia Augustiniana could nevertheless 
yield valuable insights. Gadamer’s thought suggests that a nuanced understanding of truth is 
necessary to supplement and even correct the current epistemic situation. My thesis is that 
Augustine’s understanding of sapientia provides such a resource for articulating the 
differences between types of knowledge in a way which still does justice to modern scientific 
enquiry. Moreover, I believe Gadamer’s hermeneutics provides a basis for articulating and 
“updating” Augustine’s insights, introducing them into the present day. Yet Augustine still 
has something to offer as well, as the theological dimensions of his thought provide a more 
stable basis for the claims which Gadamer himself wants to make. We are led therefore to the 
following task, namely to effect a dialogue between these two figures, reading their ideas with 
a view to their “contemporary theological generativity,”48 whilst still doing justice to the 
historical situation in which they worked, lived, and thought. In particular, I shall focus on 
how Augustine’s conception of sapientia can be developed theologically within the framework 
of a philosophical approach to hermeneutics, inaugurated by Heidegger and advanced by 
Gadamer. 
 
Status quaestionis: Gadamer and Augustine49 
 
From his early days as a thinker, Gadamer found the relationship between philosophy 
and theology intriguing.50 Zimmermann suggests that it is only according to this insight that 
one can truly appreciate Gadamer’s thought,51 as it was in theology that Gadamer located 
                                                          
45 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 101. 
46 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 101. 
47 Meijer, De Sapientia, 100; Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9; Van Riel, “La sagesse chez 
Augustin,” 393. 
48 Susannah Ticciati, A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs, Studies in Systematic 
Theology 14 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 10. 
49 For the dates of Augustine’s works, I have used the following references. For the enarrationes, the 
sermones, and epistulae, respectively, I have consulted the tables available at augustinus.it: 
<http://www.augustinus.it/latino/esposizioni_salmi/index2.htm>; 
<http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>; and <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/lettere/index2.htm>, 
respectively. For other works, unless otherwise noted, I have consulted the table assembled by O’Donnell in his 
commentary on the Confessiones (O’Donnell, Commentary I, lxvi-lxix), available at 
<http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/augustine/chrontable.html>. As O’Donnell indicates on this webpage, this is 
meant as a general guide, and not as completely authoritative. I use this table for the same purpose, namely to 
provide context and comprehensiveness to my treatment of Augustine, not to enter debates over precise dates of 
certain works. 
50 Zimmermann, “Confusion of Horizons,” 88. 
51 Zimmermann, “Confusion of Horizons,” 88. 
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resources for addressing questions which push us beyond the limits of our human existence.52 
One of his most valuable sources in this respect was Augustine. 
The starting point for treatments of Augustine and Gadamer together is a chapter in 
Jean Grondin’s 1994 monograph Der Sinn für Hermeneutik, in which he discusses the 
Augustinian inspiration behind Gadamer’s hermeneutics as presented in WM. Among other 
things, Grondin argues that Augustine was a major source for Gadamer’s hermeneutics, in 
particular the conception of hermeneutical universality,53 a point which was even confirmed 
by Gadamer himself.54 In particular, Gadamer’s source was Augustine’s understanding of the 
“inner word,” in particular as located in trin. 15.55 As a result, most of the literature dealing 
with both Augustine and Gadamer has focused on whether and to what extent Gadamer was 
influenced by Augustine or other sources, or to what extent Gadamer accurately read and 
interpreted Augustine concerning the inner word. In 2009, two monographs appeared which 
also dealt explicitly with this question, namely J. Arthos’ The Inner Word in Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics56 and M. Oliva’s Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik.57 Both of these 
monographs included extended discussion of Augustine on the inner word, as well as how this 
was received by Gadamer. Several articles or chapters have also dealt with this question. 
Grondin, Zimmermann, Llanes, and Oliva read Gadamer on the inner word in light of 
Augustine, whereas Arthos and Kaegi are more ambivalent. Arthos holds that Augustine is a 
clear focal point for Gadamer in Part III of WM, but that other classical philosophical figures 
such as Aquinas also contribute to shaping his understanding of hermeneutic universality.58 
 Some literature has also dealt with the constructive potential of Gadamer’s reception 
of Augustine. Scholars such as Kreuzer and Hennigfeld59 see the Augustinian inner word as 
possessed of the potential to overcome the instrumentalisation of language, whilst Vecchio, 
Brachtendorf, Santi, Schindler,60 and Cary are more sceptical. Indeed, the latter has argued 
that Gadamer and Augustine actually produce mutually exclusive positions as it concerns 
language and the inner word.61 In virtue of this reception of the inner word, scholars such as 
Llanes have argued that this introduces an ontological dimension into Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics,62 a point with which Grondin, Zimmermann, and Arthos can basically agree. 
                                                          
52 Zimmermann, “Confusion of Horizons,” 87. 
53 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 31-2. 
54 Arthos, “The Fullness of Understanding,” 166. 
55 It is also worth noting that although most scholars point to the Stoic distinction between the logos 
prophorikos and the logos endiathetos as the source for Augustine’s doctrine of the inner word, G. Watson argues 
strenuously against this possibility. Gerard Watson, “St. Augustine and the Inner Word: The Philosophical 
Background,” The Irish Theological Quarterly 54 (1988): 81-92, esp. 82, 88. 
56 John Arthos, The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2009). See also Idem, “‘A Limit that Resides in the Word’: Hermeneutic Appropriations of Augustine,” in 
C. Troup, ed., Augustine for the Philosophers: The Rhetor of Hippo, the Confessions, and the Continentals, Studies 
in Rhetoric and Religion 16 (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014), 93-106. 
57 Mirela Oliva, Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur 
Theologie 53 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). 
58 Arthos, “The Fullness of Understanding,” 178. 
59 For the discussion of these two figures, see Romele, “The Ineffectiveness of Hermeneutics,” 428. 
60 For the discussion of these four figures, see Romele, “The Ineffectiveness of Hermeneutics,” 427. 
61 Phillip Cary, “The Inner Word Prior to Language: Augustine as Platonist Alternative to Gadamerian 
Hermeneutics,” Philosophy Today 55.2 (May 2011): 192-8, esp. 196. 
62 María Guadalupe Llanes, “Gadamer y la igualdad sustancial de pensamiento y lenguaje en San 
Agustín,” Studia Gilsoniana 2 (2013): 145-59; the same appeared in Apuntes Filosóficos 40 (2012): 87-101. 
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 Whilst most of the literature on both Augustine and Gadamer concerns the 
Verbumlehre, a few other publications have focused on different themes. J. Crouch has written 
on the continuities between Augustine and Gadamer in terms of (biblical) hermeneutics,63 and 
similar themes have also been addressed by G. Ripanti.64 One brief article has placed these 
two figures into dialogue with each other, though the author herself admits that much work 
remains to be done on the links between these two thinkers.65 Perhaps most significantly, 
Arthos sees Augustine as anticipating key developments in the hermeneutics of both 
Heidegger, and Gadamer, such as the dynamic of the hermeneutical circle.66 My contribution 
shall consist in discussing and developing Gadamer’s understanding of questioning and of 
prejudice, respectively, informed by the thought of Augustine on sapientia. 
 
Status quaestionis: Sapientia 
 
In the last century, the main scholars who have dealt explicitly with the theme of 
sapientia in Augustine’s thought include M. Meijer,67 F. Cayré,68 V. Bourke,69 P. Agaësse,70 
H.-I. Marrou,71 G. Söhngen,72 R. Holte,73 G. Madec,74 M. Svensson,75 and G. van Riel.76 Of 
course much could be said about this, and I shall elaborate on this in due course, but a basic 
consensus obtains amongst these scholars on the following major points. It is clear that 
Augustine is situated within the antique ideal of pursuing wisdom in a holistic sense, as 
something which incorporates both intellectual and moral elements.77 Wisdom pertains to the 
knowledge of eternal things, what is described according to eide and noesis in the Platonic 
tradition, and which is located within one.78 Augustine also speaks of sapientia as the 
                                                          
63 James E. Crouch, “Augustine and Gadamer: An Essay on Wirkungsgeschichte,” Encounter 68.4 (Fall 
2007): 1-14. 
64 Graziano Ripanti, “L’allegoria o l’‘intellectus figuratus’ nel De doctrina christiana di Agostino,” Revue 
des Études Augustiniennes 18.3-4 (1972): 219-32; and Idem, “Il problema della comprensione nell’ermeneutica 
agostiniana,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 20.1-2 (1974): 88-99, here 98-9. 
65 Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 103. 
66 Arthos, “Hermeneutic Anticipations,” 110; cf. Ripanti, “L’‘intellectus figuratus,’” 228. 
67 M. Meijer, De Sapientia in de eerste geschriften van s. Augustinus (Brakkenstein-Nijmegen: 
Eucharistische Boekhandel, 1937). 
68 F. Cayré, “La notion de Sagesse chez Saint Augustin,” L’année théologique 4 (1943), 433-56. 
69 Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s Quest of Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo, Science 
and Culture Series (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce, 1945). 
70 P. Agaësse, “Notes complementaires: Sapientia et scientia,” in P. Agaësse and J. Moingt (eds.), La 
Trinité, deuxième partie: les images, Bibliothèque augustinienne 16 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), 620-3. 
71 Henri-Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: Boccard, 1983), esp. 561-9. 
72 Gottlieb Söhngen, “Wissenschaft und Weisheit im augustinischen Gedankengefüge. Eine 
Begriffstafel,” in Idem, Die Einheit in der Theologie (Munich, 1952), 101-6. 
73 Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la 
philosophie ancienne (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1962). 
74 Goulven Madec, “Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra: Le principe de cohérence de la doctrine 
augustinienne,” Recherches Augustiniennes 10 (1976): 77-85. 
75 Manfred Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII: San Augustín y las formas de la 
racionalidad,” Teolgía y Vida 51 (2010): 79-103. 
76 Gerd van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin: de la philosophie à l’Écriture,” in I. Bochet (ed.), Augustin 
philosophe et prédicateur. Hommage à Goulven Madec (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 389-405. 
77 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 98; Meijer, De Sapientia, 108; cf. Van Riel “La 
sagesse chez Augustin,” 400 n. 26; cf. Söhngen, “Wissenschaft und Weisheit,” 102. 
78 Söhngen, “Wissenschaft und Weisheit,” 101-2. 
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completion and fruition of happiness, as the fullness of beauty and being.79 However, 
Augustine concluded that the philosophical schools were incapable of leading one to truth, 
whereas Christ, and indeed, Christ crucified, can in fact accomplish this task.80 Augustine 
proudly declared that Christianity stood as an alternative to the elitist philosophical schools of 
the Platonists, the Aristotelians, the Stoics, etc.81 
This is because Augustine equates beatitude with the possession of wisdom and truth, 
which are identical with Christ.82 According to Van Riel, Augustine takes a Platonic theme 
and recasts it in Christian terms, namely in identifying Christ with the light and wisdom present 
within the soul.83 Despite the continuities with a Platonic theory of the forms, Meijer stresses 
the vivacity of Augustine’s understanding of wisdom, that it is “helemaal niet een dood, 
abstract idee,” but rather “het hoogste persoonlijke leven.”84 Whilst Augustine’s Christology 
initially reflected his more intellectual approach to Christianity (pedagogical), this view gave 
way by degrees to an ever greater emphasis on Christ as the living Wisdom of God, and hence 
a significance to the Incarnation which transcended the merely intellectual.85 Madec stresses 
the point that Augustine believes that the “philosophical” understanding of sapientia and 
scientia are realised and truly embodied in Christ, the Incarnate Word.86 As we shall see, 
though the term sapientia admits of a spectrum of meanings, it is clear that Augustine’s 
understanding of this concept clearly includes an account of Christ as the divine Wisdom. This 
will also serve as a point of departure for a further analysis of this idea in Augustine’s thought 
which, as Svensson suggests, warrants further attention in Augustine scholarship.87  
In chapter two in particular I shall take the insights of figures such as Madec a step 
forward and examine the Johannine aspects to Augustine’s doctrine of sapientia. Here I follow 
the understanding of Madec, who made it clear that even though he emphasised the 
fundamental element of Augustine’s thought as the unity of sapientia and scientia in Christ, 
nonetheless stated that he did not see this theme as present in all of Augustine’s works: “je ne 
soutiens nullement que toute son activité doctrinale ait consisté à developer cet unique 
schéma.”88 It is clear, Madec continues, that many of Augustine’s works have to be understood 
with respect to their own particular situation, and that these situations determine the content 
of his compositions in a variety of ways. However, he also claims that the recognition of the 
importance of this idea in Augustine’s thought has to make a difference to the way we read 
and analyse him: “si ma thèse se tient, elle devrait avoir quelque conséquence.”89 It is this 
“consequence” that I have sought to explicate in (part of) my thesis. 
                                                          
79 Meijer, De Sapientia, 94, 100. 
80 Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 405. 
81 Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 393. 
82 Holte, Béatitude et sagesse, 350. 
83 Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 399. 
84 Meijer, De Sapientia, 100. 
85 Van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie, 6; Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 393; Comeau, 
Saint Augustin: Exégète du quatrième évangile, 291. See also Hubertus R. Drobner, Person-Exegese und 
Christologie bei Augustinus: Zur Herkunft der Formel Una Persona, Philosophia Patrum: Interpretations of Patristic 
Texts 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1986). 
86 Madec, “Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra,” 80. 
87 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 101. 
88 Madec, “Christus scientia et sapientia nostra,” 83. 
89 Madec, “Christus scientia et sapientia nostra,” 83. 
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As we shall see in due course, the theme of sapientia in Augustine is closely linked 
with that of illumination.90 In addition to being identified with sapientia, Christ is also 
described as a sort of supernal light. Without delving into debates concerning the meaning of 
illumination in Augustine, I shall appeal to relevant secondary literature in order to substantiate 
my claims and complement my reading of Augustine. 
Illumination,91 according to V. Giraud, consists in one’s ability to know truth, the 
capacity for “true thought” (pensée vraie).92 As G. Matthews writes,93 the function of divine 
illumination is to afford the mind access to realities which are not empirically perceptible. This 
implies a certain integral link between God and the human mind.94 Within oneself one finds 
sapientia, which is itself a purifying light.95 Furthermore, illumination guides and directs one 
through the entire reasoning process, which Augustine sees as beginning with the insight of 
an authority figure, which one follows and gradually arrives at a conclusion.96 Hence 
illumination is a decidedly hermeneutical endeavour, as it begins from a general principle and 
is deepened continuously. For Augustine, authority is primary de iure, whereas de facto (re), 
reason comes first, in particular in directing one to a proper authority for opening one’s avenue 
to intellectual exploration.97 As we shall see in Part II in particular, this sense of apprehending 
a particular object as meaningful and intelligible resonates with Gadamer’s interrogative 
understanding of hermeneutics. Furthermore, this sense of illumination involves a holistic 
encounter with truth, indeed, with God himself.98 
In my estimation, Augustine’s understanding of knowledge and illumination involves 
two distinct yet inseparable elements.99 One is the enlightening activity of Christ, present 
intimately to the soul. The divine light supplies the mind with the resources necessary to grow 
in knowledge. However, this is not sufficient in order to arrive at sapientia. Created in the 
image of God, in virtue of which it possesses reason, the human soul is further formed and 
indeed reformed by continuously turning to its Creator. However, there is a catch. Augustine 
speaks in various ways of a blindness of the soul or an obstruction of the mind.100 In other 
words, though the light is present, we may struggle to see it.101 This could be for one of two 
reasons, namely our finitude or our sinfulness.102 God is invisible, and so cannot be seen by 
the bodily eye, but only by the heart, de iure.103 However, de facto, one may not be able to see 
                                                          
90 E.g., Io. eu. tr. 1.16, CCSL 36, pp. 9-10. 
91 For an extended status quaestionis on readings of illumination theory in the 20th century, see Pârvan, 
“La relation,” 87-90. 
92 Giraud, “Delectatio interior,” 211. 
93 Matthews, “Knowledge and Illumination,” 180-1. 
94 Hochschild, Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology, 109; cf. Morgan, The Incarnation of 
the Word, 86. 
95 Chrétien, L’espace intérieur, 64-5; en. Ps. 35.5. 
96 Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 348. 
97 Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 325. 
98 See Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2013), 258-9. 
99 I have presented and explained this schema in Anthony Dupont and Matthew W. Knotts, “In Dialogue 
with Augustine’s Soliloquia: Interpreting and Recovering a Theory of Illumination,” International Journal of 
Philosophy and Theology 74.5 (2013): 432-465. 
100 Cf. Menn, “The Desire for God,” 92. 
101 E.g., Io. eu. tr. 1.19. 
102 ep. Io. tr. 2.10. 
103 ep. Io. tr. 7.10. 
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God, and so must purge the cordial eye. Augustine likens this unto those who wish to see the 
light of the sun, who must cleanse their eyes.104 Therefore our vision needs to be healed and 
re-oriented. What I wish to emphasise here is the inseparability of these two aspects of 
illumination in Augustine’s thinking, as well as the fact that the latter part, the weakness of 
the eyes, stems from a two-fold source, namely human finitude, which in and of itself is not a 
moral fault, and sin, by which the intellect is darkened.105 This is crucial, as in the final part of 
this enquiry I shall read both of these, namely finitude and sin, as prejudices in the 
Gadameriean sense of the term. 
 This dynamic is neatly encapsulated in diu. qu. 46, in which Augustine states that the 
rational soul possesses a certain capacity for knowing intellectual realities, namely the divine 
ideas. Light implies a sense of vision, and Augustine states that there is some sort of eye 
through which one perceives truth: “However, every soul but the rational is denied the power 
to contemplate these ideas. This the rational soul can do by that part of itself wherein lies its 
excellence, i.e., by the mind and reason, as if by a certain inner and intelligible countenance, 
indeed, an eye, of its own.”106 In diu. qu. 51, Augustine presents a similar reflection, linking 
sapientia and illumination. Here he writes that God’s wisdom illumines the mind, and that this 
light, which is constitutive of the capacity for reason, distinguishes man from beasts.107 To be 
a thinking being possessing the capacity for rationality is to imitate God, and this more so than 
other earthly creatures.108 When reason rules in the soul, one imitates the image of God within 
one, just as God’s wisdom governs the universe.109 
However, despite the fact that everyone has some access to these ideas in principle, 
that is, although all rational souls possess some sort of interior capacity for perception de iure, 
the extent to which they exercise this faculty is contingent upon moral and other factors. Hence 
one may be blind or be absent from the light, such that one cannot see truth. As Augustine 
writes, “And indeed, not any and every rational soul is prepared for that vision, but rather, the 
soul which is holy and pure. It is this soul which is claimed to be fit for that vision, i.e., which 
has that very eye with which the ideas are seen–an eye sound, pure, serene, and like those 
things which it endeavors to see.”110 Here Augustine encapsulates what I call the gradual sense 
of illumination. 
My use of “principal” and “gradual” is not a mere word game. Rather, both of these 
terms reflect Augustine’s own language. As for the former, he sees Christ as the principium, 
as the source of all things, not least of all the capacity for reason, which is constituted by his 
image in the soul. Furthermore, the illumination of the Word provides the “first principles” of 
                                                          
104 ep. Io. tr. 7.10. 
105 Cf. Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 47. 
106 diu. qu. 46.2, CCSL 44A, p. 71: “Anima uero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua 
excellit, id est, ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie uel oculo suo interiore atque intellegibili.” Trans. 
Mosher, p. 80. 
107 diu. qu. 51.3, CCSL 44A, p. 80. 
108 diu. qu. 51.2, CCSL 44A, p. 79. 
109 diu. qu. 51.3, CCSL 44A, p. 80. 
110 diu. qu. 46.2, CCSL 44A, pp. 71-2: “Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed 
quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi uisioni esse idonea, id est, quae illum ipsum oculum, quo uidentur ista, 
sanum et sincerum et serenum et similem his rebus, quas uidere intendit, habuerit.” Trans. Mosher, p. 80. 
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reason, which Augustine describes as the initia sapientiae.111 The latter also reflects 
Augustine’s language, insofar as he speaks of moving gradatim towards truth.112 Indeed, the 
distinction between the principal and the gradual is reflected most palpably in Augustine’s 
own life, as he recounts how God was (always already) present within him, even if he was 
unaware of this presence and blinded by his predilection for the non-real creatures of this 
world. Over the course of time, thanks to God’s promptings, Augustine realises this presence 
within and then continues to deepen his attunement to that presence. As we shall see in due 
course, our reason is reflective of the way in which the world is constituted, as Augustine 
argues in locations such as Gn. litt. 
 
Outline 
 
This enquiry begins by raising a deceptively simple question: what is wisdom 
(sapientia) for Augustine? A cursory survey of the sources in conversation with the secondary 
literature reveals that this term admits of a variety of senses and meanings within Augustine’s 
corpus. It is also crucial to place Augustine’s understanding of this term within its proper 
contexts. It is clear that Augustine is situated within the classical tradition of understanding 
the search for wisdom as the task of philosophy, as the search for the happy life. One can 
discern this especially in his Cassiciacum dialogues, which deal primarily with the communal 
search for wisdom and beatitude.113 For the Greeks, philosophy and religion were not two 
separate things but the synthesis of the search for the fullness of truth. As M. Foley has 
explained, this spirit of philosophy is transmitted and made palatable to the more pragmatic 
Latin West by Cicero, whose Hortensius exerted a profound influence on Augustine even from 
his earliest days. This spirit of philosophy was also incorporated into Christianity long before 
Augustine, as the research of figures such as W. Löhr, V. de Beer, and J. C. M. van Winden 
has shown. However, one must always remember that despite this continuity there is also a 
fundamental difference between the classical understanding of philosophy as the search for 
beatitude and the approach taken by philosophia christiana, which for early Christians like 
Augustine was a synonym for theology. 
 As scholars such as G. van Riel have emphasised, Augustine does introduce some 
novelty to the historical tradition of thought on sapientia. Taking the Pauline identification of 
Christ with the Wisdom of God as a point of departure, Augustine attempts to think through 
the implications of grounding a theory of knowledge in the incarnate God. Of course we cannot 
forget that sapientia does not always and unequivocally refer to Christ in Augustine’s works. 
He speaks for instance of sapientia superba, a pseudo-wisdom of the world. He also speaks 
about sapientia in positive terms which are nonetheless not divine, such as when he describes 
pietas as true wisdom. Nonetheless, several textual sources of Augustine indicate that he takes 
very seriously the Pauline notion that Christ is the divine Wisdom incarnate. Furthermore, as 
I see it, Augustine’s texts also indicate that he attempts to understand this according to a 
“Johannine logic,” to borrow a phrase from E. Kuehn. 
                                                          
111 s. 117.8.11, PL 38, p. 667: “Voluit enim Deus inseminare omni animae initia intellectus, initia 
sapientiae.”  
112 ord. 2.19.50, in Giraud, “Delectatio interior,” 209, n. 39. 
113 Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, 10-11; Holte, Béatitude et sagesse, 322. 
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 After the initial status quaestionis which deals with the foregoing matters, I delve into 
this question of the theological elaboration of sapientia. Succinctly put, John’s theology as 
encapsulated in the prologue presents a cosmology of “re-creation,” of creation in principio 
through the eternal Wisdom of God, the discarnate Word. This act of creation has serious 
implications for the world, as it reflects something of its origin. It also implies something very 
important about our ways of knowing and thinking, as the rational mind is created ad imaginem 
Dei, in virtue of which it is illumined by the divine light and enabled to know in a normative 
sense.114 However, this capacity for reason is inherently limited in virtue of one’s creaturely 
finitude. This limitation is exacerbated by sin, whether original or personal. Adam’s folly 
results in damage not only to human nature, but to all of creation. Hence the principle of 
creation enters the world of time and space, takes flesh in a miraculous and ineffable way, and 
by means of his actions heals and redirects the fallen world.115 This activity is often described 
in epistemic terms, such as a clearing away of one’s moral blindness, or as a reintroduction of 
light into the darkness. For this reason Augustine can describe the Son as “creator et 
recreator.”116 Again, Augustine’s own words here and elsewhere show us that to think about 
sapientia is at the same time to think about matters of creation and knowledge. Key sources 
for this topic include ss. 117-121, the opening books of De Genesi ad litteram, certain parts of 
the In Iohannis euangelium tractatus CXXIV, the Christmas sermones (ss. 184-196), and De 
trinitate. 
 After presenting this overview of Augustine’s basic theology of wisdom, two 
interesting implications appear. First, Augustine speaks of the world as reflecting two aspects, 
what one might call a “principal” aspect and a “gradual” aspect. These are two aspects of 
reason which are complementary, though the latter relies on the former. The principal sense 
of reason pertains to that initial capacity to know, the universal character of human reason. 
The gradual pertains to the realisation that knowledge is not always totally given, but requires 
effort on the part of the seeker of truth, cognisant of various limitations and obstructions to the 
acquisition of knowledge. In practise these two aspects of reason are inseparable, even if 
distinct. These thoughts implicate a variety of themes which are present in two rather broad 
historical lines of enquiry, namely the wisdom tradition of the Hebrew Bible and the 
metaphysics of light. 
A brief passage from Milton’s Paradise Lost can help to illustrate the principal and 
the gradual senses of reason as I understand them. In book three, the speaker utters the 
following prayer for the ability to perceive and communicate truth: 
 
So much the rather thou, celestial Light, 
                                                          
114 For a more detailed and diachronic treatment of imago Dei in Augustine, see John Edward Sullivan, 
The Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influences (Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1963); and Gerald 
P. Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image: A Study in the Development of Pro-Nicene Theology, Oxford 
Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: University Press, 2016). 
115 My treatment of Augustine on (original) includes little of his material from the 420s and the Pelagian 
controversy. From the 420s, Augustine’s thought becomes increasingly pessimistic about our knowledge after the 
fall. Furthermore, illumination and related themes are not prominent throughout the Pelagian writings. 
116 See, for example, Io. eu. tr. 38.8, CCSL 36, p. 342, in which Augustine describes Christ as, among 
other things, “hominis formator et reformator, creator et recreator, factor et refactor.” See also s.52.2.2; s. 277.2; s. 
Mai 94.1; en. Ps. 66.2. 
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Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
Irradiate; there plant eyes, all mist from thence 
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell 
Of things invisible to mortal sight.117 
 
In these few lines, we see the tradition of the metaphysics of light encapsulated. The ambiguity 
of the term “celestial” in the first line bespeaks a qualitatively different type of light from that 
of the sun. This reading is confirmed in the next line, in which this light is portrayed as 
renovating the mind (the mind through all her powers irradiate). Light implies sight, as light 
illumines objects so that they can be seen, and without vision, the light shines in vain. In the 
following line, Milton describes eyes of a certain sort, implying some form of mental vision. 
However, this capacity itself for intellectual vision is distinct from the perfect realisation 
thereof. Certain blockages must be cleansed and removed. This point is further confirmed by 
the repetition of see; we already know that one possesses eyes, but apparently this is not a 
guarantee that one will see. Rather, once the mist has been cleared, one will be able to perceive 
the objects of intellectual vision, those objects invisible to mortal sight.  
 In this quotation, we see a number of inter-related themes. For one, we have an implicit 
schema of light, vision, and objects, based in the analogue of our bodily sense of sight. Just as 
we possess eyes which allow us to see certain objects, and this is facilitated by the light of the 
sun, so too is this model replicated on the intellectual level. Secondly, Milton’s text implies a 
distinction between vision and the full realisation thereof. This requires help from another, in 
particular for the purgation of one’s rational faculties. Finally, a discussion of illumination is 
inseparable from a discussion of intellectual vision; in fact, it is the other side of the coin. 
My thesis is that both Augustine and Gadamer espouse understandings of rationality 
which encapsulate the foregoing themes. That is, each of them hold the principal and the 
gradual senses of reason and intellectual vision in a productive tension with one another. Their 
ideas, originating from very different perspectives, seek to balance theoretical commitments 
and phenomenological insight. The commitment to holding these two elements in such a 
tension is particularly interesting, as it seems that after Descartes, one has been emphasised to 
the diminution or even the exclusion of the other.118 Hence in order to formulate a more 
adequate understanding of human reason and knowledge, I turn to Gadamer’s account of 
hermeneutics and Augustine’s concept of sapientia as two bases upon which to construct an 
alternative to contemporary theories of knowledge and cognition. 
 From the treatment of Augustine on sapientia we discover that the theme of 
incorporeality provides a locus theologicus for further study, as Augustine’s doctrine of 
                                                          
117 Milton, PL III, 51-5. Throughout this work Milton’s words will be used to express and re-enforce 
certain points, especially ones made by Augustine with respect to creation. That being said, it is important to 
acknowledge that Milton’s Arianism clearly separates him from Augustine. 
118 Scholars such as A. MacIntyre, B. Gregory, and R. Brague have suggested positions along these lines. 
The basic idea is that in modernity, concepts become individuated and extracted from their original contexts. Then 
these “rogue” contents develop apart from the original setting which renders them intelligible, resulting in 
exaggerations or misunderstandings. The importance of this is that some elements of modernity, for example, are 
implicitly contained within, e.g., the mediaeval dispensation. I think there is a case to be made that the elements of 
reason I have identified, namely principal and gradual, are both held together in a dynamic tension in earlier ages, 
whereas in the modern and the postmodern dispensations, respectively, one of these elements is emphasised to the 
diminution of the other. The result is that the complementarity essential to this relation is lost, and so too is a 
balanced account of reason which seems to be motivated by considerations of several sources of evidence. 
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sapientia generates certain conundrums which summon further attention. For example, 
Augustine often speaks of the divine wisdom as the founder of all times, and as incorporeal 
and invisible. As if this were not mysterious enough, the entry of this divine principle into 
mutable, finite reality introduces greater difficulties into the way in which sapientia can be 
understood. Hence in the secunda primae, I deal with two particular implications arising from 
Augustine’s theology of wisdom, namely the question of time and vision. As for the former, 
we are said to be related to and called to knowledge of sapientia aeterna whilst remaining 
finite and temporal. How can we, in and through time, aspire to that which transcends and 
conditions it? This is a central question which arises in the Confessiones and leads to 
Augustine’s renowned reflection on memoria. However, I also seek to demonstrate that this 
aporia concerning time is fundamental to his theology as a whole, and provides insights for 
his overall theory of knowledge. My treatment of time and extension in Augustine is grounded 
in three particular case studies, namely book seven of the Confessiones, book five of De Genesi 
ad litteram, and book eleven of De ciuitate Dei. It also takes into account other works, such 
as ss. 4-6, and passages from In Iohannis euangelium tractatus CXXIV and In epistolam 
Iohannis tractatus. A close examination of Augustine’s texts also reveals, as K. Flasch argues, 
that time is a logical result of creation in a particular form, such that time and space come to 
be seen as species of the genus of extension, an insight which will have important ramifications 
for the constructive project in which I engage in the final part of my enquiry. 
The problem of vision can therefore be seen as a variant on the question of time. God 
creates the world and can be known through it, but precisely how can we “see” his vestiges in 
creation? (V. Giraud has treated of this question with particular erudition.) What are we to 
make of Christ in the flesh? Can we see him? Indeed, can we see God himself? Questions such 
as these occasion a series of reflections on vision which recur throughout Augustine’s corpus, 
most notably in his Epistula 147, also known as De uidendo Deo, in which he addresses the 
question of whether God can or cannot be seen, framing the problem as an antinomy generated 
by the authority of the sacred scriptures. In addition to dealing with passages of Soliloquia, De 
libero arbitrio, and the Confessiones, and De fide rerum inuisibilium, I present three particular 
case studies on the question of vision, namely De Genesi ad litteram 12; Epistula 147; and De 
ciuitate Dei 22.29.1-6. From this study it becomes clear how much of Augustine’s thought on 
sapientia results from what K. Anatalios has called “scriptural reasoning,” a form of reasoning 
which takes scriptural claims and authority as a point of departure. My claim is that Augustine 
acknowledges and attempts to situate himself in the metaxu (to borrow a term from W. 
Desmond) generated by the apparent contradictions of scripture. As scholars such as G. Clark, 
T. Finan, and M. Fishbane note, it is precisely these difficulties in the scriptures which lead us 
to further knowledge, to thinking more clearly about a particular theological issue. 
The result of this first section is to see how sapientia provides resources for thinking 
about our knowledge and what must be the case in order for it to function the way it seems to 
do. For Augustine, knowledge is not so much about moving to some predetermined goal or 
imposing order on chaos, but allowing ourselves to see what is already there, to adjust 
ourselves in such a way that the images which appear to us cohere into an intelligible whole. 
His understanding of wisdom also implies that the world admits of “text-like” properties. 
Hence knowing reality becomes an interpretive, “hermeneutical” process. The themes which 
I distil from Augustine’s theology have a certain resonance with the more contemporary 
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thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer, to whom I turn as a potential source for a new approach to 
sapientia Augustiniana. 
 In the second major part of the enquiry, I delve into Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. A major task is to disabuse ourselves of certain erroneous notions often attached 
to Gadamer which are really later accretions resulting from dubious reception. First and 
foremost, as students of Gadamer such as J. Grondin and M. Scraire emphasise, Gadamer must 
be situated within the tradition of hermeneutics which passes through his tutor Heidegger, and 
in particular the latter’s “ontologisation” of hermeneutics. That is, rather than being viewed as 
a mere technique for interpreting texts, hermeneutics comes to be understood as a holistic 
approach to human reason as such. Hermeneutics is intended to describe the way in which we 
interact with the world as a whole. This is the sense of hermeneutics which Gadamer receives 
and seeks to develop in his WM. 
 Once we situate Gadamer within this philosophical context, it becomes clear that his 
thought admits of a deeply philosophical element. This leads us to the principal aspects of his 
thought. Hermeneutics comes to be identified as the capacity for discerning what is “question-
able,” as that which is intelligible. The act of questioning serves to disclose a particular object 
of enquiry which can be further interrogated. This also implies that the world exists in a 
fundamentally intelligible way, as it supports the Fraglichkeit of the particular objects thereof. 
From this, it also becomes clear that Gadamer’s approach to language has often been 
misunderstood. “Language” for Gadamer is that which is fundamentally intelligible, like the 
Greek logos, a “word” which is not so much a constituent of any particular natural language 
but rather as that which is possessed of meaning. For Gadamer, being speaks to one by 
imposing itself on the mind and arising within thought in the form of an inner word, for which 
Gadamer derives inspiration from the final book of Augustine’s De trinitate. 
 Gadamer says that we identify contents in the world as capable of being questioned; 
this corresponds to what I have termed the principal sense of reason. However, Gadamer says 
that knowledge requires further work and effort in order to come to fruition, always aware of 
the challenges of attaining such knowledge. Here we see his awareness of the gradual sense of 
which rationality admits, insofar as one must actively seek truth (hermeneutical circle) and 
must also overcome the limitations that prevent one from attaining it (Vorurteil). The properly 
“ontological” reading of Gadamer allows us to cast the staples of his thought, namely on 
prejudice, horizon, and the hermeneutical circle in a new light. 
 After I explain Gadamer’s thought in some detail, I take a moment to address various 
objections which one might take to my own approach. A major argument I make, following J. 
Zimmermann, B. Wachterhauser, and D. Di Cesare is that, far from excluding the possibility 
of transcendence, as some have argued, Gadamer’s thought actually requires it, lest his 
hermeneutics lapse into incoherence. In addition to clarifying and addressing some problems 
which arise, it also serves to lay the foundation for the third and final part of the enquiry, 
namely the constructing of a contemporary sapiential-hermeneutical theology. 
 I situate my own constructive project with respect to a small but significant body of 
literature, the common theme of which is to think of knowledge in terms of “reading” or 
“interpreting” the world. The French phenomenologist J.-L. Chrétien, who draws upon various 
historical figures such as Augustine, describes reason in terms of the dynamic of call and 
response, and states that the human mind is implicated in a dialogue with the world. The Jewish 
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theologian M. Fishbane presents similar views, drawing upon the Torah and the history of 
Jewish theology, arguing for an approach to knowledge which challenges our fundamental 
prejudices concerning ourselves and our situation within reality. Finally, M. Wahlberg has 
appropriated trends in analytic philosophy to argue for a robust and traditional theology of 
creation which is consistent with a contemporary scientific understanding of the world. My 
approach seeks to complement and expand upon the work of these scholars, in particular as I 
ground the substance of my work in Augustine and elaborate it according to a Gadamerian-
hermeneutical method, an approach which results in novel and interesting insights into the 
nature of knowledge. 
 First I address the principal sense of knowledge. Augustine often discusses his 
“speaking” with nature, even claiming that it speaks to him about his soul and about God. 
Nature speaks in virtue of the beauty it reflects from its source of being, and Augustine is able 
to see these divine uestigia by interrogating creation. We see this especially in s. 241, conf. 
10, and en. Ps. 18. In this highly imaginative and scripturally based exchange, Augustine 
provides us with a “hermeneutical” template for thinking about one’s interpretive interaction 
with reality. Along the way, we are also invited to call into question assumptions about the 
nature of the empirical, and about “vision” itself. We also realise that the intentio with which 
one looks at reality is crucial, that is, the aspect under which one views it, and the values one 
believes to be there or not be there. This is essential to determining whether or not we “see” 
what is already there. In the words of William Blake, we must learn to “cleanse the doors of 
perception” so that the world can speak to us. Augustine believes it can, and that above all, it 
tells us that we are finite, or rather, it helps us to recognise this about ourselves. 
 The conversation which the subject holds with the world foregrounds the prejudice of 
our ontological finitude. As hermeneutical, rational beings, we have the capacity to distance 
ourselves at least mentally from our immediate milieu. Augustine’s extended reflection on 
memory in the Confessiones takes us a step further, helping us to realise that our way of 
perceiving the world in terms of time and space is finite and contingent. But Augustine does 
not stop there; he challenges the very notion of “dimension” or “extension” as such, a point 
which is suggested in his reflection on John’s transcendence of all created reality, a feat which 
results in the utterance of the in principio, as he relates in his first tractate on John’s Gospel. 
Without pretending to some neutral position, we are nonetheless made aware that our finitude, 
experienced in terms of spatio-temporal extension, is a “meta-prejudice” of our hermeneutical 
and phenomenological experience of the world.119 As Gadamer says, the task is not so much 
to forsake prejudice as to recognise it as such, and hence be better attuned to the ways in which 
it influences our thought. So for example, the (implicit) thought that the physical and the 
material are the mark of the real comes to be seen not as a self-evident principle of reason, but 
as a contingent and defeasible assumption about the nature of reality itself. I also identify a 
                                                          
119 My argument here is informed by Taylor when he writes, “[I]t couldn’t be that, understanding myself 
as finite first, I then constructed by my own powers of conception the idea of a being who would represent the 
negation of myself and hence would be infinite. On the contrary, it works the other way around. I wouldn’t have 
the notion of myself as finite unless I already had implanted within me this idea of infinity and perfection. But to 
understand myself as doubting and wanting is to see myself as lacking in some respect, and hence as finite and 
imperfect. So my most basic and unavoidable modes of self-understanding presuppose the idea of infinity.” Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
140-1, emphases added. 
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further “prejudice” of sorts, which according to Augustine could be our sinfulness, which 
causes us to misunderstand the text of the world. Hence I construe pride as prejudice and seek 
to explain how we can re-orient our hermeneutic in order to overcome the obstructions of our 
fallen human nature. 
The upshot of this enquiry is to present a fundamentally different way of thinking not 
solely about reason, but the rational agent’s constitution and situation within the world, and 
what that implies about the nature of truth and knowledge. This programme is holistic and 
comprehensive. Furthermore, I make no apologies for the fact that Augustine’s thought, for 
example, originates in a different setting and is grounded in theological commitments. 
However, this does raise a difficult question concerning method. If my arguments are not 
grounded in neutral categories or “pure reason,” then how can I expect them to hold purchase 
over any considerable swathe of interlocutors? This is a question I address in more detail in 
the preliminary conclusion to this enquiry, in which I propose an alternative method for 
adjudicating truth claims between various paradigms. Informed by sources such as Augustine, 
Aquinas, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Kuhn, I argue for a form of reasoning which aspires to 
credibility, plausibility, and explanatory capacity, rather than absolute proof. Instead of 
representing a flight from scientific standards, I argue that such an approach ultimately 
represents the best hope of safeguarding the essence of science and rationality as such. 
 Here I draw upon the methodology which in the words of N. Trakakis, “looks for 
understanding rather than justification.”120 In this instance, rather than attempting to prove and 
disprove one side over against another, one would present competing, incommensurable ways 
of seeing the world, and allow the informed rational agent to make a decision on the merits of 
each, not requiring one paradigm to be forced into the categories and concepts of another. In 
this way I follow an approach taken by other philosophers and theologians, according to which 
the task is “not so much proving a specific point as of showing how an entire way of thinking 
and living is even possible.”121 I want to show the reader one particular way of seeing the 
world based on my sustained engagement with Augustine and Gadamer. 
 
Modus operandi 
 
Before beginning this enquiry in earnest, I would like to address the method(s) I shall 
be employing here. By now it should be obvious that my project will incorporate historical, 
philosophical, and theological methodologies, but that is not primarily what I mean. Instead, I 
would like to acknowledge and address a concern about the reading of an historical source for 
contemporary purposes, as well as the placing of that source in dialogue with another figure 
of a vastly different background. 
In a 2009 chapter on Merold Westphal’s appropriation of Hegel’s thought, William 
Desmond outlines several different types of approaches that one may take to an historical 
                                                          
120 Nick Trakakis, “Deus Loci: The Place of God and the God of Place in Philosophy and Theology,” 
Sophia 52.2 (2013): 315-33, here 320. 
121 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 320. 
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figure in the attempt to “despoil” them.122 Here he identifies one approach which must be 
avoided, namely the ventriloquist approach.123 Granted, there is a benign and ineluctable form 
of ventriloquism which occurs whenever two speakers are trying to understand each other. 
One repeats certain words or phrases of the other, or at least attempts to express the other’s 
thoughts with their own gloss.124 The ventriloquism which Desmond has in mind is something 
else entirely. In this case, the researcher in question uses the authority of Hegel, for example, 
to put forward their own thoughts.125 Desmond’s concern is not with the appropriation of an 
historical figure as such, even in ways that the particular person would not endorse or accept.126 
There is an enormous difference between engaging with a figure, even creatively, and blurring 
the line between the figure’s thought and one’s own.127 The constructive engagement with the 
other figure requires that one clearly distinguish between one’s own voice and that of the figure 
in question.128 For Desmond, “an honest commentator should, in the first instance, seek to be 
true to what Hegel said and intended in his own words. One must have the integrity to let 
Hegel be Hegel.”129 This is my intention for my treatment of both Gadamer and Augustine. 
Here Desmond touches upon a major problem in various theological circles, namely the 
uncritical reading of sources in light of contemporary systematic interests. The Augustine 
specialist Michel René Barnes encapsulates this concern in the following way: 
 
contemporary systematic appropriations of Augustine are based upon methods and 
accounts that are preselected for mirroring a widely held hermeneutic or ideology of 
systematic theology. These methods and accounts typically include . . . a tendency 
towards a logic of ideas, including a lust (operative even when unfulfilled) for 
encyclopedic comprehensiveness at the conceptual level coupled with a reductive use of 
primary sources, a retreat from the polemical genre, with an emphasis on the 
philosophical content of doctrine.130 
 
Herewith Barnes offers us an initial look at the problems of systematic theology in relation to 
more ancient sources. He does not mince words in condemning the approaches of 
contemporary systematicians, stating that these methods and perspectives do not represent 
correct ways in which to read and interpret an historical text, such as that of Augustine. 
Barnes is equally critical of two tendencies within theology. The first he sees as the 
past method of seeing attention to the sources as otiose, even problematic, from a theological 
perspective. He is also critical of the tendency to impose a theological agenda on a particular 
                                                          
122 William Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently: Merold Westphal and Hegel,” in B. Putt, ed., 
Gazing Through a Prism Darkly: Reflections on Merold Westphal’s Hermeneutical Epistemology (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2009), 20-34. 
123 Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 24. 
124 W. Desmond made this point in a conversation concerning “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 
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130 Michel René Barnes, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 56.2 
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figure, of using a particular theologian in order to advance a programme apart from any 
attention to or sensitivity for context or sources.131 One must be wary of the systematician’s 
tendency to speak in what Barnes calls “architectonic narrative forms,” which prize 
perspective over detail and fact.132 Barnes understands the term “architectonic” to imply an 
“idealistic” striving for comprehensive synthesis in the realm of understanding historical 
figures, as well as understanding the evolution of the “logic of an idea.”133 So in addition to a 
general neglect of the sources, Barnes also inveighs against the prejudicial reading and outright 
abuse of sources by systematicians: 
 
Aside from amnesia, the problem with the influence of idealism in systematic 
appropriations of patristic theology is not that philosophy in general has no place in 
theology, or even that idealism in particular has no place in theology. Rather, the problem 
is that, unacknowledged, idealism draws to itself bad history: the integrity of the 
discipline of historical studies is ruptured by the need to find a “historical" account which 
is already cast in idealistic terms. History is then treated as the material enstructuring of 
those themes which are constitutive of contemporary systematics. The dialogue between 
systematic theology and historical theology is transformed into a conversation between a 
ventriloquist and her or his prop.134 
 
The concern is that much systematic theology amounts to ventriloquy, to using a particular 
figure as a puppet for one’s own theological ideas. The more fundamental historical problem 
is treating the past as representing the very concepts employed today. Barnes takes 
systematicians to task for perpetuating “a grand narrative which is based on something other 
than a knowledge of the texts being narrated, indeed, a narrative which is positively based on 
conceptually bypassing the need, simply put, to read the texts being narrated. The texts thus 
have no content(s) apart from the grand narrative, and thus no integrity that would demand a 
direct encounter.”135 What is lost is the actual content of the text, and the possibility of the text 
correcting outlandish interpretations when any need to appeal to the text is excluded a priori. 
Barnes is troubled by the tendency to read Augustine or other theologians of antiquity 
through contemporary categories, that is, imposing oppositions or frameworks onto their 
thought anachronistically, such that one re-interprets or even does violence to their doctrine.136 
That is, “modern reconstructions,” he writes, “are captive to modern interpretive 
categories.”137 For example, as Goulven Madec has warned, one must be wary of imposing the 
scholastic distinction on the patristic period, or looking through it when one looks into the 
past.138 Such an application would be anachronistic, as the distinction between philosophy and 
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theology did not obtain in patristic thought, or at least not in the same way.139 It was not until 
the 13th century, Madec writes, that the distinction between philosophy and theology as it is 
known today began to be articulated.140 Yet philosophers and theologians alike tend to ignore 
this in their treatments of Augustine. In addition to the scholastic distinction, Madec argues 
that Augustine’s thought does not admit of a distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural, so familiar today, but rather on “deux economies,” of the discarnate and the 
incarnate Word, respectively.141 What is being pronounced here is the need to appreciate the 
fundamental differences between thinkers and the periods in which they thought. 
 Jaroslav Pelikan offers thoughts similar to those of Barnes on the place of constructive 
engagements with historical sources. Like Barnes, Pelikan laments the lack of careful attention 
to the sources amongst systematic theologians, and is particularly concerned about the idea 
that one can even do theology without the sources. As an historian, Pelikan emphasises the 
necessity of this discipline, a major part of which he understands as the close consultation of 
the sources. On his view, history must inform and at times correct the claims of systematicians. 
Though expressing a wariness towards some of the tendencies of the proponents of the more 
systematic approaches to theology, philosophy, and history, Pelikan nonetheless maintains the 
necessity and the legitimate autonomy of such disciplines, and sees them in a perennial if 
productive tension with the philological approaches to historical research and scholarship. For 
example, he is willing to concede that it may make more sense to read Luther in light of biblical 
figures as opposed to his contemporaneous interlocutors.142 However, it seems that for Pelikan, 
the former, namely the systematic and the constructive, requires the latter. We can see this, for 
example, when Pelikan writes,143 
 
Polemical theology must debate the issues of legitimacy and limit; dogmatic theology 
must strive to formulate some a priori judgments about the development of doctrine. But 
it is up to church history to trace the processes of development; and if church historians 
neglect to do this, they will leave the job by default for their more speculative colleagues 
to settle without irritating interference from the documentary evidence. 
 
There is of course a legitimate concern about trivialising, diminishing, or even excluding 
altogether the necessary and crucial role of historians.144 The danger of any interpretation of a 
text is ignoring or abusing the superficial meaning thereof.145 This is why Pelikan is critical of 
those who argue for the necessity of abstraction from particular circumstances in order to make 
sense of doctrine.146 
                                                          
139 Goulven Madec, Chez Augustin (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 1998), 8. However, this 
position is not universally accepted. See Paul A. MacDonald, “The Epistemology of Faith in Augustine and 
Aquinas,” in P. Cary, J. Doody, and K. Paffenroth (eds.), Augustine and Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 167-96. 
140 Madec, Chez Augustin, 9–10. 
141 Madec, Chez Augustin, 14. 
142 Jaroslav Pelikan, “An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,” Church History: Studies in 
Christianity and Culture 35.1 (1966): 3–12, here 6. 
143 Pelikan, “An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,” 5. 
144 Pelikan, “An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,” 5–6. 
145 Karla Pollmann, “Augustine, Genesis, and Controversy,” Augustinian Studies 38 (2007): 203–216, 
here 214. 
146 Cf. Pelikan, “An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,” 6. 
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We have clarified the major concerns that philologists and historians have concerning 
systematic approaches to historical figures. One is the tendency not only to ignore the sources, 
but to feel that one is warranted in doing so. Similarly, when they do consult the sources, 
systematic theologians do so with an agenda in mind, such that the credibility of their reading 
is compromised. Finally, there is the danger of anachronism, of falsely imposing contemporary 
categories on past figures, or compelling them to answer to false and forced binaries. These 
points are grave and legitimate concerns for any serious scholar. 
Although their articles were likely not intended as theoretical treatises, we can 
nonetheless glean important methodological lessons from the work of Barnes and Pelikan. In 
particular we find a warning against the uncritical appropriation of historical sources for one’s 
own aims and objectives. We are also reminded that any engagement with a source must be 
attentive to its original context. That being said, it need not and should not lead one to the view 
that no understanding is possible across time and context, or that historical sources cannot be 
engaged in the present. But I think in stating what not to do, we can gain further insight into a 
responsible way to read the sources. 
In the aforementioned chapter Desmond also describes a companioning approach. The 
companionate method mimics a conversation, in which one person comes to articulate their 
own thought, yet with the help and guidance of another speaker.147 So whilst the latter 
constitutes a source of inspiration and direction, the former does not simply repeat the thought 
of the companion.148 On the basis of the thought of one particular source, one nevertheless 
transcends that source. An example of the companionate approach can be found in Westphal’s 
theological treatment of Heidegger, wherein the former respects the integrity of the latter’s 
thought and clearly identifies the boundaries between the two of them.149 “Westphal is 
careful,” Desmond writes, “to delineate what terms he makes use of from Heidegger. This is 
a companioning use of Heidegger, not a ventriloquizing.”150 In another location, Desmond 
succinctly captures the spirit of the companionate position:151 
 
My aim is to engage the questions themselves. Some exposition of thinkers is needed and 
given, but a report of scholarly findings is not the primary focus. . . . I honor the spirit of 
philological earnestness but my interest falls on the themes themselves and engaging them 
with important philosophers. The engagement is philosophical. I am not doing art 
criticism, or literary criticism […]. 
 
In other words, Desmond too recognises the importance and the legitimate place of historical 
and philological scholarship. However, he makes clear that he is interested in a distinct realm 
of enquiry, namely into a particular philosophical issue or conundrum. This reflects a 
distinction that Augustine makes concerning biblical hermeneutics, namely between that of 
                                                          
147 Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 23. 
148 Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 23. 
149 Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 27. 
150 Desmond, “Despoiling the Egyptians–Gently,” 27, emphases added. 
151 William Desmond, Art, Origins, and Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2003), ix; emphases added. 
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the truth of a particular matter concerning philosophy or theology (de ueritate rerum), and the 
other as what was intended by the author or understood by the original audience.152 
 A further approach represents a variation on the companioning, namely the 
comparative. In this case we are not concerned with one figure, but rather a dialogue 
envisioned between two particular figures. Moreover, we are not only thinking about the 
conditions of possibility for a dialogue between two sources, but two sources separated by 
both contextual and ideological differences. Even if they can be seen as speaking intelligibly 
to one another, how are we to adjudicate disagreements between them? Again I turn to the 
thought of Desmond, who suggests that the key in such a situation is to ensure that such an 
investigation is continuously guided by an overarching question or problem. Such a 
juxtaposition is motivated by the compelling continuities between these sources, or possibly 
by their divergence. Westphal for example employs Hegelian concepts and ideas, yet in a way 
which does not presuppose Hegel’s entire philosophical system. In Westphal we see an 
instance of someone engaging constructively with a figure in Hegel who apparently has 
nothing to offer.153 His approach, as Desmond explains, is “not to deny the possibility of 
conflict, but it is to deny conflict as the last word.”154 Above all, however, this approach is best 
suited to enquiries in which a particular question, issue, or theme itself is at stake, rather than 
the study of the thought of a particular figure.6 This is the modality I adopt and seek to follow 
in terms of my formulation of a dialogue between Gadamer and Augustine: both of these 
thinkers deal in their own ways with issues of crucial importance concerning knowledge and 
reason and offer a compelling alternative perspective. In other words, I am pursuing an enquiry 
which is guided by a particular content, a particular question, to which the respective ideas of 
Gadamer and Augustine can offer guidance. In the final analysis, however, I shall be the one 
who is offering an answer to the question, albeit informed not only by Augustine and Gadamer 
individually, but by the ideas constituted by the resonance generated by placing them in close 
conceptual proximity to one another. 
 Simply put, without denying the possibility of reading classic sources for 
contemporary purposes, I acknowledge the dangers which such a project raises, and seek to 
address them and avoid the extremes of ventriloquism discussed above. 
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PRIMA PARS: AVGVSTINVS 
 
PRIMA PRIMÆ 
 
1. SAPIENTIA AUGUSTINIANA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The following enquiry begins from a deceptively simply question: What is wisdom 
(sapientia) according to Augustine? Despite the breadth of this question and the ways it could be 
answered, there are a few major points which cannot be ignored. For one, Augustine is clearly 
situated within the classical tradition according to which the search for wisdom and knowledge 
constituted a religious way of life. Like other fathers before him, Augustine viewed Christ as the 
final completion of the pagan search for truth. Furthermore, Augustine takes very seriously the 
Pauline identification of Christ with wisdom, indeed, the divine wisdom of God. Though this 
point is present in early works, I contend that Augustine gradually comes to realise the 
significance of this point over the course of his career. In particular, he articulates this according 
to a Johannine logic, namely a theology of “re-creation,” according to which the discarnate Logos 
creates the world, and then restores and even elevates it as the incarnate Word after its fall into 
sin. This framework provides the explanatory context in which to make sense of Augustine’s 
theory of knowledge. Put differently, Augustine’s understanding of sapientia and human reason 
is grounded in his Christological cosmology. 
 In what follows I discuss the significance and the meaning of Augustine’s understanding 
of Christ as the wisdom of God, and the theology and the theory of knowledge it entails. In the 
first part, I explore the background, the context, and the spectrum of senses of which sapientia 
admits in Augustine. It shall become clear that despite the spectrum of meanings, a crucial one is 
that sapientia is Christ, the divine Word. After discussing some of the overall theological 
implications of this view, I turn specifically to the significance of this point for Augustine’s theory 
of knowledge. It shall become clear that he articulates a theory of knowledge grounded in Christ 
the divine wisdom. Finally, I discuss the counterpart to Augustine’s Christological understanding 
of wisdom, namely the “counterfeit double” (Desmond’s term), or the pseudo-wisdom of the 
world, sapientia superba. Augustine encourages one to flee from the worldliness of philosophy 
and cling to the incarnate Christ. Rather than representing an option for obscurantism, I believe 
that Augustine’s critique of the philosophi huius mundi reveals the fundamentals of his approach 
to sapientia as hermeneutical. 
 
1.1. THE CONTEXT(S) OF SAPIENTIA 
 
1.1.1 Background 
 
For the Greeks philosophy was understood in its etymological sense, i.e., as the love of 
wisdom. The term sophia did not simply denote abstract knowledge but implied something more 
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holistic, something which admitted of an ethical or a normative component. In a word, philosophy 
constituted a way of life, in particular of the search for ultimate truth, wisdom, and knowledge. 
This way of life was pursued in community in schools which developed around a particular figure 
or set of ideas. A common life was pursued in a quasi-monastic style, with adherents reading and 
discussing a certain canonical text or set of texts, such as Plato’s Timaeus. Hence for the classical 
philosophical tradition, the pursuit of knowledge could not succeed apart from a total personal 
commitment, along the lines of what we might call “religion” today.1 
This philosophical spirit was strong throughout the antique Mediterranean world, so it is 
no surprise that early Christians would be imbued not simply with the ideas but the fundamental 
practises of the philosophical schools.2 Justin Martyr is often designated as the originator of this 
tradition within Christianity, the Justin for whom Christ and Christianity were seen as alternatives 
to the various philosophical traditions of antiquity.3 W. Löhr has noted how early Christians 
gathered in communities analogous to those of the Platonist philosophers. (In fact, Augustine 
himself was part of something like this in Milan.) Christians read biblical texts such as Genesis 
as their own philosophical text, a text the correct exegesis of which promised to furnish one with 
the conceptual keys to creation. Indeed, it was no coincidence that Genesis and the Timaeus were 
so important in the ancient world. They were read and interpreted as cosmological accounts of 
creation, allowing one to develop a comprehensive view of the world. The study of such texts, 
coupled with an upright way of life, granted the mind access to truth, as well as the first principles 
required to understand and interpret reality.4 
Of course, the Latin Roman world annexed the Greek world in the second century BC. 
The former had always prided themselves on their practicality and their attention to duty: they 
were the people of law and commerce, of husbandry and architecture, of war and peace. Most 
Latins therefore regarded their Greek counterparts with suspicion, seeing their art, their culture, 
and their philosophical way of life as unproductive and impractical, and hence to be avoided. 
Indeed, the philosophers the Romans produced, such as Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, are hardly 
remembered for their intellectual ingenuity. However, the Greek East did gain a foothold amongst 
the Latins, thanks to Marcus Tullius Cicero. As M. Foley explains, Cicero mediated the Greek 
philosophical ethos to Rome, making the detached life of otium honestum palatable to the 
pragmatic Roman aristocracy. Cicero’s own embrace of the Greek philosophical lifestyle, along 
                                                          
1 See Winrich Löhr, “Christianity as Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual 
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zur Kirchengeschichte 48 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1978), 122. See also M. J. Edwards, “Justin’s Logos and the Word of 
God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 3.3 (Fall 1995): 261-80. 
4 See Löhr, “Christianity as Philosophy” and Michalewski, La puissance de l’intelligible. 
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with his measured success of mediating this to his fellow Latins, set the stage for Augustine’s 
encounter with philosophy and prepared him in his search for wisdom.5 
Augustine recounts in his Confessiones how his adolescent reading of Cicero’s 
Hortensius inculcated in him a love of truth and wisdom that would remain with him throughout 
his life. The significance of the Hortensius can be seen more fully when we realise that certain of 
Augustine’s early dialogues constitute direct critical responses to those of Cicero, in particular, 
Contra Academicos to Academica; De beata uita to De finibus and the Tusculanae Disputationes; 
and De ordine to De fato, De natura deorum, and De diuinatione.6 However, Foley also notes the 
conspicuous absence of a direct response to the Hortensius, which he argues implies an implicit 
endorsement on Augustine’s part, not least of all because it encouraged its readers to pursue truth.7 
As a result of his reading of Cicero’s Hortensius, Augustine’s normative framework was 
transfigured, indeed, his desires were “transvaluated,” and he began to conceive of the 
significance of his life and his pursuits in profoundly different terms.8 In fact, rather than reading 
Augustine’s “conversion(s)” as changes or ruptures within his intellectual life, one could view 
these as a series of ever deepening insights into truth.9 Beginning from Cicero, Augustine 
searched for truth in the scriptures, for there was contained the name of Christ, which he 
intuitively associated with truth. Initially disappointed, he turned from there to the Manichees, 
and subsequently to the Platonists, and finally fully embraced the ecclesia catholica in 387. The 
thread uniting these ostensibly disparate parts of his life was his indefatigable love of and search 
for wisdom and truth.10 
The foregoing brief overview has laid the foundation for an examination of Augustine’s 
approach to wisdom, sapientia. In his earlier works, the character of classical philosophy is very 
clear. Augustine credits the Platonists with several key insights that would also become important 
for his theology, such as the notion of God as light, of God as creator, of the intellectual vision of 
God, the illumination of the soul, and one’s participation in the Word, according to which one 
becomes wise and blessèd.11 Hence reason and wisdom are linked ineluctably with the divine and 
the “religious.”12 As Cilleruelo puts it, “La unión con Dios tendrá que realizarse por medio del 
                                                          
5 See Michael Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Revue 
des études augustiniennes 45 (1999): 51-77. See also Robert J. Forman, Augustine and the Making of a Christian 
Literature: Classical Tradition and Augustinian Aesthetics, Text and Studies in Religion 65 (Lewiston: Mellen, 1996) 
and C. Baguette, “Une période stoïcienne dans l’evolution de la pensée de saint Augustin,” Revue des Études 
Augustiniennes 16.1-2 (1970): 47-77. 
6 Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots,” 62-3. Some parts of b. uita are taken directly from 
the Tusculanae Disputationes. Ibid., 68. 
7 Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots,” 63. 
8 Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 98; cf. Comeau, Saint Augustin: Exégète du quatrième 
évangile, 298. 
9 Gillian Clark, “Philosopher: Augustine in Retirement,” in M. Vessey (ed.), A Companion to Augustine 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 257-69, here 257-8. See also Virginie Pektas, “Platonic and Neo-Platonic Tradition,” in K. 
Pollmann and W. Otten (eds.), Oxford Guide to the Reception History of Augustine (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
1551-55; Catherine Conybeare, The Irrational Augustine, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: University Press, 
2006). 
10 See Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 98-100. See also Pierre Hadot, La philosophie comme 
manière de vivre, Itinéraires du savoir (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001). 
11 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 20-1. 
12 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 21. 
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conocimiento.”13 Reason therefore becomes a subinhaesio which leads us to God.14 As his career 
proceeds, Augustine gradually Christianises and biblicises his conception of sapientia. 
Nonetheless, the Christian notion of wisdom he presents and elaborates always retains something 
of this classical sense of philosophy. According to L. Ayres, Augustine develops a major motif 
of Latin antiquity, namely the tradition of using a paradigmatic exemplum as a model for moral 
and philosphical development.15 Augustine’s exemplum, according to Ayres, is the model of 
ascent and descent, illustrated by Christ, and even, in Ayres’ words, “woven into the very 
temporal structure of the created order.”16 This will constitute a key theme of the entire enquiry. 
 
1.1.2 Spectrum of senses 
 
According to the late Augustine scholar G. Madec, Augustine’s thought begins from and 
terminates in Christ, the Word made flesh.17 This is especially true, I shall argue, of Augustine’s 
understanding of sapientia. Hence the first task is to sketch the course of the path which began 
from the classical understanding of philosophy in its etymological sense and terminated at the 
Incarnate Christ, with whom Augustine identified sapientia. Milan was not the starting point for 
Augustine’s search for wisdom, though there it did acquire a new direction. From an early stage 
of his Christian period after his Milanese conversion, Augustine acknowledged sapientia as the 
goal of both the philosopher and the Christian, indeed, of the Christian philosopher. As an heir to 
both the tradition of classical antiquity and early Christianity, inter alia, Augustine inherited and 
transformed the concept of sapientia. The goal of classical philosophy was to achieve beatitude, 
the happy life, which Augustine understood as requiring a particular way of living, transcending 
the merely “intellectual” and abstract “rational,” and hence including aspects of the ethical and 
spiritual life.18 Thus we can see Augustine’s thought as arising out of the classical context which 
he inhabited, yet increasingly influenced by his Christian sympathies. 
Augustine deploys the term sapientia in a number of contexts, and the term in his thought 
admits of a variety of senses. Augustine’s understanding of the term sapientia as wisdom reflected 
its Greek origin, philosophia, such that sapientia could be understood as wisdom or as philosophy, 
according to P. Burton.19 At a basic level, Augustine distinguishes (in a Pauline fashion) between 
the true wisdom of heaven and the false wisdom of the world. However, as G. van Riel notes, 
Augustine’s approach to wisdom should be understood in terms of gradations, rather than in 
binary terms.20 Augustine offers a hierarchical understanding of sapientia, beginning at the top 
                                                          
13 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 21. 
14 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 21. 
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16 Ayres, “Into the Poem,” 265. 
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18 Gerd van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin: de la philosophie a l’Écriture,” in I. Bochet (ed.), Augustin 
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19 Philip Burton, “The Vocabulary of the Liberal Arts in Augustine’s Confessions,” in K. Pollmann and M. 
Vessey (eds.), Augustine and the Disciplines (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 141-64, here 
158. 
20 Van Riel, “La sagesse chez Augustin,” 397. 
Sapientia Augustiniana 
27 
with God, and moving to the wisdom of heaven, and then to the practical and theoretical 
knowledge of this world, and finally, the false wisdom, the carnal wisdom of the corporeal 
world.21 On occasion Augustine describes wisdom as something virtuous yet not divine, such as 
when he speaks of sapientia as the modus animi in De beata uita.22 Elsewhere Augustine also 
speaks of wisdom as the fruit of piety (sapientia pietatis est fructus)23 or as piety itself, which 
facilitates the worship of God.24 This also shows that according to Augustine, sapientia entailed 
a religious element, namely a correct relation to the divine.25 Similarly, in trin. (411-427),26 
Augustine quotes Job 28:28, which states that true wisdom consists in the proper worship of 
God.27 Wisdom for Augustine requires correct understanding, which in turn requires correct 
worship, recta religio. This position becomes clear in works from a liminal time in his life and 
career, notably his De doctrina Christiana (books I-IIIa: 396, books IIIb-IV: 426/427) and his 
Confessiones (397/401).28 Even the notion of worldly wisdom is itself nuanced. Worldly wisdom 
can be propaedeutic to the acquisition of eternal wisdom.29 Augustine made a distinction between 
“human wisdom” and “divine wisdom,” and did not see these as divided along confessional lines. 
For instance, he credited Plato with philosophising according to divine wisdom (in sapientia non 
humana, sed plane diuina).30 Hence sapientia mundi should not be immediately identified with 
sapientia superba. 
Nonetheless, Augustine’s interest in sapientia is primarily religious and Christological in 
nature.31 The entire trajectory of the reasoning process is oriented towards the divine, what Holte 
describes as the world of Ideas.32 Hence we can see how Augustine’s theory of reason, knowledge, 
sapientia, and such like, are all oriented towards and situated within an eschatological context.33 
In his Soliloquia (386-387), a relatively early work written immediately after his conversion to 
Catholic Christianity as an attempt to grasp this conversion, Augustine describes sapientia as the 
contemplation of the highest good, a definition which evokes those of Plato and Aristotle, 
respectively.34 Moreover, one of the prayers of this work represents, according to D. Doucet, “une 
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remontée vers la plénitude de la vision chrétienne.”35 Similarly, in his De libero arbitrio, 
Augustine argues that wisdom consists in that in which the fullness of truth and goodness is seen 
(cernitur) and possessed (tenetur).36 In his earliest extant work, Contra academicos (386), 
Augustine states, following the antique tradition, that sapientia constitutes the ultimate goal of 
philosophy, yet a goal which is nevertheless unattainable on this side of the veil.37 In the same 
text Augustine claims that even though the end of the search for wisdom is eschatological in 
nature, one can grow in wisdom in this life, as well as become pure in the search for it, which will 
prepare one for full beatitude after death. Hence his theory of sapientia from his earliest Christian 
days admits not only of an ethical, but also of a strongly mystical and eschatological character.38 
In De uera religione, Augustine identifies true religion (that is, true worship) with true 
philosophy.39 Augustine saw Christianity as the only true philosophy because of its universality 
and its possession of Christ’s revelation in Scripture.40 In this early work we also see a discussion 
of sapientia in terms which will become more fully elaborated in other works, as we shall see in 
the next chapter. Augustine asserts that God made all things through his wisdom, or his Son, and 
in the love of the Spirit.41 As a whole, creation is viewed as beautiful (pulchritudo uniuersae 
creaturae).42 However, as God is the supreme fullness of being, whilst all other creatures are 
limited in their being and are hence mutable.43 Furthermore, sapientia is given an epistemic value, 
as it serves as the standard of our judgements.44 The One, or God, is also described as truth itself 
(ueritas ipsa).45 That being said,  Augustine never separates sapientia from the practical and the 
incarnate, even if this is ultimately more than that.46 In uera rel. Augustine presents a theology of 
re-creation in sapientia.47 He makes clear that he understands the Incarnation in “sapiential” 
terms, for instance when he speaks of the very wisdom of God (ipsa Dei sapientia) becoming 
man (homine assumpto).48 Due to sin, the human person stood in need of some form of stepping 
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stone to divine things.49 The One becomes incarnate in order to direct the fallen world back to its 
source.50 In De utilitate credendi (391-392) Augustine speaks of Christ not only as the completion 
of the Old Covenant but also as the fulfilment of the frustrated intellectual peregrinations of old.51 
For Augustine, the task of philosophy becomes one of understanding the various precepts and 
principles given by faith.52 
Despite the increasingly biblical language and concepts Augustine uses in his discussion 
of sapientia, the emphasis on philosophy is still present later in his career. In De Ciuitate Dei, for 
example, we continue to see the strong link between philosophy and religion: “For indeed if God 
is Wisdom, ‘through whom all things were made,’ as divine authority and truth have shown, the 
true philosopher is a lover of God.”53 
As Augustine’s career proceeds, it is clear that he understands sapientia primarily as 
Christ, the wisdom of God. Though he was influenced by such sources, Augustine’s 
understanding of wisdom represents a strong reaction against the classical philosophical tradition, 
informed by Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians, in which the latter states that the Crucifixion 
is foolishness to the world, but wisdom to God. Elsewhere in his works, Augustine will make use 
of this Pauline theme, arguing that God’s wisdom is shown through the lowly and the little ones 
of this world. Christ is made our wisdom, according to Augustine, and in particular, wisdom is 
based in his Cross, by means of which he has redeemed the whole world.54 In this regard, Van 
Riel brings to light the subtle shift in Augustine’s doctrine of sapientia to reflect his newfound 
Pauline sympathies.55 The result is that Augustine’s search for wisdom is conditioned within a 
setting of searching for Christ, and here understood as the completion of both the intellectual and 
the moral life.56 
 
1.1.3 Sapientia Dei est Christus 
 
According to van Riel, after the completion of uera rel., Augustine began his study of 
Paul in 392, from which point his doctrine of sapientia took a more profoundly Christological 
turn. Identifying Christ with Wisdom itself, Augustine held him to be the proper end of all actions, 
which in turn required a proper orientation of the will.57 In several locations, Augustine identifies 
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Christ with the Wisdom of God.58 For example, in the Confessiones, composed ca. 400,59 one may 
discover not only sapiential themes, but those themes integrally connected with Johannine 
language and imagery concerning the relation between the Son and creation. Augustine writes 
that the Word and the Wisdom of God, though born from God (de te nata),60 is nonetheless equal 
to God and coeternal with him (sapientia […] aequalis tibi et coaeterna).61 God has created all 
things according to this very Wisdom, which is none other than the Son, the eternal Logos.62 
Augustine states this idea in conf.,63 clearly identifying the Son with the Wisdom of God:64 “You 
have made heaven and earth, in your Word, in your Son, in your Power, in your Wisdom, in your 
Truth.”65 Here we see a basis in Augustine’s own work for reading terms such as Christus, 
Verbum, sapientia, and ueritas as synonymous if not interchangeable, as well as linking this 
doctrine of Christ to broader questions of creation, soteriology, and knowledge. I. Bochet66 writes 
that Augustine’s references to Genesis 1 and God’s creation in principio should be understood as 
God creating in his Wisdom, underscoring the theme of the Divine Word which runs throughout 
the entire Bible, from the OT in books such as Genesis, Proverbs, and the Psalms, to the NT, in 
Paul (who of course was formed in the Greek world and preached to the Greeks), and especially 
the Johannine corpus.67 According to Van Winden, though this argumentation is found in 
Ambrose, it traces its roots to the earliest days of Christianity.68 The key texts for this classic 
position were the Johannine prologue and Proverbs 8:22-3,69 and to a certain extent 1 Corinthians 
1:24.70 The important point is that these verses were read together, such that one could identify 
Christ with the Wisdom of the OT and the logos and the arche of the NT.71 As a result, as Van 
Winden explains, “Man kann daher statt Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος (Joh. 1, 1) auch lesen Άρχη ἦν ὁ 
λόγος. Christus ist also λόγος, σοφία, ἀρχή. Demzufolge kann man auch sagen: ἐν ἀρχῇ = ἐν 
σοφίᾳ = ἐν λόγῳ = ἐν Χριστῷ.”72 
Because of this coincidence of Christ and sapientia, Augustine came to hold, like other 
fathers before him, that Christ completes the classical programme of philosophy, for Christ is the 
very same wisdom of which Cicero spoke in his Hortensius, and of which the Platonists and others 
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were vouchsafed certain opaque disclosures.73 Moreover, as the Wisdom of God incarnate, Christ 
came for the purpose of offering salvation, which underscores the necessarily soteriological and 
eschatological nature of any relation with Christ.74 Thus theology and philosophy converge for 
Augustine, as the quest for wisdom meets the search for Christ.75 In his conf., Augustine also 
presents his understanding of the process whereby one is purified in order to perceive the divine 
light fully, and this implies that one is purified by that light itself. The upshot is remarkable, in 
that contemplation, even the sort which tends towards mysticism, represents the apogee of human 
enquiry.76 Finally, in two particular locations in his trin.,77 Augustine suggests that illumination 
consists in the vision of God in heaven, that this is the fruition of enlightenment, the contemplation 
of God.78 
Whilst Augustine takes the remarkable step of identifying Christ with the goal of 
philosophy’s quest for knowledge, what is even more distinctive is the shift in values implied by 
Augustine’s understanding of sapientia, as well as the idea that the human person can never attain 
to this goal without divine assistance.79 In his pastoral ministry, Augustine also encouraged his 
flock to seek a contemplative vision of God now in this life, even though it will not be perfected 
until after one’s earthly sojourn. One can begin to participate in the vision of God here on earth, 
but this requires further development before one can behold God face to face.80 For example, in 
s. 12, Augustine states that ultimately, only Christ can bring one to wisdom, as he is wisdom itself 
(1 Cor 1:24). Here we see an eschatological dimension to sapientia, as for Augustine, Christ 
himself leads one to wisdom after this worldly existence.81 “Enlightenment as the task of 
wisdom,” writes E. Kuehn, “is tied to the true light of Christ as a soteriological hermeneutic akin 
to Augustine’s assertion in his sermon on John’s Gospel, ‘You come to Christ through Christ.’”82 
Ferri links Augustine’s understanding of Christ as both way and goal with the admonition to 
proceed through corporeal things to incorporeal ones, seeing the material world as a mediator of 
truth.83 One must accept Christ as both way and goal, the uia humilitatis, as Christ constitutes and 
points the way to God: as Augustine is fond of saying, we “go to Christ through Christ.”84 
Augustine equates beatitude with the possession of wisdom and truth, which are identical 
with Christ.85 The classical or “philosophical” understanding of sapientia is realised and truly 
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embodied in Christ, the Incarnate Word.86 So the Incarnation is the instantiation of the sapientia 
aeterna in time. Augustine sees the importance or the implication of Incarnation as primarily 
soteriological,87 as Christ came to offer salvation.88 The upshot, as Van Riel puts it, is 
an “interprétation christologique de la sagesse dans un contexte eschatologique.”89 What this 
entails, I believe, is very interesting, namely that for Augustine, the ethical, moral, and intellectual 
aspects of one’s life are ultimately theologically grounded. One cannot speak of Augustine’s 
philosophy without speaking about Christ and Christology, a notion which presents a radical 
alternative to contemporary ways of thinking. In the next chapter, we shall see that in speaking of 
Augustine’s Christology, we are led to speak about a Johannine theology of re-creation.  
Ultimately it was in prayer that Augustine most perfectly albeit incompletely 
contemplated Christ as the way and the goal of human life, which is only realised beyond this 
world. As Trottmann writes, “si l’usage du sommet de l’âme humaine est sagesse, c’est à nouveau 
comme theosebia, c’est-à-dire comme vrai culte rendu à Dieu (uerum cultum) qu’il va être mis 
en perspective eschatologique par rapport à la vision béatifique.” 90 In order to appreciate the full 
breadth and significance of Augustine’s understanding of illumination and sapientia, it is 
important to introduce a brief consideration of some of the key implications of a theory of 
knowledge grounded in Christ. In other words, it is a theory which is inherently soteriological, 
eschatological, and ecclesiological. 
For Augustine, the task of conversion is never complete in this life; one must continually 
convert and be converted to God throughout one’s life. It is a “mouvement permanent de 
conversion,” which consists in one’s search for the Truth itself.91 This implies an eschatological, 
perpetual dimension to the process of developing one’s rationality. Another way of viewing the 
matter is that the love of eternal things is not exhausted by the attainment of them. Hence there is 
a constant deepening and indeed rejoicing in God, which admits of a gradual, indefinite 
dimension,92 a point which conflicts with the ethos of postulatory finitism (Desmond’s term).93 
According to Trottmann, the soul’s journey to God is arduous and gradual: “cette ascension est 
progressive.”94 That is because the recovery of the imprint of God’s likeness on the soul “ne sera 
parfaite que dans la vision face à face [c’est-à-dire, avec Dieu]. La dernière phrase laisse 
comprendre sans ambiguïté que cette ascension ne saurait être opérée sans la grâce. Pourtant, 
l’accès eschatologique à la gloire définitive n’est rendu possible que par une lente ascension 
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rythmée ici-bas par des lumières qui relèvent déjà de la gloire,”95 or in the words of Vannier, it is 
realised “peu à peu.”96 
According to Vannier, for Augustine illumination comes to admit of a holistic, total 
character.97 As Otten notes, Augustine speaks of knowledge in terms of a transformation and 
union with the object of one’s knowledge.98 That is, knowledge involves a deeply affective and 
experiential dimension for Augustine, as it ultimately depends in part on one’s personal 
relationship with Christ.99 One knows God by loving him, and loving him, one knows him.100 As 
Trottmann writes of the knowledge of God on Augustine’s view, “une telle connaissance est en 
meme temps guérison et semble ainsi avoir quelque chose du baiser, de la touche mystique. On 
peut ainsi s’interroger sur ce qui fait la spécificité de ce chemin de conversion proposé par 
Augustin: est-il simplement moral, principalement mystique, ou tout bonnement spéculatif? Sans 
doute les trois à la fois.”101 Indeed, these aspects inter-digitate with one another, and are mutually 
supporting, even if not equal in terms of importance.102 One must not lose sight of the dynamism 
and reciprocity of illumination on Augustine’s view; it admits essentially of an affective, 
experiential, and even existential aspect.103 In a word, “L’illumination pour Augustin est une 
expérience.”104 The holistic character of Augustine’s theological programme is aptly captured by 
K. Anatolios when he writes that the former is not proposing “a simple or punctiliar transaction 
between a given set of propositions and their objective referent in divine being but rather an all-
encompassing way of imitation, purification, and ascent.”105 
Augustine’s understanding of the inward move implies a mystical aspect,106 not least of 
all because the task that it involves is the discovery of the presence of the Creator, the Triune 
God, within one.107 Moreover, Augustine viewed this turning as a type of conversion.108 This idea 
was informed by his mystical experience at Ostia with Monnica, which he records in the 
Confessiones. His path to God takes place “by way of thinking interiorly” (interius cogitando), 
and proceeds by a gradual ascent.109 Such a path parallels that of the growth in the sapiential 
knowledge necessary in order to know and love God. 
L. Schumacher, A. Pârvan, and M.-A. Vannier see Augustine’s theory of knowledge as 
part of a broader soteriological and Christological framework: just as the world was created 
through the discarnate Logos, the Wisdom and the Word of God from all eternity, so too was it 
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re-created through the Incarnate Word, Christ.110 In treating of Augustine’s anthropology in light 
of his Trinitarian theology, M. Drever expresses this point in what he calls the “soteriological 
reversal.”111 What this implies is that the soul is created by the discarnate Logos, and then re-
created through Christ the Incarnate Word. In this context, “re-creation” refers to the restoration 
of the imago dei within the soul, an image of the Trinity. Hence Christ’s work is to restore the 
imprint of the Trinity on the human soul, which was disfigured by sin. For Augustine, theology 
is integrally associated with and inseparable from anthropology.112 One location in which this 
point is particularly clear is Augustine’s trin.,113 in which he writes that it is precisely in 
contemplation that the image of God in one is recovered and refashioned.114 Augustine holds that 
it is through the mind (mens) that one can access the intelligible light, the encounter with which 
effects the deification of the soul.115 
As Vannier explains, creation, formation, and illumination are three different aspects 
under which to view the same (Christological) doctrine of Augustine.116 According to Drever, we 
can see in trin. 12 and 13 the centrality of soteriology to Augustine’s account of the Trinity.117 As 
E. Kuehn writes concerning trin., for example, Augustine’s Trinitarian theology is integrally 
connected with his soteriology, so much so in fact that these represent two different aspects under 
which to view one and the same doctrine.118 Hence the concepts of imago Dei, creation, 
personhood, and soteriology are all integrally (inter-)related and inseparable for Augustine. These 
theological themes inter-digitate, or rather, they are all made theological in virtue of this inter-
digitation.119 According to C. Mathewes, “Augustine understands the human epistemological 
project to be part of the larger soteriological project–the way to acquire salvific knowledge is to 
participate in a community seeking salvation,”120 and this community is ecclesial. Or as Drever 
puts it, “inward space is a soteriological space,”121 as the Augustinian doctrine of imago Dei 
represents an “intimate binding of soteriological and moral concerns.”122 
Augustine suggests that a true intellectual appreciation of the Christian mysteries 
logically leads to praise and confession (transeat admiratio, accedat laudatio).123 Once we are 
capable of the humility necessary to accept the power of God, this must lead us to praise.124 For 
Augustine, the light of wisdom shines most resplendently in the divine liturgy, for this is the pre-
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eminent way in which one is incorporated into the Church, which just is the Body of Christ.125 
Indeed, Augustine maintains the ultimate inseparability of Christ and the Church,126 for it is the 
latter which the former uses as an instrument to lead one into the full contemplation of sapientia 
in heaven.127 According to R. Wilken, Augustine understands the Church as the “vehicle and 
context for Christian contemplation.”128 In the Church, souls are enabled to respond to the Father 
through Christ.129 Rowan Williams writes that through his Incarnation, Christ “transfigures [the] 
human voice,” in particular by incorporating individuals into his body such that they can speak in 
a unified voice, una uoce dicentes. Whilst the Church is essentially social, it also serves as a locus 
for the individual, supplying one with the necessary resources, conditions, and context for 
personal growth and, for instance, the correct interpretation of the scriptures.130 
This is because in virtue of one’s participation in divine worship, one participates in God’s 
Wisdom; by worshiping God, one is most perfectly being formed in sapientia.131 As D. Meconi 
puts it, the Church enables one to become “divine by worshipping properly.”132 One is led to a 
profound participation in the very life of God, that is, to apotheosis, deification. As Meconi 
explains, “deification for Augustine is an ‘ecclesial process’ . . . only the communion of Christ’s 
people and the liturgical vehicles which causes [sic] this bond, can bring enfleshed human persons 
to participate in the divine life.”133 The true worship of God cleanses and heals the soul and leads 
to one’s “deification,” the fullness of unity with sapientia.134 As Meconi writes, “The liturgy thus 
becomes the locus deificandi, the place where the drama of human salvation is not only re-enacted 
but effected.”135 
Thus it becomes clear that for Augustine, prayer and liturgical worship prefigure and 
indeed, participate in the eternal liturgy in heaven. The former reflects the latter. Thus in heaven 
the soul will be involved in the eternal Mass; the perfect possession of Wisdom, an ostensibly 
philosophical or secular pursuit, is ultimately connected with prayer and worship, liturgy and 
ecclesiology, Christ and his Body.136 Through the Church’s liturgical life, and especially the 
Eucharist, one is brought into direct contact with Christ, the sapientia Dei. 
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As F. Arsenault also suggests, illumination admits of an eschatological dimension for 
Augustine, as it culminates in the vision of God and eternal contemplation of his countenance. 
The fruition of this search is only attained on the other side of the veil, and thus requires one, as 
Augustine puts it, to purify one’s heart.137 Whilst the Truth shines in our minds, the fullness of 
truth will only be manifest in the eschaton.138 Thus in order to know God, for Augustine, requires 
adherence to, attachment to God (adhaerere Deo), an eschatological notion which implies that 
love of God is closely connected with vision and contemplation.139 One can experience and have 
some access to God in a variety of ways, yet one can never totally comprehend or understand him, 
for God transcends even the mind and reason for Augustine.140 
Eternal life requires knowledge of God, which is only possible through Christ.141 
According to P. van Geest, one of the fundamental points which Augustine sought to emphasise 
in his theology is that certain truths, and especially truths about God, escape complete knowledge 
and understanding on this side of the veil. (Of course, this point is not especially remarkable, 
considering that one finds this throughout the NT.) Hence the search for truth and wisdom 
transcends the merely intellectual and comes to include the dispositions and attitudes of the hearts 
of seekers of truth. In this way, according to van Geest, Augustine is true mystagogue.142 What 
this implies is that Augustine’s discussion of sapientia is ultimately about something more than 
just a theory about (the conditions of) knowledge, but admits of an eschatological character, 
indeed, a mystical one, in that it pertains to the soul’s intimate union with God, not only in heaven, 
but already, albeit imperfectly, here on earth.143 In due course, we shall see that one’s vision 
ultimately terminates at the vision of God, which is fully realised on the other side of the veil.144 
The foregoing section has made clear the full significance of Augustine’s identification 
of Christ with the wisdom of God. Here we see two major concepts converge, namely Christian 
soteriology and classical philosophia. It becomes clear that Augustine’s theory of knowledge is 
quite radical, insofar as it is grounded in theological commitments and has its end in a qualitatively 
different realm. Before continuing to explore this theme in greater detail, it is useful to look at the 
other side of the coin of wisdom, namely sapientia superba. 
 
1.2 SAPIENTIA SUPERBA 
 
One cannot do full justice to the subject of sapientia without discussing its dark counterpart, 
sapientia superba. This is the sort of wisdom which leads one to view oneself as wise, even though 
one is actually in darkness. Augustine speaks of two types of intellectual faults, superbia and 
curiositas.145 The former pertains to thinking of oneself as supreme, and failing to acknowledge 
one’s situation, the remedy for which is knowledge in the form of a moral imperative, which 
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originates in divine illumination.146 A further examination of the theme of pride in relation to 
wisdom in Augustine will be helpful, as it will illustrate more clearly the overall understanding 
of wisdom at work in his thought, in particular the “hermeneutical” element to the acquisition of 
knowledge. In addition to clarifying Augustine’s “wisdom Christology,” this material will also 
be relevant in Part III of this enquiry.147 
 One way of framing the issue is the following: Does the acquisition of more facts 
necessarily result in greater knowledge? One answer is Yes, as knowledge is good, and since 
good, the more communicated, more abundant growes,148 the greater expansion of factual 
knowledge is clearly to be encouraged. This was the conceit of the Industrial Revolution, in which 
one envisioned that the acquisition of information would not only mean an increase in knowledge, 
but would also exert a humanising effect on society as a whole.149 Though the affirmative response 
seems intuitively plausible, Augustine rejects such a position. Then the question becomes what 
alternative remains, or on what basis does one oppose the indefinite expansion of one’s knowledge 
base? Does Augustine’s admonition, for example, to reject the erudition of the philosophi in 
favour of humble adherence to Christ represent an option for obscurantism, anti-intellectualism, 
and fideism? My answer is Not necessarily, as I think Augustine suggests a third alternative, a 
“hermeneutical” view, according to which individual data require an appropriate framework and 
interpretive key in order to be understood. As Cilleruelo explains, “la verdad depende de 
perspectivas más largas de las que ella puede descubrir y de condiciones que limitan el ejercicio 
de esa misma ratio.”150 For Augustine, this hermeneutical key is Christ, the incarnate wisdom of 
God.151 
In s. 184, Augustine discusses how the impious and the proud are prevented from 
perceiving truths about God, in particular because he reveals himself in humility and simplicity.152 
The promise to the faithful is that by accepting and embracing the humility of God, they may 
ultimately arrive at the most esoteric knowledge of his wisdom, a gift denied to the proud of 
heart.153 This is in contrast to the sapientes (falsely so), who refuse to believe in the humble Christ. 
The theme of Christ’s humility is very important to Augustine, a theme motivated by his anti-
Manichaean polemic.154 As a result, they not only fail to accept the “simple” revelations of God, 
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but they also miss the higher things (alta) as well.155 Augustine particularly has in mind the 
Incarnation and the teachings associated with it, e.g., the virgin birth, which the superbi view as 
more fiction than fact (hoc tam grande miraculum malunt illi fictum putare quam factum).156 The 
sapientes of whom Augustine speaks in this polemical context are not truly wise. Evoking biblical 
language, Augustine states that they possess a wisdom of this world, not of its creator (sunt enim 
sapientes et prudentes, sed huius mundi, non illius a quo factus est mundus).157 They lack the 
proper hermeneutic for interpreting reality, and hence do not possess true knowledge or 
wisdom.158 Because they lack true wisdom, the proud ones are not capable of accepting the 
mysteries of the Incarnation, and the fact that God entered the world in order to save it.159 Christ 
takes flesh and humbles himself by entering the time which he himself created, standing under 
the sun which he had made, for our own sake.160 Augustine locates in the Christ child a humility 
which can instruct those who are prepared, even (or perhaps especially) because the divine infant 
cannot even speak in a human voice, and yet his very presence on earth says so much (doctrinam 
tantae humilitatis agnosce, etiam in nondum loquente doctore).161 Christ’s humility serves as a 
healing medicine for our pride. He comes into the world to counteract it, to heal and uplift our 
nature, a task made more difficult by our pride, a severe prejudice indeed (tantum te pressit 
humana superbia, ut te non posset nisi humilitas subleuare diuina).162 
Augustine warns us against placing our hope in human knowledge (scientia), pridefully 
putting it before the precepts of God: “Do not presume, as if you would place knowledge before 
the precept of God, lest you remain inferior, not more firm.”163 As Harrison writes, Augustine is 
concerned about philosophies which do not seem to take seriously the limitations of human 
rationality, especially those engendered by (original) sin. He criticises the Manichaeans in this 
regard, articulating a less optimistic (but not thereby less than optimistic) view concerning post-
lapsarian reason.164 Augustine learned from his own experience how human reason can be limited, 
especially if it views itself as self-sufficient. He is also concerned with the vanity associated with 
intellectual enquiry and is concerned about the vicious potential of curiositas.165 In certain cases, 
it is better to accept one’s ignorance than to to place an exceedingly high trust in one’s own 
knowledge. As Augustine puts it, “Such pious ignorance is greater than presumed knowledge.”166 
A statement such as this clearly raises the spectre of obscurantism. However, attention to the 
context of this claim casts it in a more favourable light. Augustine makes his statement in 
preference for a sort of “pious ignorance”167 within the context of thinking of God as not bound 
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to a particular location. Commenting on the difficulty, if not the impossibility of conceiving of 
such a thing, for it is not a thing at all (sed non potes tale aliquid cogitare), Augustine says it is 
better not to think something than to think something which would give one a false sense of God: 
“We are speaking about God, why is it surprising if you do not comprehend? For if you 
comprehend, it is not God.”168 On the contrary, by fulfilling God’s commands, one is led to 
understanding: “Believe in the precepts of God, and do them, and he will give you the support of 
understanding.”169 However, Augustine reminds us that any vision of God on earth is incomplete 
and provisional; we are still in spe, and not in re.170 Augustine links the opening verses of the 
Gospel of John with 1 John 3:2. The Word in the beginning is what we shall see when we become 
like God in heaven. This is the vision promised to the faithful children of God.171 He also invokes 
Paul, claiming that we do not yet see God facie ad faciem, but per speculum.172 Harrison notes 
how the notion of seeing per speculum assumes a great importance in Augustine’s discussion of 
the difficulty of perceiving sapiential truths after Adam’s fall.173 
As he reflects on the Prologue of the Gospel of John, Augustine enumerates a three-fold 
typology of persons according to how they relate to God.174 Augustine writes of (i) the great ones; 
(ii) the little ones; and (iii) the prideful ones (Brachtendorf’s terms). The first category consists 
of those of great faith and great intellect, who believed in the truths of the faith with great fervour 
and love, who embraced it with their hearts, but who also were intellectually gifted so as to 
understand and expound upon transcendent truths. Thus Augustine: “The great minds of 
mountains, who are called ‘mountains,’ were able to see this, the minds which the light of justice 
illuminated exceptionally; they were able, and they saw that which is.”175 Augustine gives the 
example of John the Divine, the disciple whom Jesus loved,176 whose esoteric reflections on the 
nature of the Logos epitomised the ideal unity of faith and reason.177 But what makes John a great 
one is not simply his intellectual abilities, but his ability to balance these God-given talents with 
faith and humility. It is only by these latter two qualities that, for Augustine, John and the other 
great ones are able to arrive at the truth both through faith and reason: “They saw this, and so that 
they may arrive at that which the saw from afar, they did not back away from the Cross of Christ, 
nor did they scorn his humility.”178 Secondly, Augustine describes the little ones, those of a 
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simple, humble faith, who, unlike the great ones, have neither the time nor the intellectual capacity 
to study philosophy and theology or to understand in a cognitive way the teachings of the Church. 
However, like John and the other montes, they do possess the humility of faith which enables 
them to come to Christ: “The little ones who cannot understand this, not running away from the 
Cross, the Passion, and the Resurrection of Christ, may be carried on that ship to that which they 
do not see, in which ship they and those who do see arrive.”179 For these little ones, reliance on 
Scripture and authority was sufficient in Augustine’s mind. However, that did not exempt one 
from deepening one’s understanding. As Berrouard notes, the reception of the Christian mysteries 
at baptism implies an “existential” commitment to growing in and deepening one’s 
understanding.180 Following Paul, Augustine talks of those who are not yet adults in Christ, but 
only infants.181 They remain at a physical level and judge things accordingly.182 In particular they 
look upon the faith as a set of facts or propositions to be memorised, but not thereby internalised 
in the hopes of arriving at deeper illumination and understanding.183 Augustine’s critique here is 
not one of mere pedantry. A pedestrian approach to Christianity makes one susceptible to a variety 
of problems, such as the fomenting of heresy and schism.184 
Finally, the proud ones were the philosophers, even and especially the Platonists, who 
were able to reason effectively and lucidly, but because of their admiration of their own 
knowledge were unable to acknowledge its limitations or errors. Platonic pride consists in failing 
to acknowledge one’s need for divine aid.185 According to Augustine, the Platonists did not 
sufficiently address human finitude and its epistemic implications.186 Nonetheless, they did 
accomplish great things. As Augustine writes, “Certain philosophers in this world have sought 
the creator through the creature – because he can indeed be found through the creature, as the 
apostle clearly tells us, For his invisible attributes, having been perceived from the foundation of 
the world through the things that have been made, can now be gazed upon; also his everlasting 
power and divinity.”187 To this point, the reader may fail to see any difference between the great 
ones and the prideful ones. But Augustine goes one step further, claiming that even though the 
mountains and the prideful ones may arrive at similar conclusions, they see or fail to see the 
implications of those truths: “And it follows: ‘For whilst they knew God’; he did not say, ‘for 
they did not know God,’ but, ‘for whilst they knew God, they did not glorify him as God, or give 
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thanks; but they were caught up in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened.’”188 
Hence, in the words of Paul, the hardness of heart of the prideful ones is “inexcusable.”189 Rather 
than serve God, in their pride they attempted to imitate him.190 
The reader should note that Augustine does not criticise them primarily for an intellectual 
fault.191 In fact, he grants that at some minimal conceptual level, they did in fact apprehend God. 
Rather, Augustine’s critique is of a moral nature. Whilst he could basically agree that the task of 
the soul was to integrate itself with the divine and the eternal, Augustine wanted to insist that this 
being who would aspire to the transcendent was a temporal and historical being.192 This is why 
Christ is so necessary, as he manages to reconcile time and eternity within himself.193 Augustine 
rejects the Platonic idea that we ascend to God, especially without any aid; the process in his mind 
is reversed, as God first comes to us, enabling our ascent.194 Furthermore, these philosophers 
knew something of God, but did not love him, did not give thanks to him and worship him as he 
ought to be worshipped. Yet this lack of love, rooted in pride, leads to a darkening of one’s 
intellect. Augustine’s critique here is drawn from his own experience, in which he saw his pride 
as the cause of a failure to acquire knowledge and wisdom.195 The clearest example of this 
rejection concerns the Incarnation. Augustine sees philosophy as only possessed of provisional 
character, and emphasises the necessity of Christ and his revelation for the attainment of 
salvation.196 Cilleruelo places an emphasis on Augustine’s scepticism, a trait he acquired during 
his brief Stoic period and which remained with him later in his life.197 Augustine’s understanding 
of wisdom and knowledge is grounded in Christ, a position motivated especially by what 
Augustine sees as the error of philosophising without a mediator.198 Although the possession of 
human wisdom requires purification,199 one’s own efforts are not sufficient to cleanse the heart, 
but rather constantly require divine effort, and are even enabled by it.200 One does not cleanse 
oneself so that God can there enter, but rather, he is part and parcel of that cleansing so that one 
can dwell with him more fully.201 The philosophers knew Christ qua Word, but not Christ in the 
flesh. On Augustine’s account, the prideful Platonists refused to recognise Christ, his humility 
and condescension, his lowliness and his pity for the sinners of the world. It was their obstinate 
refusal to allow for the possibility of an incarnate God, an Emmanu-el, that led Augustine to view 
                                                          
188 Io. eu. tr. 2.4, CCSL 36, p. 13: “Et sequitur: quia cum cognouissent Deum; non dixit: quia non cognouerunt; 
sed: quia cum cognouissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificauerunt, aut gratias egerunt; sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus 
suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum.” Cf. Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 100. 
189 Io. eu. tr. 2.4, CCSL 36, p. 13. 
190 Lamberigts, “Peccatum,” 584. 
191 Cf. Doucet, “Recherche de Dieu, Incarnation et philosophie,” 103-4; Mathewes, “Augustinian 
Anthropology,” 201, 207; Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 67. Though of course, Augustine did not thereby see all 
of the propositional positions of the philosophers as unproblematic. Consider, for example, “magna magnorum 
deliramenta doctorum” (s. 241.6, PL 38, p. 1137), and “omnes omnium philosophorum uanas opiniones” (ciu. 8.1, 
CCSL 47, p. 216). 
192 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 24. 
193 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 24. 
194 Jeanmart, Herméneutique et subjectivité, 64-5. 
195 Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 100. 
196 Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots,” 66, 68, 69. 
197 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 16. 
198 Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 98. 
199 Meijer, De Sapientia, 109, 111. 
200 Chrétien, L’espace intérieur, 62; cf. Jeanmart, Herméneutique et subjectivité, 64. 
201 Chrétien, L’espace intérieur, 62. 
Sapientia Augustiniana 
42 
their approach as inadequate precisely because of a lack of faith and humility.202 As it concerns 
the acquisition of wisdom, the importance of humility cannot be overstated.203 
Augustine uses the Virgin as an example of how the soul should approach the essence of 
the Christian mysteries. Rather than attempting to understand or “univocalise” the message she 
received from the angel Gabriel, she assented to the divine plan of which she had been chosen to 
be an integral part. From this she bears fruit, spiritually of course, but also in her body, palpably 
in her conception of Christ: “The angel announces,” says Augustine, and “the Virgin hears, 
believes, and conceives. Faith in the mind, Christ in her womb.”204 Hence, “What human reason 
does not discover, faith seizes, and where human reason fails, reason succeeds.”205 
With all that has been said about Christ’s divinity and transcendence, his supernal wisdom 
surpassing all human understanding, one might expect him, when he comes in the flesh, to give 
us at least some intimation of how he made the universe, what this entailed, to give us some 
glimpse into the divine life. However, our expectations are frustrated, Augustine says, as what 
Christ comes to tell us first and foremost is perhaps the last thing we would expect, as we think 
according to our earthly categories. “Perhaps you were thinking that the Wisdom of God was 
going to say, ‘Learn how I made the heavens and the stars, how all things had been numbered in 
my before they came to be, how even your hairs were numbered in the power of unchangeable 
reasons.’ No. But first that saying, ‘For I am meek and humble of heart.’”206 Christ takes on 
humility for our sake, a movement which we should likewise follow, also for our own sake.207 
God is not affected by our decisions, as he remains whole and complete; rather, our choices are 
for our betterment.208 The Lord tells us that we should be humble, just as he is humble, and lives 
this example throughout his entire life. He does not regale his audience with Miltonian tales of 
creation and cosmic conflict, but rather encourages us to love one another with a simple, humble, 
indefatigable love. Indeed, M. Comeau holds that Augustine’s preferred term for Christ is 
Christus humilis.209 In the encounter with the incarnate Word, all human expectations are 
completely reversed; Christ throws a mean curveball.210 
The celebration of Christmas becomes for Augustine not simply the observance of the 
Incarnation, but the revelation of God’s humility. From a theological perspective, it provides the 
occasion for him to elaborate his Christology, which he does in a specifically Johannine way. This 
divine humility is expressed especially poignantly in s. 185, in which Augustine describes the 
incarnation of the divine Wisdom, and his first fleeting moments on earth as an infant, infinite yet 
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proficit.”  
206 s. 117.10.17, PL 38, p. 671: “Putabas forte dicturam Sapientiam Dei: Discite quomodo caelos feci et astra: 
omnia etiam in me, antequam fierent, numerata erant; quomodo in uirtute rationum incommutabilium etiam capilli 
uestri numerati sunt. Haec putabas et talia esse dicturam? Non. Sed prius illud: Quoniam mitis sum et humilis corde.”  
Mt 11:29. 
207 s. 117.10.17, PL 38, p. 671. 
208 s. 117.4.5, PL 38, p. 664. 
209 Comeau, Saint Augustin: Exégète du quatrième évangile, 317. 
210 s. 117.10.17, PL 38, p. 671. 
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finite born: “The birth of the Lord is announced, when the Wisdom of God showed himself as an 
infant, and the Word of God emitted a voice of the flesh without words.”211 Augustine is 
confronting his listeners with the paradox of the omnipotent God in the form of a powerless 
newborn.212 Yet even in the Incarnation, Christ is inseparable from God the Father (erat semper 
apud Patrem).213 The ineffable mystery of God’s becoming man is magnified by the humility of 
taking the form of a child. Christ was et infans, et Verbum,214 remaining silent in the form of a 
child, and yet allowing the angels to announce his birth.215 
It is just this recognition of divine humility that furnishes us the opportunity to ascend to 
wisdom, going to sublime things by way of small things: “Do you wish to grasp the height of 
God? Grasp first the humility of God.”216 Augustine also suggests a gradual growth in 
understanding once one accepts the humility and other commands that God enjoins on one: “At 
first you understood hesitantly; afterwards you understand more certainly and more clearly.”217 
Just as a tree grows upward by first establishing its roots firmly in the ground, so too must we be 
humble, rooted in the fulfilment of God’s precepts and the practise of his love. Only then will we 
be able to ascend to the heights of divine wisdom: “Yet without charity you wish to understand 
the highest things; without a root you ask for breezes? That is ruin, not increase. With Christ 
dwelling in your hearts through faith, be rooted and grounded in charity, so that you may be filled 
with the fullness of God.”218 Humility and confession of our weakness is essential to grow in 
wisdom.219 Augustine condemns those who believe that they can be the source of their own 
righteousness or salvation. “What poor person gives bread to himself?,” he asks.220 For this reason 
Christ comes to us, so that we may have true righteousness, that of heaven, rather than our own 
(pseudo-)righteousness.221 Augustine contrasts the true path to salvation offered by Christ with 
the false ones of the pagan world. The pagans thought themselves to be purged through 
philosophy, their worship, or by their own powers.222 Augustine contrasts Christ, the true source 
of purgatio, and the pagan tradition, charging that in their attempt to purge their souls, they have 
become worshippers of demons and partakers in sacrilege.223 Pagan culture is home to various 
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214 s. 190.3.3, PL 38, p. 1008. 
215 s. 190.3.3, PL 38, p. 1008. 
216 s. 117.10.17, PL 38, p. 671: “Vis capere celsitudinem Dei? Cape prius humilitatem Dei.”  
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218 s. 117.10.17, PL 38, p. 671: “Tu autem sine caritate uis excelsa comprehendere; sine radice auras petis? 
Ruina est ista, non incrementum. Habitante Christo per fidem in cordibus uestris, in caritate radicamini atque fundamini, 
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222 s. Dolbeau 26.36-8, DOLBEAU, Vingt-six, pp. 393-6; 26.40-1, pp. 396-8. One should note that there is 
an ambiguity in Augustine’s language. At certain points, Augustine suggests that it is God’s grace or mercy, and not 
our own works or virtue which is responsible for our purgation. See ciu. 10.22, CCSL 48, p. 828: “non enim nisi 
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forms of purgation, none of which are true or efficacious. For example, Augustine claims that 
Porphyry’s theurgical programme is an unsuccessful parody of true purgation.224 
It becomes clear that Augustine reads his philosophical sources through a biblical and 
Christian hermeneutic, and not vice-versa. This is not simply a matter of preference, as Augustine 
sees a theological (and I would say even a biblical) reason for this. As Madec writes, “Si Augustin 
trouve de l’aide chez les platoniciens, c’est parce qu’ils ont philosophé selon le Verbe, sous 
l’illumination du Verbe. Leur malheur est de ne pas avoir reconnu le Christ.”225  
Indeed, as Bochet writes,226 Augustine viewed Scripture itself as containing true 
philosophy. Augustine’s starting point, writes F.-J. Thonnard, “c’est celui de la sagesse, qui 
trouve ses principes d’interprétation dans la Révélation, mais en les approfondissant par le travail 
de la raison, afin, que ‘la foi devienne intelligence,’ c’est-à-dire sagesse et philosophie.”227 
Augustine held that anything true and good in philosophy in point of fact belonged to Christianity, 
for whatever the philosophers understood of God, they did so through the discarnate Logos.228 
Although one can locate many good and true things in the works of the philosophers, inter alia, 
as Bochet explains, all of these truths are already contained, even if implicitly, in Scripture.229 Yet 
because they failed fully to discern the source of the (partial) truths they possessed, they could 
not appropriately “contextualise” their knowledge and direct it to its goal.230 Therefore, 
Christians, who have the full revelation and truth of God in Christ, are the only ones properly 
suited to make use of this knowledge, indeed, in order to bring it to fruition and completion.231 As 
in other apologetic fathers, such reflections for Augustine arose, among other locations, within 
the context of his exegesis of Exodus, in which God is depicted as commanding the Israelites to 
despoil the Egyptians of their silver and gold during their egress from the land of their quondam 
servitude.232 This is because the pagans, though they have some share of the truth, do not use it 
properly, and therefore forfeit any right to it which they had enjoyed. As Augustine writes, “If 
those, however, who are called philosophers happen to have said anything that is true, and 
agreeable to our faith, the Platonists above all, not only should we not be afraid of them, but we 
should even claim back for our own use what they have said, as from its unjust possessors.”233 
The “normative” truth, therefore, is in Christ, Scripture, and the Church; it is distinctively 
                                                          
224 ciu. 10.9, CCSL 47, p. 282: “ex quibus tamen theurgicis teletis fatetur intellectuali animae nihil purgationis 
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Christian. One’s starting point, one’s very standard, is Christ, according to which all other ideas 
are judged; Christ, the God-man, is the measure of all things. 
 Hence we arrive at the same conclusion as in the first part of this chapter, although 
originating from a different perspective. The upshot is that Augustine can be read as grounding 
his view of reason itself in Christ. Remarkably, Augustine came to the conclusion that no merely 
human discipline could promise true knowledge, for it was only in Christ that all wisdom and 
knowledge (both sapientia and scientia) were contained.234 According to Harrison, at the heart of 
Augustine’s view of knowledge is “the centrality . . . of Christ as mediator of wisdom.”235  In 
other words, the knowledge of Christ is a sine qua non of true knowledge.236 Madec makes a 
similar point when he writes, “Augustin ne va pas au dehors se procurer une rationalité, 
platonicienne ou néoplatonicienne, pour l’appliquer au donne de la foi et en faire de la théologie. 
La rationalité, c’est le Christ Verbe qui la donne. J’ai appelé cela la ‘logique chrétien.’”237 Indeed, 
Augustine’s view of reality and man’s place within it is grounded in Christ, not only Christ the 
discarnate, eternal Logos, but also Christ incarnate. According to Madec, Augustine bases his 
whole intellectual programme not on a distinction between nature and super-nature, but rather on 
“deux économies: 1) de la création et de l’illumination par le Verbe, 2) du salut par le Verbe 
incarné.”238 Here we see a twofold aspect of Augustine’s theory of knowledge. This observation 
also establishes the basis for the subsequent chapter, in addition to the fact that Augustine viewed 
the Johannine prologue as a key polemical battleground, insofar as a Platonist could accept at 
least part of what John had written.239 
In Augustine’s mind, philosophy, as well as any other idea or text, is judged in light of 
Christ and revelation, especially the Bible, as read and interpreted by the Church. Philosophy is 
valuable to the extent that it helps (or hinders) one in growing in the knowledge, and more 
importantly the love, of Christ. As W. Klingshirn argues,240 “it was an emphasis on Christ’s role 
as mediator that made biblical learning . . . so appealing to Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana 
2 and Confessions 8,” though he also notes that “such an emphasis is not entirely absent from 
earlier writings (e.g., C. Acad. 2. 1. 1),” though in the latter case Augustine still applies a strongly 
Neoplatonic gloss.241 The crucial point is that Augustine’s responses to the philosophers are 
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biblically grounded, based in Scripture itself.242 Moreover, in order to provide some account of 
the pagans’ unbelief, Augustine appeals to a biblical idea which appears throughout his thought, 
namely that a particular truth is universally available, yet also not seen or understood, not because 
of any defect or concealment on the part of the truth itself, but rather because of the inability of 
one to see and perceive it.243 
It is worth mentioning, as a final note, that there is also the potential concern over the 
disposition of the world towards the Christians. But in the laughter of the pagans, where they see 
the weakness of Christianity, Augustine actually sees a strength. Indeed, Augustine is not terribly 
concerned with the ridicule and mockery suffered by Christians at the hands of pagan 
philosophers. In fact, he takes this as a confirmation of the truth of Christianity, claiming that 
such (mis)treatment was both prophesied and fulfilled, especially with Christ himself, who was 
despised and rejected, yet conquers sinful pride through gentle, loving humility.244 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing chapter has established two major points about Augustine’s understanding 
of sapientia. First, it is clearly situated within a broader antique context of thinking about ultimate 
truth, and the way of life most conducive to acquiring that truth. Of course, one must note still 
that even the term “way of life” risks obscuring Augustine’s firm commitment to philosophia 
christiana as the proper way of pursuing truth. Nonetheless, the point is that Augustine 
understands sapientia as the highest truth, and the pursuit of this is what constitutes the happy 
life. Just as philosophers before him, Augustine too searches for the happy life, but within a 
Christian biblical and theological framework, formed in the earlier generations of the fathers. 
Furthermore, this classical concept is “baptised” by identifying Christ with wisdom itself. Hence 
the philosophical search for beatitude and the Christian search for truth, transcendence, and 
salvation become integrated. 
 Secondly, Augustine’s understanding of sapientia admits of various senses, some of 
which are negative. We have seen the dangerous element of knowledge in Augustine’s mind, and 
how pride in one’s own knowledge can lead to ignorance. The emphasis on sapientia superba is 
at the heart of all of Augustine’s discussions of wisdom, for even though Christ is the wisdom of 
God, the false “counterfeits” of the world can easily twist facts and corrupt one’s way of thinking. 
According to Augustine, the “facts” do not speak for themselves; there is an interpretive and 
theoretical element to the acquisition of knowledge, to which Augustine is particularly sensitive. 
This is why it is so important for Augustine to ground his theory of knowledge in his theory of 
reality, which is in fact his theory of cosmology and creation, to the consideration of which we 
now turn. 
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2. THE GOSPEL OF JOHN AS AN AUGUSTINIAN LOCUS 
THEOLOGICUS 
THE “JOHANNINE LOGIC” OF AUGUSTINE’S DOCTRINE OF SAPIENTIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
So much for the overview of Augustine’s religious approach to sapientia; it has become 
clear that his approach to wisdom implicates a number of issues and concerns. Augustine 
identifies sapientia with Christ, who is also the principium, the Verbum, and the Son, the source 
of all creation and knowledge. Hence in order to understand Augustine’s account of wisdom, 
these Christological themes must be addressed. Augustine’s language and thematic imagery in 
this respect are clearly Johannine and elaborated accordingly. Now the task is to examine the 
theology of John in Augustine more precisely. 
There are two doubles here in Augustine’s thought that I shall consider. First, creation 
itself admits of two asymmetrically related features. One is creation simpliciter, as things are 
given to be. However, this creation is constantly unfolding even now. This is also replicated at 
the human level: We are created by God, indeed, in his own image, but we are nonetheless 
“incomplete” until we turn to him and are formed by him in his light, which is the light of wisdom 
itself. Secondly, Augustine also speaks about creation and re-creation, the former according to 
the discarnate Logos, and the latter according to the Incarnate Word. The human person needs to 
be re-created on account of sin. Augustine often describes sin not only as a moral failing, but as 
a darkening of the intellect. Sin represents a turning away from God, an act of disobedience which 
results in darkness. To confess one’s sins is to be illumined and become lightsome again. This 
confessio is not simply a litany of one’s faults, but a recognition of one’s dependence on God and 
one’s nothingness before him. When one realises this, one is truly illumined. In speaking about 
the two creative actions of the Word, Augustine develops his theology of sapientia according to 
a “Johannine logic” (Kuehn’s term). Hence I shall explore the theology of John, in particular the 
prologue, in order to expound further both the context and the significance of what Augustine 
says concerning sapientia. 
First, I shall discuss the state of the art with respect to Augustine’s reception of John. In 
this case, it is not a mere formality; it will become clear that this is a relatively neglected area in 
the literature. Nonetheless, I can avail myself of certain guides in order to pursue this enquiry. 
Secondly, I look to contemporary historical-critical treatments of John, in particular the prologue. 
This section serves as a “control” of sorts. In other words, if I am to discuss Augustine’s Johannine 
theology, it is useful to have a basic sense of the meaning of the gospel itself. This can serve as a 
point of comparison. With this point established, I turn at last to an extended examination of 
Augustine’s Johannine theology of wisdom. In this section, I establish the importance of John for 
Augustine, and then proceed to demonstrate this by appeal to several key texts, namely Gn. litt. 
1-3 and 5, Io. eu. tr., ep. Io. tr., trin., and two sets of sermones, namely 117-121 and the Christmas 
homilies, 184-196, respectively. The selection of these sources is based on the following 
considerations. In particular in Gn. litt., one can see a clear link of sapientia with Christ, creation, 
and human knowledge. This establishes a basis for identifying the same logic at work in other 
texts. I deal with works composed on John itself, a treatment which reveals how Augustine viewed 
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the fourth gospel as a locus theologicus, in particular for his thinking concerning wisdom and 
reason. I also look at other works as “controls,” that is, works which were not expressly composed 
on John. Hence the presence of the same theological points within these latter works suggests a 
more basic position of Augusitne, rather than something which arises only as the result of a 
particular occasion or object of exegetical treatment. The foregoing sources are also situated 
throughout Augustine’s biography, providing a comprehensive overview. Moreover, as we shall 
see presently, the differences in genre amongst these works imply that when read together, they 
complement and enhance one another, as certain themes which are present inchoately in one come 
to the fore in another or receive further attention. Such a strategy allows for Augustine’s 
Johannine theology to be seen in its completely developed form. As I conclude this chapter, I 
shall identify two particular issues which have arisen throughout my treatment, and discuss their 
importance for the enquiry as it proceeds. 
 
2.1 STATUS QUAESTIONIS 
  
In the grand scheme of literature on Augustine and John, respectively, in which the 
bibliography on one particular passage could exceed the grasp of even the most energetic and 
erudite scholars, relatively little work has been done on Augustine and John in particular, 
especially on the content of the Tractates.1 In 1913, H. Pope2 published an article in which he 
lamented the lack of treatment of Augustine’s Tractates on John, which he called a “neglected 
classic”; nearly a century later, D. Milewski could echo this same sentiment. Though there has 
been a long tradition of scholarship in French on the Tractates, this has dealt primarily with text-
critical questions, such as the date(s) of composition, rather than the content of the Tractates 
themselves.3 Milewski, expressing regret over “the lack of in-depth study of the commentary’s 
[i.e., the Tractates’] doctrine,”4 calls for further research on the tractates on John, especially in 
terms of their theological content.5 “Missing, for the most part,” he says, “are studies of what 
Augustine actually had to say about the Fourth Gospel.”6 However, he seems not to have taken 
into account the decades of work by M.-F. Berrouard in formulating this assessment. 
 Despite Milewski’s claims, there are notable exceptions, particularly in the French 
tradition. M. Comeau dedicates an entire monograph to Augustine’s reception of Johannine 
theology.7 Herein, the chapter on the names of Christ as approached by Augustine is particularly 
relevant and insightful, showing how Augustine deeply engages with John, and the Prologue in 
particular, developing a whole hierarchy of epithets which could be applied to Christ. In addition, 
                                                          
1 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 77. 
2 Hugh Pope, “St. Augustine’s ‘Tractatus in Joannem’: A Neglected Classic,” American Ecclesiastical Review 
49 (1913): 161-72. 
3 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 61-2. 
4 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 77. 
5 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 68, 76. 
6 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 77. 
7 Marie Comeau, Saint Augustin : Exégète du quatrième évangile, 3rd ed., Études de théologie historique  
(Paris : Gabriel Beauchesne, 1930).  
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though they do not address Augustine and John specifically, L. de Grandmaison,8 T.-J. van Bavel,9 
F. Arsenault,10 D. Doucet,11 M.-A. Vannier,12 E. Kuehn,13 A. Paddison,14 J. Brachtendorf,15 A. 
Pârvan,16 S. Pardue,17 and M. Drever18 each provide extended discussions of themes which bear 
theological significance for both John and Augustine. There have also been murmurs of John’s 
importance for Augustine in the German literature as well. Although Madec to a certain extent 
disputes this point,19 Söhngen argues that the Johannine Christology represents a crucial aspect 
of Augustine’s overall theology, even on a par with the well-acknowledged Platonic and Pauline 
aspects to his thought.20 
So there has been some acknowledgement of Augustine’s favourable appropriation of 
Johannine theology in the past, yet even in recent times as well. The most exhaustive and 
comprehensive of these is the 2004 study of Berrouard, who discusses the content of the tractates 
and provides an extensive bibliography.21 R. Ferri’s 2007 monograph deals extensively with the 
exegesis of John by both Augustine and Aquinas.22 Interestingly, recent works in English have 
provided a foundation for further research on John and Augustine as well. H. A. G. Houghton23 
exhaustively catalogues and glosses Augustine’s references to John.24 Though this is primarily a 
                                                          
8 Léonce de Grandmaison, Jésus-Christ (Paris, 1928). 
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(2007): 572-94. 
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16 Alexandra Pârvan, “La relation en tant qu’élément-clé de l’illumination augustinienne,” Chora: Journal 
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17 Stephen Pardue, “Kenosis and its Discontents: Towards an Augustinian Account of Divine Humility,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 65.3 (2012): 271-88. 
18 Matthew Drever, “Redeeming Creation: Creatio ex nihilo and the Imago Dei in Augustine,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 15.2 (2013): 135-53. 
19 As Madec writes, “G. Söhngen distinguait dans la structure de la pensée augustinienne trois traits 
fondamentaux, qu’il appelait l’aspect mystique néoplatonicien, l’aspect pneumatique paulinien et l’aspect 
christologique johannique.” (Emphases added.) However, Madec continues: “L’essentiel, à mon sens, n’est pas dans 
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20 Söhngen, “Wissenschaft und Weisheit,” 101. 
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John I, 3-4,” Studia Patristica 14.3 (1976): 443-5. 
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text-critical work, it nonetheless provides an invaluable resource and starting point for an enquiry 
into the theological importance of Johannine theology for Augustine.25 
A key motivation for the following enquiry is not so much the treatment of the Tractates 
for their own sake, but rather to see how the content of the Tractates, and thus Johannine theology, 
is present in other aspects of Augustine’s thought.26 D. Milewski makes the claim that the 
Tractates reveal the formation and development of Augustine’s thought, and also promise to show 
the effects of his pastoral duties on his theological doctrine.27 Other scholars such as Comeau hold 
that themes from the Tractates are reflected in other works which define Augustine’s thought.28 
In particular, I would like to explore how Johannine theology figures prominently in Augustine’s 
theory of knowledge, and how these themes reflect those developed in the Tractates. 
For this task, I draw inspiration from E. Kuehn, who has written an extensive article on 
what he calls the “Johannine logic”29 to Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, especially as it is 
present in De Trinitate.30 In his article, Kuehn proceeds to present and explain the deeply 
Johannine character of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, thus opening a door for reading key 
aspects of Augustine’s thought in light of Johannine themes, a task for which he suggests further 
work to be done in the future.31 Similar to Kuehn, my contribution is to demonstrate the integral 
connection between Augustine’s doctrine of illumination and sapientia on the one hand and the 
theme of the Logos in the Johannine Prologue on the other. I believe that in various locations 
throughout Augustine’s corpus, one can discern a Johannine aspect to illumination, and I believe 
that it is central to his theory of knowledge. 
In her recent work on illumination theory, L. Schumacher interprets Augustine’s doctrine 
in a “theological” context, arguing that illumination for Augustine has the function of re-forming 
the soul in the image of God, in which it had been created, yet disfigured by (original) sin. Hence 
illumination is integrally linked with creation, soteriology, and Christology. I do not intend to 
dispute this analysis, but rather to take it a step further. Like Schumacher, I believe that the “logic” 
of illumination is deeply biblical, but this should be read as rooted primarily in the themes, 
imagery, and theology of the Johannine prologue and its concomitant Christology, soteriology, 
and theology of creation.32 That, I think, is the appropriate context, a point with which Van 
Fleteren concurs when he writes, “Schumacher repeatedly insists that Augustine’s thinking on 
divine illumination must be ‘contextualized.’ To this contention there can be no disagreement. 
Yet she spends no time at all on contextualizing Augustine’s theory, on a quest for its sources.”33 
                                                          
25 See also Maarten Wisse and Anthony Dupont, “Nostis qui in schola Christi eruditi estis, Iacob ipsum esse 
Israel. Sermo 122, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 7 and the Donatist and Pelagian Controversies,” Zeitschrift für Antikes 
Christentum/Journal of Ancient Christian History 18.2 (2014): 186-209. 
26 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 62. 
27 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 62. 
28 Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” 68. 
29 Kuehn, “Johannine Logic,” 572, 575. 
30 See also Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate, Oxford Theological 
Monographs (Oxford: University Press, 2008). Cf. infra. 
31 Kuehn, “Johannine Logic,” 577; cf. Milewski, “Augustine’s 124 Tractates,” passim. 
32 Schumacher, Divine Illumination, passim; Dupont and Knotts, “In dialogue with Augustine’s Soliloquia,” 
passim. 
33 Van Fleteren, “Book Review: Divine Illumination,” 309. Despite my sympathy with Van Fleteren’s 
critique, I am not convinced that Schumacher is wrong in situating Augustine’s thought in a “theological” context, as 
semantics aside, it seems that there could be no other way to understand illumination. 
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He then goes on to provide the example of Augustine’s treatment of the Johannine prologue in 
light of Plotinus’ Ennead 5 in conf. 7.10.16. The latter passage, Van Fleteren suggests, represents 
the appropriate context in which to situate Augustine’s theory of knowledge and cognition.34 
Hence the contribution of this chapter is two-fold: first, it fills a lacuna by contributing 
further to research both on the (content of the) Tractates and on Augustine’s understanding of 
Johannine theology and its influence on his work overall. Furthermore, taking Madec’s 
aforementioned “deux économies”35 observation as a point of departure, I seek to show how the 
“logic”36 of illumination can be understood as specifically Johannine in nature, that is, framed 
within and informed by the terminology, imagery, and theology of John, in particular the 
Prologue, which in turn is grounded in and influenced by OT themes, such as the Wisdom 
tradition and the Memra, or Word, of God, through which all of creation was summoned into 
existence.37 The main point I intend to establish is the Johannine character of Augustine’s theory 
of illumination and sapientia. My task is to situate illumination theory within a specifically 
Johannine Christological context, such that, following G. Söhngen, one can see the influence of 
John on Augustine on a par with that of Paul and the Platonic tradition. I show that John becomes 
a locus theologicus for Augustine, in particular as it pertains to his understanding of knowledge, 
illumination, and sapientia. 
 
2.2. THE THEOLOGY OF THE JOHANNINE PROLOGUE38 
 
 In order to determine whether and to what extent Augustine’s theology can be described 
as authentically Johannine, it is important to consider, especially from a text-critical and 
philological perspective, just precisely what the Gospel of John, and in particular the Johannine 
prologue, has to say. Thus the task of this section is to review the most salient points of this fourth 
gospel, as contained in nucleo within the prologue. Substantiating my arguments by appeal to 
contemporary scientific literature on this topic, I shall argue that the Johannine Prologue presents 
a Christocentric theology of re-creation,39 according to which all things are created by God in and 
through the Son, whose vestiges are reflected in reality, though not always perceived due to 
human weakness, inadequacy, or iniquity. Then this very same principium of reality, the condition 
of its being, enters it and assumes a particular type of nature, that is, human nature, with no 
diminution of its eternity or omnipotence. The Word becomes flesh, yet it is and always remains 
the Verbum aeternum, the source of all light and life. By entering creation, the Word accomplishes 
a multifaceted salvific task. He reveals and manifests the Name of God to the world, which is to 
say that he reveals God’s “inherently relational” being as Father, Son, and Spirit. Christ becomes 
                                                          
34 Van Fleteren, “Book Review: Divine Illumination,” 309. 
35 Madec, Chez Augustin, 14. 
36 Cf. Kuehn, “Johannine Logic,” passim. 
37 McNamara, “Logos of the Fourth Gospel,” 116; Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and 
Genesis 1,” 53. See also J. McHugh, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on John 1-4. G. N. Stanton, ed. (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 2009); and Michael Theobald, Im Anfang war das Wort: Textlinguistische Studie zum Johannesprolog, 
Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 106 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1983). 
38 Though the prologue is often considered to include the first eighteen verses of John, I have limited my 
treatment to Jn 1:1-14, the final verse beginning with et Verbum caro factum est. 
39 Cf. Ioan Chirilă, “Despre Logos, Creatie si Re-creatie,” Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai – Theologia 
Orthodoxa 53.2 (2008): 95-105. 
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the hermeneutic for understanding all of reality, as he is also its antecedent. He redeems and 
thereby re-creates human nature, and unites all of its members in order to lead them back to the 
Father. This theology, and in particular its dynamic understanding of Christology and Trinitarian 
theology, I argue, is essential to Augustine’s theory of knowledge, and his theology overall. 
 
 2.2.1 Verbum aeternum 
 
The Johannine prologue focuses on the Logos, the divine, discarnate Word, treating of 
Christ, the Word made flesh, beginning from a divine perspective.40 This principle is the source 
of all things, as the prologue states (omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod 
factum est). As scholars have recently observed, just as Matthew gives Christ’s human genealogy, 
John provides a “divine” genealogy, that is, an account of the broader background in which 
Christ’s advent must be understood, seen, and interpreted.41 Indeed, according to Van der Merwe 
and Albalaa, “The prologue can be seen as a splendidly constructed a priori introduction to the 
gospel concerning Jesus Christ.”42 
The first verses are also meant to establish the relation which obtains between God and 
the Logos, namely that of an inner relationship within God. In fact, M. Coloe sees this as the 
central theme of the prologue.43 The author posits an identification of the Logos with God, Light, 
and Life. These are not merely metaphors, but rather the prologue envisions this identification in 
literal terms.44 The Logos and God, or the Father and the Son are distinct but inseparable, and 
indeed, one cannot be conceived of or understood apart from the other.45 According to Coloe, the 
use of the imperfect tense with en and of pros are meant to express the “dynamic intimacy 
between the Word and God through all time.”46 The Word can also be understood as God’s 
Wisdom.47 The early part of the prologue depicts the Logos prior to the Incarnation, in particular 
in terms of its “identity” with God and its creative, illumining activity.48 Whilst Justin Martyr is 
known for laying the foundation for later patristic thought on this theme, M. J. Edwards asserts 
that the identification of Christ with the Logos extends back to Paul and John, and is indebted as 
well to Jewish thought.49 
John affirms that creation took place through Logos.50 One way in which this is seen is in 
referring to the Logos as Life, uita. John’s understanding of the Logos as the ultimate source of 
all life has two aspects, namely God’s relation to the world, as well as the Logos as that through 
which all things were created.51 The appeal to a theology of creation, one which is crucial for 
Augustine, is also seen in another way. The first verses of Genesis and of John, respectively, begin 
                                                          
40 Michielin, “Augustine’s Interpretation of John’s Prologue,” 302; cf. Arsenault, Augustin: Qui est Jésus-
Christ ?, passim. 
41 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part II,” 1. 
42 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part II,” 1. 
43 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 43-4. 
44 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 2, 4. 
45 Koester, “Jesus as the Way,” 121. 
46 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 46-7. 
47 Theobald, Im Anfang, 111-12. 
48 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 1. 
49 Edwards, “Justin’s Logos,” 265. 
50 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 4; see  also Jn 8:1. 
51 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 5. 
The Gospel of John as an Augustinian Locus Theologicus 
53 
with the exact same phrase: en arche, in principio.52 According to J. C. M. Van Winden, the 
original context of arche in Greek thought concerns the problem of the One and the Many.53 The 
arche was posited as that principle which would serve as the explanation or even the reconciliation 
for the multiplicity of the world in a more basic unity.54 The terminology employed in the 
Johannine prologue is precisely the same as that found in the LXX.55 Therefore the use of this 
terminology by the author of the prologue is deliberate and intentional, and done for the purpose 
of making clear that the creation of the world is what is being discussed. Hence the similarities 
with Genesis are no coincidence.56 
Moreover, the prologue is conveying something about the nature of that creation, which 
is easily lost in the rather misleading English translation of in principio as “in the beginning.” 
Johannine scholars view the term in principio as referring to the transcendent and the eternal, and 
so it should not be understood in a temporal sense.57 Such a view was well established in the 
patristic tradition of biblical exegesis. For example, as G. van Riel explains,58 various Christian 
authors, who later became sources for Augustine, such as Ambrose, Basil, Tertullian, and 
Filastrius, reacted vehemently against Hermogenes’ critique of in principio as referring to 
something material. The fathers countered this Platonic reading of Genesis by emphasising the 
transcendent character of God as the ground of created reality.59 From a philological perspective, 
the text leaves no doubt that for John, the Logos is seen as the divine agent responsible for all 
creation.60 Furthermore, in virtue of the fact that creation is effected through the Logos, all of 
creation is impressed with vestiges of the divine. A profound and primordial ontic bond is 
established between the world and its Creator; all being is somehow related to him.61 The Logos 
acts as the mediator in the economy of creation, God’s agent, but is also the source in terms of 
the “forms” of created things.62 As the source of all creation, the Logos is also somehow always 
present the world, governing and ruling.63 
Despite this intimate presence, John writes that the darkness did not “comprehend” 
(comprehenderunt) the light of the Logos. The result of the world’s darkness, according to 
Theobald, is that one lives in a state of self-alienation (Selbstentfremdung) and self-contradiction 
(Selbstwiderspruch).64 This is applied equally to the chosen people and the “pagans.”65 The 
                                                          
52 For more on the Greek concept of arche, see Tomás Melendo, “Αρχή y έναντίωσις: su nexo en el 
pensamiento preparmenideo,” Anuario Filosófico 20.1 (1 January 1987): 131-65, and J. C. M. Van Winden, 
“Frühchristliche Bibelexegese. ‘Der Anfang,’” in Archè: A Collection of Patristic Studies by J. C. M. Van Winden, J. 
Den Boeft and D. T. Runia, eds., Supplements to Vigliae Christianae 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
53 Van Winden, “Frühchristliche Bibelexegese,” 9. 
54 Van Winden, “Frühchristliche Bibelexegese,” 9-10. 
55 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 5. 
56 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 53; McNamara, “Logos of the Fourth 
Gospel,” 116. Cf. infra on Augustine’s sermo 1.1. 
57 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 5. 
58 Van Riel, “Augustine’s Exegesis,” 225. 
59 Van Riel, “Augustine’s Exegesis,” 225. 
60 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 6, 7. See also Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part II,” 1-2; Michielin, 
“Augustine’s Interpretation of John’s Prologue,” 302; Io. eu. tr. 2.10; Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 42-3. 
61 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 7. 
62 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 7. 
63 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 47. 
64 Theobald, Im Anfang, 110. 
65 Theobald, Im Anfang, 110. 
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curious rendering of this term in the Latin reflects the ambiguity of the Greek, which could suggest 
either a physical aspect, that is, the light overcame the darkness, or an intellectual sense. In fact, 
perhaps it was the author’s intention to allow for these varying interpretations.66 What does it 
mean that Wisdom was not received, or that the Logos was rejected by “his own” (sui eum non 
receperunt)? John’s Gospel echoes themes from Deuteronomy and Wisdom, in particular the idea 
that in order to perceive truth, one must be attentive and properly attuned; the Baptist heard, whilst 
others did not.67 John’s prologue can also be read in connection with other biblical verses, such 
as Romans 1:19-20, the common theme of which is the revelation of God in the things of the 
world, or how creation reflects and even speaks of her Creator.68 In particular, verses 3-5 concern 
the latent presence of the Logos within creation.69 As we shall see, such themes are crucial for 
Augustine, especially in his second tractate on John, as well as other locations70 in which 
Augustine claims that God also reveals himself through nature. 
Furthermore, the Prologue depicts the Logos as the source of illumination,71 as the divine 
light itself which bestows its light from all eternity.72 This notion of light is not used in an 
empirical sense, but rather implies something celestial, intelligible, and heavenly.73 According to 
some scholars, the metaphor of light inheres in the prologue and is essential to its structure. In 
fact, it is used as a way for elaborating the activity of the pre-Incarnate Logos.74 As illumination 
occurs through the Logos,75 it also suggests that illumination on the Johannine account is about 
something deeper, that is, that it is closely linked with soteriology, eschatology, Christology, etc. 
What John seeks to do in the prologue is to use a light metaphor as a framework for articulating 
an economy of illumination which is linked with that of (re-)creation.76 In fact, as certain scholars 
                                                          
66 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part II,” 5. 
67 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 48. 
68 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 8; Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 
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69 Coloe, “The Structure of the Johannine Prologue and Genesis 1,” 47; cf. Madec, Chez Augustin, 14, on the 
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uenientem. In contrast, Dirk G. van der Merwe unambiguously states that erchomenon applies to the light, to phos, and 
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and Exegetical Commentary on John 1-4, G. N. Stanton, ed. (T&T Clark, 2009), 33-4; Van der Merwe and Albalaa, 
“Part II,” 2. 
72 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 5; Part II, 7. 
73 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 3, 5. 
74 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 2, 3. 
75 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 7. 
76 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 8. 
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have recently argued, the light metaphor enjoys an essential place in the prologue and in the gospel 
more generally. The hermeneutical key to John is this notion of divine light.77 
 Within the Johannine scheme, illumination also pertains to the perfect demonstration of 
the divine light by Christ, that is, as the perfect revelation of the Father.78 In virtue of the 
Incarnation the Logos, who is Light, enters the world in a radically novel way. Even though it 
was present before, the Word made flesh constitutes a significantly different form of divine 
presence.79 In the Incarnation, Christ’s power is revealed in a new way, not merely as a productive 
or creative force, but as that which makes manifest and available life in and with God.80 The 
Logos Incarnate fulfils its mission of illuminating through being sent into the world in order to 
enlighten and save it.81 
Related to themes of creation and illumination, the prologue is redolent of epistemic 
themes which resonate throughout Augustine’s corpus. For one, the dynamic of the Prologue is 
one which moves the reader or hearer beyond the realm of all created reality, even spiritual 
reality.82 Indeed, the theological approach suggested by the prologue is an intellectual one, and 
much more so than the synoptic gospels. This must be qualified by the observation that 
knowledge, whilst important, is ultimately provisional in the fourth gospel, and that one’s 
relationship with Christ is paramount.83 Despite the more “philosophical” character of the fourth 
gospel, the method of John’s ascent is not so much discursive or purely rational as contemplative: 
as one reaches a higher level of understanding, one delves deeper into a mystery which exceeds 
mere human capacity.84 For John, to come to God means to know and believe in him, and this 
cannot be accomplished apart from one’s activities as a human moral agent, as well as one’s 
contact with Christ.85  
 
 2.2.2 Verbum incarnatum 
 
John’s prologue is constructed according to a double movement: having transcended 
creation in the ascent of the first part of the Prologue, now one descends again.86 For John, the 
Incarnation represents an unfolding of the divine life in time, and the enacting of the eternal drama 
on a temporal stage.87 From a Johannine perspective the Incarnation represents the 
incomprehensible coincidence of “divine and human polarities . . . in one person.”88 Prior to the 
Incarnation, the Logos was present to the world in virtue of its creative activity. But with the 
Incarnation, God becomes present in a new way, in particular as assuming a nature and becoming 
a human person, just like one of us.89 As Paddison writes, “The prologue unmistakably identifies 
                                                          
77 Van der Merwe and Albalaa, “Part I,” 8. 
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83 Koester, “Jesus as the Way,” 122. 
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the eternal Word with the startling reality of a particular enfleshed human being, ‘the Word 
became flesh.’”90 The task becomes to show how these two names or concepts, the latter 
philosophical-religious and the former distinctively Christian, actually designate one and the same 
reality.91 For John, Christ is the Incarnate Logos; the Logos is still the Logos, but now it has really 
become (egeneto) man, not merely adopted human nature as a garment.92 Thus the Incarnation 
can be understood as the perfect instantiation of the divine Light and Life, Christ.93 The prologue 
emphasises that the Incarnation represents the continutation of an ongoing revelation which 
begins in eternity.94 
John’s theology envisions an uncrossable ontological gulf between God and man, 
prescinding from any considerations of sin, darkness, or the fall.95 Yet when God takes flesh, he 
comes to us in a way which is at least partially accessible to human capacities.96 Thus a further 
crucial implication of the Incarnation is the immediate accessibility afforded by Christ’s human 
nature. This is truly novel, as the encounter with God in the Jewish tradition was primarily located 
in the Torah, but now in the new covenant a man becomes the locus of divine-human encounter.97 
John’s theology implies that the Incarnation constitutes the pre-eminent form of God’s contact 
with man, as now God has become accessible in a certain way to empirical sight.98 As Coloe 
writes, “The pre-existent Word of God has become flesh and so is accessible to ordinary human 
experience.”99 Yet the Incarnation, though revelatory of God, should not be understood as totally 
pellucid and universally available. Even in the flesh, Christ is only recognised as God by those 
with faith. Hence for John, the Incarnation is possessed of a remarkable and radical significance, 
insofar as it divides the world between those who accept Christ and those who reject him; there 
is no middle ground.100 
 The prologue envisions a two-fold activity of the Logos, namely of illumination (creation) 
and salvation.101 Just as the world was created through the Logos, it is fitting that it is redeemed 
and saved through the Logos.102 A central aspect of John is one’s alienation from God through 
sin, which results in moral, spiritual, and intellectual darkness, such that the world can no longer 
know its Creator.103 This darkness as a result of the fall is comprehensive; everyone is affected by 
this “fundamentally human problem.”104 Even God’s chosen people, who had been vouchsafed 
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something of the divine Wisdom, had failed to perceive it manifest in Christ.105 One can no longer 
find God without aid, as one stands in need of faith, illumination, and humility, which are 
provided through the Incarnate Christ.106 Here we see that a “heteronomous” sense of knowledge 
is implied by John’s theology. The main result is that the work of creation discussed in Genesis 1 
and John 1 is completed by the passion of Christ.107 It is for this reason that John states that we 
can become children of God (tekna tou theou), but that this comes as a result of divine agency; 
one cannot accomplish this on one’s own. Rather, it is a result of God’s free gift of grace. This is 
made clear by verses 12-13, which emphasise that through Christ, God effects the adoption of the 
faithful as his children, which requires one’s patience to Christ’s salvific action.108 For John, 
Christ’s salvific activity is, to use Paddison’s words, a “profoundly ontological event.”109 This 
allows God to act as the divine physician, it establishes a theological foundation for Christus 
medicus: especially on Calvary, Christ acts on human nature. In assuming human nature, Christ 
unites it with himself, thus “healing humanity from within.”110 Christ is the divine physician who 
cleanses our cordial eyes.111 The Johannine understanding of Christ envisions his salvific role as 
inseparable from his identity.112 
Now that we have considered an overview of John’s theology, we shall be better equipped 
to consider these themes within Augustine’s own works, to the consideration of which we now 
turn. 
 
2.3. AUGUSTINE’S JOHANNINE THEOLOGY OF WISDOM 
 
 2.3.1 The significance of John for Augustine 
 
For Augustine, the Gospels, which recount Christ’s life on earth, represent the normative 
centre of the Bible, which provide it with its unity and focus, thus influencing how one interprets 
the rest of Scripture. As K. Pollmann writes, Augustine saw “within Scripture a hierarchy of 
authority among its books, with the Gospels at the top.”113 However, I think there is a case to be 
made that Augustine saw John’s Gospel as normative amongst these four canonical sources. Why 
might he think so? 
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 In general one can note, as we have seen with Madec,114 that Christ was a central focal 
point of Augustine’s doctrine. Augustine’s homiletic corpus is replete with the theme of Christ’s 
divinity,115 and he saw John’s Gospel as a prime locus for thinking about this topic.116 We see two 
more clues in the first tractate, and another in the second, in which Augustine speaks of the 
evangelist, identifying him with the beloved disciple of the presumably eponymous Gospel.117 
According to M. Pontet, Augustine invokes the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture in 
order to demonstrate the pre-eminence of John by citing the passage in which John rests his head 
on Christ’s chest in the Cenacle.118 Christ allowed John, the beloved disciple, to rest upon his 
heart, from which John imbibed special revelations vouchsafed to him alone.119 This event for 
Augustine explains the special nature of John’s Gospel.120 Augustine suggests that this shows the 
special place of John, as we was specially favoured by Christ, and that the riches of wisdom he 
received accordingly influenced and inspired his Gospel: “Thence the one who said these things, 
that John, brothers, who reclined upon the Lord’s chest, and from the chest of the Lord drank 
what he passed on to us.”121 However, this also suggests that John’s ascent was a result of God’s 
special favour; in other words, John’s ascent presupposes Christ’s descent.122 
Furthermore, Berrouard argues that Augustine saw John’s gospel as pre-eminent among 
the gospels.123 This claim is substantiated in part by pointing to the robust Christological resources 
that were present in this text, namely the idea that it is the divine Word that takes flesh.124 As 
Berroaurd writes, “c’est cette christologie si ferme et si complète qui me paraît expliquer et la 
prédilection d’Augustin pour le quatrième Évangile et la décision qu’il prend de le commenter à 
ses fidèles.”125 In contrast to the other evangelists, John has contemplated with his own eyes the 
divine light.126 Indeed, Berrouard states that no other human has risen to the heights John 
reached.127 John’s utterance of the In principio results from his reclining on Christ’s chest.128 
Berrouard notes that Augustine sees this scriptural passage as evidence for the unique authority 
of John.129 However, John’s uniqueness extends beyond the Prologue.130 One of the key themes 
of Augustine’s exegesis of John is the way in which Christ’s human life becomes a locus in which 
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he reveals his divinity.131 In Augustine’s mind, the Prologue forms a gloss which applies to the 
entirety of the gospel, as all of the actions of Christ as a man are linked essentially with his identity 
as the divine Word.132 John’s gospel invites the reader to perceive Christ’s divinity in tandem with 
his humanity.133 
I would also like to suggest a less obvious example from Augustine’s most famous work, 
Confessiones, in particular the passage from book seven, in which he discusses his reverence for 
the libri platonicorum. Of course, this part of conf. is familiar, but the focus of various enquiries 
goes to determining how Platonism influenced Augustine’s intellectual development. But what is 
less often mentioned is how John, and specifically the Johannine Prologue, figures in this passage. 
Why, after all, does Augustine have such reverence for Platonism? Because, as he writes in 
conf.,134 he read in their books the same doctrine contained in John.135 Augustine famously 
asserted that among the philosophers of antiquity, the Platonists approached the truth most 
closely.136 One way of expressing the reason for this, as Clement of Alexandria had also stated, 
was that the followers of Plato recognised and acknowledged God as the ground of intelligibility 
and the source of all being.137 Even when his erstwhile enthusiasm for Platonism begins to fade, 
Augustine still maintains the strong link between John and the libri platonicorum.138 According 
to Comeau, Augustine’s treatment of John is heavily influenced by Platonism. In fact, Augustine 
believed that he found Plato in John, and hence Augustine’s approach to the Gospel text is in 
terms of a philosophical systematisation.139 As we have seen, Augustine viewed his search for 
wisdom as inaugurated in his adolescence, taking him from the Wisdom of Cicero’s Hortensius, 
to Plato’s Nous, to the Logos of John’s Gospel.140 We also know that the younger Augustine often 
discussed John with his interlocutor Simplicianus. As Madec notes, in 386, Simplicianus 
introduced Augustine to the Gospel of John, which was crucial in facilitating Augustine’s 
conversion to Christianity, and this for two main reasons. First, Augustine recognised much of 
Platonic philosophy in John’s prologue, as we know. He saw Christianity and reason as 
compatible with one another, and indeed, the latter as deriving from and depending on the former, 
or more specifically, the founder of the former, namely Christ, which leads to the second point of 
interest. Augustine finally discovered Christ in John, the Incarnate Word which he had not seen 
in the libri platonicorum or anywhere else.141 What this implies, according to J. Wolinski,142 is 
that Augustine was well versed and deeply interested in John from an early stage of his 
philosophical-theological career. His knowledge of John would have provided him with his 
Christological doctrine, which distinguished between but did not thereby divide the discarnate 
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and incarnate Logos.143 The point is that for Augustine, the Johannine Prologue seems to serve as 
a brief and pre-eminent summary of Christian doctrine, thus suggesting again the importance of 
John and the Johannine corpus for his theology. 
 
2.3.2 Case Studies 
 
To this point, the enquiry into the nature of sapientia in Augustine’s thought has led us to 
Christ as the Wisdom of God, and from there also to John’s principium. With some sense of the 
importance of Johannine theology for Augustine established, let us now turn to a more detailed 
discussion of this material. A key location to start would obviously be Augustine’s explicit 
treatment of John’s Gospel. However, one must also realise that, in addition to addressing related 
themes in other works, he sees John as integrally linked with Genesis. In sermo 1, originally 
preached in the early 390s, Augustine establishes a direct link between the opening verse of 
Genesis and that of John. He identifies the principium of both. In other words, Christ is the Word 
through whom all things were made, and who took flesh in the Incarnation.144 As further evidence 
for this, Augustine cites John 8:25, in which Christ speaks of himself as the principium. On 
Augustine’s view, this confirms the already strong connection between Genesis and John.145 In 
his exceptionally erudite article, Van Riel analyses Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis 1 in the 
twelfth book of the conf.146 One of the notable upshots of this essay is Augustine’s understanding 
of in principio, not only his linking the term’s use in Genesis with that of the Johannine prologue, 
but also the link of this term with the idea that God created the universe through his Wisdom.147 
This observation motivates an examination of Augustine’s treatment of John to be placed 
alongside his treatment of Genesis. Indeed, Augustine returns to this point less explicitly in De 
Genesi ad litteram, in which he describes in principio as referring to the creation of all things in 
the Son.  
 
2.3.2.1 Gn. litt. 1-3, 5 
 
In Gn. litt., we read familiar themes regarding light and wisdom, but now they are 
articulated and elaborated within an explicit framework of creation. The treatment of these themes 
in this source reflects closely Augustine’s commentary on Genesis in book thirteen of the conf. 
God speaks eternally through his Wisdom,148 his Word.149 One cannot separate the Father’s 
speech from that of the Son.150 This speech is part and parcel of God’s creative activity. God acts 
as a unity in creating, even though the three persons of the Trinity each have a contribution to 
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make.151 The first person plural (faciamus) signals the Trinitarian element of creation.152 
Augustine identifies the “economy” of creation, as the Father creates in his Word insofar as the 
rationes aeternae are contained with him, the treasury of wisdom and knowledge.153 All of the 
ideas upon which individual creatures are based are held within the Word together, though not 
thereby confused, even before each of them is individually named.154 This creative process is 
guided and brought to fruition through the love of the Holy Spirit,155 in virtue of which God sees 
that creation is good.156 
The existence and the creation of all things depends on God and his divine Word (nec 
instituta est nisi ab illo utique summo Deo uero, ex quo sunt omnia).157 Augustine links the psalm 
in which it is stated, omnia in sapientia fecisti,158 and Paul, who writes, “since in him were 
fashioned all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible.”159 The identity of the Word and 
Wisdom is established, leading to the notion of creation in sapientia (ipsa Sapientia, per quam 
facta sunt omnia).160 Augustine cites the opening verses of John in order to substantiate his claim: 
“So then, as regards those unchangeable and eternal divine formulae, this is how scripture gives 
su the evidence that the very Wisdom of God knew before they were made all the things that were 
made through her: In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and God is what 
the Word was.”161 One should also note that the discussion of the creation of light in Genesis 
pertains to the light which is seen by the eyes of the body, the corporeal light, in contrast to God, 
who is uncreated light.162 
Drawing upon the text of Genesis, Augustine speaks of two aspects under which to view 
creation, which I call the “principal” and the “gradual” senses, respectively.163 The former pertains 
to the way in which all things were made together (omnia simul), and the latter to the continuous 
working of God in the world (opera eius, in quibus usque nunc operatur).164 Thus Augustine can 
describe all things as having come into being at once, even though they are only subsequently 
instantiated. In other words, as it pertains to creation, one can speak of creation either “without 
any intervals or periods of time between” or “through periods of time.”165 As it pertains to the 
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latter, God still works in the world, creating even now in the unfolding of life and movement in 
its multifarious forms.166 Scripture speaks of both creation according to a plan of seven days, as 
well as creation according to one seminal moment.167 Such difficulties as these pose a challenge 
to the reader; some may be able to understand, whereas others may require more time and 
assistance.168 The temporal character implied by the creation narrative is a result of our existence 
in time and represents a sort of scriptural condescension which crudely expresses a truth about 
God’s eternity (potuit diuidere Scriptura loquendi temporibus, quod Deus faciendi temporibus 
non diuisit).169 This narrative form also serves to prevent the proud from arriving at crucial 
knowledge concerning God and his creation.170 Augustine suggests that as scripture is wont to do, 
it can present something in a way which is pellucid to little ones, but nonetheless contains some 
deeper truth for those who are capable of receiving it.171 
Augustine further problematises the foregoing understanding of the senses of creation, 
deploying a threefold distinction to encapsulate the ways in which creation can be understood and 
categorised.172 Creation can be understood as the eternal forms present in the divine Word 
(rationes incommutabiles in Verbo Dei); the works narrated in Genesis, created together, and from 
which God rested (illa eius opera a quibus in die septimo requieuit); and finally as creation 
unfolding and being realised even now (ista quae ex illis usque nunc operatur).173 The last of 
these three, the works of creation as they are happening now, are available to us through the senses 
of the body (per corporis sensus), and are also known by the habit of this life (huius 
consuetudinem uitae).174 The latter two Augustine describes as unfamiliar to our senses (remota 
a sensibus nostris, et ab usu cogitationis humanae).175 The eternal ideas are therefore invisible in 
principle to mortal eyes. 
These forms of all creatures were present in the divine wisdom from all eternity, and they 
were not the result of something else. The forms of creatures in this world are therefore de iure, 
and neither accidental nor merely de facto (quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt 
omnia).176 In one sense, the forms are certainly eternal, but in another sense, they come to be in 
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creation.177 The forms could be said to exist and not to exist (antequam fierent, et erant, et non 
erant: erant in Dei Scientia, non erant in sua natura).178 The divine Word sees the things he is 
about to create in himself (non praeter seipsum uidens, sed in seipso ita enumerauit omnia quae 
fecit).179 Hence these things were known in God before they came to be (priusquam fierent, erant 
in notitia facientis), and in this eternal knowledge they are eternal and unchangeable.180 In the 
divine mind, all things are known together, but in creation, when they are made, they are present 
as individual things, according to their own nature: “before they were made, they were known 
‘with him’ in such a way as to be eternally and unchangeably alive and to be life, while once made 
they existed in the way all creatures do, each according to its kind.”181 
Augustine states resolutely that God still acts in the world in a creative way, an argument 
he substantiates by appeal to Christ’s words in the Gospel that he and the Father continue to 
work.182 The world and the things in it do not serve as a Demiurge of sorts, nor does God command 
the world to produce things whilst he himself remains neutral. On the contrary, God is 
providentially involved with the world (omnia Dei prouidentia gubernari).183 Moreover, 
Augustine also defends this claim against the objection that Christ’s words pertain only to the 
internal activity of God, and not to any work in the world.184 Hence Augustine, without employing 
ipsissima uerba, defends a theology of creatio continua, as well as the idea that God the creator 
is still working within the world.185 “So then, let us believe,” writes Augustine, “or if we are able 
to, let us even understand that God is working until now in such a way that if his working were 
to be withheld from the things he has set up, they would simply collapse.”186 From an initial, 
primordial seed of creation, all other things arose, in particular as this initial thing contained the 
forms of all subsequent creatures.187 God can be said to create now in virtue of the potencies he 
placed in his original creation, as well has continuous providential governance of those things.188 
Augustine describes God as working in and through creation in virtue of the movements of created 
bodies, or the actions of his human agents (fecit Deus haec potentia Verbi sui sine pluuia, sine 
opere humano. Nam etiam nunc ipse facit, sed iam per pluuiam et per hominum manus).189 
Augustine’s understanding of creation in sapientia grounds his theory of knowledge and 
reason. The rational soul is unique, as it is created from eternal light (aeterna luce), and the faculty 
of reason is placed in it by the Word.190 Hence to be created in the image of God means to be 
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illumined by the original image of God, the Son, who is also God himself, as we have seen.191 
God’s coeternal Word (uerbum) is identical with his Wisdom (sapientia).192 Hence Augustine can 
describe the Son in this work as genita sapientia,193 whence the Soule reason receives.194 The 
principium Augustine also identifies with the lumen sapientiae.195 This eternal Word-Wisdom 
illumines the minds of rational creatures.196  
Unlike other creatures, however, we have a free will, which we can use either for good or 
ill, in the latter case decreasing in goodness.197 Sin makes the rational creature more like a non-
rational beast.198 Prior to sin’s entry into the world, “natural” evil was not experienced as a burden, 
but now because of the damage done to the flesh by sin, one suffers these things as pains and 
difficulties.199 Yet despite the pernicious effect of sin, all creation is still essentially good.200 
As we have already noted, creation involves two elements, to come into being (creari) 
and to be perfected in one’s being (formari).201 This is replicated at the level of reason. Created 
by God, rational creatures fall into darkness by sin, but Christ restores one and renews one in 
knowledge.202 This narrative reflects two aspects of the model of illumination, namely the initial 
illumination of the mind and its subsequent need to be perfected and healed. Augustine claims 
that illumination consists in turning to the Creator, being perfected by the Word, and so becoming 
light.203 In other words, God calls creatures to turn to him and be perfected.204 What is clearly 
implied is that there is an element of reason which originates from beyond the self. Augustine 
states that one must imitate the Word by attaching oneself to the Creator (inhaerendo Creatori).205 
The task proper to the intellectual soul is to approach the Creator by imitating his Wisdom.206 
In this work we also begin to the see the significance of incorporeality as it pertains to 
human knowledge and God’s wisdom. This theme is even more prominent in the conf., and will 
constitute a major focus of this study in due course. For the moment, we can mention the 
following. Augustine writes that the term in principio does not refer to a beginning in time.207 
God creates through the utterance of his Word, but this is not a temporal way of speaking.208 Due 
to our spatio-temporal situation, we must narrate the eternal activity of God in a similar way, such 
that we can gradually begin to understand how God exceeds all time and space.209 The angels do 
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not have any corporeal senses as we do; they see wisdom “immediately” within themselves.210 
For us, in contrast, the pulchritudo of the world is composed in a succession of times.211 
One can summarise the foregoing discussion of Gn. litt. in the following way. God is 
eternal and unchanging, invisible to the bodily eye and beyond all time and space. He exists 
eternally in himself, and contains the forms of things in his mind. In creation, these things come 
to be instantiated in matter. In addition to being given to be, they are given to grow and to be 
formed. Hence creation admits of two elements which are inseparable if asymmetrically related. 
This theory of creation is reflected in Augustine’s approach to knowledge and illumination in Gn. 
litt. In other words, just as the mind is created in order to know truth, it must continuously seek 
to be perfected so that it can indeed attain to the truth. The human soul, in virtue of being created 
in God’s image, receives the gift of reason. It is enabled by a supernal light. Moreover, because 
of this connection to God and the logical link of creation and the divine mind, one can discern 
something of the order in creation and thereby be led to know God. 
 
2.3.2.2 In Ioannis euangelium Tractatus  
 
The foregoing treatment of Gn. litt. provides a basis upon which to explore further 
Augustine’s approach to John, beginning with his Tractates on the fourth gospel. According to 
Berrouard, the first fourteen tractates (save number six) constitute a sustained commentary on the 
first fourteen verses of John.212 Here I shall focus especially on the first three tractates,213 the 
themes of which are also present throughout the entire work. In these locations we see a clear 
emphasis on Christ as source of creation and indeed re-creation. Furthermore, this understanding 
of sapientia, I argue, grounds his understanding of knowledge and illumination. Berrouard sees 
Augustine’s sustained and intricate discussion in the tractates of various aspects of Christ as a 
result of a carefully conceived system.214 Augustine’s understanding of John remained fairly 
stable throughout the 400s. Berrouard notes the strong continuity between cons. eu. and tr. 36, 
respectively, which were composed about twenty years apart.215 The context and the occasion for 
Augustine’s treatment of John are also important, especially the very pressing concern over 
Donatism, as well as Augustine’s general pastoral interest.216 In other words, the tractates do not 
constitute a merely abstract treatise on the fourth gospel.217 
 
 2.3.2.2.1 Tractates on the Prologue 
 
Augustine collects together several terms which are used to designate God or some 
“aspect” of the Godhead, such as lux/lumen, uita, and sapientia, and links them.218 Terms such as 
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light and truth are only used by Augustine in reference to God.219 Furthermore, Augustine appears 
again to link the Gospel of John with the Psalms, and indeed, the OT tradition of the divine 
Memra, the Word of God, through which creation took place.220 He speaks of God’s Wisdom, 
sapientia Dei, and he says, quoting the Psalms, omnia in sapientia fecisti.221 When John refers to 
the Word, he is discussing Christ in his divine nature.222 All true wisdom is based in God’s 
Wisdom, which is his (co-)eternal Word, which is to say, the Son. The Word he maintains is 
immutable, truly divine, whereas creation is mutable.223 In addition, Augustine connects John and 
Exodus, claiming that the divine Word is the same revelation of God to Moses as ego sum qui 
sum.224 As we shall presently, Ex 3:14 becomes a major proof-text for Augustine’s discussion of 
divine immutability and incorporeality. As Ayres notes, Augustine employs the terms modus, 
species, ordo, pondus, numerus, and mensura with respect to Wisdom 11:21, stating that the order 
of the universe is produced by God’s wisdom.225 
In the third tractate, Augustine identifies Christ with the second person of the Trinity and 
the agent of creation, couching this theological principle in Johannine language, and indeed, 
developing it according to the opening verse of the gospel itself.226 Augustine proceeds to describe 
the Son as the uncreated source of creation,227 around whom from the beginning all the Sanctities 
of Heaven stood thick as Starrs.228 As he states also in Gn. litt., the Word did not come to be in 
the way that the rest of creation came to be; in fact, it did not come to be at all.229 That which 
exists now was always present in the mind of God, in particular in the Son:230  
 
Is it perhaps possible that this Word was made by God? No. For ‘this was in the beginning 
with God.’ Therefore what? Did God not make other things which are similar to the Word? 
No. Because ‘all things were made through him, and without him nothing was made.’ How 
were all things made through him? For ‘what was made in him was life,’ and until it came to 
be, it was life.231 
 
This discussion of creation in the Word means that God created all things in his Wisdom, and this 
sapientia is eternal and immutable, in contrast to the things made through it:232 “What was made 
is not life, but before it came to be, it was life in knowledge, this is, in the Wisdom of God. What 
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is made, passes. What is in Wisdom is not able to pass.”233 One of the major dangers for Augustine 
is thinking of the divinity of the Word according to some created form, a point which he even 
mentions in his preaching.234 
There is an epistmic implication to the foregoing theological principle. Augustine 
contrasts the “spirit” (my term) of the OT and the NT, stating that to think in accord with the latter 
means that one must forsake all carnal images as they apply to God and his relationship with 
man.235 In order to begin to conceive of God, Augustine tells one, “Thefore expel carnal thoughts 
from your hearts, so that you may truly be under grace, so that you may relate to the New 
Covenant.”236 Granted, physical things serve as a means of mediation, but these are simply means, 
and not ends in themselves. Augustine states (tendentiously perhaps) that the people of the OT 
were held captive by temporal images and conceived of the covenant in purely corporeal terms.237 
Augustine confirms in the tractates that his theory of knowledge is grounded in his 
theology of creation. Those who have reason share in the logic of the Word, indeed, are formed 
in God’s divine, rational image; one can be deemed, in Augustine’s words, a particeps Verbi.238 
The human soul is illumined by God’s divine light, for man is made in God’s image (ad imaginem 
Dei), which means that man has a rational soul capable of receiving wisdom (sapientia).239 The 
capacity for wisdom thus becomes distinctive and constitutive of rationality and human nature. 
For Augustine, the image of God is none other than the pattern of the Son, the eternal Logos. The 
upshot, therefore, is that rationality is a constitutive feature of human nature, and rationality 
realises itself fully in the attainment of (divine) wisdom, as we have already seen with respect to 
Augustine’s thought.240 
Augustine continues the Johannine train of his thought, stating that the divine light is an 
incorporeal, intelligible light, not to be likened unto that of our sun which is common to man and 
beast alike:241  
 
but ‘life was the light of men.’ Is it possible that this light is the light of animals? For that 
light is of both people and animals. There is a certain light of people, from which we may see 
that people stand apart from animals, and then we understand what the light of people might 
be. You are not different from an animal, except by the intellect. Do not boast from anything 
else.242 
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Our difference from animals and other parts of nature consists in the fact that we possess the 
image of God within us, in particular in our mind or our intellect.243 This allows us to think, 
reason, and come to know God in and through his creation, which reflects something of his being 
and his glory:  
 
From what are you better? From the image of God. Where is the image of God? In the mind, 
in the intellect. Therefore if you are better than an animal, because you possess a mind by 
which you can understand what a beast cannot understand, then moreover you are a human 
being, because you are better than an animal. The light of people is the light of minds. The 
light of minds is above minds, and exceeds all minds. This is that life through which all things 
were made.244 
 
This light of minds is Wisdom, divine and eternal, the source of all form and intelligibility, and 
ultimately responsible for our rationality as well, which is constituted by the image of God, 
present in the human mind.245 
This discussion of illumination leads to a further deepening of Augustine’s theory of 
knowledge. We are mutable, changeable creatures, yet we can also have thoughts about a God 
who is beyond such categories, indeed, an immutable being. How could such thoughts even arise 
in mortal minds? For Augustine, the reason for this is clear: it is the intimate presence of God, 
qua Logos, to the human mind (hoc est uerbum de Deo in corde tuo),246 a point in continuity with 
the discussions of the presence of God to the mind in early works.247 In Part II, the further import 
of this doctrine of the inner word for Gadamer will be addressed. Moreover, this apparent 
paradoxical tension becomes a further locus theologicus for Augustine, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters. 
On a similar note, Augustine states that this Wisdom is invisible to our bodily senses:248 
“The Wisdom of God is not able to be seen by the eyes. Brethren, if Christ is the Wisdom of God, 
and the Power of God, if Christ is the Word of God, and the word of a person is not seen by the 
eyes, is the Word of God able to be seen in that way?”249 God is not like anything which we see 
in this world, that is, those things which we perceive by the bodily eyes.250 Rather, we see God 
by means of an interior sense of vision, and indeed, one which is pure and fit to see this.251 As 
Augustine puts it, “all things which are seen corporeally, were not that substance of God. For we 
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see those things by the eyes of the flesh. Whence is the substance of God seen? Ask the Gospel: 
‘Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.’”252 
The Son is visible to the bodily eyes in the sense that he takes flesh in the incarnation, 
becoming lac paruulorum.253 Augustine states that the fides catholica can accept this.254 What it 
cannot accept is that the Son is visible in se, in his divine nature, in contrast to the Father, who is 
ever invisible.255 In the OT, for example, God took the form of some created being (facta enim 
sunt illa uisibilia corporaliter per creaturam, in quibus typus ostenderetur), but in using this as a 
means of becoming sensible, the substance of God itself (non utique substantia ipsa) was not 
seen.256 God manifested himself through various corporeal things to Moses, but his substance 
remained hidden.257 God is incorporeal, and so whenever scripture speaks of him as if he possesses 
something bodily, we must interpret this in some analogous terms.258 This passage anticipates key 
themes which arise in Augustine’s ep. 147, dedicated to the vision of God.259 
Because it was created in the Wisdom of God, the world has always born testimony to 
him.260 There is a certain beauty, fittingness, and balance to creation, as God has created and 
ordered it wonderfully.261 Though God’s mysterious plan is invisible, it takes visible form in 
creation.262 Augustine speaks of God’s ars, which is life itself, but not in the individual tokens of 
their ideal types, which possess life through the divine ideas which sustain their being.263 
Furthermore, God is present to the world as its artifex, governing that which he has made, though 
not as a particular individual thing within the world.264 Thus the world becomes a means of seeing 
God, or rather, as Arsenault states, the world becomes an address from God to the soul in virtue 
of its creation in sapientia.265 
The divine light was always shining in the world, in virtue of which it is also gave 
testimony to God, but only for those who were prepared to receive it.266 As Augustine states, “And 
where was that [light]? ‘It was in this world.’ And how was it ‘in this world’? Was this light in 
the world in the same way that that light of the sun, of the moon, of the stars? No. For ‘the world 
was made through him, and the world did not know him.’” This is, ‘the light shines in the 
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darkness, and the darkness has not comprehended it.’”267 The problem becomes even more acute 
in the incarnation, for to see Christ completely is to see him not simply as a man, but as God in 
the flesh:268 “Certainly it is he himself, but not the whole which the Jews saw. This is not the 
whole Christ. But what is he? ‘In the beginning was the word.’ In what beginning? ‘And the Word 
was with God.’ And what kind of Word? ‘And God was the Word.’”269 Augustine raises the 
question of why certain people were not able to perceive Christ as God.270 In a sense, the world’s 
testimonies of God were so obvious that they could not be missed. Hence Augustine appeals to 
the notion of epistemic darkness as a way to explain why people could not perceive the presence 
of the divine light: “if all those things gave testimony, how did the world not know him, unless 
because the world was lovers of the world, having the world in their heart?”271 “For the world is 
darkness,” Augustine states, “ because the lovers of the world are the world.”272 This truth was 
apparent and present, yet not available to those who were in darkness.273 He articulates this point 
again by using the Johannine terminology of the light shining in the darkness, and the darkness 
not understanding it.274 This is also the meaning behind the verse according to which the Word 
came to his own, and they did not receive him.275 The light is shining and ever present, but we are 
absent to it in virtue of vice and sin: “The light is not absent,” says Augustine, “but you are absent 
from the light. A blind person in the sunlight has the sun present, but he himself is absent to the 
sun.”276 Here we have a clear textual basis for the idea that knowledge for Augustine involves 
seeing what is already there, and requires removing the blockages or re-envisioning the reality in 
front of us. In Augustine’s own biography we find an example of this concept. As a free rational 
subject, one is capable of rejecting the truth and fleeing from the light of God. All the while God 
remains present to one, even if one is not present to God.277 One can also see here a clear linkage 
between epistemic darkness and blindness on the one hand and morally vicious behaviour and 
activity on the other.278 Augustine tells his listeners not to be amatores saeculi, which among 
other things is constitutive of the aforementioned darkness.279 
As Berrouard explains, in the first tractate, Augustine draws on Paul (1 Cor 2:14) in order 
to substantiate his claim that those who are accustomed to the flesh are unable to understand 
higher things.280 He re-enforces this point by drawing upon Christ’s words about judging 
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according to the flesh.281 Those who judge accordingly take their own reason and their 
acquaintance with the created world as the mark of the real, and are thereby prevented from 
challenging their prejudices and their limitations.282 They remain blind to the potential 
enlightenment of the Spirit, which offers them “une tout autre intelligence.”283 Those who are 
imprisoned in the flesh are like the Israelites who saw the manifestation of manna in purely 
corporeal terms, whereas Moses, for example, saw the deeper spiritual significance of the means 
of bodily sustenance.284 Furthermore, Berrouard avers that the source of these different 
approaches to God’s gift of manna come from the Spirit’s illumination.285 This implicit discussion 
of grace stands in stark contrast to Augustine’s discussion of Peter’s fidelity to Christ following 
the bread of life discourse.286 Peter’s ad quem ibimus constitutes a confession which resulted from 
the intervention of the Spirit.287 
In his discussion of the flesh of Christ, Augustine intimates that there is a difference 
between our limitations according to the flesh, that is, simply in virtue of being created, and 
additionally in virtue of sin, or more specifically, the tradux peccati from Adam.288 The fault of 
Lucifer, Augustine states, was that even though he was illumined, he did not stand fast in the 
truth, and looked to himself as the source of his own light and knowledge (in ueritate non stetit).289 
It is not sufficient to be capable of receiving illumination, but one must continuously 
acknowledge, as John the Baptist did, that the source of one’s illumination is not oneself.290 
Ultimately, one must be taught inwardly by God himself in order to apprehend something of the 
humility of God in the flesh.291 
 The theology of re-creation I have identified is problematised in the tractates and couched 
in the terminology of illumination. Augustine writes that if one had not sinned, then one would 
have remained under the illumination of the Word.292 Yet foolish hearts are corrupted by sin and 
thus cannot perceive God’s light.293 The light itself is present to everyone, yet the sinner represents 
the tenebrae which did not comprehend the divine light in the world.294 In order to perceive 
wisdom, the eyes of the heart must be cleansed of the obstructions of sin, and for this one must 
entreat the assistance of God.295 Augustine notes that it is fitting that just as we sin and are thus 
wounded by the flesh, we are also healed in the flesh: “For all eye drops and medicines are nothing 
except from the earth. From dust you were blinded, from dust you are cleansed; therefore, as the 
flesh had blinded you, so now the flesh may praise you.”296 Christ comes to act on the human 
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soul, cleansing its spiritual eyes.297 To emphasise this point, Augustine references one of the 
Beatitudes, according to which those who are pure of heart will see God.298 As we shall see 
presently, Mt 5:8 is particularly influential for Augustine in terms of his theory of cognition. 
There is a certain fittingness or symmetry to the divine plan for our salvation, insofar as 
the world becomes the source of our cleansing, just as it was the original source of our wounds 
(ut quia terra caecabamur, de terra sanaremur).299 Furthermore, just as the eternal, discarnate 
Word created all things, so too it is fitting that, when creation fell, it would be re-created through 
him: “Therefore do not believe that it was made, through which all things were made, lest you not 
be re-made through the Word, through which all things are re-made. For you were made through 
the Word, but it is fitting that you be re-made through the Word […].”300 Augustine emphasises 
the different aspects of Christ’s two natures, namely Christ as the discarnate, eternal Logos, and 
Christ as the incarnate God-man.301 However, like T.-J. van Bavel, J. Wolinski  warns against 
reading Augustine as separating the natures of Christ.302 The theme of the inter-connection of 
creation and re-creation is re-enforced by Augustine’s reference to Moses (understood as the 
author of Genesis, and more specifically, the accounts of creation).303 Augustine also draws upon 
the symmetry that Paul discusses with respect to Christ and Adam.304 Adam, created as the first 
man, also allows sin into the world, in response to which Christ, the new Adam, comes without 
sin and rescues fallen man.305 What is of particular interest here is the way in which salvation is 
discussed in epistmic terms, incorporating the language of sight and light, and grounding these 
healing actions in the person of Christ. Appealing to John, in particular the High Priestly Prayer, 
Augustine identifies eternal life with knowledge of God, in particular God the Father and his Son, 
Jesus Christ (cognitio Dei promittitur).306 
 
 2.3.2.2.2 Other Tractates 
 
Augustine specifically takes the Johannine prologue as a point of departure for his first 
several tractates. However, he discusses similar points throughout the rest of the Tractatus. 
Moreover, in passages of John which especially reflect themes present in the prologue, Augustine 
raises or elaborates on similar points already broached in the early part of the work. For example, 
in Io. eu. tr. 54.8, Augustine writes that Truth itself illumines the mind directly, and this Truth is 
none other than the Logos.307 In the final analysis, the source of one’s knowledge is derived from 
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the presence of the divine Word within, intimately present to one’s mind.308 Elsewhere,309 
Augustine speaks of Christ as the divine light, co-eternal with the Father.310 Likewise, the Wisdom 
of God transcends all time and contains within it the causes, the principles of all things.311 In fact, 
Augustine describes Christ, the Wisdom of God, as the one who places the stars in their order in 
the heavens.312 He is the conditor, the founder of creation,313 the “unconditioned conditioner,” per 
quem facta sunt omnia.314 
In other tractates, and indeed, other works, Augustine posits an integral link between 
Christ the Incarnate Word and Christ the eternal Word.315 As Camelot explains, “C’est la même 
vérité qui est connue dans la foi et dans la vision. … Aucune trace chez Augustin . . . d’une 
opposition entre le foi au Christ et la contemplation du Verbe.”316 Despite the different emphases 
that Augustine displays in different contexts, he remains committed to the unity of the divine and 
the human in the person of Christ.317 To substantiate this position, Augustine quotes John 1:1 and 
1:14 together.318 Here we see a further value to the fourth gospel, as John serves the purpose of 
demonstrating that the man Jesus was also in fact God.319 According to Berrouard, “C’est donc 
manifestement le Christ dans l’unité de son être et la totalité de son mystère qu’Augustin veut 
constamment placer sous les yeux des chrétiens d’Hippone au cours de cette première série de 
sermons sur le quatrième Évangile.”320 
According to Augustine, in the incarnation, Christ comes to us.321 We struggle to rise to 
the divine, so Christ comes and establishes his flesh as a stepping stone to his divinity.322 It is 
necessary to pass through the flesh of Christ in order to arrive at his divinity.323 Once our 
immediate link with God is cut, the divine Word becomes our means of mediation.324 Essential to 
Augustine’s Christology is the simultaneous divinity and humanity of Christ, the former the goal 
and the latter the means and the way.325 This principle also formed the basis for his preaching, as 
the faithful could not reject one nature of Christ without falling into serious error.326 In denying 
his humanity, one denies the means of cleansing and salvation, and if one denies his divinity, one 
denies the Creator.327 “C’est là en effet ce qu’il faut tenir ensemble, comme un bloc solide et qui 
assure notre propre fermeté, la majesté du Christ et l’humilité du Christ, ce que Jean a su 
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merveilleusement exprimer en disant que le Verbe était au commencement et que le Verbe s’est 
fait chair.”328 Augustine of course recognises that not all will be able to understand God’s divinity, 
but that does not mean that they should be put on a diet of milk alone.329 Of course they must not 
be overwhelmed, but some notion of Christ’s divinity must be communicated to them.330 In fact, 
as Berrouard notes, this is a matter of extreme importance, as for Augustine, one who fails to 
acknowledge the Creator will not be re-created.331 Augustine never separates the natures of Christ; 
the way to the possession of truth is in the final analysis none other than the way of the cross.332 
One can see this logic at work in particular in the eighth tractate, in which Augustine 
treats of the beginning of John 2, which describes the wedding feast at Cana and the miracle that 
Christ performs there. In the eighth tractate, Augustine mentions how creation was effected by 
God through the Word, and how he continues to be present to it and administer it, à la the artifex 
of the second tractate.333 As in the prologue, Augustine describes Christ as the supreme truth 
(ueritas).334 He also presents the following thought to his audience. Why is that we marvel at the 
miraculous changing of water into wine, but we do not marvel at creation, which has been effected 
by the very same principle? 
 
God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ made all things through his Word, and he who created 
these things rules them. The first miracles he performed through his Word, who is God with 
himself, and the later miracles he performed through his own Word Incarnate, and made him 
man for our sake. Just as we marvel at what has been done through Jesus the Man, we ought 
to marvel at what was made through Jesus the God.335 
 
We see the inherent link between Christ as man and as God, and yet two distinct functions of the 
Word. Moreover, a theology of re-creation is implicitly present. The miracles which Christ 
performs are like new creations of a sort, and the greatest of these by far is the renewal of the 
image of God within man, effected through his passion, death, and resurrection.336 Moreover, the 
“miracles” of the world are present to everyone, but some will not see them as miracles. Seeing 
them in this way requires a certain intentional aspect, as well as a certain broader context in which 
to make sense of them, to see them as possessed of such a meaning. As we shall see presently, 
Augustine speaks of one’s acquaintance with the things of the world as a potential hindrance to 
realising truths of this sort which are hiding in plain view. 
In this same tractate, Augustine emphasises the unity of the two natures of Christ in the 
Incarnation, describing the flesh (caro) as the bride (sponsa) of the Word.337 He also appeals to 
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the authority of John to demonstrate that Christ had a human mother. The simple words “the 
mother of Jesus (mater Iesu) was there” are possessed of deep theological significance, showing 
the union and bond of the human and the divine in Christ, and the authentic human nature which 
he accepted in the Incarnation.338 
Augustine’s Johannine understanding of Christ and his Incarnation is also elaborated later 
in the tractates. For one, he steadfastly maintains the unity of the two natures in Christ.339 He 
writes that in the Incarnation, the Word is not changed into man in the sense of losing something 
of its divine status. By the same token, however, the human nature of Christ is not subsumed into 
God, for otherwise Christ could not be true God and true man.340 For Augustine, the Word has 
truly become flesh without loss or diminishment, let alone confusion.341 
Moreover, Augustine sees the revelation of Christ as possessed of universal significance, 
as he emphasises Christ’s manifestation of the Father’s name to all men,342 a feat which is not 
possible without the work of the Son.343 Prior to the Incarnation, Augustine avers, many knew of 
God as the artificer, the maker of all things, and discerned him through his vestiges in creation. 
Yet they did not know him as Father.344 This is a result of Christ’s Incarnation, and represents a 
complete novelty in the scope of human history.345 Therefore like John, Augustine can say that 
God was not received by his own: for creation was accomplished through him, yet when he 
entered it, he was not recognised, but in fact rejected. For example, Augustine says that the Jews 
did in fact see the Son, but they did not know that he was God Incarnate, revealing the Father.346 
In his discussion of Augustine’s exegesis of John, Kuehn explains this point with exceptional 
lucidity:  “what was in eternity presented in glory is simply hidden from the eyes of the flesh. For 
this reason Philip is goaded by Christ, not because the equality of the Word was not displayed in 
Christ’s person, but precisely because it was, and Philip did not have the eyes of faith to see it.”347 
To see Christ as merely human is not truly to see Christ.348 To recognise Christ truly is to recognise 
him as way, truth, and life.349 
As we have discussed, Augustine also sees a clear and logical link between creation and 
sanctification.350 Eternal life consists in knowing God,351 and so Christ, the Word of God, is the 
best possible agent of God’s revelation. Moreover, he accomplishes a regeneration (regeneratio) 
of human nature.352 The Son descends from heaven in order to raise fallen humanity and to lead 
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it to heaven.353 As in Gn. litt., in later tractates the entire Trinity is discussed in terms of the 
economy of salvation.  Berrouard writes that in Augustine’s thought, at least in the Tractatus, the 
activity of the Son and the Spirit, respectively, on the human soul is distinct yet complementary.354 
The Son, who is the source of all truth and light, teaches one in what one might call intellectual 
terms.355 The Spirit gives the gift of caritas which allows the soul not only to receive an initial 
message but to grow in understanding of it.356 We shall return to this point in Part III. The Father 
sanctifies in his Word, yet this action is an inherently Trinitarian action, for the activity of Father 
and Son imply the presence of the Holy Spirit.357 The Father hands over all things to the Son, yet 
the entire Trinity works in tandem to realise the work of redemption and salvation.358 Just as the 
creation of the world is accomplished by the Father through Christ, so too is the glorification of 
the Father by the world accomplished through Christ.359 
 
2.3.2.3 ep. Io. tr. 
 
In addition to his treatment of the gospel of John, it also behoves one to look at 
Augustine’s treatment of 1 Jn, in which certain key Johannine themes are addressed. Moreover, 
certain themes pertinent to knowledge are given special attention and development herein. 
In this set of tractates, one encounters familiar themes already discussed. For example, 
Augustine states that the light of which John speaks in the first epistle which bears his name is 
not a light like that of the sun or the moon, not a corporeal or physical type of light.360 This point 
is confirmed by the way in which Augustine describes the grandeur and the excellence of this 
light, as far greater than that of the sun, in the way that, for example, the Creator is greater than 
creation.361 This light is the source of all light, and in it we are capable of being light, whereas in 
ourselves we become darkness.362 From other locations in Augustine’s corpus, we can 
immediately recognise that what Augustine means here is that the light of which John writes is a 
divine, eternal, incorporeal light, indeed, part of the very substance of God.363 However, although 
this light is exceedingly great, we can grow close to it if we acknowledge it for what it is, and 
seek to be illumined by it.364 
In ep. Io. tr., Augustine pursues the theme of creation further, discussing the incorporeal 
and eternal character of Christ, and what this implies for our human ways of knowing. However, 
the style of this treatise is different from that of the tractatus, reflecting the differences in the 
genre of the biblical books in question. Even in the commentary, this difference appears. In one 
passage Augustine suggests that sapientia is the eternal, incorporeal source of all creation 
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(quantum sapientia ab eo quod factum est per sapientiam).365 All things came to be through 
Christ.366 Therefore, Christ always is; he is never not or becoming. In Augustine’s words, “he has 
not known except to be.”367 Augustine says this in order to explain Christ’s enigmatic rebuke of 
the pharisees’ disingenuous invocation of Abraham, in which Jesus says “Before Abraham was, 
I AM.”368 The allusion to Ex 3:14 is clear, a passage which Augustine also takes to testify to 
God’s eternity. Augustine says that Christ did not say “I was” (fui), for then he would have been 
then but not now; the same is true of the future tense, mutatis mutandis.369 In his divine nature, 
Christ always is, and he admits of no possibility of change (fuisse et futurum esse non nouit).370 
He is truly eternal, sine spatiis, sine mensura, sine horis.371 God is eternal and incorporeal, which 
for Augustine means that he is “begotten in eternity, with no beginning, no end, no space of 
width.”372 “Recognise the fathers, then,” Augustine writes, “for they become fathers by 
recognising what is from the beginning.”373 Hence to know Christ is to know him as the Word, 
which is to know that he is incorporeal, eternal, and immutable. 
This particular set of tractates is also noteworthy insofar as Augustine revisits his doctrine 
of Christ as the inner teacher which he had first broached in mag.374 In ep. Io. tr. he draws a 
contrast between those sounds which are communicated from the outside, and those who either 
learn or do not learn on the inside.375 One may speak openly to all, but not everyone will 
understand.376 In Augustine’s words, “We can offer a suggestion by the sound of our voice, but if 
he who teaches is not within, our voice is of no avail.”377 God “gives the increase,” which is to 
say that ultimately the divine light is responsible for our understanding.378 Augustine is not 
engaging here in some pious or even saccharine imagery of Christ within one, nor is he being 
intellectually lazy or even dogmatic in attributing all of our knowledge ultimately to Christ. 
Rather, it seems to me that what Augustine is suggesting is that there has to be something about 
our mental capacities that simply allow us to understand and make sense of the world in the first 
place; the mind comes “pre-programmed” with the basic “software” of intellectual functioning, 
without which it would have no meaningful connection with the world around it. At a certain 
point, even the most ostensibly pellucid verbiage requires an informed act of reception by a 
rational agent, an act which Augustine describes as the inspiration of Christ: “Therefore the 
interior teacher is the one who teaches, Christ teaches, his inspiration teaches. Where his 
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inspiration and his encouragement are not present, the words resound emptily on the outside.”379 
We do not “learn” how to understand, but already find ourselves understanding and continue to 
improve by doing so. In Part II, I shall revisit a similar theme in Gadamer’s thought, namely how 
we enjoy some intimate and pre-theoretical bond with the world. 
Augustine also addresses this theme in en. Ps. 120, claiming that words in and of 
themselves do not communicate their content, but rather rely on a more basic rational 
sensibility.380 We cannot learn to understand, but already find ourselves understanding, possessing 
and possessed of the necessary conceptual knowledge which links us with the world. Augustine 
invokes his doctrine of Christ as the inner teacher when he states, “but when we speak, we do not 
show you from ourselves that what we say is true, but you yourselves recognise that what we say 
is true. But whence do you recognise this, except the one who dwells within you who shows 
you.”381 I shall return to this point in subsequent chapters with respect to Gadamer. But the point 
for now is that once again, we see Augustine grounding human reason in Christ, the inner teacher 
who illumines and instructs one from within oneself. 
 
 2.3.2.4 ss. 117-21 
 
In ss. 117-121, Augustine specifically treats of the Johannine prologue, elaborating his 
exegesis of John and illustrating how this is linked with his overall theology. From an historical-
critical perspective, what is interesting about these particular sermones is that they span several 
decades, from Augustine’s early Christian years to his time as an experienced bishop, and key 
points in between. This temporal placement allows for a particularly revealing diachronic 
analysis, as it can reveal any potential changes or developments over time. If anything, however, 
this series of sermons demonstrates a strong continuity, as Augustine often returns to the same 
point, sometimes even using the same words and phrases. The critical ordering of the sermones 
does not reflect the dates they were preached. Chronologically, the order proceeds as follows. 
Augustine delivered s. 120 in Hippo after Easter of 396. Sermo 119 is dated to 409, sometime 
after Easter. Scholars are divided on the location in which it was originally delivered, namely 
between Carthage and Hippo. Sermo 121 is dated to Easter of 412 or 413. Augustine delivered s. 
118 in 418. Due to the thematic continuity between these homilies over the course of several 
years, my treatment of them will be primarily thematic, rather than diachronic. Furthermore, this 
treatment will be primarily expository, with the evidence presented here as a basis for my 
arguments and conclusions. 
These homilies bespeak a clear continuity with the Tractatus, even if there are clear 
departures or deepenings as well. For example, in these sermones, Augustine states again that all 
                                                          
379 ep. Io. tr. 3.13, PL 35, p. 2004: “Interior ergo magister est qui docet, Christus docet, inspiratio ipsius docet. 
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Things Themselves: Eudaimonism, Direct Acquaintance, and Illumination in Augustine’s De magistro,” Journal of the 
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Metaphilosophy 29 (1998): 179-95. 
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things come to be in virtue of God’s creative activity, which takes place through the Son, who is 
identified with the Word and the Wisdom of God.382 Boersma claims that Augustine’s use of 
sapientia as a Christological term can be traced to earlier anti-Arian polemics.383 Augustine 
describes the eternal Word as the form of forms, as the source of all form and order, and indeed, 
of all being itself.384 God did not “make” the Word as he made heaven and earth. In this respect, 
Genesis confirms this reading of John.385 God is eternal and unchangeable; he always is.386 
Augustine makes clear that the being of the Trinity, and likewise the generation of the Son, should 
not be understood in a temporal or a carnal sense. Rather, this generation is eternal and beyond 
time, “For therefore in eternity there is stability, but in time difference. In eternity all things stand, 
in time some things come, and others follow.”387 The Word through which God effected all of 
creation is not a word like our words, the ones which begin and end, which are communicated in 
transient sounds.388 We must refrain from thinking of the eternal Word in terms of time, as all 
time comes to be through him: “Do not seek a time for him through whom times were made.”389 
Augustine elaborates on the Word’s immutability with respect to time and space. Nothing 
we do, Augustine says, can effect or cause any change in the divine Word. He remains intact and 
whole at all times. Furthermore, just as the objects to which we are accustomed in our quotidian 
experience are confined to certain times and places, they are limited and circumscribed by these 
spatio-temporal indices. In virtue of being there my book cannot be here. In a sense, though, I 
connect them. The result is that in a particular part or region of time and space, a part of an object 
is less than the whole, or at least different. In virtue of being situated in a corporeal matrix, one is 
ipso facto exposed to conditions of contingency, flux, and spatial limitation. This is not the case 
with the divine Word, who as immaterial is not confined to a place, and yet is mysteriously present 
in all times and places (manens in se, et innouans omnia), and is their very condition and 
ground.390 Augustine describes this Word as “the form of all things, the form not fashioned, 
without time, as we have said, and without spaces of places.”391 The approach here is dynamic, 
as the broadening of one’s perspective simultaneously reveals the limits of that perspective. 
Augustine warns us about applying the worldly categories we have gleaned from regular 
experience to the divine Word. Rather, we must seek to challenge and overcome these prejudices: 
“Thus all things which are in a place, are less in the part than in the whole. Let us understand no 
such thing about that Word, let us think nothing of the sort. Let us not conceive of spiritual things 
from the suggestion of the flesh. That Word, that God is not less in the part than in the whole.”392 
                                                          
382 E.g., s. 117.2.3, PL 38, pp. 662-3.  
383 Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 249. 
384 s. 117.2.3, PL 38, p. 662. 
385 s. 119.2, PL 38, p. 674. 
386 s. 119.1, PL 38, p. 673. 
387 s. 117.7.10, PL 38, p. 666: “Quia ergo in aeternitate stabilitas est, in tempore autem uarietas; in aeternitate 
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388 s. 118.1.1, PL 38, p. 672. 
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390 s. 117.2.3, PL 38, p. 663. 
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The upshot, as Augustine puts it, is that “Thus let us understand the Word of God, dearest 
brethren, as born incorporeally, inviolablly, unchangeably, without a temporal birth; nevertheless 
born from God.”393 
Whilst discussing the remarkable mystery of the Incarnation, Augustine suggests that his 
listeners must learn to think in a new modality, not to think about things according to their earthly 
categories, but according to divine ones (nec nosti diuina cogitare).394 Augustine suggests that a 
pitfall of theological reasoning is aligning oneself too closely with custom and habit, especially 
when it comes to the very categories of our world, as in the case of the Arians: “the Church of 
God has often been sorely tried, when materialistically-minded people find it easier to accept what 
they have been accustomed to see.”395 He warns his audience about the danger of too closely 
linking material reality with that of the divine: “By this habit of seeing, they desire to transfer 
carnal things to spiritual ones, and they are easily led astray by the extension of carnal things.”396 
Our customs and our daily experience teach us to think of words in terms of the individual words 
of our languages, but Augustine warns us against thinking of the divine Word in this way 
(solemus, audiendo quotidie humana uerba, uile habere nomen hoc Verbi. Hic noli habere uile 
nomen Verbi).397 As he states, “I produce a word concerning the Word. But what kind of word 
concerning what kind of Word? I make a mortal word concerning an immortal Word, a mutable 
word about an immutable Word, a transitory word about an eternal Word.”398 
Augustine exhorts his listeners not to apply any physical imagery or similitudes to the 
eternal Word of God. For instance, even light which has no termination is not like the divine Word 
of God, for with physical light, there is a certain logic of division, insofar as there is a difference 
between the part and the whole. But God is everywhere whole and admits of no change or lack or 
deficiency.399 Thus Augustine: 
 
Lift up your hearts, my brothers and sisters; as best as ever you can, lift them up. Whatever 
thought, of whatever sort of body, may occur to your imaginations, reject it. If the Word of 
God strikes you in the same way as you think about the light of the sun, however much you 
expand it, however much extend it, setting no limits to its light in your thoughts–it’s still 
nothing compared to the Word of God.400 
                                                          
393 s. 117.4.6, PL 38, p. 664: “Itaque Verbum Dei, fratres carissimi, incorporaliter, inuiolabiliter, 
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397 s. 119.2, PL 38, p. 674; cf. Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 61. 
398 s. 120.3.3, PL 38, p. 677: “Verbum facio de Verbo. Sed quale uerbum, de quali Verbo? Mortale uerbum, 
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399 s. 120.2, PL 38, p. 676. 
400 s. 120.2, PL 38, p. 676: “Erigite corda uestra, fratres mei; quantum potestis, erigite; quidquid uobis per 
imaginationem cuiuslibet corporis occurrerit, respuite. Si occurerit tibi Verbum Dei, quomodo cogitas lucem solis 
huius, quantumlibet pandas, quantumlibet extendas, nullos eius lucis fines in cogitatione constituas; ad Verbum Dei 
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Augustine admonishes his audience to remember that God is far different from anything we have 
experienced in our daily lives, whether we have perceived by the senses of the body or thought it 
in the mind. God transcends all of these things completely: “Before everything nevertheless keep 
this, that whatever we were able to collect, whether by a sense of the body or by a thought of 
mind, the Creator transcends indescribably.”401 
Augustine expresses the frustration of not being able to find the words which would be 
adequate to communicate this sublime truth to his listeners: “Who may explain this with words? 
Who sees this? By what proof shall I show you that what I say is true?”402 Human words fail to 
capture the grandeur of the eternal Word,403 for ultimately, Ineffabilis est autem Deus.404 “But it 
seeks to go out from you,” Augustine laments, “and it does not find a worthy vehicle. The vehicle 
of the word is the sound of the voice. What I saw with myself, I seek to say to you, and my words 
fail.”405 Augustine’s struggles bespeak the following question: If God is so far above us that we 
cannot understand or grasp him, then why even speak or write about him? If our words are bound 
to fail, then it seems worthless to speak, and that any speech about God will be self-serving at 
best. Augustine recognises a certain utility, albeit limited, to our utterances about God. However, 
in s. 117 he takes a different approach, stating that the Gospel of John, in this case, contains great 
protreptic potential. Rather than trying to speak about the Word, Augustine decides to describe 
the reasons that it is so difficult to speak meaningfully about this Word.406 In a sense, the point of 
the text is negative; one is not meant to arrive at understanding because of it, but rather realise 
one’s lack of understanding, and from this seek to remove the impediments to understanding. The 
text is meant to provide a contrast experience of sorts, which will first enable one to realise one’s 
lack of understanding and then seek to do something to overcome it. Thus Augustine:  
 
We say how incomprehensible what was read may be. Nevertheless it was read, not so that 
it may be comprehended by a person, but so that a person may sorrow that he does not 
understand it, and may discover whence he is impeded from comprehension and remove 
those things, and may desire the perception of the unchangeable Word, being himself 
changed from something lesser into something better.407 
 
Furthermore, though eternal things cannot be compared with temporal ones (non posse 
comparari temporalia aeternis), Augustine states that a certain comparison can be made between 
                                                          
nihil est. Quidquid tale cogitat anima, minus est in parte, quam in toto. Cogita Verbum ubique totum.” Trans. Hill, p. 
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403 s. 120.1, PL 38, p. 676. 
404 s. 117.5.7, PL 38, p. 665. 
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things which are coeval and coeternal, though even this is qualified.408 In our experience, a parent 
is greater than the child, at least in terms of being prior in time. Hence it is strange to think of a 
Father begetting a Son outside of time. In our creaturely state we cannot see anything (co)eternal, 
for within the world there is no such thing. But we can, Augustine says, see a certain similarity 
between the coeternity of the Father and the Son and the equality in age of things on earth.409 
Augustine appeals to the notion of light and its concomitant warmth as a way of illustrating the 
unity of natures in the Trinity. He likens God the Father unto a light, of which the Son is the 
candor, or the heat or radiance of that light.410 The heat of the fire is coeval, that is, of the same 
temporal duration as its source. They cannot be separated, as they come to be at the same time. 
However, the relationship is asymmetrical: the fire generates warmth, and not vice-versa. This 
suggests some model for thinking about the relationship between the Father and the Son, though 
of course the Trinity is not subject to time, but is the foundation of all time.411 One must always 
remember that both the fire and the warmth thereof come to be in time (ambos tamen esse 
coepisse).412 Though the light is a conceptually prior to the heat, it is not prior in time; wherever 
there is light, there is heat.413 (As we shall see in the following chapter, this logic of causality as 
conceptual and not temporal is crucial to a particular aspect of Augustine’s doctrine of creation, 
as presented in Gn. litt. 5.) Of course, one has to take this example with a pinch of salt, as 
Augustine acknowledges. Although in our world we see a certain deficiency in the product with 
respect to the producer, this is not the case with God.414 
 Creation itself provides another source of knowledge about God. In virtue of being 
created according to the ideas within God’s mind, nature reflects something of God, even if 
imperfectly, from which the rational mind can see something of God, assuming it is prepared to 
do so: “Look at the works,” Augustine states, “and be fearful of the Worker: ‘All things were 
made through him.’”415 From the informed observation of earthly realities, we can be led to 
knowledge of higher things: “Infer great things from small things. Reflect upon earthly things, 
praise heavenly ones.”416 
 We are able to see these things in virtue of a rational capacity to perceive formal realities, 
which results from our being created in the image of God, whereby we are equipped with the 
“starter kit” for reason and knowledge. As Augustine says, “For God wished to plant in every 
soul the beginnings of understanding, the beginnings of wisdom.”417 Similarly, we possess a 
certain inner vision or countenance by means of which we can see God: “we are able to see God 
mentally or by an interior sight of the heart.”418 We also see or intuit formal realities within 
corporeal creation in virtue of this rational capacity. As Augustine explains, “Daily concerning 
bodies, which are before our eyes, which we see, which we touch, among which we are, we are 
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able to judge that whatever body in a place has a form.”419 The perception of God is proper to the 
mind, or the eye of the heart.420 One can attain to some contact with God, assuming that the eye 
is pure.421 This “touching” of God is not a bodily touching but something somehow incorporeal 
and spiritual.422 In Augustine’s words, “If however [a pure eye] reaches God, it reaches him by a 
certain incorporeal and spiritual touch.”423 Augustine here identifies God with the source of our 
life, our wisdom, and our light, by the “touching” (contingendo) of which we shall come to 
instantiate these properites perfectly: “and that is itself eternal blessedness; and that by which we 
are made alive is eternal life; that by which we are made wise is perfect wisdom; that by which 
we are enlightened is eternal light.”424 Augustine’s understanding of illumination and wisdom is 
participatory, insofar as we are changed into something we are not by becoming wise and 
illumined, whereas God does not change (Deus non crescit ex cognitore, sed cognitor ex 
cognitione Dei).425 
Despite this attaining to God, it should not be confused with comprehension, as divine 
matters remain beyond our complete understanding and are ineffable.426 Though we can 
understand something of God in our current earthly state, he exceeds our complete comprehension 
de iure: “To reach some part of God mentally is a great happiness; to comprehend him, however, 
is altogether impossible.”427 This we must remember whenever we seek to draw any comparison 
between something in our world and God.428 
In addition to our inherent cognitive limitations in virtue of being created, we also suffer 
from a certain blindness due to sin. “For the one who turns himself from the true light, that is, 
from God,” Augustine says, “is already made blind.”429 Those who are turned from God do not 
even realise their blindness; they are already punished even if they do not sense it: “One does not 
yet feel one’s penalty, but one already has it.”430 Our hearts were not cleansed, and in fact, we 
stood in need of the very means by which to cleanse them. Our inner vision was wounded and 
prevented from seeing due to our sins.431 The Word becomes flesh and comes to us, becoming 
what we are so that we might see and become divine.432 Augustine suggests that the purity of 
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heart required to see God is a sort of ontological purgation. That is, one cleanses one’s heart by 
ceasing to think of God in corporeal categories, and constantly reminds oneself by a sort of 
apophatic reflex that God is ultimately transcendent. As Augustine states, “But you wish to touch 
him mentally? Purge the mind, purge your heart. Make the eye clean, whence that may be able to 
be reached, whatever it is. Make clean the eye of the heart, for ‘Blessed are the pure of heart, for 
they shall see God.’”433 
In the Incarnation, Christ takes flesh, but does not thereby cease to be divine.434 He 
occupies a middle stage between God and man, and hence truly becomes a mediator. Christ 
remains fully God and is not changed into man, but rather changes man in himself.435 Augustine 
confirms such a reading, stating that that which came to be through the Word is re-made through 
him as well: “what has been made through the Word, this is returned to [the Word], so that it 
might be restored.”436 Augustine establishes in the opening lines of s. 117 the logical foundation 
for a theology of re-creation, stating that in his divine nature, Christ is the source of all creation, 
and in his human nature, he is the source of the restoration of a fallen world: “As John teaches in 
his Gospel, we take the Lord Jesus Christ according to his divinity as founding all creation, and 
according to his humanity as repairing fallen creation.”437 Indeed, here we see further evidence 
for the importance of John for Augustine. “He descends to us,” Augustine says, “and will we not 
ascend to him? For us he takes our death, and is he not about to give us his life?”438 Christ comes 
in the flesh as milk for children, allowing himself to be perceptible to our bodily senses. In virtue 
of the incarnation, we are given a point of contact with the divine in this world: “Therefore he 
comes, therefore he takes our infirmity, so that you might be able to grasp the strong utterance of 
the God who is carrying your infirmity.”439 Even though one cannot see the Word in his divinity, 
one can still hear him in the flesh: “But so that we may arrive, if we are not yet able to see the 
Word as God, let us hear the Word as flesh. Because we were made carnal, let us hear the Word 
made flesh.”440 One can understand divine things to a greater or lesser degree, in particular with 
God’s help.441 
 
2.3.2.5 De Trinitate442 
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In subsequent chapters I shall treat further of certain parts of trin., in particular book 
fifteen on the inner word and book one on vision. For now, I would like to focus on parts in which 
we see a continuation of earlier illumination ideas, couched in Johannine Christological terms. In 
addition, the link of illumination and re-creation is particularly strong. Augustine identifies Christ 
with the Wisdom of God, which is perceived by a sort of mental vision, and which is not available 
to physical or empirical sight.443 In contrast to the human person, who is made in the image of 
God, Christ as wisdom is born (nata) from God.444 God is still understood in terms of a light and 
a source of knowledge.445 Augustine writes that within our minds we enjoy some contact with the 
divine forms, an innate knowledge which enables us to think in terms of right and wrong, of just 
and unjust, etc.446 Indeed, the idea of the good itself is impressed on the human mind (nobis 
impressa notio ipsius boni).447 Hence we can identify a certain continuity between early works 
and later works in terms of illumination. Moreover, the integral and logical link between 
illumination and caritas, L. Gioia writes, must be maintained and never overlooked.448 The 
Wisdom of God “innovates” or renews and gives life to all things from within.449 Augustine’s 
approach to illumination, Gioia writes, is not so much about epistemology as we understand it 
today but rather about the essence of the Christian mysteries.450 Thus one can see that Augustine 
posits an integral link between Christ and knowledge.451 Christ reconciles the temporal and the 
eternal within himself. In the Incarnation, man is granted a medium through which to encounter 
God without thereby obviating the need for faith.452 
In trin. 4, we see a similar thought, but here expressed in explicitly Christological terms. 
That is, Augustine situates illumination within a highly theological, and indeed Christological 
context. He states that the illumination of the mind results from our acquaintance with the Word, 
and even constitutes a participation in the Word itself: “Our enlightenment is to participate in the 
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Word, that is, in that life which is the light of men.”453 One’s capacity for reason in the mind is 
constituted by God’s presence therein; in virtue of being a rational agent, the soul reflects the 
image of God.454 As Gioia rightly notes, however, the apparent optimism of linking our rationality 
with the divine mind “must not be isolated from the trenchant sentence which follows, 
encapsulating all the main terms Augustine uses to label epistemological sinfulness, i.e. prauitas, 
cupiditas, infidelitas, and blindness.”455 Indeed, what may seem like a remarkable laudatio of 
human rational abilities, even to the point of excess, is immediately qualified by emphasising the 
weakness of human nature on account of its sinfulness. The imago is damaged (though not 
destroyed) by sin; Augustine describes this damage as deformis et decolor.456 Augustine writes 
that we are less capable of maintaining this participatory connection to the divine, which is the 
very reason that Christ came to heal us: “Yet we were absolutely incapable of such participation 
and quite unfit for it, so unclean were we through sin, so we had to be cleansed.”457 Hence 
illumination cannot be discussed apart from the requisite moral and intellectual purification 
enabled by the incarnate Christ.458 Augustine understands the darkness mentioned in the 
Johannine prologue as designating those who are blinded by sin: “But the light shines in the 
darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it. The darkness is the foolish minds of men, 
blinded by depraved desires and unbelief.”459 Here Augustine uses the language of blindness 
(caecatae) to describe the mind.460 Moreover, he assigns blame for this blindness to cupiditas and 
infidelity, In fact, it is in response to this darkness and blindness of human vision that the Word 
became flesh, so that he might heal and cleanse these poor souls (Has ut curaret atque sanaret 
Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, caro factum est et habitauit in nobis).461 The need for Christ 
is made clear, as Augustine holds that it is extremely prideful and a source of uncleanness to 
believe that one can purge oneself by one’s own virtue.462 Here we see a link between confession 
and illumination. Augustine also describes the life of sin and blindness as one of being cast into 
the many, being torn apart and divided. Christ comes to re-unify us, to re-collect us into unity, 
but he does so through the multiplicity of the world and its creatures, which Augustine finds 
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fitting.463 Ultimately, we do not arrive at God by any rational activity (iudicando), but rather by 
loving him (amando).464 
 
2.3.2.6 Christmas sermones465 
 
In order to conclude this enquiry into Augustine’s Johannine theology, I turn to the 
Christmas sermones (ss. 184-196). These sermones are difficult to date, but given their thematic 
continuity, it makes sense to discuss them together. These texts recommend themselves for several 
reasons. As is the case with ss. 117-121, these homilies cover a broad range of dates within 
Augustine’s biography, and their content bespeaks a strong continuity with the themes we have 
encountered in other treatments of John, such as the Tractatus. The Christmas homilies are replete 
with Johannine language, in particular as applied to Christology and creation. Despite the 
continuity that these sermons display, both ad intra and ad extra, there is also something 
distinctive about them. For one, the liturgical occasion, namely the Nativity, offers Augustine the 
opportunity to reflect on a familiar set of themes, but beginning from a different perspective, 
namely Christ’s earthly birth, in contrast to his eternal generation. In speaking of this latter birth, 
Augustine emphasises the eternal and incorporeal character of Christ in his divine nature, 
deepening and expanding upon a theme which is present but less elaborated in the foregoing 
sources. 
Throughout these homilies, Augustine describes his (Nicene) Christology in Johannine 
language, closely following the formulae of the prologue, whether in terms of the Word’s eternal 
existence, its taking flesh, as well as the Word as the source of creation.466 That is, Augustine 
incorporates Johannine language and themes into his discussion of Christ by describing him as 
Word (Verbum), life (uita), and the light of men (lux hominum).467 Augustine makes clear that 
when he speaks of light, he is concerned about a qualitatively different, and indeed superior type 
of light.468 The light of Christ is light, but “not the light which is common to human beings and 
animals, but the light which shines on angels, the light which hearts are cleansed for seeing.”469 
Here we see two aspects of this light, that it shines and illumines (the angels), and in shining also 
cleanses the heart, presumably so that it can see more clearly. In s. 184, Augustine describes true 
wisdom (uera sapientia) in terms which reflect very closely the Johannine identification of the 
Logos with God: “true wisdom, which is of God and is God.”470 Augustine opens s. 188 by re-
affirming the divinity and eternity of the Son with the Father, and that creation was effected in 
and through the Son, the divine Word: “the Son of God just as he is with the Father, equal to him 
and coeternal; the one in whom all things were established in heaven and on earth, visible and 
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invisible; the Word of God, and God, the life and light of the human race.”471 Augustine identifies 
Christ with Wisdom and Word, describing how God became incarnate and eternal wisdom dwelt 
on the earth, a point which he immediately substantiates by quoting the opening verse of John: 
“The Lord Jesus wished to be a man for our sakes. Do not hold this kindness cheap; Wisdom is 
lying there on the earth. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God.”472 Though the Son is begotten, he is neither made nor does he begin to be. The 
Son is never “not,” and the Father is never without the Son, even if he begets him.473 Throughout 
these sermones one can also discern familiar themes pertaining to the incarnation, such as lac 
paruulorum, the unity of the two natures of Christ, and the paradox of the Creator entering 
creation.474 
In his discussion of the Word and its eternal generation, Augustine invokes his conception 
of the inner word, and its counterpart, the eternal birth of Christ. However, there is a further 
element to Augustine’s theory of the inner word, namely as a more basic capacity for thought 
which is pre-linguistic. Augustine speaks of the word in the heart as apart from any natural human 
language, and not as the simple repetition of linguistic utterances within the silence of one’s mind 
(non cum ipsa uox in silentio cogitatur, quae uel graecae est, uel latinae, uel linguae alterius 
cuiuslibet).475 Rather, Augustine specifies that he means a word prior to the variety of human 
language (ante omnem linguarum diuersitatem).476 In order to articulate a thought, we draw upon 
an inner mental content (quiddam mentis nostrae), which is not entirely formed.477 As Grondin 
explains, Augustine holds that “Unser Verbum schöpft immer aus einem impliziten Wissen […], 
um seinen Gedanken zum Ausdruck zu verhelfen.”478 He describes this cordial word as nude 
(nuda), in particular to the one thinking and understanding it (intellgenti),479 and suggests that it 
is clothed (uestitur) in the garments of a natural language so that it can be communicated.480 
In s. 195 in particular, Augustine succinctly presents a theory of illumination which is 
grounded in and developed according to a Johannine logic. Augustine begins by noting the 
principle at the heart of creation, namely Christ, and his entry into the created world, after having 
been present there in a vestigial form: “So this is the day on which the one who made the world 
came into the world; on which the one who is never absent in his power became present in the 
flesh; because he was in this world, and he came to his own.”481 From this foundational position 
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on creation, Augustine proceeds to discuss how the Son was present and yet not seen: “He was in 
the world, but he escaped the world’s notice; because the light was shining in the darkness, and 
the darkness could not comprehend it.”482 In order to rectify our inability to perceive the divine 
light, Christ takes on flesh, by means of which he can heal our blindness, that is, restore our vision 
in its fullness: “So he came in the flesh, with the intention of cleansing the defects of the flesh. 
He came in medicinal earth, with which he would cure our inner eyes, which our outer earth had 
blinded.”483 After our blindness, epistemic, moral, and otherwise, is healed, we can again become 
light in the Lord; we can be “re-created,” or our originally intended created state can be realised: 
“so that once they were healed we, who were once darkness, might become light in the Lord.”484 
The upshot is that whilst before, the light was shining but one was unable to see it, now one can 
perceive it clearly: “and thus the light would no longer be shining as present to darkness that was 
absent, but would appear plainly to people who could distinguish it.”485 In a sense, what the 
healing action of the incarnate one accomplishes is the re-orientation of the human soul so as to 
allow it see what was already present to it. This vision however will only be perfected in the 
eschaton, in heaven. What this brief excerpt serves to establish is the way in which Augustine 
grounds a theology of re-creation and thereby illumination in the Gospel of John and its 
theological universe. 
One novel point in these homilies is how Augustine notes that the Incarnation is an aporia 
which calls for further attention. The peculiarity of this mystery invites the dutiful reader to a 
fuller investigation which promises to disclose further insights concerning the essence of the 
Christian mysteries. In virtue of his divinity, Augustine says we have warrant to conclude that 
Christ could remain with the Father and yet be born of a woman, indeed, a virgin.486 In this way, 
he can continue to illumine the angels whilst he shows himself to man (hinc ad oculos humanos 
exire, inde mentes angelicas illustrare).487 Because he does not cease to be God even in the flesh, 
he can truly be Emmanuel, nobiscum Deus.488 Just as Augustine describes Christ as the bread of 
angels, so too does he speak of him as the food of wisdom (sapientiae cibus), that food which 
continues to nourish the angels even when it becomes available to one on earth.489 We also see 
Augustine speak of Christ as the Truth, one with the Father, who is nonetheless also carried by 
human hands.490 Augustine emphasises the unity of the two natures in Christ, appealing to 
cosmological notions of creation in order to illustrate this surprising and paradoxical connection. 
For instance, the Son, eternal and the timeless conditioner of time itself, enters the world and 
comes to be in time in a human form (propter nos fieret in tempore, per quem facta sunt 
                                                          
482 s. 195.3, PL 38, p. 1018: “In mundo erat, sed mundum latebat: quia lux lucebat in tenebris, et eam tenebrae 
non comprehendebant.” Trans. Hill, p. 58. 
483 s. 195.3, PL 38, p. 1018: “Venit ergo in carne, carnis uitia mundaturus. Venit in medicinali terra, unde 
curaret interiores oculos nostros, quos exterior nostra excaecauerat terra.” Trans. Hill, p. 58. 
484 s. 195.3, PL 38, p. 1018: “ut eis sanatis, qui fuimus antea tenebrae, lux efficiamur in Domino.” Trans. Hill, 
p. 58. Eph 5:8. 
485 s. 195.3, PL 38, p. 1018: “et non iam lux in tenebris luceat praesens absentibus, sed appareat certa 
cernentibus.” Trans. Hill, p. 58. 
486 s. 187.2, PL 38, p. 1001. 
487 s. 187.2, PL 38, p. 1001. 
488 s. 187.3, PL 38, p. 1002. Mt 1:23. 
489 s. 187.1, PL 38, p. 1001. 
490 s. 185.1, PL 38, p. 997. 
The Gospel of John as an Augustinian Locus Theologicus 
90 
tempora).491 “Veritas de terra orta est: quia Verbum caro factum est.”492 In speaking of the two 
generations of Christ, Augustine also illustrates his understanding of God’s eternity and 
incorporeality. “Generationem ergo eius quis enarrabit?” (Is 53, 8) Augustine wonders, “whether 
that one without time or this one without seed; that one without beginning or this one without 
precedent; that one which never was not, or this one which never was before or after; that one 
which has no end, or this one which has its beginning in its end?”493 
Indeed, one of the major themes running throughout the Christmas sermons is that of the 
two births, or the duae natiuitates of Christ, one eternally from the Father, and the other 
temporally from the Virgin. Both of these births are equally ineffable, incomprehensible, and 
miraculous. The first generation of the Son is that which takes place in eternity from the Father, 
and which is described by the opening verse of John, which he quotes verbatim.494 In a 
characteristically dialectical style, Augustine plays on the complementary aspects between 
Christ’s two generations, “one divine, the other human, both remarkable; the former without a 
woman as a mother, the latter without a man as a father.”495 Augustine’s conclusion is that 
“Catholic faith, you see, obliges us to accept two births for the Lord, one divine, the other human; 
the first apart from time, the second in time; both, however, wonderful; the first without mother, 
the second without father.”496 As Berrouard notes, Augustine particularly enjoys noting the 
paradoxical situations arising as a result of Christ’s incarnation, such as his birth from the Virgin, 
whom he created.497 For instance, Christ and his mother, though they enjoy the same relationship 
that any child shares with its mother, also enjoy a much deeper relationship which is similar to 
that which all of us enjoy with our Creator. Furthermore, in virtue of Christ’s divinity, the Virgin 
seems to enjoy a place of pre-eminent honour among creation, as she is given the privilege of 
carrying the one whom the heavens do not hold, and governing the one who rules all things.498 
She even nurses the bread of life, though in doing so, it is also she who is nourished and fed, in 
particular by truth, which is incarnate in her.499 This entire dynamic is one of remarkable, 
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ineffable, paradoxical beauty, which leads Augustine to exclaim, “O manifest infirmity and 
wondrous humility in which was thus concealed total divinity!”500 
We are familiar with Augustine describing Christ as light, though in certain of the 
Christmas sermones he also describes the Son as eternal day (dies Filius ex die Patre, Deus ex 
Deo, lumen ex lumine).501 “Who is that day from day,” Augustine asks rhetorically, “except the 
Son from the Father, light from light?”502 In s. 195, Augustine exhorts his listeners, “So let us 
celebrate this day as a high and happy holiday; and faithfully long for the eternal day through 
him, who being eternal was born for us in time.”503 Hence in the opening paragraph of the 
following sermo Augustine can refer to the feast of the nativity as the day that “day” was born: 
“The birthday, on which the Day was born.”504 The liturgical feast, Christmas or Christ’s birth as 
man, provides the occasion for the exploration of the fuller breadth of the Christian mysteries. Put 
another way, one cannot understand the full significance of the (human) nativity of Christ without 
understanding his complete identity, which is to be the eternally begotten Son of the Father:505 
“Christ is eternal day from eternal day.”506 As eternal day, he admits of no beginning or end, no 
rising or setting (dies ergo ille non habet ortum, non habet occasum).507 He is the day of the 
heavenly homeland, where the angels dwell and await man to join them. This eternal, incorporeal 
light is the same who takes on flesh and is born of the Virgin.508 
In the Christmas sermons, we see a deepening of a theme which arises with respect to 
Augustine’s Johannine reflections on sapientia, namely the immutability and eternity of the 
divine Word. The liturgical observance of the human birth of Christ also offers an opportunity for 
discussing this child’s identity with the divine Word. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 
language and the concepts reflect closely those which appear in conf. 7, inter alia, and are crucial 
to understanding Augustine’s overall theory of knowledge and cognition. In the Christmas 
homilies, Augustine attempts to understand the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, 
faithful to the tenets of Nicene orthodoxy. He holds that the eternal Word is begotten by the Father 
apart from any temporal consideration:509 “the one who was before all ages the Son of God, 
without beginning of days, was prepared in these last days to become a son of man; and that the 
one who was born of the Father, not made by the Father, was made in the mother whom he had 
made; so that he might exist here for a time, being born of her who could never and nowhere have 
                                                          
500 s. 184.3.3, SPM 1, p. 76: “O manifesta infirmitas, et mira humilitas, in qua sic latuit tota diuinitas!” Trans. 
Hill, p. 19. 
501 s. 190.3.4, PL 38, p. 1008. 
502 s. 189.1, MA 1, p. 209: “Quis est iste dies de die nisi Filius de Patre, lumen de lumine?”  
503 s. 195.3, PL 38, p. 1019: “Hunc ergo diem laeti solemniter celebremus et aeternum diem, per eum qui 
nobis aeternus in tempore natus est, fideliter exoptemus.” Trans. Hill, p. 58. 
504 s. 196.1, PL 38, p. 1019: “Natalis dies, quo natus est dies.” Trans. Hill, p. 60. See also (ibid.): “illud sine 
die, hoc certo die.” 
505 s. 196.1, PL 38, p. 1019. 
506 s. 190.3.3, PL 38, p. 1008: “[Christus] est dies aeternus ex aeterno die.”  
507 s. 189.1, MA 1, p. 209. 
508 s. 189.2, MA 1, p. 210. See also s. 195.1, PL 38, p. 1018: “[Q]uis enim enarrabit quomodo natum sit lumen 
de lumine, et unum lumen utrumque sit ? quomodo natus sit Deus de Deo, nec deorum numerus creuerit? quomodo 
uelut de re transacta dicatur quod natus est, cum tempus in illa natiuitate nec transierit, quo praeterita esset; nec 
praecesserit, quo futura esset; nec praesens fuerit, quasi adhuc fieret, et perfecta non esset?” 
509 s. 186.3, PL 38, p. 1000. 
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existed except through him.”510 One and the same Christ, the eternally begotten Son who is also 
born of a woman in the Incarnation, is the one who establishes time itself (de Patre ordinans 
omnem diem).511 Moreover, in his divine nature, he is entirely beyond and outside of time (de 
Patre sine tempore).512 Not only does the Son, though begotten, not admit of temporal features 
such as having a beginning, but he stands as the condition for any beginning whatsoever (sine 
initio generato nullum est initium).513 This is because the Son is the principle through which God 
the Father creates all things, a point made clear by the frequent references to John 1:1 throughout 
this homily.514 Augustine admonishes his listeners not to seek a “when” in heaven, that is, in the 
Son’s eternal begetting from the Father.515 This generation is beyond any notion of time 
whatsoever, whereas one rightly notes the temporal character to Christ’s human birth (ambae 
generationes mirabiles. Prima generatio aeterna, secunda temporalis).516 In his divine nature, 
however, Christ exists beyond time and space, without beginning or end (ipse [=Filius] apud 
Patrem praecedit cuncta spatia saeculorum).517 Furthermore, the eternal generation of the Son 
from the Father is qualitatively distinct from the act of creating all things through the Word; whilst 
the Son is eternally begotten and neither created nor made, this is not so of creation.518 The created 
world admits of flux, motion, change, none of which are present in the divine nature (mundum 
autem fecit Deus; mundus transit, permanet Deus).519 And just as God is eternal and beyond time, 
so too is he beyond space. In fact, God’s invisibility and his eternity are part and parcel of his 
incorporeality. In his divine nature, God is invisible, and wholly different from the sun which we 
can see with our eyes.520 In speaking of the discarnate Word, Augustine describes him as not 
located in a particular place or admitting of change over the course of time: “[the Word of God] 
is neither confined in places, nor stretched out through times, nor varied by short and long 
quantities, nor woven together out of different sounds, nor ended by silence.”521 The terminology 
of space, time, and extension figures prominently in Augustine’s discussion of God’s 
incorporeality, as we shall see in the following chapter. Furthermore, these themes carry certain 
implications for human knowing and being in the world. 
I have noted that the gradual sense of reason finds its logical foundation in the weakness of 
reason on account of human finitude, a point which Augustine stresses in these sermons. That is, 
the Christmas sermones serve as an occasion for Augustine to emphasise the incomprehensible 
and ineffable quality of the mystery of Christ and his (double) generation (utrumque sine humana 
aestimatione, et cum magna admiratione).522 A human mind is incapable of understanding either 
                                                          
510 s. 191.1.1, PL 38, p. 1010: “erat ante omnia saecula sine initio dierum Dei Filius, esse in nouissimis diebus 
dignatus est hominis filius; et qui de Patre natus, non a Patre factus erat, factus est in matre quam fecerat; ut ex illa 
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511 s. 194.1, PL 38, p. 1015. 
512 s. 194.1, PL 38, p. 1015. 
513 s. 196.1, PL 38, p. 1019. 
514 s. 196.1, PL 38, p. 1019. 
515 s. 189.4, MA 1, p. 211. 
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519 s. 188.1.1, PL 38, p. 1003. 
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521 s. 187.2, PL 38, p. 1001: “nec locis concluditur, nec temporibus tenditur, nec morulis breuibus longisque 
uariatur, nec uocibus texitur, nec silentio terminatur.” Trans. Hill, p. 28. 
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of Christ’s births, a point to which Isaiah testifies (generationem eius quis enarrabit?).523 As if it 
were not difficult enough to understand how the Son was eternally begotten without any 
beginning, his entry into our material reality is even more unfathomable, and this is a result of our 
finitude. As Augustine states, “Who could ever grasp that, who could ever think worthy thoughts 
about it? Whose mind would dare to scrutinise it, whose tongue dare to pronounce upon it? Whose 
thought would be capable of grasping it?”524 “Small wonder therefore,” Augustine says, “if we 
human beings, who are among all the things that were made, cannot explain in words the Word 
through which all things were made.”525 Any thoughts or words which our mind could produce 
are inherently conditioned by the temporal, finite, contingent, and created nature of the mind 
itself. He speaks of the mind as forming words about that by which it was itself formed.526 Indeed, 
one is attempting to understand the very Word which made one, using discursive thought to 
understand that which is beyond temporal transition. Hence there will always be some limitation 
in our ability to comprehend God, always moving towards this understanding asymptotically. The 
realisation of this fact should not surprise us; rather, once we recognise and acknowledge it, 
authentic deepening in wisdom can take place.527 In a very real sense, then, our created nature 
represents an “ontological” prejudice of sorts, not to mention the sinfulness inherent in humanity. 
Augustine also suggests, albeit subtlely, two related but distinct limitations to our 
comprehension, one being our finitude, and the other being sin and impurity.528 We are not yet 
prepared or worthy to see God, but if certain changes are made, such as having our sin purged 
and our hearts cleansed, we shall indeed see God: “After all, how can our tongues have the 
capacity fittingly to praise one whom our hearts still lack the capacity to see, our hearts in which 
he put the eyes that he could be seen with if they were purged of their iniquity and healed of their 
infirmity, and blessed would be the pure of heart, because they shall see God?”529 
Due to the limitations caused by sinfulness and finitude, the dynamic of human knowing 
is reversed, as it is Christ who first comes to us, and our subsequent movements are responses to 
his initiative. As Augustine states, “You were sleeping, he comes to you; you were snoring, and 
he has roused you; he made a way for you through himself, lest he lose you.”530 It is fitting and 
even necessary that Truth would come to us, as in virtue of sin darkness had entered the world. 
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Hence the one who wishes to speak the truth must turn towards the Truth itself.531 From this, 
Augustine suggests a paradigm of participation, namely in the “form” of Truth, which is Christ 
himself.532 The dynamic vector of the Incarnation is always one of redditus, and this applies as 
much to knowledge as it does the salvation of the soul (ut per inuisibilem factum, a uisibilibus ad 
inuisibilia transiremus).533 Beginning from visible things, Christ is always moving one to a 
knowledge of the invisible, but in and through, and without demeaning the former (ad illum imus, 
per illum imus, non perimus).534 
In discussing the eschatological and asympototic dimension to knowledge and vision in 
this life (ex parte scimus, donec ueniat quod perfectum est), Augustine suggests that a sense of 
hermeneutical anticipation is integral to the Christian life and search for knowledge.535 The 
beatific vision, in which we shall see God sicuti est, per 1 Jn, is tantamount to the full vision of 
God, suggested by Christ in his retort to Philip, who had requested to be shown the Father. That 
is, the fullness of wisdom and knowledge consists in the unadulterated sight of God, the 
enjoyment of which is “enough for us,” as it completely fills and satiates all of our deepest 
longings.536 In s. 194, we see Augustine speak of the connection he envisions between belief, 
knowledge, and love: “Hear what you have known, cultivate anew what you have heard, love 
what you believe, preach what you love.”537 Charitable love is a necessary condition of salvation 
(inde accendamus caritatem, ut perueniamus ad eius aeternitatem).538 The theological virtues of 
faith, hope, and charity are an aid to one’s contemplation, and also tend towards being surpassed 
as one is perfected in the resurrection.539  
The aforementioned link which Augustine posits between the natiuitates duae suggests a 
theology of re-creation as well.540 In the depiction of the nativity in the gospel, Augustine sees a 
hint of the ultimate re-creation to be accomplished by Christ, namely that we shall ourselves 
become gloria in excelsis Deo.541 Elsewhere he states that Christ’s Incarnation serves the purpose 
of the re-creation of sinful man: “The likeness of the flesh of sin (Rom 8:3) has been born, so that 
the flesh of sin might be cleansed and purified.”542 Christ’s incarnation serves the purpose of 
human re-creation. As Augustine states, “We would not have arrived at a divine regeneration 
unless [Christ] had had a human birth: he was born, so that we might be reborn. Let no one doubt 
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that he is reborn, Christ is born. He has been begotten, he does not need to be re-begotten.”543 
Augustine also describes the work of Christ, the opus Christi, as the renewal of the inner man (a 
quo interior homo noster renouatur de die in diem), demonstrating the clear link between the 
Incarnation, salvation, and knowledge.544 Our salvation comes as a direct result of the Incarnation, 
without which we would have been without hope: “You would be dead forever, unless he had 
born in time. You never would have been freed from the flesh of sin, unless he had taken the 
likeness of the flesh of sin.”545 This is no accident or side effect of God’s taking flesh, but the 
very motivation for it in the first place: “For whose benefit did such sublimity come in such 
humility? Certainly for none of his own; but, if we are believers, totally for ours. Wake up, 
mankind; for you God became man.”546 Man is thus saved by the action of God-made-man and 
not by his own actions: “for believing in him who was born, man is justified not by himself, but 
by God.”547 In humbly receiving this good news, one is offered the gift of salvation. For this great 
act of mercy and love, we search in vain for any reason or motive in a human sense, but can only 
explain it by grace: “seek merit, seek a cause, seek equality, and see whether you find anything 
except grace.”548 
In addition to Christ’s re-creative activity of “re-forming” the image of God within the 
soul (reformat nos ad similitudinem Dei),549 Augustine specifies a further aspect to his salvific 
action. In virtue of re-making and re-forming man, Christ the Son makes us into sons. Similarly, 
taking the form of a servant, Christ frees those who were once slaves of the flesh and of sin in 
order for them to become free, in particular so that they can ultimately see God.550 The Son of 
God condescends to us, assuming human nature, and thereby becoming a son of man so that the 
sons of men might become sons of God.551 This entire process begins with the Incarnate God, 
who is at the same time both infant and Word.552 Thus the Incarnation serves the purpose of saving 
and reconciling the world to God. Thus Augustine: “But because the Word of God which abides 
for ever became flesh, in order to dwell among us, on account of the form of God which is hidden 
but remains, we call his name, as Gabriel announced it, Emmaneul. Hebecame man, you see, 
while remaining God, in order that the son of man too might rightly be called God with us; not 
one person being God, another being man. And so let the world exult in the persons of all 
believers, for whose salvation the one through whom the world was made has come.”553 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Augustine’s understanding of Wisdom includes the identification of sapientia with the 
Son, who is likewise Word, Light, and principium, as a pre-eminent if not normative element. 
The eternal, discarnate Word serves as the principle of creation. All things are created in God’s 
Wisdom, in virtue of which they reflect something of their origin and source. Furthermore, the 
divine image is impressed on the human soul, constituting its rationality, as well as its initial 
illumination from God. In virtue of this it can perceive the vestiges of the divine within the world. 
However, this is inherently limited in virtue of one’s created, material being. Human reason is not 
absolute but is rather conditioned by creation and the inherent deficiences thereof. These 
limitations are exacerbated by sin, which is often couched in terms of moral darkness. As a result, 
the creator enters creation itself and becomes a re-creator. The incarnate Word heals the wounded 
rational faculties of man, and redirects him to heaven. Hence the darkness and blindness of sin, 
the damage done to our inner eyes, is cleared away, and we are enabled again to perceive 
according to our original state. Hence we see that the understanding of two aspects of reason is 
grounded in Augustine’s overall theology of creation and redemption. 
The findings thus far from the investigation of Augustine’s conception of sapientia are 
compelling and useful, but we can go further still. In the foregoing examination of his works, we 
have come across a curious theme, namely the incorporeality of God. To be incorporeal means 
not to be extended in time and space, to be immaterial and eternal in essence. We are temporal 
and corporeal in virtue of being finite creatures, made by God. We began to be and can cease to 
be, at least in a particular way. We undergo change, whether good, bad, or neutral. We grow and 
decrease, and we acquire and lose properties. God is not like this in any way. Augustine reiterates 
with some frequency that the Son is the eternal Word, begotten of the Father without any interval 
of time. Similarly, he admits of no extension in space, nor of corporeal properties, in virtue of 
which he is imperceptible to the bodily senses. The commitment to the incorporeality of God 
results in two closely related epistemic problems which recur throughout Augustine’s corpus. One 
has to do with time and eternity: how is that we, who are inherently temporal and know in a 
temporal way, can ever aspire to that which is eternal? Similarly, how can we “see” God, when 
he is invisible? What are we to make of the scriptural promises that indicate that we can or will 
see God, for instance, if we have a pure heart? These two related questions will constitute the 
focus of the next two chapters, respectively, being addressed as loci theologici for knowledge and 
cognition. 
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SECVNDA PRIMÆ 
 
3. DIVINE INCORPOREALITY:  
AUGUSTINE’S RE-DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF SPACE-TIME 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Augustine speaks of sapientia as the source of all creation, and identifies this divine 
Wisdom with the second person of the Trinity, the Son, the Word in whom all the forms of 
creation are present. Augustine also speaks of the way in which the world reflects something of 
its maker, and the way in which the Son is present within the world, sustaining and continually 
creating it from within. As a result, one can know something of God through his vestiges in 
creation. God is even within us. As we have seen in Io. eu. tr., for instance, the presence of a word 
in our heart provides us with a sentiment of the eternal God. However, Augustine encounters a 
difficulty in this respect: he holds that God is both invisible and eternal, but all the things we see 
in the world are temporal, mutable, and finite. What Augustine is trying to understand – and what 
we are supposed to come to see as remarkable1 – is how we know in and through time, and yet 
seem to know beyond it as well. This problem arises on the basis of his approach to creation, 
which is grounded in his understanding of sapientia, and hence is important for our understanding 
of how we as human agents come to know that which is timeless in and through time. 
 Herein I demonstrate how Augustine sees time as a conundrum, that is, how he grapples 
with the inherently temporal way of our knowing. It will become clear that Augustine understands 
our corporeality, that is, our extension in both time and space, as an essential ontological feature 
of our own particular created nature. This particular enquiry proceeds in four parts. In the first 
part, I present an overview of how Augustine understands time and eternity. This part will also 
make clear how from his earliest days as a Christian author, Augustine grounded his 
understanding of time in creation and the eternity of God. This will also provide a basis for 
discussing the diachronic development of the same themes throughout his career, which 
constitutes the task of the second part. In the next section, I address the theme of incorporeality 
and its importance to the conf. and Augustine’s thought overall. Then I pursue three particular 
case studies in which Augustine discusses our relationship to time, as well as the inherent link 
between creation, matter, and time. These are conf. 7, Gn. litt. 5, and ciu. 11, respectively. The 
upshot is that to be a part of (corporeal) creation means ipso facto to be temporal; Augustine sees 
time and space as two species of the same genus. After Part II, the treatment of Gadamer will 
allow us to see the discussion of time and incorporeality in a new light. In particular, the mediation 
of Gadamer’s thought will allow us to see that our situation within time and space is itself 
constitutive of an “ontological prejudice.” I conclude this chapter by broaching Augustine’s 
response to the difficulty of knowing the eternal God, discussing the resources that Augustine 
identifies for such a task. This will provide the basis for a further discussion of this matter in Part 
III. 
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3.1. CREATION AND TIME 
 
3.1.1 Status quaestionis2 
 
Augustine’s doctrine of time is a massive area in itself. Here I shall briefly review some 
of the key publications on this and related themes from recent years, and use this as a basis for 
situating my own enquiry. G. O’Daly has treated at length of the specifically Pauline terminology 
which Augustine appropriates in order to articulate his theory of time. In a 2007 article, K. 
Anatolios treats of the foundational logic at work in Augustine’s De Trinitate, viewing the theory 
of knowledge developed therein as a response to the very issue that I shall be discussing here, 
namely how the temporal, finite human creature can aspire to know the infinite and eternal God.3 
In the last few years, some other works have dealt with this theme, especially in the Confessiones. 
A. Nightingale4 and P. Hochschild in full-length monographs both treat of Augustine’s approach 
to time and the implications thereof. (Some of their major conclusions are consistent with my 
reading of conf. 11, and their work shall figure prominently herein.) To put the point succinctly, 
both of these authors appreciate the way in which Augustine sees time as a mark of the creation 
of the cosmos by God de nihilo.5 To be a person therefore ineluctably involves temporal aspects,6 
the significance of which is rather remarkable from the perspective of Augustine’s theology. 
C. O’Regan as well has addressed the same material, indicating among other things the 
“aporetic” nature of Augustine’s enquiry, namely how he can “gesture” towards the reality of 
time but never totally articulate or comprehend it, as we saw for instance in the Christmas sermons 
                                                          
2 Further major studies on time and related issues in Augustine and his context include: David L. Balás, 
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31; Roland J. Teske, “Origen and St. Augustine’s First Commentaries on Genesis,” in Origenianum Quintum (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1992), 179-85; Roland J. Teske, Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 1996); Gérard Verbeke, L’évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à s. Augustin (Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer ; Louvain : Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1945); Sean Hannan, “To See Coming: Augustine and Heidegger 
on the Arising and Passing Away of Things,” Medieval Mystical Theology 21.1 (2012), 75-91. 
3 Khaled Anatolios, “Oppositional Pairs and Christological Synthesis: Rereading Augustine’s De Trinitate,” 
Theological Studies 68 (2007): 231-53. 
4 Andrea Nightingale, Once out of Nature: Augustine on Time and the Body (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011). 
5 Paige Hochschild, Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology, Oxford Early Christian Studies 
(Oxford: University Press, 2012), 137. 
6 Hochschild, Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology, 137. 
Divine Incorporeality 
99 
in the previous chapter.7 In his commentary on conf. 11, K. Flasch situates Augustine’s treatment 
of time within the context of his discussion of creation in Gn. litt. 5 and ciu. 11.8 This is an 
insightful link which deserves further exploration. He also states that Augustine sees time as a 
logical result of the motion of formed created matter. The added gloss I wish to add is that this 
line of thought must be understood within the context of incorporeality, and hence the situation 
of the discussion of the creation of time in conf. 7 is motivated. 
Even more recently, a volume on the Confessiones from Oxford University Press9 has 
included two essays, by C. Tornau and P. Helm, respectively, each of which deal with time. Other 
essays in this work touch upon related themes as well. Both Tornau and Helm helpfully clarify 
and emphasise the full extent of the meaning of God’s divine otherness, of his transcendence and 
immutability. A Christian doctrine of creation presents subtle if decisive differences from the 
Plotinian view. Whereas for Plotinus, the soul and the divine ideas are essentially of the same 
substance, this is not the case for Augustine. The divine ideas are contained in Christ, who is 
uncreated and unchangeable. But the human soul is created, finite, and subject to the 
vicissitudinous effects of time and space.10 Like other authors, Helm emphasises that God’s 
eternity represents “an intrinsic part of the conceptuality of the Creator-creature distinction.”11 
God’s infinitude and eternity imply, as Augustine writes in conf. 7, that God is qualitatively 
distinct from his creation.12 In virtue of being radically grounded in a Christological framework, 
Augustine’s theory of creation is distinct with respect to the antique sources he inherited.13 As E. 
Kuehn is careful to note, this schema is crucial for Augustine’s overall thought and constitutes a 
neglected point in contemporary scholarship.14 
R. Teske has noted, following F. Masai and G. Verbeke, that the formulation of the notion 
of eternity as tota simul, and not as indefinite extension or duration is original to Augustine. As 
Helm explains, thinking of God’s eternity as somehow the “present” misses the point, as he is 
supposed to be utterly transcendent. God sees all times together, and our way of seeing prevents 
us from completely understanding this. Thus this view of God’s eternity as shadowing the present 
still succumbs to the problem of thinking of God in temporal terms.15 As Helm writes, “God’s 
                                                          
7 Cyril O’Regan, “Answering Back: Augustine’s Critique of Heidegger,” in F. O’Rourke (ed.), Human 
Destinies: Philosophical Essays in Memory of Gerald Hanratty (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2012), 134–184; see, e.g., 154-5, 160-1. 
8 Kurt Flasch, “Wandlungen: Zeittheoretisches in anderen Schriften Augustins,” in Idem, Was ist Zeit? 
Augustinus von Hippo. Das XI. Buch der Confessiones. Historisch-Philosophische Studie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1993), 92-108. 
9 W. Mann (ed.), Augustine’s Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography (Oxford: University Press, 2014). 
10 Holte, Béatitude et sagesse, 349. 
11 Paul Helm, “Thinking Eternally,” in W. Mann (ed.), Augustine’s Confessions: Philosophy in 
Autobiography (Oxford: University Press, 2014), 135-54, here 142. 
12 Maico Michielin, “Augustine’s Interpretation of John’s Prologue: A Theology of God’s Word,” Theology 
Today 67.3 (October 2010): 299-307, here 306. 
13 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9; O’Regan, “Answering Back,” 136. Cf. Giraud, “Signum 
et vestigium,” 264 (n. 49); Mayer, Die Zeichen in der Geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie des jungen 
Augustinus, 255. 
14 Evan Kuehn, “The Johannine Logic of Augustine’s Trinity: A Dogmatic Sketch,” Theological Studies 68 
(2007) 572-94. here 576. 
15 Helm, “Thinking Eternally,” 148. 
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knowledge of time transcends time. According to Augustine, for God all time exists: he is the 
‘eternal Creator of time,’ and as a consequence all times are present to his eternal mind.”16 
Additionally, J. Durandeux offers an analysis which substantiates Teske’s view of 
Augustine’s originality, claiming that the biblical understanding of eternity has to do with endless 
time rather than timelessness per se.17 The theological novelty of this view should not be missed, 
as an authority of no less calibre than Tertullian emphasised that God could not be incorporeal. 
The motivation for this was the idea that anything “real” was somehow a “body,” even if God is 
also (a) spirit. Indeed, from Tertillian’s perspective, the claim that God is incorporeal sounds 
tantamount to saying that God is merely imaginary.18  
Griffin and Paulsen identify three particular types of sources which lent credence to the 
corporeal or even anthropomorphic conception of God.19 These three sources are apocalyptic 
literature; accounts of the beatific vision; and mystical literature, respectively.20 Besides the 
obvious, the common denominator was the power which these works exercised on the typical 
Christian mind; it was common therefore to hear accounts of God in human, physical, and spatial 
terms.21 Suggestions to the contrary therefore could easily smack of blasphemy or impiety. Griffin 
and Paulsen point to Tertullian as a major proponent of the idea that God not only is but must be 
corporeal, for to suggest otherwise would be to say that God is “merely” imaginary, that he does 
not exist.22 Consider, for instance, “There is nothing incorporeal except that which is not.”23 This 
point is made particularly clear in his Aduersus Praxean, in which he writes, “who will deny that 
God is body (Deum corpus esse), although God is a spirit? For spirit is body, of its own kind, in 
its own form.”24 The key to understanding Tertullian’s position is his reception of Stoic 
cosmology, according to which to be real meant to be corporeal in some sense; substance or 
substantial existence was considered a function of soma or corpus.25 According to Cilleruelo, this 
was the same position that Augustine himself had once held: “Augustin venía del materialismo, 
acostumbrado a creer que lo que no es materia no es nada.”26 
 This Stoic tendency obviously conflicted with the Platonic tenet of divine incorporeality 
which was widely accepted among non-Christians.27 As for the Stoically-inclined Christians, 
though their philosophical rigour may not have been compelling, Griffin and Paulsen assert that 
the tendency to adhere to a strict interpretation of anthropomorphic passages about God held sway 
in large segments of early Christianity, and was not simply confined to the laity.28 Indeed, in ep. 
148, Augustine has to emphasise to a fellow bishop that the lack of spatial extension in God is 
                                                          
16 Helm, “Thinking Eternally,” 149. 
17 Durandeux, L’éternité dans la vie quotidienne, 146-7, cited in Teske, To Know God and the Soul. 
18 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 202-3 (n. 13). 
19 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 99. 
20 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 99-100. 
21 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 99-100; cf. Christopher Stead, Philosophy 
in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 102. 
22 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 101. 
23 Tertullian, Carn. Chr. 11.4, CCSL 2, p. 895, quoted in Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality 
of God,” 106 n. 51: “Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est.” 
24 Tertullian, Prax. 7.8, CCSL 2, p. 1167, trans. E. Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (London: 
SPCK, 1948), 138, quoted in Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 101. 
25 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 101. 
26 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 7; cf. Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 99. 
27 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 102. 
28 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 103. 
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not his own idea.29 In both the west and the east, the anthropomorphic or corporeal understanding 
of God was strong and prevalent, and was fiercely opposed by certain fathers.30 It was only after 
and as a result of the thought of Augustine that this position came to be seen as orthodox.31 
Augustine received from Platonism the conception of something which could be both real 
and omnipresent, completely and everywhere whole.32 Augustine takes the term spiritus to mean 
a sort of being which is complete and whole, in a word, incorporeal.33 According to Cilleruelo, 
Augustine invested the meaning of spiritus with a biblical significance, even if the inspiration 
came from the Stoics, as well as the term xoristos in Plato and Aristotle.34 However, Augustine 
develops this concept so as to refer to something simultaneously transcendent and immanent, as 
in God who, though the infinitely great Creator, is nonetheless intimately present to his creation.35 
In this way he develops a distinct and novel concept which is contrary even to the views of the 
Platonists.36 Though the formulation of Augustine’s position certainly resulted from his contact 
with the Neoplatonists in Milan, his concept of eternity represents a stark departure from the Stoic 
corporealism that was regnant until that time in western Christianity.37 Cilleruelo describes 
Augustine’s position as “completely original” (completamente original),38 and states that it is 
reducible neither to philosophy nor to theology, but must rather be seen as Augustine’s own 
synthesis from the “colaboración intima de Atenas y Jerusalén.”39 In order to understand the 
significance of this, it is important to have some sense of the theological and intellectual context 
of the early Christian world. 
Griffin and Paulsen attempt to contextualise the theme of divine (in)corporeality by 
relating Augustine’s approach to this theme to the broader Christian milieu which he inhabited, 
as well as that which preceded him.40 Simply put, they describe a situation in which Christians of 
Stoic sympathies who conceived of God in corporeal terms held the majority over their 
counterparts who thought of God in non-spatial and non-temporal terms. These authors trace the 
transmission of Christian thought on incorporeality from Origen to Basil, Basil to Ambrose, and 
Ambrose to Augustine.41 The first Christian defender of divine incorporeality was Origen,42 
whose reaction was occasioned by the ideas of two groups within Christianity, namely those who 
adhered to Stoic ideas on the one hand, and those who emphasised a literal reading of passages 
                                                          
29 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 112-13; ep. 148.13. Cf. Van Geest, The 
Incomprehensibility of God, 121-5. 
30 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 103. 
31 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 105. 
32 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 8. 
33 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 8. 
34 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 8. 
35 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9. 
36 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9. 
37 Roland J. Teske, SJ, To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of St. Augustine (Washington, DC: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2008) 50, 150, 171, 270. See also Gérard Verbeke, L’évolution de la doctrine 
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38 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9. 
39 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 9. 
40 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 98. 
41 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 116. 
42 Griffin and Paulsen, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God,” 101. 
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which described in human terms on the other.43 As Griffin and Paulsen write, “Origen enunciated 
a theology of the kat’ eikona which removed it from the body entirely and placed it in the soul 
alone, removing any implication of anthropomorphism.”44 The war over divine incorporeality, so 
to speak, was fought on the battlefield of image theology. Though Jewish theology had interpreted 
accounts of the creation of man in the image of God (Gen 1:26-7) in a physical or corporeal way, 
not all Christians (though obviously many) followed this view.45 For Augustine, the question of 
the corporeality of God is ultimately a question of hermeneutics, especially scriptural 
hermeneutics.46 He is clearly situated within the context of patristic exegesis, according to which 
predicates not “worthy” of God (theoprepes/Deo dignum) must be interpreted in some non-literal 
or equivocal fashion.47 
Hence Origen prepared the way for Basil to defend incorporeality in the east. As the latter 
states, “Do not circumscribe God with corporeal concepts, do not confine him with your mind.”48 
This brief admonition could just as well be placed in the mouth of Augustine. Furthermore, as 
Van Winden notes, Basil preached his sermons on the Hexaëmeron ca. 379, and in 380 Ambrose 
cited these homilies, even quoting from them verbatim.49 In these homilies, Basil speaks of the 
arche as timeless, suggesting that it cannot be extended temporally or spatially.50 
Masai credits Marius Victorinus and the Platonists in Milan as influencing the 
development of incorporealism in the west.51 Lössl and Nielsen have also discussed how 
Augustine’s time in Milan with figures such as Simplicianus, Ambrose, and Victorinus led him 
to eschew his attachment to a material conception of God.52 G. A. McCool also argues that 
Ambrose exerted a strong influence on Augustine in this respect.53 Indeed, one can see 
Augustine’s own positions anticipated if not explicitly stated in the works of Victorinus and 
Ambrose.54 For instance, the former is comfortable with describing God as me on (not being),55 
which as we have seen was the very problem that the corporealists feared. However, though 
Victorinus is uncomfortable with applying “substance” language to God, rather than saying that 
God is anousion, he rather says that God is “supersubstantial,” hyperousion.56 Victorinus is also 
adamant that God admits of no material or temporal qualities.57 Citing conf. (6.3.4-4.5), Griffin 
and Paulsen argue that Augustine began to think of God as incorporeal as a result of his encounter 
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with Ambrose in Milan.58 Augustine’s move from a corporeal conception of God to an incorporeal 
one marked a fundamental shift in his thinking. 
Augustine’s early corporeal conception of God was not his own idea, but was the standard 
view of his time, especially in the early African church.59 It was this conception of God as 
something extended in time and space which prevented Augustine for so long from accepting 
Christianity.60 Griffin and Paulsen assert, following Verbeke, that in the Christian west prior to 
Augustine, the belief in the incorporeality of God was not widely held, and in fact the reverse was 
true, and was strenuously defended by figures such as Tertullian and Lactantius.61 With the 
exception of a coterie of Christians with Platonic sympathies, Christians had no conception of 
God as purely spiritual.62 
I shall take Augustine’s “conversion” to incorporeality as a point of departure for 
examining his approach to time and its significance for knowledge. As I see it, Augustine is 
considering the following questions: What does it mean to say that God is “incorporeal,” 
“eternal,” “infinite,” etc.? What is the significance of the fact that we seem to be embedded in and 
conditioned by space and time? In a certain sense, on Augustine’s view these are two ways of 
asking the same question. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the significance of these questions 
and the answers to them, with a focus on Augustine’s own discussion in the Confessiones and 
beyond. 
 
 3.1.2 Hierarchy of being 
 
Augustine’s understanding of time is firmly situated within the context of creation, and 
in particular the hierarchical order of reality it implies.63 This framework provides the foundation 
for Augustine’s thinking on time and the implications thereof for human knowing. In his letter to 
Celestinus, Augustine suggests a threefold division of reality: “There is a nature which is mutable 
through places and times, as a body; there is also a nature which is itself mutable only through 
times and in no way through places, as the soul; and there is a nature which is able to be changed 
neither through places nor times, and this is God.”64 Augustine reiterates his demarcation of 
reality, simplifying it to that which is God and that which is not God: “What I have hinted at here 
is that what is mutable in some way is called a creature, and what is immutable is called the 
Creator.”65 Elsewhere Augustine describes the contrast between mutable and immutable in the 
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following way: “Other things which have been created are able to be in one way and then another. 
The one who created, however, is not able to be one way and then another.”66 God cannot suffer 
change in any way (mutari ex nulla parte potest), nor does he admit of parts or pieces.67 As 
Cilleruelo puts it, “En Dios no tiene validez la dialéctica de este mundo.”68 That being said, one 
should keep in mind that Augustine’s conception of God’s being, ipsum esse, is biblical, not 
philosophical.69 God’s being is not “merely” an intellectual posit, but something very personal.70 
Thus idipsum stands in stark contrast to ousía.71 Creation comes to be understood as a result of 
God’s gratuitous beneficence.72 
The context of Augustine’s early discussion of time and creation is his anti-Manichaean 
polemic. As he writes in De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos, the Manichees refused to accept 
Genesis as a canonical book, and dismissively asked what God was doing before he made heaven 
and earth.73 Augustine responds by arguing that principium should not be understood as temporal, 
but as atemporal, eternal, as the foundation of all things in a conceptual and intelligible sense. In 
other words, the principium is the Son, the source of all the forms of creation.74 As a result of his 
exegesis of Genesis 1:1, Augustine states that time is a result of creation, and hence there is no 
time with God.75 Augustine takes a further step, stating that time came to be as a result of the 
creation of heaven and earth: “And if time began to be with heaven and earth, a time at which 
God had not yet made heaven and earth is not able to be found.”76 This position is further 
articulated in later works of Augustine, which I shall discuss presently, as well as the significance 
of this point for his understanding of reason and knowledge. 
 In various locations, Augustine emphasises that God’s eternity implies no passage of 
time, indeed, no aspect of time altogether. Thus Augustine: 
 
[T]he Word of God, God with God, the only Son of God, is co-eternal with the Father, 
although when God said this in the ternal Word, a time-bound creature was made. While 
“when” and “some time” are time words, all the same the time when something should be 
made is eternal for the Word of God, and it is then made when it is in that Word that it should 
have been made, in the Word in which there is no “when” nor “some time,” because that 
whole Word is eternal.77 
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God however is the operator omnium temporum.78 In his eternity, God is above and beyond all 
time, and time only comes to be as a result of his creative activity.79 As God is beyond time in a 
pristine eternity, he does not perceive time in succession; rather all times are present to him as a 
unity, indeed, like “one day” (anni tui dies unus):80 
 
[Y]ou are ever the same, and your years fail not. Your years do not come and go. Our years 
pass and new ones arrive only so that all may come in turn, but your years stand all at once, 
because they are stable: there is no pushing out of vanishing years by those that are coming 
on, because with you none are transient. In our case, our years will be complete only when 
there are none left. […] Your Today is eternity, and therefore your Son, to whom you said, 
Today I have begotten you, is coeternal with you. You have made all eras of time and you 
are before all time, and there was never a “time” when time did not exist.81 
 
In addition to human rational agents who occupy a middle ontological position and are embedded 
in the flow of time,82 Augustine also posits intellectual creatures who are not subject to the 
vicissitudes of time’s relentless flow. A brief consideration of these will help us to see more 
clearly the significance of what Augustine has to say regarding the inherent temporality of human 
knowing.83 
Augustine’s ontological system departs from his Platonic influences insofar as the 
division consists no longer of the intellectual and the material, but rather between God and 
creation.84 On the latter side, there are creatures who are purely intellectual. The heaven and earth 
of Genesis 1:1, according to Augustine, are collective terms for designating spiritual, intelligible 
creation on the one hand, and physical, material, sensible creation on the other.85 The former, the 
intellectual creatures (i.e., angels), though created, are closest to God, especially insofar as they 
know in a way which is not subject to the vagaries of spatio-temporal extension.86 As Tornau 
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explains, for Augustine, intellectual creatures possess “non-discursive knowledge,”87 the proper 
object of which is God.88 These spiritual creatures are said to know (nosse) “together without any 
change of times.”89 In Gn. litt. 4, Augustine attributes to the angels a facility whereby they can 
see all things together, rather than in succession as we do.90 
Therefore, on Augustine’s view, though both angels and human rational agents share a 
spiritual aspect to their nature, they nonetheless differ in the respect of the temporal character of 
their knowing, or lack thereof. Purely intellectual creatures, that is, creatures without any physical 
component, can know in a purely intellectual, atemporal way. But due to the ineluctably temporal 
character of the human person, whose body is extended spatially and temporally, and whose soul, 
which though only extended temporally, still relies on the body for the acquisition of knowledge, 
must know and learn in a temporal way.91 The upshot is that we occupy a middle ontological 
place, being rational beings whose souls are not extended in space.92 Nonetheless, we experience 
the distending effects of time, unlike intellectual creatures, who know all things together in a 
timeless way. God’s knowledge differs even further from that of the human mind, as well as of 
any creature. Hence we know in and through time; but it could be otherwise. Augustine finds this 
remarkable, and seeks to investigate further the implications of this insight for our knowledge. In 
Part III, I shall argue that Augustine’s confrontation with the concept of incorporeality represents 
the foregrounding of an ontological prejudice. But first, let us consider Augustine’s attempt to 
grapple with this question, beginning with the conf. 
 
3.2. INCORPOREALITY 
 
The following will demonstrate how the theme of incorporeality can be understood as 
fundamentally important to Augustine’s entire life and thought. The realisation of this point 
reveals that the discussion of time in conf., far from being a “novelty item”93 in Augustine’s 
works, actually forms a key basis of his entire theological programme. According to figures such 
as É. Gilson and B. J. Cooke, the concept of divine immutability is a central theme for Augustine, 
and can even be seen as the foundation of much of the rest of his theology.94 Indeed, Augustine 
                                                          
diebus, qui solis huius circuitu peraguntur, fieri non potest. Et hoc quidem non potest eisdem partibus terrae: uniuersum 
autem mundum quis non uideat, si attendere uelit, et diem ubi sol est, et noctem ubi non est, et uesperam unde discedit, 
et mane quo accedit, simul habere? Sed nos plane in terris haec omnia simul habere non possumus: nec ideo tamen 
istam terrenam conditionem lucisque corporeae temporalem localemque circuitum illi patriae spiritali coaequare 
debemus, ubi semper est dies in contemplatione incommutabilis ueritatis, […] hic fortasse per temporum uices, sed 
tamen, quantum puto, significans quid sine temporum uicibus ageretur in patria, cui eius peregrinatio suspirabat.” 
87 Tornau, “Intelligible Matter and the Genesis of Intellect,” 197. 
88 Tornau, “Intelligible Matter and the Genesis of Intellect,” 197. 
89 conf. 12.13.16, CCSL 27, p. 224: “simul sine ulla uicissitudine temporum.” 
90 Cf. Gn. litt. 4.29.46, CSEL 28,1, p. 128: “sed eorum mentem mirabili facilitate haec omnia simul posse.” 
In Book V of Paradise Lost, Milton depicts Raphael speaking to Adam, describing reason as either “Discursive, or 
intuitive; discourse oftest is yours, the latter most is ours.” (PL V, 488-9) This is another way of expressing Augustine’s 
understanding of the difference between the knowledge of angels and of men, respectively. However, it is doubtful that 
Augustine would endorse what follows immediately thereafter: “Differing but in degree, of kind the same.” (V, 490) 
91 Cf. Teske, Know God and the Soul, 211-12. 
92 Cf. Arthos, “Hermeneutic Anticipations,” 114, 126-7. 
93 I owe this idea to conversations with S. Hannan. 
94 O’Donnell, Commentary, 394. 
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is the first known source to use terms such as incommutabilitas.95 The discussion of this theme 
throughout the conf. in particular will allow for a clearer situation of the more focused discussion 
of book seven. 
As L. Ayres suggests, reading Augustine’s Confessiones is problematic for a number of 
reasons. Recent scholarship has emphasised the protreptic nature of this work, which seems to 
situate it more firmly within the classical tradition overall, though of course not thereby 
minimising the distinctive nature of this text. A further challenge is the banal identification of 
Augustine’s conf. as an, indeed the first, autobiography. Though this work certainly contains 
elements that anticipate the contemporary genre of autobiography, such a categorisation obscures 
what is at stake in the work. In the conf. Augustine is not so much trying to express his own unique 
experiences, but trying to show the way in which his own inner life is one particular way in which 
the general human drama can and has been played out. According to Ayres, Augustine is writing 
so that others can relate to it and see that pattern within themselves.96 
Scholarship for decades has sought to understand what if anything links the individual 
books of the Confessiones together as a coherent, unified work. In this respect, R. Teske takes an 
approach which is both creative and compelling, as it provides an aspect under which to view the 
work as a whole. Teske reads and interprets the conf. as an account of Augustine’s coming to 
understand the incorporeality of God.97 He cites a selection of passages especially from the early 
books of conf. which have seldom been linked with the discussion of this theme in book seven. 
This reading is also consistent with such locations as book nine, in which Augustine recounts his 
fleeting glimpse of God along with Monnica, the brevity of which can be attributed to the 
weakness of human nature in light of God’s incorporeality.98 Similarly, the discussion of time and 
memoria is motivated by God’s eternity, as I shall discuss presently. The exegesis of Genesis as 
well also makes sense in light of the idea that creation has its source in the unchangeable, eternal 
God. 
Teske sees in the opening passage of conf. (1.1.1) an anticipation of the theme to be 
articulated gradually throughout the work, in particular as God is described as unchangeable and 
timeless.99 Teske also argues that certain key themes of book three, such as Augustine’s encounter 
with Cicero’s Hortensius, are relevant to the later discussion of incorporeality.100 When Augustine 
began his insatiable search for sapientia, he first turned to the Christian scriptures, but found the 
imagery and the language crude and unfit for a supreme being.101 In virtue of this he turned to the 
Manichaean sect, who proclaimed the name of Christ and held the spiritual aspect of God, as 
                                                          
95 O’Donnell, Commentary, 395. 
96 Ayres, “Into the Poem,” 263-5, 264, n. 6, 278. For more on the genre of the Confessiones, see William B. 
Parsons, “Introduction,” in Idem, Freud and Augustine in Dialogue: Psychoanalysis, Mysticism, and the Culture of 
Modern Spirituality, Studies in Religion and Culture (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 
1-28. 
97 Roland J. Teske, SJ, “Divine Immutability in Augustine,” in To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the 
Thought of St. Augustine (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 131-51, here 136. See 
also Matthew W. Knotts, “Divine Incorporeality in Augustine’s Tractatus in Ioannem,” La Ciudad de Dios 229.2 
(Mayo-Agosto 2016): 369-88. 
98 Cf. Svensson, “Scientia y sapientia en De Trinitate XII,” 100. 
99 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 137. 
100 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 137. 
101 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 137. 
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opposed to one which appeared anthropomorphic.102 Teske states that Augustine’s search for truth 
was further frustrated by his situation within the African church, a church the adherents of which 
were generally unschooled and rather simplistic in their beliefs about God.103 For this reason, they 
interpreted passages about, for example, the image of God, in a corporeal sense.104 Augustine 
found that his speculative approach to thinking about God was suppressed or met with 
incomprehension and sceptisicism by his co-religionists.105 Augustine’s encounter with 
Aristotle’s Categories, recounted in conf. 4.16.28, caused further difficulty, as he thought that 
God had to be placed in one of these categories of being.106 Indeed, Augustine states that the entire 
cause of his errant and tortuous trajectory towards truth came as a result of his corporeal 
conception of God.107 
Augustine’s encounter with Ambrose’s preaching in Milan played a key role of showing 
him that the description of God in the Bible as admitting of bodily features could and even should 
be read and interpreted metaphorically.108 After his time with Ambrose and the Milan 
Neoplatonists, Augustine recounts having a sense of relief, as he began to realise that he was not 
upset with the Catholic faith as such, but rather the falsehoods of conceiving of God in terms of 
something corporeal (contra carnalium cogitationum figmenta).109 Teske holds that although 
Augustine was predisposed to think of God in purely immaterial terms, this desire remained 
incomplete until he acquired from the Neoplatonists the concepts required to articulate this 
view.110 As Teske writes,  
 
as Augustine’s inability to conceive of a spiritual being was “the greatest and almost sole 
cause of [his] inevitable error” (conf. 5, 10, 19), so what freed him from this same error was 
the ability to conceive of God as a substance that is whole everywhere, as infinite but not 
spatially so, as above us, not as oil is above water or the sky above the earth, but because he 
made us. As incorporeal, God obviously does not have the three spatial dimensions of length, 
breadth, and depth; he is not extended through stretches of space.111 
 
Teske further substantiates his point by appeal to conf. 7.9.14, in which Augustine states that the 
books of the Platonists contained an understanding of God’s coeternal word (even if they did not 
                                                          
102 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 137. 
103 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 138. 
104 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 138. 
105 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 138. 
106 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 139. 
107 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 149. As Augustine states, “quoniam cum de Deo meo cogitare uellem, 
cogitare nisi moles corporum non noueram - neque enim uidebatur mihi esse quidquam, quod tale non esset - ea maxima 
et prope sola causa erat ineuitabilis erroris mei.” (conf. 5.10.19, CCSL 27, p. 68) This point also helps to show why 
John was so important for Augustine, as it was in the fourth gospel that he located resources for discussing divine 
incorporeality. 
108 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 140. 
109 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 139. As Augustine states, “gaudens erubui non me tot annos aduersus 
catholicam fidem, sed contra carnalium cogitationum figmenta latrasse.” (conf. 6.3.4, CCSL 27, p. 76) 
110 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 148. 
111 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 149. See also trin. 12.7.12 CCSL 50, p. 366, in which Augustine writes, 
“Cogitatio quippe turpiter uana est quae opinatur Deum membrorum corporalium lineamentis circumscribi atque 
definiri.” 
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have any sense of the Incarnation of this Word).112 The sense of ebullience Augustine received 
from his encounter with Ambrose and his ilk in Milan facilitated his “conversion” to thinking of 
God as incorporeal, which he narrates in book seven of the conf.113 In my estimation, whilst the 
early books of the conf. recount Augustine’s growing awareness of God, the latter books include 
Augustine’s attempt to determine the implications of this for human being and knowing. 
 
3.3. CASE STUDIES 
 
Augustine famously discusses his “conversion” to thinking of God as incorporeal in book 
seven of the Confessiones. This will constitute the first case study. What we see here is a report 
of Augustine’s gradual process of coming to realise that God admits of no extension and no 
physical properties. The true radicality of this conclusion finally dawns on Augustine, facilitating 
his decision to be baptised. Rather than viewing this realisation as something consigned to a 
particular era in Augustine’s life, I argue that this commitment to divine incorporeality is a 
fundamental feature of his overall theology, and thus strongly influences and conditions his 
thinking about knowledge. In order to show this, I address two other key sources in which 
Augustine addresses similar themes and appears to continue this line of enquiry, although within 
a specifically biblical framework. These sources are the fifth book of Gn. litt. and the eleventh 
book of ciu., respectively. In both of these sources, we see the fundamental link that Augustine 
posits between creation and extension in time and space. This is in contrast to the incorporeal 
God, the eternal, immutable divine wisdom. Hence for the former, creation, “to be” is just as 
much as “not to be.” One’s very being is constituted by the distention experienced as a result of 
non-being inherent in creation. This “non-being” of the soul in contrast to eternal and unchanging 
wisdom represents a key locus around which Augustine develops his understanding of 
knowledge. Therefore I shall discuss the three aforementioned key sources herein, though still 
giving attention to other sources where appropriate. 
 
3.3.1 Confessiones VII 
 
Augustine opens the seventh book of his Confessiones by reflecting on a major shift in 
his thinking about the nature of reality and the divine.114 He recalls with approval how he had 
begun to think of God in a way which did not conceive of him in human form: “I was no longer 
thinking of you, O God, in the figure of a human body, from which I began to hear something of 
                                                          
112 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 148. It seems that Marius Victorinus could have played a major part 
in introducing Augustine to a concept of atemporal eternity and non-material, non-extended being. In his monograph 
on imago Dei in pro-Nicene Latin sources, G. Boersma notes how Victorinus addressed the question of the processions 
of the Trinity. He came to the conclusion, Boersma writes, that the generations within the Trinity “must be stripped of 
all temporal and material associations because God is utterly simple and outside of time.” (Boersma, Augustine’s Early 
Theology of Image, 60) See Gerald Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image: A Study in the Development of 
Pro-Nicene Theology (Oxford: University Press, 2016), 58, 60, 71. 
113 Cf. Lössl, “The One,” 92; Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality,” 99-100; McCool, “The Ambrosian 
Origin,” 72-4. 
114 For more on the structural elements of the conf., see, e.g., E. Williger, “Der Aufbau der Konfessionen 
Augustins,” Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche 28.1 (1929): 81-106; and 
Goulven Madec, “Une lecture de Confessions VII,IX,13-XXI,27. Notes critiques à propos d’une thèse de R.-J. 
O’Connell,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 16.1 (1970): 79-137. 
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wisdom.”115 In his commentary, O’Donnell notes the retrospective presentation in conf. 7; in other 
words, after his encounter with Platonic thought, Augustine came to understand his prior beliefs 
in the way that he presents them in this book of conf.116 With respect to Augustine’s shift or 
“conversion” to thinking of God as incorporeal, Teske distinguishes two particular developments 
as recounted in book seven. The first, which is presented in the opening passage of this book, 
pertains to thinking of God no longer in anthropomorphic terms.117 This describes Augustine in 
385 at the age of 31.118 Though Augustine began to hear the faint murmuring of truth, “something 
of wisdom” (aliquid de sapientia), this was undermined by his “materialistic” reflex, namely to 
think of God in other spatio-temporal terms: “I was not able to think something of a substance 
except such as the type of thing which is often seen through these eyes,”119 by which he means 
the eyes of the flesh and the body. Augustine is emphasising that the attempt to think of God in 
the familiar categories of time and space is bound to fail to capture him, not simply adequately, 
as that is not possible, but altogether. God is beyond all categorisation, and the logic of such 
worldly thinking can insinuate itself into one’s reasoning process, subtly subverting it. Even when 
Augustine had disabused himself of the error of anthropomorphising God, and thought that he 
had risen to a higher level of understanding, his ideas were still vitiated by material categories: 
“although not in the form of a human body, I was nonetheless bound to think of you as something 
corporeal through spaces of places, whether infused in the world or even diffused outside the 
world through infinite spaces.”120 In the next paragraph, Augustine recounts how his way of 
thinking logically resulted in the conclusion that God could be “more present” in larger parts of 
the world and could be divided into various parts.121 But Augustine thought this way for God had 
not yet shed light upon his intellectual darkness.122 In his tractates on 1 Jn, as in the seventh book 
of his Confessiones, Augustine decries the error of thinking of God according to some corporeal 
form, even some form which is infinitely extended in space.123 This is not to deny that God can 
and does take some form of mediation in order to interact with the world. Rather, the mistake for 
Augustine is reducing God to the forms of his mediations. Describing this error, Augustine writes 
that one makes for oneself an image of God perhaps as some “huge shape … or he stretches out 
some immeasurable vastness through space, as though spreading across open places–as much as 
he can–the light that he sees with these eyes.”124 As Helm explains,125 in conf. 7 Augustine is 
describing one of the stages in the process whereby he finally came to a realisation of God’s 
incorporeal character. What allowed him to do this was a Platonic “way of thinking about the 
                                                          
115 conf. 7.1.1, CCSL 27, p. 92: “non te cogitabam, Deus, in figura corporis humani: ex quo audire aliquid de 
sapientia coepi.” 
116 O’Donnell, Commentary, 392. 
117 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 140-1. 
118 Teske, To Know God and the Soul, 140-1. 
119 conf. 7.1.1, CCSL 27, p. 92: “cogitare aliquid substantiae nisi tale non poteram, quale per hos oculos uideri 
solet.” 
120 conf. 7.1.1, CCSL 27, p. 92: “quamuis non forma humani corporis, corporeum tamen aliquid cogitare 
cogerer per spatia locorum siue infusum mundo siue etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum.” 
121 conf. 7.1.2, CCSL 27, p. 93. 
122 conf. 7.1.2, CCSL 27, p. 93. 
123 ep. Io. tr. 7.10, PL 35, p. 2034. 
124 ep. Io. tr. 7.10, PL 35, p. 2034: “ingentem formam, aut magnitudinem aliquam inaestimabilem distendit 
per locos, uelut lucem istam quam uidet his oculis, auget per campos quantum potest […].” Trans. Ramsey, p. 111. 
125 Helm, “Thinking Eternally,” 120-1. 
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Church’s language about God that would free it of physical implications, implications about time 
and space, and so of the need for physical imagery.”126 Augustine gradually comes to realise the 
truly radical implications of human creatureliness and finitude, and in particular how it is realised 
epistemically. 
 This theme is continued throughout the seventh book of the Confessiones, with particular 
attention to its implications for human knowledge and the spiritual journey. For instance, later 
Augustine describes himself as having been plunged into a region of shadows and false images 
when he was still ignorant of God’s incorporeality: “I found that I was far from you in a region 
of unlikeness.”127 As Menn writes, Augustine describes this tendency as the consuetudo 
carnalis,128 which designates that particular weakness in human nature which causes it to think in 
merely “four-dimensional” terms, and to allow itself to be confined to such thinking.129 In addition 
to conf. 7.17.23, Augustine makes a similar point in trin. 8.3 on the misleading nature of sensory 
images.130 The result is that one tends away from the contemplation of unchanging truth to 
particular lesser reflections of it.131 Augustine notes the contingency, finitude, and inherent 
limitations of all the particular entities he observes in the world around him, and how they differ 
from God in that they derive their being from him.132 His thought evokes the metaphysics of 
participation, according to which particular things instantiate to varying degrees some particular 
“form,” whether beauty, goodness, or being itself.133 As Augustine writes of created things, they 
seem “neither completely to be nor completely not to be.”134 Moreover, Augustine also describes 
God in terms of an incorporeal light, far different from the light to which we are accustomed at 
the physical level (aliud ualde).135 Reiterating the point of God’s infinite difference from creation 
in the fourteenth chapter, Augustine goes on to say that the soul is bound to remain in a state of 
disquietude and unease if it persists in conceiving of God along the lines of some finite, spatially 
extended substance.136 In another location, Augustine expresses this point, stating that it is a great 
thing to arrive at a conception of God as incorporeal, which according to him means “something 
which may not be extended through locations, nor change through times.”137 This incorporeal 
character is also distinctive of the form of wisdom, species sapientiae.138 
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Continuing with conf. 7, one can notice a shift in Augustine’s consideration of the 
transcendence of God. Whereas in the opening stages of this book, his language was redolent of 
physical and spatial imagery (e.g., corporeum; diffusum; per spatia locorum; minorem partem; 
etc.), Augustine takes a step further, including time in this consideration as well, thereby laying 
the logical foundation for a more extended discussion of time in the later books of this work.139 
For Augustine, time is not the measure of motion (as he makes clear later in the conf.), but is itself 
co-extensive with a type of corporeal motion. Here he suggests a position that will become more 
clearly pronounced later in his career, namely that time arises as a result of creation. This move 
to link space and time is neither obvious nor self-evident; what Augustine is doing implicitly is 
positing an essential link between the two, viewing both of these as ineluctable conditions of 
finite, material creation. According to Helm, Augustine sees time, and our experience of it in 
terms of past, present, and future, as a subtle if indubitable mark of our creaturely finitude, in 
contrast to God’s eternity.140 Centuries before Einstein’s relativity theory revolutionised our 
conception of space and time by viewing them not as two distinct realities but as two aspects of 
the same material universe, Augustine’s intuition is that extension, both temporal and spatial, 
intrinsically characterises created being, in contrast to the eternal and immutable God.141 
The logical trajectory of Augustine’s thought on time and distention comes as a result of 
his doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.142 The attempt to think of God as eternal, whilst we are situated 
within time, occasions one of the seminal reflections on the notion of time. As O’Regan claims, 
“Augustine’s reading of time is profound and [much] of the profundity derives from his 
specifically Christian commitments.”143 In this sense, one can view Augustine’s programme in 
the Confessiones as an expression of the “scriptural imagination,” or what K. Anatolios calls 
“biblical reasoning.”144 
In conf. 7, Augustine describes the way in which he gradually came to appreciate the truly 
radical implications of human creatureliness and finitude, and in particular how it is realised 
epistemically. In addition to thinking of time and space as the results of creatio ex nihilo, 
Augustine also addresses the epistemic implications of God’s eternity and our finitude. One can 
see these reflections as rooted in the realisation that it is remarkable to think that it is precisely in 
and through time, not only that we know, but that we can come to know the eternal and immutable 
God and source of creation, who is fundamentally different from anything we experience. 
As we have seen, Augustine in conf. 7 establishes the incorporeality of God which, in 
addition to spatial categories, is also taken as applying to time. He returns to this point later in the 
conf., noting how God’s eternal being differs from ours, as well as certain ways in which it is 
realised. In what follows, we shall see the way in which Augustine’s understanding of 
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incorporeality is deepened in two other works, namely in Gn. litt. 5 and ciu. 11. From this it will 
become clear how Augustine continues to link time and space, seeing the former as a logical result 
of the latter. Moreover, he nuances his view on the nature of material reality with respect to time; 
in other words, it is formed and formable space and the movements thereof which are constitutive 
of time itself. We shall continue to see how God’s ultimate transcendence bears implications for 
our situation as human knowers. After the consideration of these two passages, I shall return to 
the latter portions of the conf., in which Augustine offers the initial suggestion of a solution to the 
problem of knowing the eternal God. 
 
 3.3.2 De Genesi ad litteram V 
 
 In his chapter on Augustine’s theory of time as present in locations besides the conf., K. 
Flasch identifies two other locations in particular, namely Gn. litt. 5 and ciu. 11. These are 
locations which Teske also addresses. In a treatment of these passages, one can see how Augustine 
develops his understanding of incorporeality based on his exegesis of scripture, most notably 
Genesis, and the further articulation of key points concerning time and immutability which he 
makes in conf. 
In Gn. litt. 5, Augustine describes God as incorporeal (apud quem non est commutatio, 
nec momenti obumbratio),145 beyond time and space, admitting not even of the possibility of 
change.146 Augustine sees this as the meaning of Ex 3:14, which depicts God speaking to Moses 
through the burning bush, identifying himself as ego sum qui sum.147 God’s nature is 
unchangeable and eternal, and he is the source of his own being in himself.148 Even in acting in 
the world or performing creative actions, God himself does not admit of temporal change or 
motion.149 Whilst God’s nature may be beyond comprehension, we can speak intelligibly about it 
to a certain extent, provided we scrupulously avoid discussing time and space, as God is beyond 
these corporeal categories altogether: “that substance is inexpressible and can only be presented 
by one human being to another in words taken over from space and time, though it is before all 
times and all places.”150 (As in conf. 7, this passage suggests Augustine’s understanding of time 
and space as two aspects of the same reality, more on which anon.) In addition to identifying the 
Wisdom of God with the Son, Augustine also states that this Word-Wisdom is co-eternal with the 
Father.151 Augustine likewise identifies this Word-Wisdom with divine light, an identification 
which clearly follows a Johannine logic, and for which he even cites the prologue of this gospel.152 
In a subsequent paragraph of the fifth book of Gn. litt., Augustine more clearly expresses this 
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series of identifications, stating, “the life and the light of people, which is Wisdom itself, and the 
Word itself, the only-begotten Son of God.”153 
God creates heaven and earth by bringing into existence corporeal matter, which is 
partially formed already and admits of the possibility of being formed further, as its form is not 
yet totally realised.154 The created world involves not simply the existence of matter, but matter 
which is formed at a number of levels, from types of things in general to their individual instances 
and the constituent parts thereof (formatis atque distinctis partibus et generibus rerum, quibus 
uniuersa creatura disposita atque composita reddit hanc speciem quae mundus uocatur).155 
Augustine suggests that time itself begins with the creation of the world.156 He presents an 
argument for the coincidence or co-creation not only of matter and form, but of time and space.157 
In Gn. litt. 5.5.12, he begins by stating his thesis: “creatures once made began to run with their 
movements along the tracks of time.”158 He proceeds to state that without motion, there cannot be 
time, and there cannot be motion without things which admit of the possibility of movement and 
change.159 Although both proceed from and are grounded in God’s creativity, time and space, or 
in Augustine’s words, tempus and creatura, admit of an asymmetrical relationship. That is, time 
comes to be as a result of creation.160 As Teske explains, “for Augustine God creates time in 
creating the world.”161 Without creation, there is no time.162 The argument is not so much that 
time is the measurement of motion, in this case the motion of created things, but rather that time 
presupposes the change of one formed thing into another type of formed thing.163 
As K. Flasch argues, time is a logical result of creation on Augustine’s view. Time only 
comes to be as a result of the movements of created bodily things. As Flasch writes, “Die Zeit 
ergibt sich, wenn Naturprozesse ablaufen. Folglich gab es keine Zeit, bevor es eine Schöpfung 
gab.”164 But there is a further point here which Flasch brings to light. It is not simply the existence 
of created reality as such which gives rise to time; rather, it is creation according to form that 
allows time to be. Movement implies change, and change implies one particular thing becoming 
another type of thing. As Flasch explains, “Dies impliziert auch, dass es Zeit nur gibt, sofern die 
völlige Formlosigkeit der reinen Stofflichkeit überwunden ist, also sofern spezifisch geprägte 
Wesen existieren. Die Natur muß Unterschiede aufweisen, damit Zeiten möglich sind.”165 
Therefore, Augustine “auch die erste Materie als zeitlos ansehen und die Zeit als eine Folge der 
Form beschreiben kann.”166 Tornau concurs with this assessment, stating that in the conf., 
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Augustine also identifies matter with mutability.167 Such a theological move is significant for the 
purposes of a theory of knowledge. Intelligibility is a matter of formal determination; there has to 
be something to be thought. In this instance one can see the integral link of a theology of creation 
and a theory of knowledge. This is a point to which I shall return in Part III. What we have also 
established is that time is neither an ad hoc dimension of creation nor some reality created 
distinctly or even separately from matter. Rather, time is a logical result of created and formed 
matter, or put more provocatively, time and space are inherently, integrally connected.168 
One must recall that elsewhere in this same work, Augustine states that form and matter 
are created together.169 Augustine reaffirms this point in book five, saying that the treatment of 
the creation of heaven and earth and day in Genesis are not two different things, but one and the 
same. In other words, it is not that heaven and earth are created, and then “day” is created 
afterwards, but that these are two aspects under which to view one and the same act of making. 
As Augustine writes, “so should anybody wish to understand what is placed first […] before he 
fashioned the day, just because here too heaven and earth are first mentioned and next the day is 
made, they would be put right by the words that follow, because the name of heaven and earth is 
also added again after the mention of the making of the day.”170 Augustine reaffirms this reading 
in the following paragraph of Gn. litt. 5 when he writes, “In this way he [i.e., presumably Moses] 
is obliging us beyond a shadow of doubt to understand that he has mentioned how heaven and 
earth were made when the day was made.”171 
Augustine provides the example of the beauty (pulchritudinem) of a tree as a way to 
understand the way in which God created all things together, and yet still creates even now. In 
the seed of a tree the entire entity is pre-formed, even if it has not been realised in space and time 
yet. Hence God can create the world and all things in it at one particular point, and can continue 
to create as he providentially guides the realisation of these things in their own natures (in semine 
ergo illa omnia fuerent primitus, non mole corporeae magnitudinis, sed ui potentiaque causali).172 
(One can also relate this passage to s. 241, not only in terms of the speaking of beauty, but as well 
as the way in which all of the aspects of the tree testify to the perceptive, attentive mind. This also 
relates to Gadamer’s understanding of language.) “Now just as all these elements, which in the 
course of time and in due order would constitute a tree, were all invisibly and simultaneously 
present in that grain, so too that is how, when God created all things simultaneously, the actual 
cosmos is to be thought of as having had simultaneously all the things that were made in it and 
with it when the day was made.”173 
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The apparent tension between two opposing understandings of creation is resolved by the 
distinction between creation in temporal succession and in causal priority (non per moras 
temporum, sed propter ordinem conditorum).174 In other words, this concept allows him to say 
that God created all things at once, even though it had not been realised in time:175 “God did not 
make those things in the same way as he makes such things now, when it rains and men work. 
These things, after all, now happen over periods of time, of which there were none then, when he 
made all things simultaneously in the moment from which times too began.”176 So matter is 
created first and is subsequently formed by God’s command, though the existence of matter is 
primary, not in a temporal way, but in a logical one.177 Thus Augustine: “in the beginning God 
made heaven and earth as a kind of formability, if I may so express it, of material which was 
subsequently to be formed by his word, and which preceded its own formation, not in time but in 
origin.”178 Augustine suggests a distinction between temporal causation and the bestowing of 
order according to the “connection of causes” (non interuallis temporum, sed connexione 
causarum).179 In other words, these causes are related logically, apart from intervals of time. This 
helps to explain how matter can be said to be created first, even though it is not prior in time. The 
primacy pertains to the realm of principle, logic, and causality, not to time.180 As Augustine writes, 
“so it was in the order of causes, not of time, that the first thing to be made was formless and 
formable material, both spiritual and corporeal, from which would be made whatever had to be 
made, since this too would not have existed before it was set in place.”181 
The foregoing cosmological account of creation is also important as regards Augustine’s 
theory of knowledge. God knows all things eternally, which is to say in a purely simple way (illo 
simplici ac mirabili modo nouit omnia stabiliter et incommutabiliter).182 Augustine interprets 
John 1:4, according to which all things are life in the Word, in the following way. One is not the 
source of one’s own life or being, but receives it from God. Moreover, this is received from the 
source of creation who knows all things eternally apart from their being made.183 God is ultimately 
responsible for all knowledge, whether he reveals it to man or angel (quia cognosci facit, siue ab 
angelis, siue ab hominibus).184 The mind receives its light from another source; it is not the source 
of its own capacity for knowledge.185 (As Gadamer says, we cannot learn how to understand.) 
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As in his conf., in Gn. litt. Augustine also addresses the epistemic implications of his 
cosmological account of time. Here he speaks of the different ways in which creation is known 
to angels and to men, respectively. One could also think of the former category in terms of a mind 
freed from the flux of space and time, as a result of which, they would be able to know 
immediately, or as Augustine puts it, “primordially” (primordialiter) and “originally” 
(originaliter).186 This type of knowledge corresponds to the aspect of creation which takes place 
at one distinct point.187 Our knowledge, which is acquired in time (per ordines temporum), 
corresponds more closely to the continuous act of creation, according to which God works even 
now (Deus … usque modo operatur).188 (In any case, God’s knowledge is far different from that 
of any creature, whether angelic or human.189) 
 To summarise Augustine’s theory of creation and time in Gn. litt., God creates all things 
in his Wisdom, which means that all things are given to be in a particular form and with particular 
potencies. These things are created as material, corporeal creation, already formed in some way. 
In a sense, all things come to be together, and in another sense, God continues to work and create, 
insofar as due to the logical connection of causes inherent in created things, they unfold and 
continue to realise their full potential, which is reflected in the eternal ideas in God’s mind. This 
movement of corporeal creation from one form to another just is constitutive of time. 
 
 3.3.3 De ciuitate Dei XI 
 
 The discussion of time as a result of the creation of matter in book eleven of De Ciuitate 
Dei serves as an apt punctuation to Augustine’s overall theory of time. Whereas previously this 
point was addressed to the Manichees, here the context is an anti-pagan polemic. Augustine 
rejects the idea that the world is eternal, and he harshly criticises those who accept this idea.190 
God made all things in his wisdom, knowing all the things he would create.191 Augustine describes 
sapientia as the treasury of all wisdom and knowledge, as well as the source of the reasons and 
forms of things.192 The Father and the Son are of the same coeternal and immutable substance.193 
God’s Word, and indeed, the Word in which he creates, is not a temporal one which sounds 
through space and time (Verbo intellegibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali).194 Unlike 
our words, which are bound to time and space, and pass through various temporal intervals, God’s 
word is always and ever complete.195 God was not changed in making the world, even if the world 
admits of change.196 Rather, he suggests that time and space only come to exist when creation 
takes place.197 In other words, time is a result of the creation of formed matter; time does not come 
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to be without the motion of particular objects, changing from one thing into another.198 Thus 
Augustine:  
 
For, if eternity and time are rightly distinguished on the ground that time does not exist 
without some movement and change, while in eternity there is no change at all, who does not 
see that time would not exist if no creature had been made to bring about change by means 
of some motion? And who does not see that time is a function of this motion and change, 
when things that cannot exist simultaneously succeed each other at shorter or longer intervals 
of delay?199 
 
That is, if we begin from the notion that eternity is truly timeless and admits of no change, and 
that change only comes to be when matter is made, then that “mutable motion” from X into Y just 
is constitutive of time.200 Augustine punctuates this point when he writes that the world was not 
made in time but with time (procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore).201 
As Augustine writes, “But there could not have been any time that had passed, because there was 
no created being to provide the change and motion of which time is a function.”202 
As in the previously discussed works, a cosmology of creation provides the basis for a 
hierarchical and theological theory of knowledge. Augustine speaks of the creation of light (Fiat 
lux) as the creation of the angels, who are illumined by the eternal light of wisdom, which he 
proceeds to identify with the Son, through whom all things were made.203 Moreover, the angels 
become participants in Christ as the eternal day by sharing in his light.204 Christ is the source of 
all being and light, and all creatures rely on him for this.205  
In contrast to the angels, “qui semper uident faciem Patris,”206 the human soul knows in 
and through time, but is nonetheless illumined by the divine light. Certain things are perceived by 
the mind or the soul (animo ac mente sentiuntur), and this is enabled by an incorporeal light (in 
illo incorporeo lumine).207 Augustine speaks of our senses, both interior and exterior, stating that 
God is available to neither (a sensibus nostris, siue interioribus siue etiam exterioribus).208 God 
speaks to man in neither a corporeal nor a spiritual way, insofar as God does not speak to the soul 
in a way which relies upon corporeal images or the similitudes thereof in the mind.209 (In the next 
chapter we shall see how this reflects Augustine’s tripartite understanding of vision as he presents 
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it in Gn. litt. 12.) Rather, he speaks by the truth itself (ipsa ueritate), though he is only heard by 
those who are fit to hear this mentally (si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore).210 
(Here we see the dynamic of the principal and the gradual at work.) God speaks to the part of the 
person which is not only highest in its own nature, but which is surpassed only by God: “Ad illud 
enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine ceteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse 
Deus solus est melior.”211 This capacity of the soul, whether one call it mind or intellect, is 
constituted by the image of God within the soul, in virtue of which the human person is superior 
to the other parts of creation.212 This part of one’s human nature marks one as unique.213 
The foregoing case studies reveal a consistent view of time and creation spanning several 
decades of Augustine’s career. For Augustine, time is ultimately a result of finite, material 
creation, and only makes sense in light of eternity. Here we have an illustration of how 
Augustine’s understanding of knowledge is theologically grounded. An interest in knowledge and 
reason is not far from his mind when he discusses such issues. For example, the hierarchy of 
creation also reflects different ways in which one knows. What Augustine finds remarkable is 
how we are situated within the double extension of time and space, and yet our thought is 
conditioned by that which transcends it. He is driven to understand how these two apparently 
contradictory commitments can be reconciled with one another. The remarkable point is that on 
the basis of a theological commitment, Augustine derives significant implications for his theory 
of knowledge. It is also notable that he first seeks to describe the situation in which he finds 
himself. The significance of this will become clear once we have examined the way in which 
Augustine proposes to go beyond or counteract the obscuring effects of time. 
 
3.4. A RE-DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF TIME AS DISTENTIO 
 
As we have seen, Augustine sees an integral link between creation, matter, and time. As 
bodily creatures, we are inherently spatio-temporal. Indeed, for Augustine, time is a radical part 
of who we are as created beings; it is deeply ingrained in us, part of the logic of our existence; it 
is in our “ontological bones.” Augustine finds himself pulled apart in the relentless flow of time 
as the multiplying villainies of nature do swarm upon him,214 caught between time and eternity. 
For Augustine, time “perplexes and masters us,”215 and therefore requires extended and careful 
reflection in order properly to transcend it en route to the eternal God. This is easier said than 
done. Just as Augustine’s movement away from thinking of God as in the form of a human body 
still fell prey to materialistic categories, so too can the attempt to think God’s eternity still be 
subverted by temporal images. As he starts to grapple with the question of time in conf. 11, 
Augustine states that what seems to be distinctive of time is that it tends towards non-being (tendit 
non esse).216 Thus one can see again, just as in conf. 7.1.1, that like spatial extension, Augustine 
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sees time as a consequence of created being, which is nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse.217 
Because created being is ultimately mutable and constantly subject to deficiency, Augustine can 
be characterised as “un Heráclito cristiano.”218 Augustine proposes the hypothesis that time is like 
a stretching (uideo igitur quandam esse distentionem).219 Shortly thereafter, in conf. 11.26.33, 
Augustine solidifies this position of time as distentio based on an argument concerning the 
reciting of a poem and its constituent verses.220 As we shall see, memoria is necessary for the 
acquisition of sapientia. 
According to Augustine, time exerts an enervating effect on the soul. In virtue of its 
temporal extended-ness, the soul is pulled apart and never feels entirely whole. This ontic entropy 
has effects on the soul and its knowledge; it longs for an escape from such a troubled experience. 
As Augustine describes it, “[I] lost my desire to dissipate myself amid a profusion of earthly 
goods, eating up time as I was myself eaten by it; for in your eternal simplicity I now had a 
different wheat and wine and oil.”221 As he does in other locations, Augustine contrasts the many 
things of spatio-temporal existence with the unity and simplicity of God’s eternity.222 In order to 
know truth, the vision of the soul must be simple and unified, and it must aspire to the synthetic 
unity of God’s vision. This does not so much imply a sublation of the individual creatures of the 
world, but rather a simple, which is to say, parsimonious aspect, which enables one to make sense 
of the various facets of the world. Without the correct framework, one is epistemically upset by 
the constant stream of images and facts, which do not on the surface bespeak any deeper unity or 
meaning.223 
Thoughts of this sort are behind his discussion of time and memoria in the latter books of 
the conf. Augustine realises that the distention of the mind exerts a distressing effect on the soul, 
which must be suffered, yet also counteracted and ultimately overcome.224 In order to overcome 
this “entropy,” one must constantly and intentionally act to (re-)unify oneself by means of godly 
things, avoiding the dissolution caused by earthly ones. Hence Augustine in conf. calls for a 
“renovation of memory as intentio.”225 The memory for Augustine is necessary in order to know 
God, yet ultimately must be transcended. It provides the starting point, the necessary condition 
for temporal beings to arrive at the atemporal God.226 The merely passive collection of data and 
sense impressions does not suffice for knowledge; that requires mental activity, processing, and 
judgement, for which intentio supplies the necessary operation.227 A somewhat simplistic if not 
altogether unhelpful formulation would be that memoria pertains to the primarily passive 
collection of sense impressions, whereas intentio pertains to a deliberate and active operation of 
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the mind.228 Augustine uses various terms, such as intentio, extentus, and meditatio to denote a 
certain mental capacity for unifying various strands of information into a coherent whole.229 
Elsewhere in the conf., as O’Daly notes, the language of extension evokes the mystical ascent of 
Augustine with his mother.230 One is enabled to attain wisdom through meditation, which extends 
beyond mere memory.231 As Augustine writes in the narrative of the mystical experience at Ostia, 
“we extended ourselves, and by a swift thought we touched the eternal wisdom which is remaining 
over all things.”232 In conf. 11.29.39, Augustine identifies the necessity of intentio for arriving at 
knowledge.233 As Nightingale writes, it is by means of intentio that one is enabled to apply focused 
attention to memory and expectation, from which the mind derives meaning from the various 
images and strands of memories present therein.234 According to Nightingale, “intentio is an 
active and deliberate mode of attention that focuses on future plans and expectations. [...] the 
mind uses [intentio] to find scattered thoughts in the memory and collects them together to use in 
carrying out a planned action or to engage in analytic thinking.”235 
 Relevant here is Augustine’s distinction between two forms of memory, as explained by 
Jeanmart. That is, Augustine distinguishes between the memoria sui and the memoria Dei.236 The 
former pertains to the more common sense of the term memory, which allows one to recall past 
experiences.237 The latter, however, is more basic; Jeanmart describes it as the condition of 
possibility of the former, and describes it in terms of a basic cognisance of cosmic truths, such as 
an awareness of one’s origin.238 The memoria Dei represents a vestige which summons one back 
to unity with God.239 This trace is original, however, in that, as Jeanmart suggests, we do not so 
much discover it as rediscover it: “Il n’en reste que la trace, un vestige de Dieu […] vers laquelle 
on va tender désormais de sorte que l’on ne parvient pas tant à Dieu, à l’unité originelle, qu’on y 
revient.”240 We “remember” God by returning to our original unity, by seeing what was already 
there within us. Jeanmart emphasises that the presence of unity within us is merely a trace, a 
vestige, when our lives begin.241 We begin de facto in the midst of multiplicity and distention, yet 
we attempt to recover a unity which is imprinted on our memories.242 According to Jeanmart, 
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“C’est la mémoire elle-même qui constitue le témoignage de l’errance parce qu’elle est la 
puissance de ré-unification et, comme telle, elle débute son procès dans le multiple.”243 Jeanmart 
specifies a further epistemic implication of the memory. Because we begin to exist in the 
dispersion of time, we are always in a reflection of reality, always in the realm of representation, 
of the “less real.”244 
 This also pertains to the inherently ascetic dimension to knowledge in Augustine. The 
attainment of knowledge is also an ascetic process.245 Augustine inherits from Neoplatonism an 
ascetical dimension to his approach to wisdom.246 Knowledge and purification belong together, 
as purification entails dependency on God, not on oneself.247 In particular, one must purify oneself 
of the tendency to take the spatial and the temporal as the mark of the real.248 In a soul in which 
sin and division reign, the movement within is made dangerous and frightening. One does not 
wish to confront this and so the problem only festers. According to Chrétien, it takes a certain 
ascetic violence to impose divine peace on the soul: “Faire le paix en soi et avec soi, c’est purifier 
son cœur, faire le ménage dans sa chambre en le nettoyant de la cupidité, de l’avarice, de la 
superstition, des mauvaises pensées, de la haine. Elle peut devenir un lieu de silence, d’ordre et 
de paix.”249 
Augustine discovers within his memory certain capacities and potencies which enable 
him to judge, interpret, and process information, the reports of the senses. These standards of 
judgement did not originate in the senses, but rather allow him to interpret those reports, which 
are contained and stored in the memory.250 According to Nightingale, intentio involves focusing 
the mind on a particular aspect of memory, enabling certain of the images contained therein to 
become more unified and coherent, and thereby more meaningful. Whilst one’s intention does not 
promise an escape from the distention of temporal embodiment, it does nonetheless provide a way 
to mitigate some of its effects, in particular by directing the soul’s interior focus towards God, a 
directedness of looking that will be completed and perfected in heaven.251 Nightingale’s helpful 
explanation is worth quoting at length: 
 
Intentio gathers together disordered memories in its effort to construct a plan or an action 
that involves concentrated focus. But it can shape events only by actively focusing the mind 
on a specific set of memories and expectations. It does not overcome distention; rather, it 
offers a more coherent experience of time. Working against mental clutter, it uses specific 
memories and expectations to carry out activities that allow one to worship God (e.g., by 
controlling one’s body, helping one’s neighbor, etc.). In short, it directs and concentrates the 
mind but cannot overcome distention or integrate the psyche. Only God will gather together 
and unify the psyche at the end of time. On earth, humans must use intentio as a way to stay 
focused on God and on activities that support this orientation. Intentio works against 
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distractions and interruptions and, for brief periods, can reduce the feeling of being scattered 
and torn apart in time.252 
 
The upshot of Augustine’s enquiry in conf. 11 is what I call a “re-descriptive” account of 
time as distentio. By re-descriptive I mean the following: Augustine begins from certain 
foundational principles and observed phenomena, and attempts to account for these, thinking 
about the conditions of their possibility.253 In other words, what do the experiences of our knowing 
within time and space imply about our condition as finite rational agents, as well as reality more 
broadly? We see some evidence for this in conf. 11.22.28, in which Augustine comments on the 
intuitive ease with which one speaks about time, especially the measurement thereof and the 
comparison of that with other stretches of time.254 Though we never question what we say, there 
are deeply perplexing aspects to this which are realised upon further reflection.255 In his article on 
Augustine and Heidegger on time, S. Hannan too notes how the primarily descriptive account of 
time in Augustine’s thought raises the question of the extent to which the normative does or 
should enter the discussion.256 For Hannan, the normative and descriptive are not ultimately 
separable, and that the latter can be propaedeutic for the former. “Before making 
recommendations,” writes Hannan, “about the way things should be, we have to open ours [sic] 
eyes to the way things ‘are.’”257 
What Augustine endeavours to do is not so much produce a normative or prescriptive 
account of what reason should or should not do. Rather, as I see it, Augustine formulates a re-
descriptive account of human knowing, working backwards in a sense. That is, he takes into 
consideration various observations, experiences, and other given facts, and tries to determine from 
them what must be the case about human knowing and identity, based in a Christian framework. 
Augustine is seeking to describe the way in which we know, and what he produces does so, but 
in a way that is at the same time novel and different, and goes beyond a mere intuitive reflection 
on the nature of knowledge. One thought might be that Augustine’s account, if it is truly 
descriptive, is therefore philosophically uninteresting. We can look at Anatolios’ thought, which 
he proposes in the specific context of the soul’s triune reflecting of the eternal Trinity: “As 
Augustine himself takes many occasions to point out, the triadic structure of human consciousness 
is far from self-evident, and the grasp of this structure is fraught with aporias and failures.”258 
Sometimes accounting for something is extremely challenging and difficult. Moreover, once this 
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account has been completed, it assumes a normative character, or serves as the foundation for a 
prescriptive programme that Augustine employs. For the (re-)descriptive account, in its synthetic 
nature, is not always perfectly reflected at the factual level. Augustine is also keenly aware of 
human limitations and sinfulness. Therefore, one ought to return to or further realise the faculty 
with which they have been endowed by God. As Menn helps to explain, the problem in arriving 
at knowledge of God does not lie with the object of our enquiry, but rather with us the enquirers.259 
Hence the very categories one uses in order to describe or account for a particular phenomenon 
are very telling. In the final analysis, however, Augustine maintains that our temporality must 
always be understood with respect to eternity, and any chance we have of true knowledge and 
peace is based there. As O’Regan inimitably explains this point, “It is in the Word that the 
evanescent syllables of our lives cohere into a sentence (3.10-12).”260 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing chapter has revealed the way in which Augustine’s understanding of 
sapientia as the source of creation leads to considerations of the nature of time. In other words, 
the eternal Wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, is eternal, yet also the source 
and summit of all knowledge. Augustine sees our temporal situation as an inherent part of who 
we are, and hence how we know. Time is a logical result of the movement of created things, which 
is to say that time and space are integrally linked. As we are corporeal, that is, we occupy space 
and are extended through time, we always exist at some remove from incorporeal things. 
However, such immaterial realities as love, beauty, and wisdom are perceived mentally. 
Somehow we do know them, or have some contact with them, such as pulchritudo, for example. 
In Part III I shall discuss the hope that Augustine sees for transcendence, for overcoming the 
limitations of this mortal coil, if only fleetingly. The tension described here leads Augustine to 
theorise about knowledge, just as the way in which we can or cannot see the invisible God leads 
him to a similar series of reflections on (intellectual) vision. As I see it, this is the logical 
counterpart to a discussion of time, as formed and formable space and matter form the created 
basis for time. It is to this topic that we now turn. 
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4. SEEING SAPIENTIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We began this enquiry by considering the meaning of sapientia in Augustine’s theology. 
Though this study was conducted according to a historical-critical and philological method, it was 
done with a view to disclosing insights of constructive theological interest. For Augustine, Christ 
is the wisdom of God, the principle of all reality, and likewise the agent of the re-creation of fallen 
human nature. Theological and cosmological considerations are by the same token considerations 
of epistemic relevance. I argued that that Augustine’s theology of wisdom, elaborated according 
to a Johannine logic, can be seen as the foundation for Augustine’s theory of knowledge, 
illumination. In virtue of being created in the image of God, we are endowed with a capacity for 
reason.1 Due to our corporeality and further complications caused by sin, however, we struggle 
in the exercise of this capacity, which is only truly corrected by the merits of Christ’s passion. 
This notion of reason is often couched in quasi-metaphorical terms, as Augustine speaks of the 
vision of the soul, the eyes of the heart, and such like. Whilst these are innate characteristics of 
the rational mind, they nonetheless stand in need of perfection and purgation. Augustine often 
speaks of eyes which have been clouded by sin or some other material element, and that they need 
to be cleansed in order to see properly, in order to have access to the light. Again, we see the 
“principal-gradual” schema reflected in this account of intellectual or mental vision. 
As scholars such as W. Otten and B. McGinn note, the idea of the vision of God (uisio 
Dei) is central to Augustine’s theory of knowledge.2 To name just a few examples, one can look 
to trin. 8.4.6, in which Augustine speaks of how one can grow closer to God and “see” him. This 
is only possible by the vision of the mind (mente), also making clear that such sight does not 
pertain to the empirical sense.3 In his fourth enarratio, Augustine links God's light with truth, and 
claims that it is not perceptible by one’s (physical) eyes, but only intellectually (mente 
conspicitur).4 In ciu., Augustine discusses the “incorporeal light” which shines in and illumines 
our minds, suggesting thereby a corresponding “incorporeal” sense of sight.5 To be human means 
to be imbued with the capacity to behold God. However, in one’s earthly existence one is not 
capable of doing so. According to Otten, this challenge of moving from the state of imperfect 
knowledge to beatitude becomes a crucial preoccupation for Augustine. Not only is this 
completed in heaven, but it also serves to imply, as I have been arguing, that illumination is 
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intrinsically possessed of a gradual element, which is to say, that knowledge always involves 
struggle and continuous progress towards the eschaton.6 
There is a second point of theological significance which directs us towards an enquiry 
into the nature of vision in Augustine’s thought. As we have seen with respect to incorporeality 
and eternity, Augustine is confronted with the challenge of how we as finite, embodied agents in 
time can aspire to some knowledge of the timeless God. The problem is similar when it comes to 
how we can “see” the invisible God, or his vestiges present in the created world. Indeed, in trin. 
12, Augustine states that one is able to perceive sapiential truths in virtue of their being subjoined 
to material things.7 In fact, Augustine confronts this question directly in certain parts of his corpus. 
In grappling with this fundamentally biblical conundrum, he provides us with a profound and 
nuanced reflection concerning the nature of vision and reason, which discloses further points of 
contemporary theological interest. 
 The task of the following chapter is to present a diachronic analysis of Augustine’s theory 
of vision, grounded in his understanding of wisdom. After presenting an overview of some key 
points involving Augustine’s understanding of the senses, I shall turn to three particular case 
studies in which he deals at length specifically with the topic of vision, namely in the twelfth book 
of his De Genesi ad litteram, his Epistula 147, and one of the closing sections of De ciuitate Dei 
(22.29.1-6). These three particular sources recommend themselves for several reasons. First of 
all, Augustine raises questions concerning vision in a specifically biblical-theological context. 
That is, he takes scripture as a point of departure for thinking about the meaning of human vision 
itself. This reveals how these thoughts on vision, in addition to being relevant to a discussion of 
sapientia, are also fundamentally influenced by Christian commitments. Additionally, these three 
particular texts are also situated at different points in Augustine’s life, and hence allow one to see 
a trajectory of development. Indeed, we see Augustine discussing various levels of vision his 
work on Genesis. Here he is concerned with intellectual vision and the way in which we perceive 
different intelligible realities in the sensible world, a point which becomes important especially 
in trin. 12. About two decades later, as Augustine is composing a response to the question of what 
the sight of God in the resurrection will be like, we see him using essentially the same categories 
of vision, but now applying these specifically to the sight of God. Here he introduces further 
biblical evidence to substantiate his view. He nuances his understanding of vision, in particular 
articulating more clearly the place of faith, as well as the eschatological element to the beatific 
vision and how it differs from our experience now. Finally, shortly before his death, we see in 
some of the final passages of ciu. how Augustine confirms his earlier views and even deepens 
them further, as he again reflects specifically on human sight in a spiritual and resurrected body. 
 
4.1. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
 
4.1.1 Augustine on the senses 
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Augustine follows the Aristotelian tradition of enumerating five types of bodily sense (nam 
cum sint quinque corporis sensus, cernendi, audiendi, olfaciendi, gustandi, tangendi).8 Man and 
beast alike share the five basic senses, which serve the function of discerning corporeal things 
(sensus corporalia discernendi).9 As Augustine suggests in Gn. litt., the sense of touch for 
example is closer to our animal nature, whereas hearing and vision are the pre-eminent senses of 
the body.10 Augustine concedes that even non-rational animals possess some capacity for sight 
and memory; in fact, he even sees the latter as an essentially “natural” faculty.11 As G. Boersma 
notes, what distinguishes the rational from the non-rational soul is the capacity to judge and to 
interrogate reality. Indeed, the capacity for judgment is the mark of true wisdom.12 The rational 
soul can judge “empirical data” in the sense that it can see this content as possessed of a deeper 
meaning and significance. Intellectual vision is distinctive of rational beings, of the anima 
rationalis (homines autem possunt interrogare).13 Ayres and O’Daly note that Augustine’s 
thought admits of a basic distinction between the higher soul and the lower soul, the former of 
which governs and judges the reports of the sense, which are collected in the lower part of the 
soul.14 In due course we shall see the way in which Augustine elaborates and articulates such a 
view, and the key drivers of that development. 
In locations such as Confessiones 10 and De libero arbitrio 2, Augustine distinguishes each 
physical sense based on the object proper to each. So for example, the perception of colour 
pertains to the eye, and the sense of olfaction pertains to the nose or the nostrils.15 In en. Ps. 146, 
Augustine briefly presents a line of thought he discusses at greater length in the second book of 
lib. arb. Even though two particular people in very different places think about number or justice, 
these forms can in principle be equally present to both of them simultaneously.16 Though this 
point is only fleetingly discussed in the enarratio, a careful look at lib. arb. reveals the following. 
Corporeal objects can only be sensed in an inherently limited way. For example, a particular 
morsel of a particular piece of cake can only be tasted at one time by one and the same person. 
Someone else could take another morsel, or taste the piece premasticated by someone else, but is 
nonetheless not the same.17 The way in which hearing and vision work is less bound to time and 
space, but is still limited by these conditions nonetheless. Many people can hear the same thing 
at the same time, even if each will hear it in slightly different ways and at slightly different times. 
A better example is vision. If Jones is looking at Michelangelo’s David from one side, Smith 
could look from that side, but his perspective will be slightly different, even if both are standing 
close together.18 One’s vision of immaterial realities, such as number, iustitia, or even sapientia, 
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however, is not limited or conditioned in this way, Augustine notes, an observation which 
bespeaks its incorporeal character.19 
However, Augustine makes clear that the logic of the corporeal senses does not carry over 
for the way in which the heart “senses,” and indeed, this is a distinguishing mark of intellectual 
perception. In conf. 10, Augustine presents a rather self-conscious reflection on the use of 
language in relation to the senses.20 He writes that one uses terms related to vision to apply both 
to the bodily or physical sense of sight, as well as in an intellectual sense of understanding 
something.21 However, what sets sight apart from the other senses is that the intellectual sense of 
sight seems to encompass all aspects of understanding or experiencing. Augustine bases this 
conclusion on a reflection on expressions such as “see this scent,” which according to the purely 
corporeal meaning of the word is absurd, especially given his idea that the bodily senses each 
have their own proper object. But intuitively for the sense of sight this does not seem at all 
strange.22 This observation suggests that there is another sense of “sense” at work in such 
locations. 
For Augustine, the heart is a central point of the human person, a sort of command centre, 
as it were. We see this logic at work especially in his eighteenth tractate on John’s Gospel. The 
heart overseas the operation of the various senses which each have their own function and object.23 
That is not so for the heart, to which all of the senses report. 
 
See how all the senses of the body may announce inwardly to the heart what they sense from 
the outside. See how many servants the one interior ruler may have, and what he may do on 
his own without these servants. […] The eyes report white things and black things to the 
heart; the ears report to the same heart melodious and dissonant things; the nostrils report to 
the same heart pleasant and unpleasant smells; tastes report to the same heart harsh and sweet 
things; touch announces to the same heart soft things and hard things.24 
 
Whilst in the body, we have different faculties of perception which sense different objects and in 
different ways, our inner sense is unified: “Show me the eyes, the ears, the nostrils of your heart. 
There are different things which are referred to your heart, but different members are not found 
there.”25 In the body, we hear in one way and see in another, whereas in the heart, hearing and 
seeing are not divisible: “Whilst in your flesh you hear in one way, and you see in another, in 
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your heart, where you see, you hear.”26 Returning to the original point which occasioned this 
extended reflection on the senses, Augustine uses these reflections as a basis for explaining how 
the Word can be said to “see” the Father doing certain things. In other words, if those who are 
made in the image of God perceive by the heart in ways which are not bound to the corporeal, 
then a fortiori so too can the original, the Son, and indeed, even more so (si hoc imago, quanto 
potentius ille cuius imago? Ergo et audit Filius, et uidet Filius, et ipsa uisio et auditio Filius).27 
Here we see an instance of Augustine’s method of scriptural reasoning, about which I shall say 
more presently. 
Augustine suggests that in the heart we also have eyes and ears of a certain sort (In 
corpore tuo inueniebas alibi oculos, alibi aures: in corde tuo numquid hoc inuenis? An in corde 
tuo non habes aures?: De quibus ergo Dominus dicebat: Qui habet aures audiendi, audiat? An in 
corde non habes oculos? Unde dicit Apostolus: Illuminatos oculos cordis uestri.).28 We possess 
within ourselves, indeed, within our hearts, the faculties whereby we can perceive and know God. 
Only within ourselves can we begin to know God, and Augustine states that it is because that is 
where his image is impressed: “Return to the heart, see there what you may perhaps perceive from 
God, that there is the image of God.”29 Our interiority and our exploration of our hearts is always 
already defined and conditioned within a context of the divine presence within (in interiore 
homine habitat Christus, in interiore homine renouaris ad imaginem Dei, in imagine sua 
cognosce auctorem eius).30 
As Chrétien explains, when it comes to the inner senses, there is a unity and a dynamism 
which surpasses the strictures of those of the body.31 As Augustine writes in trin. concerening 
interior perception,32 “it is not one thing to hear and another to see.” As in trin., Augustine in ep. 
Io. tr. suggests that the “spiritual” senses are not individual senses corresponding to their 
corporeal analogues; rather, they are different ways of speaking of one and the same inner 
capacity.33 Speaking of these various inner senses, Augustine states that “there are not parts 
distinct through places, but the one who has charity sees the whole by the intellect.”34 One can 
see invisible things, such as the virtues of one’s soul, by some other type of eye (alio oculo 
uidentur), not by the “normal” sense of sight.35 This interior sense of sight is a certain gaze of the 
heart (interiori cordis aspectu).36 Augustine also employs the language of a “cordial ear,” by 
means of which one understands the content of scripture (audistis modo, cum Euangelium 
legeretur; certe si aurem ibi non tantum corporis, sed et cordis habuistis).37 
                                                          
26 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. “In carne tua alibi audis, alibi uides: in corde tuo ibi audis, ubi uides.”  
27 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. 
28 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. 
29 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. “Redi ad cor; uide ibi quid sentias forte de Deo, quia ibi est imago Dei.”  
30 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. 
31 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 45. In this respect, Chrétien quotes Paul Claudel’s curious formulation, 
“l’œil écoute.” (Ibid., 45.) 
32 trin. 15.10.18, CCSL 50A, p. 485: “non est aliud atque aliud uidere et audire.” 
33 ep. Io. tr. 7.10, PL 35, pp. 2033-4. 
34 ep. Io. tr. 7.10, PL 35, p. 2034: “Non sunt membra distincta per locos, sed intellectu totum simul uidet qui 
habet caritatem.”  
35 ep. Io. tr. 8.1, PL 35, p. 2036. 
36 ep. Io. tr. 8.1, PL 35, p. 2036. 
37 ep. Io. tr. 8.2, PL 35, p. 2036. 
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Augustine’s understanding of the inner unity of sensation helps to explain why he speaks 
of “touching” God, especially when he is so committed to the immateriality of the divine being, 
as well as the idea that tactile sensation is closer to our animal nature. Furthermore, according to 
Cilleruelo, Augustine found the language of touching particularly compelling, as it allowed him 
to capture two aspects of his understanding of intellectual vision which were crucial to him.38 
First, it provided him with a sense of active searching on the part of the rational subject.39 
Secondly, it provided him with the language fit for expressing the partial touch that one enjoys 
with respect to an object, that touching does not completely grasp the thing but only a part of it.40 
Just as there is a different version of “sense” as it pertains to one’s heart or one’s mind, so 
too are there different objects of this vision. The heart, in addition to supervising the function of 
the senses, also has operations of its own which do not rely on the senses and perceive objects 
apart from any corporeal determination: “The heart itself also reports to itself just and unjust 
things. Your heart both sees and hears, and judges other sensible things; and where the senses of 
the body do not aspire, the heart discerns just things and unjust things, evil and good things.”41 
The return to oneself, in this case, to one’s heart, is contrasted with exterior ways, which entail a 
wandering from God and truth (redite ad cor: quid itis a uobis, et peritis ex uobis? quid itis 
solitudinis uias? Erratis uagando; redite).42 This point is made clear when Augustine asks where 
one should go (redite. Quo? Ad Dominum).43 The inward turn, the movement to one’s heart, is at 
the same time a movement to God. Moreover, Augustine establishes an integral link between 
knowledge of God and knowledge of oneself, and it is this link which is at the heart of his 
admonition that one should return within: “first return to your heart, you as an exile wander 
outwardly from yourself; you have not known yourself, yet you seek the one by whom you were 
made!”44 In this respect, we also get a sense of why the return to the heart also requires a 
separation from corporeal things (redi, redi ad cor, tolle te a corpore; and dimitte et corpus tuum, 
redi ad cor tuum).45 
We can find a similar discussion in lib. arb., in which Augustine discusses how he perceives 
such properties as “unity” in things. However, it seems that he does not have any “empirical” 
experience of the oneness of things, since various things are composed of manifold parts. In fact, 
it seems to be the other way around: some concept of unity seems to be required in order to have 
intelligible experience at all. As Augustine writes, “Accordingly, we acknowledge that no bodily 
reality is one, truly and simply, and yet it would be impossible to enumerate so many parts within 
                                                          
38 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 5. 
39 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 5. 
40 Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 5. 
41 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186: “renuntiat et sibi ipsum cor iusta et iniusta. Cor tuum et uidet et audit, 
et caetera sensibilia diiudicat; et quo non aspirant corporis sensus, iusta et iniusta, mala et bona discernit.”  
42 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. 
43 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. 
44 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186: “primo redi ad cor tuum, exsul a te uagaris foris; teipsum non nosti, et 
quaeris a quo factus es!”  
45 Io. eu. tr. 18.10, CCSL 36, p. 186. For more on the theme of interiority in Augustine, see, e.g.: Charles T. 
Mathewes, “Augustinian Anthropology: Interior intimo meo,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 27.2 (Summer 1999): 
195-221; Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung, “Le moi et l’interiorité chez Augustin et Descartes,” Chora: Journal of Ancient 
and Medieval Studies 9/10 (2011-2012): 321-38; David Peddle, “Re-Sourcing Charles Taylor’s Augustine,” 
Augustinian Studies 32:2 (2001): 207-17; Thomas Harmon, “Reconsidering Charles Taylor’s Augustine,” Pro Ecclesia 
20:2 (2011): 185-209; Emmanuel Housset, “L’invention de la personne par saint Augustin et la métaphysique 
contemporaine,” Quaestio 6 (2006): 463-82; Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’espace intérieur (Paris: Minuit, 2014). 
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the body unless these were differentiated by the concept of one.”46 Augustine identifies an idea, 
namely “oneness,” which we do not experience by means of the senses and which we presuppose 
in making judgements about the material world. From this observation, Augustine derives the 
following conclusion: 
 
Consequently, when I recognise that a bodily reality is not one, I know the meaning of one; 
otherwise, I could not number the many parts in the body. Wherever it is that I come to know 
one, I certainly do not know it by the bodily senses, for by these I know only bodies, which, 
as we have shown, are not one, truly and simply.47 
 
In a work composed several years after lib. arb., Augustine makes a similar point concerning 
number and our apparently intimate awareness of it, insofar as it conditions our thought and seems 
inseparable from the “empirical” realities we observe. As Augustine writes in conf. 10, we judge 
numeral instances in the world according to an innate knowledge of number itself; in fact, the 
latter provides the very condition which enables one to perceive particular objects in the world. 
The numbers which we enumerate (quos numeramus) when we count are the instances of those 
numbers by which we count (quibus numeramus), and these latter, Augustine suggests, exceed 
the corporeal senses: “I have even sensed the numbers which we count by all the senses of the 
body; but they are different, the numbers by which we count, they are not the images of them and 
therefore exist to a great degree.”48 By adding that these “intelligible numbers” exist in a supreme 
way (ualde sunt), Augustine is suggesting a certain link between number and the divine mind, 
namely that the latter causes the instantiation of the former in reality, and because of our own 
creation ad imaginem Dei, our mental faculties are constructed in such a way that we can perceive 
such properties instantiated in physical states of affairs.49 God’s being is reflected in nature, in 
particular in terms of its beauty (forma, species) and its unity (numerus). The very unity and 
formal identity of a particular being just is the divine uestigium present in it.50 This will become 
a focal point in Part III. 
 We read a similar line of thought in an opuscule which Augustine composed around the 
same time as his conf., ca. 400, De fide rerum inuisibilium. In this work, we again see Augustine 
grappling with the problem of vision and its highly “intentional” character. Herein Augustine 
describes a certain type of perception, the objects of which exceed the “merely empirical” (aliena 
sit ab istorum conspectibus oculorum).51 In this work, he operates with a notion of sight admitting 
of two aspects, one corporeal, and the other intellectual. For example, he speaks of the sight 
(aciem) of the flesh (carnis) and of the mind (mentis), respectively.52 Likewise, whilst sometimes 
                                                          
46 lib. arb. 2.8.22, CSEL 74, p. 58: “propterea nullum corpus uere pureque unum esse concedimus, in quo 
tamen non possent tam multa numerari nisi illius unius cognitione discreta.” Trans. Russell, p. 131. 
47 lib. arb. 2.8.22, CSEL 74, p. 58: “Ubi ergo noui quod non est corpus unum, quid sit unum noui; ubi enim 
si non nossem, multa in corpore numerare non possem. Ubicumque autem unum nouerim, non utique per corporis 
sensum noui; quia per corporis sensum non noui nisi corpus, quod uere pureque unum non esse conuincimus.” Trans. 
Russell, p. 131. 
48 conf. 10.12.19, CCSL 27, p. 165: “sensi etiam numeros omnibus corporis sensibus, quos numeramus; sed 
illi alii sunt, quibus numeramus, nec imagines istorum sunt et ideo ualde sunt.”  
49 Giraud, “Signum et vestigium,” 265, 266-7. 
50 Giraud, “Signum et vestigium,” 263. 
51 f. inuis. 1, CCSL 46, p. 1. 
52 f. inuis. 2, CCSL 46, p. 3. 
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one perceives by the bodily eyes (corporeis oculis), sometimes one sees by (means of) the mind 
(ipso animo uides; cernis animo tuo).53 Indeed, each type of vision has its own proper object: 
corpora praesentia for the flesh, cogitationes and uoluntates for the mind.54 
 In f. inuis., Augustine moves fluidly between formulations according to which there are 
different types or sets of senses (e.g., corporeis oculis),55 and those according to which it is the 
individual as a unified entity perceiving by means of different aspects of the same faculty. In the 
aforementioned passage from conf. 10, we see both formulations, and a clear instance of the latter 
type as well. For instance, when he is speaking of number, Augustine recounts how he has come 
to this knowledge: “The interior man has known these things through the service of the exterior; 
I the interior man have known these things, I, I the mind through the sense of my body.”56 (In Part 
III we shall again encounter this passage and see a further point of significance to it.) He reiterates 
that it was he himself who saw and cognised the “formal property” of number, which “is” to a 
higher degree. This suggests a close link between the corporeal and the intellectual sense of sight.  
This is essentially the point that Augustine makes in the twelfth book of trin. Though number, for 
example, transcends the five bodily senses, it is nonetheless communicated through them in a 
certain way: 
 
The conclusion we should rather draw is that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so 
established by the disposition of its creator that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the 
order of nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non-bodily light that is sui generis, 
just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us in this bodily light, a light they 
were created to be receptive of and to match.57 
 
These “intelligibles” are formal properties, truths which are not merely “empirical.” Yet in order 
for the mind to have access to them, these must be connected to something of the natural order, 
for otherwise one would not be able to perceive it at all. Harrison has noted that in his theory of 
cognition Augustine relies on an important if subtle distinction between that which pleases the 
senses and that which pleases through the senses.58 In a more contemporary idiom, we could 
speak about the instantiation of certain properties in physical states of affairs. As Harrison puts it, 
“the factum contains the mysterium.”59 
 The principal-gradual logic I discussed previously is also present in Augustine’s doctrine 
of vision. That is, one possesses eyes of the heart or of the mind which are capable of perceiving 
certain objects, but these eyes often need to be healed or cleansed in order to actualise this superior 
sense of sight. Augustine’s use of purgatio figures prominently in contexts connected to 
                                                          
53 Consider also f. inuis. 2, CCSL 46, p. 3: “aut extrinsecus corpore aut intrinsecus corde.” 
54 See also William Blake’s “The Everlasting Gospel,” in which he writes, “This life’s five windows of the 
soul/Distorts the Heavens from pole to pole,/And leads you to believe a lie/When you see with, not thro’, the eye.” 
55 f. inuis. 2, CCSL 46, p. 2. 
56 conf. 10.6.9, CCSL 27, p. 160: “Homo interior cognouit haec per exterioris ministerium; ego interior 
cognoui haec, ego, ego animus per sensum corporis mei.”  
57 trin. 12.15.24, CCSL 50, p. 378: “sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam 
ut rebus intellegibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subiuncta sic ista uideat in quadam luce sui generis 
incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis uidet quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique 
congruens est creatus.” Trans. Hill, p. 336. 
58 Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, 18. 
59 Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, 66. 
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intellectual vision, which provides an image for the Christian life as a whole. Purgation is required 
in order for one to be illumined (purgate cor, et ipse illuminet).60 The light of purgation is a 
qualitatively different type of light which pertains to the mind (sed lux mentium purgatarum, non 
istorum corporis oculorum).61 This divine light requires a cleansed mind in order to be perceived 
(non lumen commune hominibus et pecoribus, sed lumen quod angelis lucet, lumen cui uidendo 
corda purgantur).62 One contemplates the eternal light of truth by an exceedingly purged mind.63 
The mind must be purged in order to discern God’s presence in creation, as well as to hold to that 
light once it has been seen: “the soul must be purged, so that it can both be strong enough to see 
that light and to hold to it once it has been seen.”64 
God purges the eye of the heart, that eye by which he can be seen.65 It is one thing for 
something to be understood by a purged mind (intelleguntur mente purgata), and another for it to 
be demonstrated to the (corporeal) eyes.66 The former pertains to understanding things about God 
which challenge our spatio-temporal categories of perception, such as the understanding of the 
Son’s co-eternity with the Father.67 Just as one’s physical eyes cannot see if they are clouded, so 
too with those of the heart or the mind. One who believes in God must purge the mind of (false) 
opinions and errors (ab his igitur opinionibus et erroribus purget animum, qui credit in 
omnipotentem Deum).68 Augustine suggests that Christ the medicus commands one to purge one’s 
eyes from sin and other obstructions which prevent one from seeing.69 Just as the eye needs to be 
clear in order to see the sun, so too the mind for seeing the light of God. One’s intellectual vision 
is purged from whatever nos impedit ab aspectu Dei.70 Purgation is required for proper 
reasoning.71 The Christian life prepares the mind for the full vision of spiritual truths (mentem 
purgabit uitae modus diuinis praeceptis conciliatus et idoneam faciet spiritalibus percipiendis).72 
One’s intellect, once purged, aids one in arriving at truth (per intellectum purgatum).73 Truth 
exercises a pacifying and purgative effect on the soul (ueritatis serenitate purgatur).74  
Purification is required for the soul to perceive the spiritual things of God75 and enables 
contemplation.76 This is necessary for intellectual sight, and in a high degree for the “perception” 
                                                          
60 en. Ps. 30.2.3.8, CCSL 38, p. 218. See also en. Ps. 61.11, CCSL 39, p. 782: “ut purgatam a sordibus ueniat 
ad lucem”; and en. Ps. 124.9, CCSL 40, p. 1843: “siue purgantem, siue illuminantem.” 
61 ep. 92.2, CSEL 34,2, pp. 437-8. 
62 s. 189.1, MA 1, p. 209. 
63 spir. et litt. 41, CSEL 60, p. 194: “qui nondum aeternam lucem perspicuae ueritatis mente purgatissima 
contemplatur.” 
64 doct. chr. 1.10, SIMONETTI, p. 30: “purgandus est animus, ut et perspicere illam lucem ualeat et inhaerere 
perspectae.”  
65 doct. chr. 2.11, SIMONETTI, p. 86: “ipsum oculum purgat, quo uideri Deus potest;” “purgat oculum 
cordis.” 
66 s. Denis 11.4, MA 1, p. 46. 
67 s. Denis 11.4, MA 1, pp. 45-6. 
68 s. 214.2, RB 72 (1962), p. 15. 
69 Io. eu. tr. 1.19, CCSL 36, p. 11. 
70 s. 88.5, RB 94 (1984), p. 79. See also s. 4.7, CCSL 41, p. 24: “conamini ergo uidere talem lucem. Sed non 
potestis. Palpitat mentis acies, purgetur ut uideat. Ut autem purgetur et uideat, credat ut purgari mereatur.” 
71 util. cred. 33, CSEL 25,1, pp. 41-2. 
72 uera rel. 13, CCSL 32, p. 196. 
73 doct. chr. 2.17, SIMONETTI, p. 98; cf. uera rel. 47. 
74 s. 153.10, PL 38, p. 830. 
75 s. Dom. m. 1.11, CCSL 35, pp. 9-11. 
76 en. Ps. 25.2.3, CCSL 38, p. 143. 
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of God, the Good itself: “that fullest good which is seen by exceedingly purged minds.”77 
Intellectual vision (uerum illum aspectum aciemque) requires cleansing since, though in principle 
one can see spiritual things by this type of sight, it requires purgation in order to be perfected. In 
certain locations, Augustine employs a subjunctive form of purgo, the use of which places an 
emphasis on this gradual and heretofore unrealised acquisition of a clear vision.78 An exceedingly 
purged piety (purgatissima pietate) is necessary for knowing God as the principium of all 
reality.79 The purged sight of the mind (purgata mentis acies) allows one to know the Incarnate 
Christ as equal to God the Father.80 Christ as the Son taking flesh can only be seen by the heart, 
and indeed, one which has been exceedingly purged (non nisi purgatissimo et simplicissimo corde 
uideatur).81 Christ in this way is not known humanae menti nondum purgatae.82 In the 
Incarnation, Christ condescends to our human weakness so that we may be purged and come to 
know him as the Divine Word (ut purger ad illud contemplandum, infirmitati meae ipse 
subuenit).83 Humility is a necessary precondition of the purgation offered through Christ, the true 
mediator, as he only purges the humble, indeed, those who reflect his own humility.84 Purification 
through the mediator is necessary for the perception of him; he can only be known by those who 
are exceedingly purged (purgatissimis).85 Augustine also suggests that a purged mind is connected 
with understanding the divine word in the prophets.86 
Augustine finds inspiration for his thought on purgation and vision in Matthew 5, the 
Sermon on the Mount. Suggesting a distinction between corporeal sight and spiritual vision, he 
describes the clean of heart of the Beatitudes as those who perceive by a purgato oculo: 
“understanding belongs to those who are pure of heart as if to a purged eye, by which that may 
be able to be seen which the bodily eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has arisen in the heart of 
man.”87 The light of the sun corresponds to the corporeal eyes which, though in principle they can 
see this light, need to be purged and clear in order to do so.88 Likewise, God emits a spiritual light 
which constitutes the object of another type of vision. Again, though one in principle can perceive 
this kind of light, one’s vision must nonetheless be purged: “if we would wish to see that sun, we 
would purge the eye of the body, whence the light is able to be seen; we who are willing to see 
God should purge the eye by which God is able to be seen.”89 Purification enables us to come to 
                                                          
77 trin. 1.4, CCSL 50, p. 31: “illud summum bonum quod purgatissimis mentibus cernitur.”  Cf. acad. 3.27. 
See also trin. 1.3, CCSL 50, p. 30: “necessaria purgatio mentis nostrae qua illud ineffabile ineffabiliter uideri possit.” 
78 c. ep. Man. 42.48, CSEL 25,1, p. 248:  “Verum illum aspectum aciemque purgemus, qua cernitur, quantum 
in hac uita licet, quid sit iustum, quid pium, quae sit sapientiae pulchritudo: quae quisquis cernit, praeponit longe 
omnium localium spatiorum plenitudini; et sentit, ut ista cernat, non per locorum spatia diffundi aciem mentis suae, sed 
incorporea potentia stabiliri.” 
79 uera rel. 1.1, CCSL 32, p. 187. 
80 s. 143.3, PL 38, p. 786; see also s. 126.14. 
81 c. Adim. 9, CSEL 25,1, p. 132. 
82 ep. 242.4, CSEL 57, p. 566. 
83 s. Dolbeau 22.10, DOLBEAU, Vingt-six, p. 563. 
84 s. Dolbeau 26.38, DOLBEAU, Vingt-six, pp. 395-6. 
85 s. Dolbeau 26.38, DOLBEAU, Vingt-six, pp. 395-6. 
86 c. Faust. 12.46, CSEL 25,1, pp. 374-5. However, the idea that God is invisible is also present in the Greeks. 
87 s. Dom. m. 1.11, CCSL 35, p. 10: “intellectus congruit mundis corde tamquam purgato oculo, quo cerni 
possit quod corporeus oculus non uidit nec auris audiuit nec in cor hominis ascendit.”  
88 Cf. Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustin,” 4. 
89 ep. Io. tr. 7.10, PL 35, p. 2034: “si solem istum uidere uellemus, oculum corporis purgaremus, unde uideri 
lux potest; uolentes uidere Deum, oculum quo Deus uideri potest, purgemus.”  See also s. 4.4, CCSL 41, p. 21: “non 
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a certain mental grasp of God (mente) by cleansing our intellectual faculties, the mind and the 
(eye of) the heart.90 The face of God can be seen only by the eye of the heart, not of the flesh, and 
indeed, this inner eye must be purged, for God only reveals himself to those who are purged: “he 
wishes to show his face to those who are purged, not to the eye of the flesh, but the eye of the 
heart.”91 
 
4.1.2 The Vision of God 
 
Augustine shows particular interest in the OT theophanies as loci theologici for thinking 
about vision, especially the vision of God. In this respect he is very similar to Ambrose. It is no 
accident that both thinkers were particularly compelled by these divine appearances. According 
to Studer, the discussions of the theophanies in Ambrose and Augustine must be understood 
within the context of the Council of Sirmium in 351 and the struggle against Photinus and 
Arianism.92 The real debate over the proper interpretation of the OT theophanies had been 
introduced in 351 within the context of the condemnation of Photinianism.93 Studer writes that 
Basil of Ancyra and the western Eusebians intended to refute Photinus’ denial of the pre-existence 
of Christ by linking the OT theophanies with the appearance of the Son. In so doing, however, 
they read these theophanies in a subordinationist sense.94 This is what Ambrose and Augustine 
wanted to counter, to present an “orthodox” reading of the OT theophanies, and indeed, to 
integrate this reading with certain passages in the NT.95 For Studer, this is the crucial context in 
which to situate ep. 147.96 
Augustine understands God’s invisibility as a result of his transcendence, which then calls 
for some explanation for how he was seen, as it is recorded in the scriptures.97 In s. 6, Augustine’s 
exegesis of the Mosaic theophany provides the occasion for a brief reflection on the perception 
of God by the corporeal senses: “If when God wished to appear to the bodily eyes of the saints, 
as much as he is able to be sensed by that flesh, he appeared either through himself but through 
some visible and sensible creature, or through a sounding voice, that is, to the ears.”98 Augustine 
holds that God cannot be sensed by human persons in virtue of his transcendent, incorporeal, 
immutable divine nature. Drawing upon Johannine passages, he describes God as a qualitatively 
different sort of light, not perceptible by carnal eyes (nec potest esse nota oculis carnis).99 This 
type of light, writes Augustine, is that of which John speaks in the prologue, the light of 
                                                          
uidetur oculis corporis, sed purgata acie mentis. Beati mundo corde [ Mt 5:8 ]. Ad quam uisionem beati sunt? Quoniam 
ipsi Deum uidebunt.” 
90 Cf. Parsons, Freud and Augustine in Dialogue, 63-4. 
91 s. Mai 15.4, CCSL 41, p. 305: “faciem suam uult ostendere purgatis, non oculo carnis, sed oculo cordis.”  
92 Studer, Zur Theophanie-Exegese Augustins, 8. 
93 Studer, Zur Theophanie-Exegese Augustins, 37; cf. Watson, “St Augustine and the Inner Word,” 90. 
94 Studer, Zur Theophanie-Exegese Augustins, 8. 
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illumination. God dwells in inaccessible light, and his light is that of truth (ueritas), wisdom 
(sapientia), and righteousness (iustitia).100 Augustine hints at the qualitatively different character 
of God, at which one arrives only in the eschaton.101 This Johannine sentiment resonates soon 
thereafter in s. 4, where Augustine states that the “joy of the Creator” (gaudium creatoris) is not 
perceived by means of corporeal vision (non uidetur oculis corporis) but by a certain sight of the 
mind (acie mentis).102 
In s. 6, Augustine states that because of our incapacity to “perceive” God directly, he 
adopts some sensible form, for instance, in the OT theophanies, so that he could be perceived. 
Sapientia deigns (dignatur) to become visible by assuming flesh, a physical thing which is proper 
to one’s corporeal sense of vision.103 Whilst remaining always divine, Christ assumes a human 
nature such that one can see him through this and ultimately come to know him as he is, as much 
as is possible in this life, and completely in the next.104 While remaining God, Christ assumes 
human nature in order to render assistance to his fallen creation.105 In s. 5, Augustine sees the 
meaning of Noli me tangere as pointing to the constant need to remember that Christ is no “mere” 
man: “Do not touch me carnally, but such as I am equal to the Father.”106 Grace illumines one, 
enabling one to know and understand Christ as he truly is, i.e., as equal to the Father. To see 
Christ this way is truly to see him Augustine says, citing Paul to support his position: “After his 
grace illumined us, we understood that the Word is equal to the Father.”107 
So whilst God can only be seen by the vision of the mind (acie mentis), Augustine 
appends the qualifier purgata, suggesting that this sight can be more or less complete.108 A similar 
issue is addressed in s. 6, in which Augustine appeals to a passage from Christ’s Sermon on the 
Mount as a “proof text,” which reads that the pure of heart are blessed, for they shall see God 
(beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum uidebunt).109 Indeed, Matthew 5:8 is a favourite passage 
for Augustine, who often appeals to this verse in contexts in which he is discussing vision or 
reason, and in particular the purgation of the mind.110 In the fullness of his divine substance, God 
can only be seen by the clean of heart: “God does not deign to appear through his substance, as 
he is, except to the clean of heart, for thus it is written in the Gospel, ‘Blessed are the pure of 
heart, for they shall see God.’”111 The discussion of certain of the sermones here is no coincidence; 
as Berrouard suggests, there is an ecclesial dimension to intellectual vision which is presented in 
Augustine’s homilies. Through prayer and the reading of scripture, the faithful will turn from the 
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habit of seeing according to worldly standards and begin to perceive by their cordial sense of sight 
objects which are invisible to the bodily eye.112 
 From the foregoing survey, we have discovered a few key points to keep in mind as we 
proceed with this study of Augustine’s take on vision. He understands the bodily senses as diverse 
and each oriented towards their own object. In contrast, an inner sense of vision is far different 
from these, as it is holistic and possesses its own type of objects. Hence we perceive certain formal 
realities through and not with the bodily eyes. Indeed, these structuring principles provide the 
basis for sight in the first place. Fact and value are combined inseparably for Augustine, and this 
is a major theme that not only runs throughout his oeuvre, but also provides a basis for his 
understanding of vision, with particular respect to the vision of God. However, one must always 
remember that even if the “factum contains the mysterium,”113 it does not exhaust it. 
Augustine emphasises that by taking flesh, Christ never ceased to be God, remaining 
divine (manens id quod Verbum Dei est).114 According to Augustine, Christ came in the flesh so 
that he might lead us to the knowledge that he is God. Augustine sees this as the very logic behind 
the Incarnation itself: the eternal Son of God condescends to our human level, making himself 
visible, assuming a form “lesser” than that of the Father (minorem Patre),115 yet in virtue of this 
human nature, using it as a way of conducting the pious to the belief that he is also God. It allows 
them to see his divinity, precisely in virtue of his humility and presence in the flesh. All of the 
iudicandi will see Christ as the Son of Man, that is, in his human nature, forma serui (uisio quippe 
filii hominis exhibebitur et malis; uisio communis erit et impiis et iustis).116 Augustine writes that 
since all the living and the dead are to be judged, it is fitting (oportet) that the judge, who is Christ, 
will appear in a way that all can perceive him (in forma uideri ab omnibus potest).117 However, 
those who have listened to the voice of Christ and have believed in the Incarnation will be shown 
the fullness of his being, that is, not only as the son of man (filius hominis), but also as the son of 
God (uisio formae Dei non nisi mundis corde; uidere iniqui non possunt).118 
In my estimation, in trin. 1, Augustine is claiming that two (types of) people can look at 
the same object and perceive it differently. Although all rational creatures possess this capacity 
for judgement,119 some use it to a greater or more excellent extent than others. This point suggests 
that nature is also saying or speaking something, but one person “hears” it, whilst another does 
not. The difference between the two, according to Augustine, is that the one who really “hears” 
the testimony of nature compares the reports of the senses with the truth which resides within one: 
“indeed, it always speaks to everyone, but they understand, who compare the voice received from 
the outside with the truth on the inside.”120 
                                                          
112 Berrouard, Introduction aux Homélies, 52. 
113 Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, 66. 
114 s. 6.5, CCSL 41, p. 64. 
115 trin. 1.13.30, CCSL 50, p. 74. 
116 trin. 1.13.30, CCSL 50, p. 74. 
117 trin. 1.13.30, CCSL 50, p. 75. 
118 trin. 1.13.30, CCSL 50, p. 75. 
119 Cf. Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 250; uera rel. 31.58, CCSL 32, p. 225; conf. 10.6.10, 
CCSL 27, p. 160. 
120 conf. 10.6.10, CCSL 27, p. 160: “immo uero omnibus loquitur, sed illi intellegunt, qui eius uocem 
acceptam foris intus cum ueritate conferunt.” 
Seeing Sapientia 
138 
What is suggested by such passages is a more nuanced notion of sight than that to which 
we are accustomed. By the same token, it also suggests a more nuanced way of thinking about 
the relationship between the “empirical” and the intentional. Augustine’s theory of knowledge is 
one which proceeds per corporalia ad incorporalia.121 It is tempting to separate these two 
movements in a temporal fashion, but that need not be the case. Rather, these are two aspects or 
two moments of the same act of looking. The corporalia, which are accessible to the “bodily 
senses,” provide the substrate, the forum for the perception of meaningful, valuable content. They 
are co-extensive, but the full content of a particular factum is not always perceived due to an 
inadequacy in one’s own intentional way of looking, whether in terms of moral impurity, 
theoretical commitments, or some such.122 In the next part of this enquiry, we shall see how 
Gadamer approximates a view of reason and vision which also links the “empirical” and the 
“theoretical.” 
As we shall see, in ciu. 22 in particular, Augustine maintains the eschatological character 
of the beatific vision. Even purged intellectual vision is limited in this life.123 Rationality, and 
indeed, the purification thereof, entails a certain eschatological element. One’s growth in rational 
knowledge, ultimately points beyond earthly knowledge and even knowledge of formal realities, 
but to the beatific vision itself (mentes quippe rationales purgatae gratia eius possunt peruenire 
ad eiusmodi uisionem, qua nec superius quicquam sit nec beatius).124 The eschatological element 
to this vision is clear, as Augustine includes the qualification regarding as much as such vision 
may be permitted in this life: “let us purge that true aspect and sight, by which is seen, as much 
as it is possible in this life, what is just, what is holy, which is the beauty of wisdom.”125 
Before turning to the case studies, I shall examine two particular (potential) sources for 
Augustine’s theory of vision. The first is Plato’s Theaetetus. Whilst is unlikely that Augustine 
encountered this text directly, a brief examination of the themes present therein can serve to 
illustrate the nuances of Augustine’s own understanding of vision. Furthermore, it is likely that 
he would have encountered these themes as a reader of Plotinus. Then I turn to Ambrose, who is 
certainly a major source for Augustine, as we shall see presently. 
 
 4.1.3 Sense perception and reason in Plato’s Theaetetus 
 
In the Theaetetus,126 Plato argues that the senses of the body do not suffice on their own 
for the acquisition of knowledge.127 For instance, sounds are only sounds unless they have 
meaning, intelligible content, which only a rational agent can discern: “And thus there are some 
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things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are naturally able to perceive as soon as they 
are born.”128 Sensations are mere feelings, which do not admit of intelligible content until they 
are expressed in a perceptual or internal judgement.129 The intuition is that knowledge does not 
simply “happen” to one but requires some active and intentional contribution of the thinking mind. 
Two examples serve to motivate this point. For one, if knowledge is nothing more than sense 
perception, in principle there would be no reason to say that animals know anything less than 
humans do.130 For the Greeks, at least, such a conclusion would be absurd. Furthermore, when 
one hears a foreign language, or sees it in print, one is unable to understand it. However, one 
certainly has a sense perception of it, though it is hard to qualify this as knowledge in any non-
trivial sense.131 Hence Socrates argues that knowledge involves some amount of active, mental 
contribution.132 As we shall see presently, this example comes close to one which Augustine 
proposes in Gn. litt. 12. 
In conversation with Theaetetus, Socrates presents a distinction between sense perception 
and mental activity.133 Socrates and Theaetetus then agree that “it is ‘through which’ we perceive 
in each case, rather than ‘with which’” as regards the senses:134 
 
But as regards their [perceptions] being–the fact that they are . . . the matter is different. Here 
the soul itself attempts to reach a decision for us by rising to compare them with one another. 
[…] And thus there are some things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are naturally 
able to perceive as soon as they are born; I mean, the experiences which reach the soul 
through the body. But calculations regarding their being and their advantageousness come, 
when they do, only as the result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal 
of trouble and education.135 
 
The notion of sense perception here is one which is primarily passive, in contrast to the more 
active nature of mental activity.136 The latter function is able to draw conclusions and glean 
information from the reports of the former. 
 Plato presents Theaetetus as suggesting a faculty of judgement proper to the mind.137 
Certain things that we apparently know are not objects of sense perception in themselves, such as 
the being of a particular thing, or the relationship between various entities or states of affairs. The 
individual senses each receive their own type of object; the mind performs the task of judging and 
synthesising these various types of reports. Moreover, the mind can apparently consider these 
things apart from the present experience of them, working in some way by itself.138 
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By demonstrating the crucial differences between “mere” sense perception and mental 
activity, Socrates purports to have shown that knowledge and perception cannot be identified.139 
Thus Socrates: “We shall not now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever 
we call that activity of the soul when it is busy about the things which are.”140 The Greek verb “to 
perceive” (aisthanesthai) admits of an ambiguity between to feel or experience in a bodily way 
and to be aware of something or familiar with it. Plato seeks to investigate this ambiguity, and in 
so doing, say something definitive about the nature of cognition and perception. As M. Frede 
argues, “[O]ne fails to understand what Plato is trying to do, in particular in the Theaetetus, unless 
one understands that it is only Plato who introduces a clear notion of sense-perception, because 
he needs it for certain philosophical purposes. […] Plato narrows down [the broad use of 
aisthanesthai] to have the meaning ‘to perceive by the senses.’” 141 
Plato’s discussion of cognition in the Theaetetus is at a minimum illustrative of key facets 
of Augustine’s theory of vision. It is not a stretch to suppose that Augustine would have had some 
exposure to these themes, in particular through Ambrose, to whom we turn now. Indeed, with 
Ambrose, the influence in terms of Augustine’s understanding of vision is more clear and direct. 
 
 4.1.4 Ambrose on vision 
 
 The reason for turning to Ambrose at this stage is two-fold. First, the vocabulary and 
general principles of vision are very similar in Ambrose to those of Augustine. The terms used 
for seeing, in particular certain finite forms of the verbs uidere and cernere, whether active or 
passive, as well as various forms of substantives such as anima, animus, mens, aspectus, and 
acies, are used fluidly and interchangeably.142 What is also noteworthy is the fact that neither 
Augustine nor Ambrose use a different verb for different types of perception. Rather, favouring 
uidere, they qualify its various forms, usually by an ablative, which indexes that sort of vision to 
the bodily eyes or to the mind or the soul, respectively. Moreover, as we shall see presently, 
Augustine deliberately draws on Ambrose in ep. 147 for guidance on the question of how God 
can be seen. Hence a discussion of Augustine on vision is inseparable from a discussion of 
Ambrose on vision. In order to provide a succinct if helpful overview of Ambrose’s understanding 
of this topic, I have selected a brief work from around the time of Augustine’s conversion, in 
which the vision of God is a key question. 
Ambrose’s De mysteriis is dated roughly to the late 380s, around the time that his 
commentary on Luke was being completed, not to mention when Augustine was being received 
into the Church.143 It concerns the initiation of the catechumenate into the Christian mysteries of 
salvation, which they enter in a decisive way at the Easter vigil. This short work serves primarily 
as a catechetical manual, explaining some key theological and doctrinal tenets of the Christian 
religion which the catechumens are about to embrace as their own. It could be the case that 
Augustine received from this work the idea of the non-opposition between temporal and eternal 
things. Of further interest is the way in which Ambrose provides some insight into his 
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understanding of vision, grounding this view in certain scriptural passages, not least of all from 2 
Cor. Because of its temporal situation, as well as Augustine’s use of similar ideas and language, 
one wonders if Augustine would have been one of the first readers of myst. In any case, the 
language and the concepts reflect closely those which he proposes in his commentary on the 
Gospel of Luke, as well as the thought of Augustine in ep. 147. 
 In the third paragraph of myst., Ambrose presents a distinction between temporal things 
(temporalia) and eternal things (aeterna), the latter of which are fitting for our contemplation (ea 
contemplanda nobis).144 Furthermore, the eternal things, which we should contemplate, are not 
seen. As Ambrose writes, citing Paul, “First of all, the Apostle taught you that not those things 
which are seen are to be contemplated, but those which are not seen, for those which are seen are 
temporal: those which are not seen, however, are eternal.”145 Shortly thereafter, Ambrose clarifies 
this distinction, stating that the vision of these different objects is realised with respect to different 
faculties or aspects of the human person. So whilst temporal things are seen by the bodily eyes 
(corporis tui … oculis),146 eternal things are not; rather, these are perceived in a certain mental or 
spiritual way: “Therefore you should not believe only by the eyes of the body: it is seen by the 
wise that which is not seen; for one is temporal, and the other eternal which is desired, which is 
not comprehended by the eyes, but is seen by the soul and the mind.”147 Ambrose holds that the 
bodily eyes neither see nor are able to grasp invisible things, which is to say, eternal things, the 
things of God: “for those things which are invisible are not seen, nor can they be comprehended 
by human eyes.”148 He emphasises this point by quoting 1 Corinthians 2:9, in which Paul writes 
that the heavenly rewards promised to the righteous have not been countenanced by human 
thoughts: “Something which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has arisen in the heart of man, 
God has prepared for those who love him.”149 Here we also see the decidedly eschatological nature 
of the vision of God, that it is only realised on a qualitatively different plane of existence. Relying 
especially on Paul, Ambrose demonstrates not only the possibility but the necessity of maintaining 
that God is in some sense seen by the human soul. 
Ambrose150 grounds his understanding of divine invisibility in his understanding of God’s 
incorporeality.151 The appearance of the term mundo corde suggests that this passage should be 
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situated in a broader context, namely of a theory of knowledge informed by reflection on the 
Gospel. Augustine closely follows his mentor in this respect in ep. 147. The emphasis in various 
scriptural locations on God’s not being seen serves as a safeguard against conceiving of God as 
some visible, corporeal, temporal thing, a type of thing within the universe.152 Augustine links 
four particular scripture passages (namely Jn 1:18; 1 Jn 4:12; 1 Tim 6:16; and Mt 5:8, 
respectively), arguing that they say the same thing regarding God’s invisibility, and that all of 
these passages and others are grounded in the understanding of God as incorporeal, a point which 
Augustine confirms by citing Ambrose.153 God’s invisibility is an unchangeable and permanent 
condition of his divine nature, and part and parcel of his incorporeality.154 Therefore God is not 
and cannot be seen as visible, that is, temporal and corporeal things are seen: “For as those things 
are seen which are called visible, no one has ever seen God, nor can see him, for he dwells in 
inaccessible light, and is by nature invisible just as he is incorruptible.”155 The divine nature itself, 
the nature in which all three persons of the Trinity share, is itself invisible: “The nature of God is 
invisible, not only the Father, but the Trinity itself, the one God. And because not only invisible, 
but also unchangeable, thus he would appear to those whom he wished, in what form he wished, 
so that with it his invisible and immutable nature would remain intact.”156 Augustine also follows 
Jerome in saying that all persons of the Trinity are by their nature invisible, disputing the claim 
of certain Arians who held that the Son was in himself visible.157 In other words, Augustine 
resolutely maintains the invisible nature of the Trinity itself.158 The divine essence is essentially 
invisible to mortal eyes.159 
Ambrose explains divine theophany, that is, some manifestation or revelation of the 
divinity to human eyes, by a distinction between God’s nature and his will. The former by its very 
nature is invisible; however, if God chooses to do so, he may manifest himself to those whom he 
wishes, such that the form of his appearance may be immediately accessible to the bodily senses 
of the person. For this position, Ambrose cites several biblical examples, such as God’s 
appearance to Abraham:  
 
But the objects of the senses are not seen in that way, and he on whose will it depends to be 
seen, and whose nature it is not to be seen, is seen because of his will. For, if he does not 
wish it, he is not seen, but if he wishes, he is seen. Thus, God appeared to Abraham because 
he willed it; to others he did not appear, because he did not will it. When Stephen was being 
stoned by the people, he saw the heavens opened and Jesus standing at the right hand of God, 
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but this was not seen by the people. Isaiah saw the Lord of hosts, but no one else could see 
him, because he appeared to whom he pleased.160  
 
Hence the vision of God is a gift granted according to the mysterious divine will. “And why is it 
so remarkable if in the present age, the Lord is not seen, except when he wishes? In the 
resurrection itself it is also not easy to see God, except for those are clean of heart: and therefore, 
blessed are the pure of heart; for they shall see God.”161 The vision of God is promised to the 
saints, the holy ones of God, in the resurrection. They shall see God because they will be filled 
with grace, thus becoming clean of heart and able to see God: “He has seen both Christ and the 
Father, who has known what may be the width and the length, the height and the depth, and the 
supereminent love of the knowledge of Christ. For we have not now known Christ according to 
the flesh, but according to the spirit. For the spirit before our face is Christ the Lord, who may 
deign in his mercy to fill us in all the plenitude of God so that he may be able to be seen by us.”162 
 On a final note, one can see how Ambrose in his De Isaac uel anima (8.78-9) also speaks 
of vision in terms of a higher form of vision or cognition, as well as the importance of the purity 
of this vision, themes which are also prominent in Augustine:163 
 
The beauty of the soul, its pure virtue and attractiveness, is its more genuine knowledge of 
higher things, so as to see the good on which all things depend and which itself depends on 
nothing else […]. Let us accustom our eyes to see what is bright and clear, to look upon the 
                                                          
160 ep. 147.6.18, CSEL 44, pp. 289-90: “Non enim similiter sensibilia uidentur, et is in cuius uoluntate situm 
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faciem nostram Christus Dominus qui nos in omnem plenitudinem Dei misericordia sua implere dignetur ut uideri 
possit a nobis.” 
Augustine writes that one’s being filled with God’s goodness does not mean that we will become equal to 
God, suggesting potentially a critique of the more Eastern position (ep. 147.15.36, CSEL 44, pp. 309-10). See also ep. 
147.6.18, CSEL 44, p. 290: “Et quid de hominibus loquimur, cum etiam de ipsis coelestibus Virtutibus et Potestatibus 
legerimus quia Deum nemo uidit umquam? et addit quod ultra coelestes est Potestates, Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu 
Patris, ipse narrauit. Aut acquiescatur igitur necesse est, si Deum Patrem nemo uidit umquam, Filium uisum esse in 
Veteri Testamento; et desinant haeretici ex Virgine ei principium dare, qui antequam nasceretur ex Virgine uidebatur. 
Aut certe refelli non potest, uel Patrem, uel Filium, uel certe Spiritum sanctum, si tamen est Spiritus sancti visio, ea 
specie uideri, quam uoluntas elegerit, non natura formauerit; quoniam Spiritum quoque visum accepimus in columba. 
Et ideo Deum nemo uidit umquam, quia eam quae in Deo habitat, plenitudinem diuinitatis nemo conspexit, nemo mente 
aut oculis comprehendit: Vidit enim, ad utrumque referendum est. Denique cum additur, Unigenitus Filius ipse 
narrauit, mentium magis quam oculorum uisio declaratur.” 
163 Ambros., De Isaac uel anima, CSEL 32,1, pp. 697-9: “Pulchritudo autem animae sincera uirtus et decus 
uerior cognitio superiorum, ut uideat illud bonum, ex quo pendent omnia, ipsum autem ex nullo. […] Aduescamus 
oculos nostros, uidere quae dilucida et clara sunt, spectare uultum continentiae et temperantiae omnesque uirtutes […]. 
Ipsum est bonum quod quaerimus, solum bonum; nemo enim bonus nisi unus Deus. Hic est oculus qui magnum illum 
et uerum decorem intuetur. Solem nisi sanus et uigens oculus non aspicit, nec bonum potest uidere nisi anima bona.” 
Trans. King, “Augustine’s Anti-Platonist Ascents,” 21-2. See also Allan Fitzgerald, “Ambrose at the well: De Isaac et 
anima,” Revue des Étudies Augustiniennes 48.2 (2002): 79-99. 
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face of continence and moderation and all the virtues […]. He whom we seek is good, indeed 
the only good; for no one is good save the one God. This is the eye that gazes upon that great 
and genuine graciousness. Unless it is healthy and strong the eye cannot even glance at the 
sun; unless the soul is good, it cannot see the good. 
 
Ambrose identifies the good (bonum) with the source of all creation (ex quo pendent omnia … 
ipsum autem ex nullo). The imagery of the senses is clearly present, as he speaks of seeing the 
Good (uideat). This discussion of seeing the good implies a spiritual sense, which Ambrose makes 
more explicit when he proceeds to discuss the necessity of a healthy and clear vision in order to 
see. The analogy between physical sight and intellectual sight is made clear by the relation of the 
eye (oculus) to the soul (anima).164 As I see it, Ambrose speaks of this intellectual sight according, 
first of all, to the capacity to see the good, presumably by means of the mind and reason, and 
secondly, to the degree to which one is prepared for that sight. In other words, it requires a good 
soul, just as sight of the sun requires healthy eyes. The upshot is a felicitous parallel with 
Augustine’s own nuanced understanding of vision according to the principle and the gradual 
senses, respectively.165 
Although arising only occasionally in myst., we see Ambrose’s theological principles on 
display as they pertain to vision of the divine. Composed at roughly the same time as in Luc., 
myst. provides us with a point of comparison for Ambrose’s thought on this point, as well as his 
treatment of scripture. We can also see how the language, the vocabulary, and the concepts are 
consistent with those which Augustine cites from in Luc., which Augustine likely knew from his 
time in Milan.166 In his ep. 147. In addition to providing a basis for a comparative analysis between 
Ambrose and Augustine’s treatment of him, it also reveals how Augustine’s own thought on 
intellectual vision is fundamentally informed and influenced by his ghostly father. 
 
4.2. CASE STUDIES167 
 
 The following three case studies are primarily selected on the basis that in each of these 
locations, Augustine deals explicitly and at length with the question of vision. Moreover, these 
three locations have much in common, such as the terminology and the concepts employed to 
explain vision, as well as their situation within a scriptural context. Scripture sets the agenda, 
providing the parameters of the discussion of the problem, and it provides the basis for thinking 
about solutions. The temporal situation of these works is also interesting; in the foregoing section 
I dealt with a selection of Augustine’s works, most of which were completed by 400 (with the 
obvious exception of trin.). The following three works were begun after 400: De Genesi ad 
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166 O’Donnell, Commentary, 392. 
167 For further literature on Augustine and the topic of vision, see, e.g.: Robert J. O’Connell, “Faith, Reason, 
and Ascent to Vision in Saint Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 21 (1990): 83-126; Margaret Ruth Miles, “Vision: The 
Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's De Trinitate and Confessions,” The Journal of Religion 
63.2 (1983): 125-42; Jan Lemmens, “Zo zie je God, volgens Augustinus,” Innerlijk Leven 41 (1987): 23-32; Francis X. 
Winters, “A Note on St Augustine’s View of Man’s Knowledge of God during Life,” The Modern Schoolman 39 
(1962): 383-5; E. Naab, Über Schau und Gegenwart des unsichtbaren Gottes (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998); 
S. MacDonald, “The Divine Nature,” in W. E. Mann (ed.), Augustine’s Confessions: Critical Essays (Lanham, Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2006); Michael Chase, “Porphyre et Augustin : Des trois sortes de ‘visions’ au corps de résurrection,” 
Revue d’Études Augustiniennes et Patristiques 51 (2005): 233-56. 
Seeing Sapientia 
145 
litteram was begun ca. 401 and completed in 415; ep. 147 was written somewhere between 410 
and 414; and finally, De ciuitate Dei was completed ca. 427, shortly prior to Augustine’s death. 
A further virtue of dealing with these three particular sources is the difference in occasion and 
genre: Gn. litt. is a work of exegesis, but highly cosmological and philosophical. Ep. 147 was 
composed as a response to a particular prompt concerning the vision of God; Augustine’s entire 
writing in this instance is from the beginning directed towards this question. Finally, we shall see 
that in ciu. Augustine turns his attention to countering the thought of the pagan world. These 
works allow us to see a common thread running through Augustine’s doctrine of vision, as well 
as the developments within that understanding as well.  
 
4.2.1 Levels of vision in Gn. litt. 12 
 
Augustine frames the twelfth and final book of Gn. litt. based on the theophanic 
experience narrated in 2 Corinthians 12:2-4, in which Paul describes a “man in Christ” 
(presumably himself) who was “caught up” (raptum) to the “third heaven.”168 For Augustine, 
there is no question that Paul was taken into the “third heaven” and that that was what he “saw.” 
Augustine bases his interpretation on the text itself (scio [...] nescio).169 It was the third heaven 
itself (proprie uidit),170 and not an image or a reflection (non imaginaliter) which he saw.171 So 
Paul recounts that he did in fact know that it was the third heaven, but he did not know how 
exactly he was able to perceive it.172 Hence Augustine identifies Paul’s doubt in this episode as 
pertaining to the mode of his vision, not the object thereof.173 His exegesis of the Pauline passage 
provides the occasion for Augustine to propose a problematised understanding of sight. He 
identifies three types of vision(s) (tria genera uisionum),174 the first of which is the corporeal sort, 
which is facilitated by the eyes of the body (per sensus corporis),175 and allows one to see objects 
of sense. Spiritual vision, which seems to be what Augustine has in mind in the Confessiones 
when he discusses memoria, involves images being impressed on the mind through one’s spirit 
(per spiritum).176 This spirit is not the soul as such, but a certain faculty of the soul which is able 
to retain images captured by the senses. Finally, there is the intellectual sense of vision, which is 
proper to the mind.177 In a word, this is reason or understanding, vision in a normative sense. This 
type of vision is incorporeal, as are its objects, which do not admit of any material component. 
Moreover, when one perceives them with the mind, one is seeing the things themselves (res 
                                                          
168 Gn. litt. 12.5.13, CSEL 28,1, p. 385. 
169 Gn. litt. 12.4.12, CSEL 28,1, p. 385. 
170 Gn. litt. 12.5.14, CSEL 28,1, p. 386. 
171 Gn. litt. 12.5.14, CSEL 28,1, p. 386. 
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173 Cf. Gn. litt. 12.5.14, CSEL 28,1, p. 386. 
174 Cf. Parsons, Freud and Augustine in Dialogue, 62-3. 
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ipsae).178 So when one truly understands and sees wisdom within one’s mind, that is not one’s 
own thought of wisdom, but sapientia ipsa (my term).179 
 
4.2.1.1 Corporeal 
 
 Augustine understands corporeal vision as what we intuitively call to mind when we think 
about “seeing” something. Moreover, just as there are different senses of vision, so too are there 
different objects proper to each. As for corporeal vision, these are corporeal realities immediately 
available to our sight, hence shown to the bodily senses.180 He writes that bodily things are 
perceived by the corporeis oculis.181 Augustine’s wording suggests a demarcation between the 
bodily senses on the one hand (oculis huius corporis)182 and those of the mind on the other. 
Likewise, there is a distinction between the objects proper to the former, which are accessible to 
the corresponding bodily senses, and those which are only perceived intellectually, such as 
sapientia.183 Although God can manifest himself through corporeal objects, and thereby to our 
human senses (humanis et corporalibus sensibus), his substance is entirely different from these, 
and not directly perceptible to them.184 
 
4.2.1.2 Spiritual 
 
 As the corporeal sense of vision pertains to praesentia corpora, the spiritual vision 
pertains to the images and similitudes thereof. Augustine writes that the bodily senses convey 
images to the spirit, where images of those bodies are formed and stored.185 For Augustine, 
corporeal and spiritual vision are not so much two different senses, or two operations separated 
in time, but are rather two aspects of the same act of looking; after the object has disappeared, 
one realises the spiritual vision in the form of a memory.186 Hence spiritual vision is the soul’s 
vision of images which have been impressed on it from the corporeal senses.187 However, in 
addition to things one has actually experienced, it is also possible to see images of things which 
one has never seen, speculating and constructing mental pictures from past experiences.188 For 
example, I have been to Budapest, so I can call to mind certain images thereof in my memory. I 
have not been to Beijing, but based on various memories, I can produce speculative images of 
what it may look like. Both of these operations are based in the spiritual sense of vision for 
Augustine which, though not itself corporeal, is concerned with the images of corporeal things.189 
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179 Gn. litt. 12.3.6, CSEL 28,1, p. 382; 6.15, CSEL 28,1, pp. 386-7; 7.16, CSEL 28,1, pp. 387-8. 
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 The use of terms “spiritual” and “intellectual” can be a bit confusing. That is true for us 
just as it was true in Augustine’s time. In order to dispel any possible confusion amongst his 
readers, Augustine qualifies and restricts his use of the term “spiritual,” first acknowledging the 
various senses which it can take in scripture. These uses of spirit include mind (oculus animae), 
which pertains to the image of God within the soul, a meaning which really comes closer to 
Augustine’s understanding of intellectus in this work. However, though Scripture seems to 
complicate Augustine’s schema, it also provides him with the basis for making it in the first place. 
Augustine points to 1 Corinthians 14:15 (orabo spiritu ... et mente) to substantiate his distinction 
between the spiritual and the intellectual.190 Thus Augustine makes clear that in this particular 
work, he is using spiritus in his own restricted sense, and hence it should not be confused or 
conflated with “intellectual.”191 
 This difference is further clarified as Augustine continues his enquiry into the tria genera 
uisionum. He writes that the spirit delivers its contents to the mind, where the intellect conducts 
its operation of seeking, parsing, and understanding the images contained therein.192 For this 
reason the spiritual sense of vision can rightly be described as a mediator between the mind and 
the body.193 The intellectual sense is superior still, for it has the role of directing the enquiring 
sensations of the body, as well as making sense of the contents contained within the spiritus; the 
intellect pertains to one’s capacity to interpret and understand.194 
 
4.2.1.3 Intellectual 
 
The third and most superior type of vision, the “intellectual,” is unique, in that there is a 
different type of light proper to it, and that its objects do not possess any corporeal properties, 
such as colour, taste, and such like.195 Rather, they are known by one’s intellect, one sees them 
by understanding and thinking (intellegendo et cogitando).196 Thus there is a strong demarcation 
drawn between corporeal and spiritual vision on the one hand, and intellectual vision on the other. 
Intellectus is proper to the mind, and is responsible for moving from images to knowledge.197 In 
the mind, the images delivered by the spiritual sense are judged (diiudicantur).198 Drawing upon 
1 Corinthians 14:16, Augustine writes that speaking in various tongues is worthless if one cannot 
communicate or make one come to knowledge thereby, thus emphasising the distinction between 
spirit and understanding.199 (Here we see at least a thematic parallel with the Theaetetus.) 
The operation of the mind pertains to one’s understanding, one’s cognitive grasp of 
something, in particular non-corporeal realities, which the soul beholds within itself. These are 
not images but the things themselves (res ipsae).200 The “region” of intellectual vision is beyond 
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all corporeality.201 Here the claritas Domini itself is seen, as much as the mind can handle, not a 
reflection (non per aenigmata).202 Augustine writes that “intelligible things” such as love 
(dilectio), virtues (uirtutes), and wisdom (sapientia) are perceived by the mind, as these objects 
are neither corporeal, nor do they possess any corporeal features (uidetur mente sapientia, sine 
ullis imaginibus corporum).203 Because one is perceiving such spiritual properties by the mind, 
one grows closer to God and thereby perfects one’s human nature (quibus propinquatur Deo).204 
Though he speaks of different “types” (genera) of vision, Augustine sees these as 
inherently connected to one another. Though there can be a temporal separation between them, 
there need not be. This he makes clear by his example of reading a particular scriptural passage, 
showing how each type of vision can be operative simultaneously: 
 
Behold, when it is read in this one precept, You shall love your neighbour as yourself, three 
types of visions occur: one through the eyes, by which the letters themselves are read; another 
the spirit of man by which near and far are thought; the third through the contuition of the 
mind, by which the intellectual thing love itself is perceived.205 
 
Indeed, we have already seen how corporal and spiritual vision, respectively, are two aspects of 
the same act of looking.206 This may well be true for intellectual vision, if one is attuned to 
perceive and cognise the intelligible forms available before one. For Augustine, intellectual vision 
implies that one either sees or one does not. As Giraud explains, “Il ne s’agit plus tant de prouver 
que de voir.”207 The intellectual sense of vision in the sense of complete understanding may not 
happen at the same time. However, one’s rational faculties may still be at work in detecting that 
which one does not (yet) understand and directing the mind to enquire further.208 Augustine also 
speaks of this in Gn. litt., and in so doing, appears to anticipate what Gadamer and other 
contemporary figures have to say about the notion of a hermeneutical consciousness.209 
Augustine believes that one can have a sort of “indirect” intellectual perception, one 
which is incomplete, yet provides the very basis for its own completion. In this respect, Augustine 
cites the example of the Babylonian king Belshazzar from the book of Daniel,210 in which he has 
a vision of a hand writing in an unknown language on the wall. Then Daniel is called to interpret 
the message. Two points are worth noting here. First, Augustine designates Daniel’s act of 
understanding and interpretation as the superior act of vision, though by forming an image of the 
symbol in his mind, the king was certainly partaking in spiritual vision. Moreover, Augustine 
identifies Belshazzar’s intellectual vision with a certain “hermeneutical” pre-understanding: 
Though the king’s intellect could not understand the writing, he could nevertheless identify it as 
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intelligible and as containing some hidden meaning, which provided him with an intentional 
object into which to enquire, whether by himself or with another.211 Even though he lacked 
complete understanding, his mind was nonetheless able to direct his enquiry and to recognise 
something of intelligible value in the objects of his perception, the image of which was contained 
in his spirit. Augustine speaks of this movement in terms of a call or a summons, such that one’s 
mind is called (adhibetur intellectus) to discover the meaning of particular corporeal images, 
artefacts, and such like, or rather, the meaning contained within those material images.212 What is 
suggested here is a variation on the “principal-gradual” schema: One has some capacity for 
perceiving non-corporeal objects, which stands in need of being completed or perfected. In other 
words, one gradually grows in knowledge of a particular object of such vision. 
We see a similar line of thought in De fide rerum inuisibilium, in which Augustine is 
grappling with the problem of vision, and its highly “intentional” character. He speaks of 
intellectual sight in terms of a kind of faith; in other words, before we can begin to interact with 
someone, we have to have a sense of their identity and their unity (cum te committis ut probes, 
credis antequam probes),213 and this Augustine locates in the heart or the soul (amici faciem cernis 
corpore tuo, fidem tuam cernis animo tuo).214 There has to be a certain sense in which one 
perceives an intelligible, coherent reality which, whilst constituted by sensible matter, is 
ultimately more than the sum of its parts and is thereby not directly “visible” to the corporeis 
oculis.215 When we reflect (self-)critically, we realise that our lives seem to make sense in light 
of these invisible realities; it seems that we are already implicated in them without realising it, 
and we proceed accordingly in our quotidian lives (etiam tunc eorum erga nos beneuolentiam 
credimus potius quam uidemus).216  
Similarly, Augustine recasts the Meno paradox in trin. 8.6, pondering how one can have 
a desire to know God when one does not yet know him.217 According to Menn,218 “Augustine says 
that we can pray to God, even before we have knowledge of God, based on faith in God.” For this 
position, Augustine draws upon Hebrews 11:6, suggesting that one must have some “pre-
cognition” of God which guides them to seek him and which provides an initial direction for 
enquiry.219 
In Gn. litt. 12, we see Augustine dealing with vision in highly nuanced terms. Though the 
question is occasiond by scripture, the application is not so much to the vision of the divine per 
se but more about the way in which we as human agents perceive sapiential contents (with)in the 
world. In fact, as I have suggested, there is a somewhat hermeneutical element to Augustine’s 
account of vision. In other words, in virtue of vision in its normative sense, the intellectual type 
of vision, we can perceive an intelligible content which is nonetheless not completely understood. 
We are then directed to question and interrogate this object in order to uncover its meaning. A 
discussion of the theological significance of this point will have to wait until Part III. For the 
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moment, however, we continue to the next two case studies, in which the vision of God is the 
explicit and central focus of the enquiry. Yet in my estimation, Augustine relies upon distinctions 
and nuances presented in Gn. litt. 12. 
 
4.2.2 De uidendo Deo (ep. 147) 
 
4.2.2.1 Context and status quaestionis 
 
Certain scholars have treated of ep. 147 in particular. B. Studer has written on this work, 
with particular focus on Augustine’s reception of Ambrose and the anti-Manichaean polemical 
intent of this text.220 Madec221 and P. van Geest222 have both contributed significant material to 
this source. M.-A. Vannier has also treated briefly of this work in two different locations. Vannier 
holds that in ep. 147, Augustine formulates an apophatic theology.223 Indeed, she strongly 
emphasises the Neoplatonic and mystical character to this work, a point about which I am less 
convinced.224 However, that is not the issue here. Rather, what I seek to do in this section is to 
complement and further explore ep. 147, with particular attention to the hermeneutical and 
exegetical problem it is intended to address. I shall return to this presently, but before that, I shall 
briefly situate this work in its historical and literary context. 
Augustine’s work De uidendo Deo is seldom listed in his bibliography; rather, it is 
included in his epistolary corpus, number 147. Indeed, this text was drafted as a letter in either 
413 or 414. The initial question seems to have concerned the resurrection of the dead and the type 
of vision that the saints will enjoy. Yet in order to address this question, it quickly becomes clear 
that the entire matter of vision is itself quite vexed. In this letter, Augustine says that scripture 
strongly suggests that vision is not a merely physical phenomenon.225 Hence one is led to question 
how it is to be understood. In his autobibliography, the Retractationes (426-7), Augustine 
dedicates a brief paragraph to this work, describing it as a book (librum scripsi),226 the same term 
he uses for other treatises, such as De magistro and De utilitate credendi.227 In the retr. he makes 
clear that one of the key issues was how if at all we can understand God as capable of being seen: 
“I have written a book On seeing God, in which I have a more focused enquiry concerning the 
spiritual body, which will be in the resurrection of the saints, whether or how God, who is spirit, 
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may yet be seen through such a body.”228 Here he states that he also deals with this same question 
in the twenty-second book of his De ciuitate Dei, in paragraph twenty-nine to be precise.229 
Augustine refers to this matter of the sight of God as “a most difficult question” (eam … 
quaestionem … difficillimam),230 which explains in part why he spends a great deal of time on 
this matter, and also why he invokes the help of his former guide, Ambrose of Milan. According 
to Studer, Augustine first encountered Ambrose’s commentary on Luke in 393, two decades prior 
to the composition of De uidendo Deo.231 This fact bespeaks the profound influence Ambrose 
must have exerted on Augustine, as twenty years later this work still figured prominently in the 
latter’s thought, and is even quoted verbatim at length.232 Despite Augustine’s indebtedness to 
Ambrose on questions of divine incorporeality, the former goes far beyond the latter with respect 
to elaborating upon this concept.233 In addition to the immediate occasion for this text, Vannier 
notes in addition the less obvious polemical context of ep. 147, and how the discussion of God’s 
incorporeality could have been in response to certain heterodox movements of the time, such as 
those of Arianism, Manichaeanism, and Photinianism.234 
However, this interest is not merely or even primarily polemical. As Vannier notes, the 
issue of the vision of God was one of the major questions which Augustine addressed throughout 
his Christian career.235 According to Cilleruelo, Augustine addresses this issue no fewer than 368 
times, beginning with his earliest works.236 The vision of God was a uniquely Christian problem, 
as the visibility of God was an obvious principle to both the Stoics and the Manichees, who held 
a material conception of the deity.237 Within the context of antiquity, the Stoics held fast to the 
visibility of God in some physical sense, whereas the Platonists maintained that God was 
invisible.238 Furthermore, Cilleruelo contrasts the primarily passive understanding of vision found 
in Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek fathers with the active sense of vision developed by Augustine 
in terms of uidere.239 In contrast to Plotinus, Augustine envisions a relationship with a personal 
God which is simultaneously interior and transcendent.240 Perhaps this is why Augustine is so 
interested in “seeing” God, as he desires an immediacy of contact with God which is comparable 
to our experience of realities we see in this world.241 A further pressing question concerns the 
multi-faceted nature of sight, namely the way in which our “physical” sense of sight seems to 
admit of several layers, such that we see intelligible things instantiated within physical states of 
affairs. A further aspect of vision pertains to the vision of God, and it is this specific issue which 
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provides us with the matter for the following enquiry. In other words, scripture tells us that we 
can see God, but how can we say that, if God is invisible and transcendent? 
 
4.2.2.2 Scriptural reasoning 
 
One’s faith in and grounding in scriptural authority provides the starting point for the 
route to the conclusions which Augustine reaches.242 Augustine attributes to scripture a normative 
and unassailable weight. It seems to me that what Augustine is doing is establishing a 
fundamental, non-negotiable principle or position. Put another way, the notion that God is seen 
forms a locus around which other ideas must be arranged and assembled accordingly. As 
Augustine puts it, “But if of the divine scriptures, indeed of those which in the Church are called 
canonical, it is confirmed by clear authority, without any doubt it should be believed.”243 
Ambrose, for example, enjoys another type of authority with respect to that of the scriptures. 
Augustine sees the weight of Ambrose’s words deriving not from the fact that he said them, but 
rather the fact that they are true, and indeed, are confirmed by scripture as well.244 What is also 
interesting here is that faith in the authority of the Bible is perceived as a starting point of enquiry, 
not an end. In Augustine’s mind, according to G. Clark, “reflection on scripture was a way of 
thinking, not an evasion of thinking.”245 This is in part because even though scripture is 
authoritative, it does not solve the hermeneutical problem; interpretation is the hard part. 
Augustine suggests that scripture sets the agenda, that it provides the programme which will guide 
and direct a particular enquiry. The critical if aided investigation of a particular issue, raised 
within a scriptural context, represents the starting point of a path to certain propositional 
conclusions which, though they are substantiated by appeal to scripture, are nonetheless not 
completely clear to any reader; rather, a certain type of hermeneutical investigation and reading 
is required.246 
The logical trajectory of Augustine’s thought on vision comes as a result of his doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo, which, as C. Tornau reminds us, is distinctively Christian and grounded in 
scriptural exegesis.247 For the fathers, the Bible was no mere story book or collection of “Semitic 
folklore.” As Otten writes, Scripture was seen as a source of theological and philosophical content 
which stood to be further elaborated and explicated. It provides a normative framework from 
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which to identify, initiate, and execute particular enquiries.248 Clark draws a comparison with the 
school of the Platonists and their reading of certain canonical texts,249 such as the Timaeus.250 As 
C. O’Regan has noted, Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis and the idea of creatio ex nihilo 
determines the intellectual framework in which the latter theorises about a variety of aspects of 
human experience.251 The attempt to think of God as invisible occasions a series of reflections on 
what it means to “see” and how we can perceive apparently “non-empirical” realities. 
One can view Augustine’s programme in ep. 147 as an expression of what Anatolios calls 
“biblical reasoning.”252 That is, Augustine takes the Bible as a repository of content which admits 
of indefinite depth and significance. He also sees it as a coherent unity, in virtue of which the 
apparent anomalies generated between two particular passages, rather than vitiate the authority of 
Scripture, invite one to explore further and to deepen one’s understanding. As Clark writes, for 
Augustine “scripture trains our minds and directs us to hidden truths by making us think about 
puzzling statements or apparent contradictions or unanswered questions (Ciu. Dei 11.19).”253 
Following E. Auerbach, T. Finan writes that the surprises or the anomalies of a particular text 
invite the reader to further enquiry and investigation. In a sense, it is these verbal potholes which 
jar the reader, forcing one to focus more deliberately on a particular location or issue. This is the 
essence of interpretation, namely bringing to light what is hidden, clarifying that which is 
opaque.254 
Augustine viewed scripture as giving rise to several opportunities of this kind. Obscure 
and difficult ideas, especially in the scriptures, are meant to challenge and encourage one to 
further investigation.255 A challenge of this type is presented to one so that one may seek to know, 
and in seeking to know may be exercised and trained in knowledge.256 As a result, one will become 
more capacious for other such esoteric truths.257 We have seen something of this with respect to 
his reflections on time, memoria, and intentio. A closely related difficulty concerns vision for 
Augustine. We see two further examples in the Enarrationes. In en. Ps. 120, Augustine engages 
in an exercise in scriptural reasoning, looking to the apparently heterodox ascription of bodily 
parts to God (in this way, it appears that Augustine is following a similar line of thinking which 
Fishbane describes as remez, about which more infra).258 Divine wisdom (sapientia) is eternal 
and without end.259 So even though it is described in Proverbs as length of days (longitudo 
dierum), this is done in a biblical manner of speaking (proprio modo), and should not be taken in 
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a corporeal or spatial sense.260 Bearing in mind the incorporeality of God (euidentius audi, frater, 
ne forte carnali sensu adhuc cogites quia membris distinctus est Deus), Augustine feels justified 
in interpreting this passage in a more creative way.261 
 This observation sets the stage for the following analysis. The enquiry into the vision of 
God is generated by the following tension. On the one hand, it seems that God is not and cannot 
be seen. This is in part a result of the commitment to the incorporeality of God. One of the logical 
cornerstones for Augustine’s treatment of this issue is his understanding of incorporeality, 
discussed in the previous chapter. God is extended neither in space nor in time, and he does not 
admit of any corporeal qualities such that he could even in principle be perceived by our physical 
sense of sight. The doctrine of God’s invisibility preserves his being from some sacrilegious, 
blasphemous reduction to a thing within the world.262 Certain passages of scripture seem to 
confirm this view beyond any doubt, such as Jn 1:18, in which the author states that no one has 
ever seen God. Similarly, Paul in 1 Corinthians 2:9 suggests that nothing of divine things has ever 
been revealed to our senses, and even within our hearts. So in brief, it seems that a good Christian 
must maintain that God is invisible. 
 On the other hand, however, it seems not only that God can be seen, but that one must 
maintain that he is seen.263 The force of such a position again derives from the apparently 
unambiguous pronouncements of the Bible, in which it states that God either will be seen or that 
he even has been seen. One could think of the OT theophanies, as well as certain key passages in 
the NT. In ep. 147, Augustine cites two particular passages to substantiate the claim that God is 
able to be seen (posse Deum uideri). One is Matthew 5:8 (beati mundo corde; quoniam ipsi Deum 
uidebunt), and the other 1 John 3:2 (scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus; quoniam 
uidebimus eum sicuti est).264 This unambiguous language provides a clear and non-negotiable 
basis for maintaining the “visibility” of God.265 Besides Matthew 5:8, Augustine also suggests 
that other divine authorities could be cited in support of this claim.266 He does cite other passages 
throughout the letter to establish the visibility of God, suggesting that he sees the same meaning 
underlying all of these verses in question. 
The key point is that Augustine holds that God is seen on account of the authority of the 
scriptures (sed tantum quia scriptum est in ea Scriptura cuius fideles sumus … quoniam Deum 
nec corpore aliquando uidimus, sicut hanc lucem; nec mente, sicut ipsam in nobis, qua id 
credimus, fidem),267 which he understands as a unity in virtue of their divine authorship.268 The 
claim that God can be seen is a tenet of faith, of revelation rooted in the Bible (credimus uideri 
Deum), which is itself the manifestation of God’s revelation.269 After citing 1 John 3:2, he writes 
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“[John] said he knew something that had not happened, and which he knew by believing, but not 
by seeing. Therefore we were right in saying: ‘We know that God can be seen,’ although we have 
not seen him, but we have put our faith in the divine authority which is contained in the holy 
books.”270 It is in virtue of the clear testimony of scripture that one must hold that God, in some 
sense, is in fact seen: “why do we believe that [God] is seen, except that we rest our faith upon 
the Scripture, where we read: ‘Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.’”271 
Hence we arrive at an antinomy in the Kantian sense, that is, two apparently equally 
correct principles which are mutually exclusive and directly contradictory to one another. 
Augustine identifies the problem of seeing God with respect to scripture in the following way. On 
the one hand, he writes, “His substance is designated as invisible in the Holy Scriptures,”272 and 
yet on the other hand, there is material concerning the perception of God in some bodily, physical 
way, an apparent contradiction: “and it is discovered in the same authorities that he is seen by 
many through the body and in corporeal places.”273 It is important to note that the antinomy 
derives its force from its normative grounding, i.e., biblical Christian faith. Augustine could not 
brook a contradiction within the scriptures themselves, even if the the appearance of it was hard 
to explain.274 What is interesting here is that Augustine cites both notions arising in the same 
authorities (in eisdem auctoritatibus),275 such that the question cannot be overlooked or 
dismissed.276 
These sorts of difficulties in scripture played a major part in shaping the theological 
discourse of the fathers. As we have noted above and as we shall see demonstrated presently, 
figures such as Ambrose and Augustine saw such questions as serious sources of theological 
reflection which promised to divulge a richer understanding of the faith to which they held. In 
their responses, they navigated between two extremes, namely of rejecting the scriptures as 
essentially incoherent on the one hand, and on the other of interpreting these passages so 
equivocally that they become vacuous and virtually meaningless. These different principles held 
in the scriptures must both be maintained, they must be held in a productive tension with one 
another. Ambrose and Augustine respond by making distinctions, providing nuanced concepts, 
and “problematising” the notion of sight itself, in particular by bringing considerations of an 
eschatological nature to bear on the matter in question. In my opinion, this suggests that in 
addition to–or as a part of–the rule of faith, Ambrose and Augustine view the Bible in terms of a 
differentiated unity, such that intra-textual interpretation provides the possibility of a resolution 
to such apparent contradictions. Ambrose and Augustine understand these points of pressure 
generated by scripture as providing the occasion for a deepening and an enriching of their faith. 
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Such a difficulty provides the occasion for an extended discussion of vision as propaedeutic to 
addressing the vision of God in particular. One of the upshots of such a consideration, and one 
which we have seen intimated in Gn. litt. 12, is that Scripture strongly suggests that vision is not 
a merely physical phenomenon.277 Hence one is led to question how it is to be understood. 
 
4.2.2.3 Scriptural bases 
 
Augustine bases his discussion of vision on a variety of scriptural passages, most notably 
Matthew 5:8, on the basis of which he argues that one can only come to understand the 
immateriality of God if one has a pure heart. As Augustine writes, “Doubtless, he understood or 
believed that God, who is seen by the clean of heart, is such as that.”278 As Augustine has quoted 
Ambrose on God’s incorporeality in the previous sentence, the context makes clear that to say 
that God is understood in such a way (talem) refers to his unavailability to the physical senses.279 
As he has suggested in other locations, Augustine sees a crucial epistemic-ethical component to 
divine vision as consisting in freeing one’s mind of spatio-temporal categories, a move 
emphasised by Ambrose and later by Augustine (uides quemadmodum uir sanctus enitatur 
nostras mentes ab omnibus carnis sensibus seuocare, ut aptas faciat ad uidendum Deum).280 
Indeed, Augustine attributes such a realisation of God’s incorporeality to divine grace and the 
interior action (intrinsecus operetur … Deus)281 of the Holy Spirit (adiutorio Spiritus Dei): 
“Without the help of the Spirit of God, who would be able to think that there is something, that it 
is greater than all the things which are experienced through the body, and that it is not seen in any 
locality, is not an object of search by the eyes, is not heard by its utterance, nor held by touch, nor 
perceived in its approach, yet is seen by the clean heart?”282 (In Part III, we shall note further how 
Augustine sees the Holy Spirit at work in leading one to a knowledge of God’s incorporeality.) 
After mentioning the pride of place that purity of heart enjoys with respect to the other beatitudes, 
Augustine immediately proceeds to quote Ambrose, linking purity of heart with a certain 
intellectual purity, a removal of the consuetudo carnalis. In other words, Augustine suggests that 
a major part of purity of heart is the shedding of corporeal categories with respect to the divine. 
He expresses this point, following Ambrose: “Thus, he will be seen by the clean of heart, who is 
not seen in any locality, is not sought by bodily eyes, nor limited by our sight, nor held by touch, 
nor heard by his utterance, nor perceived in his approach.”283 With appeal again to 1 Jn, Augustine 
states that God is not seen in this life sicuti est, and that the vision of him differs from the sight 
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of visible, corporeal things. The sight of God pertains non ad oculorum corporalium, sed ad 
mentium uisionem.284 
As regards the beatific vision, the vision of God as he is, Augustine states that this is 
enjoyed by the pure of heart. This is not remarkable, whether in the context of this epistle or in 
other parts of Augustine’s corpus. What is more novel is the way in which he situates this vision 
with respect to the other beatitudes, even suggesting a certain hierarchy or at least pre-eminence 
due to purity of heart. In fact, Augustine states that it is in virtue of their cleanness of heart, and 
not of any other beatitudes, that the blessed will see God sicuti est: “Those who will see him as 
he is will then see him in that form of God; but they will not see him so because they were poor 
in spirit in this life or because they were meek, because they mourned, […], but because they 
were clean of heart.”285 The reward proper to this virtue of purity of heart is none other than the 
vision of God, a reward promised for no other beatitude.286 God’s presence and absence is a 
mystery which results from our inability to comprehend his divine nature. As Augustine writes, 
in ways which echo his discussion of this theme in conf. 7, God is not a substance which can be 
divided into parts, or which can be situated with respect to some location (nec spatiis includitur 
paruis, magnisue diffunditur).287 God’s presence is ubiquitous, as he is intimately present to and 
infused into the order of things. Augustine follows Ambrose in making this assertion: “‘When he 
is thought absent, he is seen, and when he is present, he is not seen.’ [Ambrose] did not say ‘When 
he is absent,’ but ‘when he is thought absent,’ for he who fills heaven and earth without being 
confined by limited space or spread through vast space is nowhere absent.”288 Those who can 
grasp this character of the divine presence are able to see God (hoc qui excedente mente intellegit, 
uidet Deum, et cum absens putatur). Hence his absence is only an appearance, but one which 
derives its strength from our created nature. In order to overcome this blindness, Augustine 
exhorts one to pray directly to God, in particular so that one may merit (mereatur) such 
perception.289 As an example of the way in which God can remain hidden in plain sight, Augustine 
invokes Christ’s rebuke of his apostles in the Gospel of John, concluding: “See how God was 
present and was not seen.”290 
Besides Matthew 5:8, Augustine also sees 1 John 3:2 as a key passage concerning the 
vision of God, and he even adopts its terminology, in particular sicuti est, incorporating this phrase 
into his extended treatment in ep. 147.291 With appeal to 1 Jn, Augustine states that the sight of 
God pertains “not to the vision of the corporeal eyes, but to that of the mind.”292 Following Paul, 
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Augustine says that in the future we will be filled with his fullness, which will make it possible 
for him to be perceived by us.293 According to Augustine, Paul specifies the way in which 
someone may be able to see God sicuti est, namely by grasping the height and the depth of Christ’s 
love: “Then, explaining by what sort of men God is seen as he is in that contemplation, he says, 
‘he who knew “what is the breadth and the length and the height and the depth, and the charity of 
Christ which surpasseth all knowledge,” saw both Christ and the Father.’”294 Augustine seeks to 
interpret this enigmatic passage from Paul, stating that the altitude of God’s charity represents the 
hope of eternal reward, and the depth refers to his inscrutable judgements.295 Likewise, Augustine 
appeals to 1 John 3:2 in order to substantiate his claim that God can be seen as he is: “If you ask 
whether he can also be seen at any time as he is, I answer that this was promised to his sons, of 
whom it is said: ‘We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see 
him as he is.’”296 Augustine makes clear that though he envisions the sight of God in his divine 
nature as a real possibility, it is nonetheless not proper to this life, a point which he makes clear 
by speaking of it as promised, which is further clarified by the passage from 1 John.297 In order to 
attain to the vision of God in his divine nature, Christ admonishes us to cleanse our hearts: “But, 
in order to attain that vision by which we see God as he is, he has warned us that our hearts must 
be cleansed.”298 Augustine uses the language of Matthew 5:8 and 1 John 3:2 together, implying 
an underlying logical link and a mutually illumining relationship. 
Augustine locates in Paul further evidence for the incorporeal character of the vision of 
God, in particular his assertion that we know Christ not according to the flesh, but according to 
the spirit. Augustine interprets Paul as speaking not of a physical face but of a spiritual reality 
when he writes that in the future we are promised a vision of God facie ad faciem.299 Paul adds 
this, Augustine writes, “lest it seem to someone very slow that he spoke concerning corporeal 
vision.”300 
The scriptural example of Moses’ theophanic encounter provides an explanatory locus 
which Augustine can use to illustrate the overall scope of his account of vision. God appeared to 
Moses and spoke with him face to face; however, Augustine states that this was still under some 
form which God had decided to adopt, not in his own nature (non … in natura propria).301 Because 
of his faithfulness and his ministry to God’s people, he was worthy of the exceptional privilege 
of seeing God’s glory. The language of John, sicuti est, is used here to describe Moses’ vision, 
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which is the same vision that is promised in eternity to God’s children.302 This vision of God in 
his nature, sicuti est, is eschatological in character, promised to the saints in another life.303 
Indeed, Augustine employs 1 John 3:2 in order to make sense of this OT theophany. That is, those 
who saw God in some form did not see him in his nature, sicuti est.304 As Augustine writes, 1 Jn 
concerns the vision of God in eternity, which is “not as men saw him when he willed under the 
appearance that he willed; not in his nature under which he lies hidden within himself even when 
he is seen, but as he is.”305 
The situation of the vision of God sicuti est in an eschatological context is further 
confirmed by Augustine’s discussion of the beatific vision with respect to the angels’ sight of 
God’s face. In order to establish the framework of the question, Augustine refers to the passage 
in Luke (20:36) according to which we shall become like the angels. Although we in this earthly 
state do not yet see God sicuti est, Augustine suggests that he is seen in this way by the angels in 
heaven already. Though he is not completely committed to this position in ep. 147 (cf., e.g., 
fortasse uidetur a quibusdam angelis),306 he confirms and more firmly adheres to this position in 
his later discussion on vision in book twenty-two of ciu.307Augustine also cites Matthew 18:10, 
in which it states that the angels always gaze upon the face of God.308 Now if we are to be made 
like the angels, and if the angels see God, it is important to determine in what way they see him, 
i.e., whether they see him in his nature, sicuti est.309 As Augustine writes, “if [the angels] do not 
see him as he is, how shall we see him, when we have become like to them at the resurrection?”310 
We see here the clear allusion to 1 John 3:2, in particular by the use of the very words sicuti est, 
and the understanding of this passage at work driving the problem which Augustine is addressing 
in this enquiry. 
 
4.2.2.4 Development of the levels of vision 
 
In ep. 147, Augustine draws a further contrast between the inner and the outer senses. He 
notes how one spontaneously uses terms related to vision (uerumtamen hoc uerbo utimur et in 
caeteris), although this sense pertains mainly to the eyes (uisus quidem in eis praecipue oculis 
adtributus est).311 In fact, strange formulations such as “seeing with the (inner) ear” on this view 
are perfectly acceptable.312 The inner eyes and the inner ears, according to Chrétien, “sont ceux 
du cœur, et pour saint Augustin il n’y va que de deux formulations distinctes de la même ouverture 
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et de le même réceptivité spirituelles.”313 Speaking in various ways of the heart, the sight of the 
mind, or the soul, Augustine conceives of one’s inner faculty of intellectual perception as holistic 
and unified, and thus able to judge the reports of the individual senses and to “perceive” in these 
reports different “types” of objects.314 
In ep. 147, Augustine also further develops the understanding of vision which he has 
enumerated in Gn. litt. Here he suggests a three-fold division of the objects of sight and the type 
of vision proper to them, reflecting very closely, both in terms of the ideas and the language, the 
tripartite schema he establishes in Gn. litt. 12. That is, he discusses sense experience as a genus 
admitting of two species, namely corporal and spiritual. Furthermore, Augustine suggests that the 
presence of an object to one’s senses, whether corporeal or mental, is the criterion of vision, as 
opposed to faith (uidentur autem quae praesto sunt, unde et praesentia nominantur uel animi uel 
corporis sensibus).315 Hence one perceives physical things by means of the bodily sense, and 
perceives these images spiritually or within the mind’s memoria. Indeed, Augustine maintains 
memory as a proper sense of vision, and yet different from faith still. One remembers things that 
one has previously seen or otherwise perceived, and these are proper to vision, not to faith (neque 
enim inter credita, sed inter uisa deputantur; et ideo nota sunt, non quia fidem habuimus aliis 
testibus, sed quia nos uidesse sine dubio recordamur et scimus).316 Memory or mental vision 
provides the opportunity for having things “present” in order to see, though their images recorded 
in the mind, not the things themselves.317 The mind receives contents through the body, but it 
leaves the things themselves outside (et quae nuntiata quasi suscipere perhibetur, foris ea 
relinquit), generating images which it then stores in the memory for later consideration (sed eorum 
imagines, id est, incorporeas similitudines corporum, incorporaliter commendat memoriae; unde 
cum uoluerit et potuerit, uelut de custodia productas atque in conspectum cogitationis exhibitas 
iudicet).318 Just as physical things are contained in our memory in a purely intellectual, non-
extended way, how much more so, Augustine wonders, for those things which are in their nature 
already incorporeal, listing such objects as caritas, pax, and fides as examples.319 (Later in ciu. 
22, Augustine will state that in eternity our thoughts will be visible to one another, as they were 
in our prelapsarian state, these thoughts which here on earth are not visible to others, but only to 
oneself.320) Such things are perceived in the mind apart from anything physical.321 Augustine also 
allows a place for spiritual vision apart from the bodily senses. He cites the example of the vision 
of the prophets, stating that they perceive future events spiritually, and not by the eyes of the body 
(as we shall presently, Augustine makes a similar point in ciu. 22).322 In these passages of ep. 147 
we see a line of thought which is strikingly similar to that developed earlier in conf. 10 and Gn. 
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litt. 12. The development and further nuance is explained, I believe, by the fact that whereas 
before Augustine was concerned about the multifarious aspects of human vision in earlier works, 
his attention is now directed specifically to the perception of God, a question which is even more 
complex. 
Knowledge (scientia) according to Augustine is composed of things which are seen and 
believed (constat igitur nostra scientia ex uisis rebus et creditis).323 The former he divides into 
things we see or are seeing (uidemus) and things we have seen (uidimus), claiming that we 
ourselves are the “witnesses” with respect to such contents, whereas the content of things believed 
is communicated by other witnesses: “in those which we believe, we are led to our assent by the 
testimony of others, because, of the things which we do not recall having seen, or do not now see, 
we receive indications, ither by spoken or written words, or by certain documents, and, when 
these have been seen, the unseen things are believed.”324 Hence in addition to objects of our 
(direct) vision, Augustine also claims that the objects of faith are indeed constitutive of our 
knowledge: “Not without reason do we say that we know not only what we have seen or see, but 
also what we believe, when we yield assent to some fact under the influence of suitable evidence 
or witness.”325 Augustine adds that therefore, things which are believed are also seen mentally, 
even if they are not objects which can in principle be present to the senses: “Moreover, if it is not 
inappropriate to say that we also know what we firmly believe, this arises from the fact that we 
are correctly said to see mentally what we believe, even though it is not present to our senses.”326 
The objects of our faith, whilst not by their nature present to our senses, are nonetheless conveyed 
to us by those things which are. The objects of faith, the contents of the words or other media of 
communication are perceived by the mind (animo), whilst the means of communication are 
available to the senses of the body. It is through the latter that one has access to the former, and 
even forms a certain image of them within one’s mind: “The Scriptures are then included among 
the objects of the bodily senses: of the eyes if he reads them, or of the ears if he hears them read. 
He sees them in his mind and he understands whatever is signified by the shapes or sounds of the 
letters.”327 Indeed, the formation of some image of the faith-content is an essential part of 
understanding the meaning of the means by whereby the thought is communicated (uidet etiam 
ipsius resurrectionis quamdam imaginem in animo suo factam, sine qua intellegi non potest 
quidquid factum corporaliter dicitur, siue credatur, siue non credatur).328 
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One’s thoughts and wishes are not seen by others, and hence by others they are said to be 
believed and not seen, as they are hidden from the senses (latet sensum corporis et animi mei, 
credo, non uideo).329 One’s own faith, whilst not visible by the body, is nonetheless visible to 
oneself, but only to oneself; Jones cannot see Smith’s faith, or vice-versa, though Jones can see 
his own faith mentally. As Augustine explains it, “it is not visible to another’s mind, as your faith 
is not perceived by my mind, although I believe it is in you, but I do not see it corporeally–and 
neither can you–nor mentally, as you can; as I see mine, but you cannot.”330 Later in this same 
epistle, Augustine again invokes his distinction between two types of “scientific” vision, namely 
that which occurs by the mind, and the one which occurs through the senses. Whilst certain objects 
are physical and corporeal and are seen by the bodily senses, others are only perceptible by the 
mind, such as one’s will. Moreover, this object of vision is only available to oneself; only Jones 
can see his own will in the proper sense of the term, whereas Smith can only have faith in, believe 
in the presence of Jones’ will or thoughts or what have you.331 In this passage, Augustine echoes 
thoughts which he had expressed over a decade earlier, in the opuscule f. inuis. In this work, 
Augustine discusses the good will of a friend towards oneself, and states that this ultimately 
cannot be the object of (direct) perception, but can only be grasped by a certain sort of faith.332 
With respect to things not seen, one applies faith, in particular by judging the weight of the 
testimony one receives.333 
These examples serve a key function for the discussion of the vision of God. Having 
considered examples of spiritual perception, Augustine proceeds to discuss how God is somewhat 
similar in terms of his incorporeality. The argument suggested here is a fortiori; in other words, 
if we believe that certain objects of mental vision do not admit of any spatial extension, then how 
much more God himself, the very source and conditor of these natures: “if those things which we 
perceive with the eyes of the heart by means of that light are distinguished from each other and 
separated by no intervals of space, how much more is this true of God, who inhabits light 
inaccessible to the bodily senses, to whom there can be no approach save for the clean of heart.”334 
In other words, part of ourselves, namely our reason and our mind, is invisible to our bodily 
vision; hence, a fortiori, God, who is superior even to our minds, cannot be visible in a corporeal 
way, either.335 
Heretofore Augustine has more or less recounted the first two senses of vision which he 
presents in Gn. litt. 12. However, things change when he proceeds to discuss the vision of God: 
“it is true that no one has seen God at any time, in the sense in which visible things of the body, 
as known by the senses, are seen; since, if he has been seen at any time in that way, he is not seen 
according to his own nature, but is seen by appearing under that aspect which he wills, although 
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that nature remains hidden and unchangeable within him.”336 Indeed, this distinction between 
God’s nature and the form thereof is, according to Studer, the fundamental principle of 
Augustine’s treatise.337 The importance of the foregoing distinctions becomes clearer when 
Augustine introduces the contrast with these types of vision and faith. Faith in things neither seen 
nor able to be seen is an entirely different type of vision from the two foregoing types, namely 
corporeal and mental (aliud autem credere quod in corporis mentisue conspectu nec adest nec 
adfuisse recolitur).338 God is presented as a qualitatively different type of object, the perception 
of whom is unlike both physical things (corpora siue caelestia, siue terrestria) and the internal 
objects of mental perception.339 Augustine makes clear that the vision of God is not realised by 
means of either of these two sorts of vision which he has heretofore described: “but God may be 
seen by no type of those two.”340 Augustine solidifies this distinction (hanc itaque distinctionem 
tene) in the following paragraph, and then proceeds to contrast these two distinct sorts of vision, 
namely by the oculus carnis and the mentis intuitu, respectively, with the vision of God.341 It is 
through the incorporeal eyes, which one can see God. Augustine links this with various scriptural 
passages, stating that the need for illumination is a need from a supernal light source, one which 
is not like our way of seeing the light of the sun. The upshot is that clear vision is integrally linked 
with one’s capacity to conceive of God as incorporeal: “Consequently, he who can see God 
invisibly can be joined to God incorporeally.”342 
Despite God’s hiddenness and his inaccessibility to human perception, a point which 
Augustine emphasises again and again, this does not mean that God ever remains a complete 
enigma. In fact, it is the function of the Son, the Word of God, to communicate to man the nature 
of the Godhead in a mysterious way which goes beyond words: “But the only-begotten Son who 
is in the bosom of the Father without sound of words declares the nature and substance of the 
Godhead.”343 Augustine suggests that this revelatory action of the Son with respect to the divine 
life constitutes the logical ground of God’s making himself visible to man (dignis idoneisque 
tanto conspectu oculis etiam inuisibiliter monstrat).344 In fact, the economy of God’s being seen 
is one aspect under which to view the broader mystery of revelation.345 By taking some corporeal 
form, God not only opens himself to the possibility of being seen by his chosen ones, but by all 
people; however, this is of course not as he is, for his divine nature remains hidden (uerumtamen 
non esse mirandum, si aliqui etiam non mundi corde euident Deum in specie quam uoluntas eius 
fecerit, latente inuisibili et apud se incommutabili manente natura).346 The vision of God is not 
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so much a question of God’s presence to one, but the disposition of the soul. Ambrose cites 
Philip’s apparently obtuse question to Christ recorded in the Gospel of John, for which he is 
censured.347 Even the apostles, who were with God in the flesh, did not necessarily see him;348 
such a vision pertains to the knowledge of Christ (supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi).349 
Here Augustine follows Ambrose, who states that the vision of God results from grace, and that 
it is a revelation initiated solely from the perspective of the divine: “It is not in our power to see, 
but in his to appear. However, even if we have no power of seeing, there is a grace of meriting 
that we may be able to see.”350 
Augustine interprets Ambrose as speaking of the present, earthly life when he discusses 
the necessity of grace in order to see God. Now in this world we lack the grace of seeing God; to 
some it has been granted in this life, though of course he qualifies this by saying that it was not 
God in his nature, but rather under some form (non in sua natura, sed in qua uoluit specie, 
dignatus est apparere).351 The full vision of God will only be realised in the eschaton (in futuro 
autem saeculo) in the kingdom of God, and will pertain only to those who are clean of heart: “In 
the age to come, however, those who will receive the kingdom which has been prepared for them 
from the beginning, all of these will see him by a clean heart; nor will there be any in that kingdom 
except for this kind [who see by a pure heart].”352 This point is confirmed in the following 
paragraph, in which Augustine, again quoting Ambrose, who himself cites Matthew 5:8, suggests 
that in the resurrection, only the pure of heart will see God (in ipsa quoque resurrectione non 
facile est Deum uidere, nisi iis qui mundo sint corde: et ideo beati mundo corde; ipsi enim Deum 
uidebunt).353 
 
4.2.2.5 Illumination 
 
Augustine’s discussion of vision in ep. 147 shows that considerations of vision are 
inseparable from considerations of light, the condition of the possibility of vision. As he had 
suggested decades earlier in his sol., a certain type of light provides the fabric constitutive of our 
intelligible experience of the world, connecting seer and seen.354 Throughout his corpus Augustine 
returns to this theme of light, and here in ep. 147, he emphasises the necessity of a certain sort of 
light in order for mental perception to be possible. Augustine suggests a connection between our 
capacity to see and perceive this incorporeal light on the one hand, and our cleansing from sin on 
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the other, in particular through the action of Christ, “until all the infirmities of our soul shall be 
healed by him who becomes merciful toward our iniquities.”355 
In keeping with the theme of illumination, Augustine also suggests that the capacity to 
arrive at certain conclusions, e.g., the notion that the invisible is to be preferred to the visible, 
comes as a result of guided scriptural enquiry.356 The spiritual element in our nature is distinctive 
insofar as it enables one to know and to perceive the spiritual things of God; it also enables one 
to judge, whereas that which is merely animal cannot judge, but rather is judged.357 As we have 
noted above, Augustine identifies the faculty of judgement as a key feature to mental vision.358 
Whilst the corporeal eyes can see physical bodies, the reports of sense perception are never totally 
separated from the intentional activity of the mind (nihil isti uideant, unde non illi tamquam 
praesides iudicent).359 Moreover, as we have seen, the eyes of the mind see things which the 
corporeal eyes do not. In virtue of this apparent hierarchy in terms of operation (isti autem illis 
quodam officio nuntiandi et ministerio famulentur), Augustine concludes that the mental type of 
perception is qualitatively superior to that of the body (quis non illos istis incomparabili 
aestimatione praeponat?).360 Augustine’s discussion of vision leads him to a point which was a 
key theme of some of his earliest (Christian) works, namely that of a sense of normative categories 
present within the mind.361 Although some objects are perceived by the body and others by the 
mind (alia corpore, alia mente uideamus), our capacity for distinguishing and judging is a feature 
perceptible only to the mind itself.362 One does not need any bodily sense in order to judge the 
truth of the things which one perceives by the mind; this is a purely mental function, and not 
dependent on the body, though the contents which it judges may come as a result of corporeal 
perception.363 Sense knowledge only derives its meaning from mental processes. Without the 
presence of the mind to the self, there would be no way of parsing the contents which the senses 
receive: “However, none of the things which are seen through the body are able to be contained 
in our knowledge, unless there is a mind present which might receive such things which are 
announced.”364 (This evokes a key theme of the Theaetetus.) 
The mental activity of judging and discerning, indeed, even of identifying the very 
categories of interior and exterior requires in Augustine’s mind some influence or presence of a 
kind of intelligible light source (in nulla te putas, an in aliqua luce uersari?).365 The perception 
of such intellectual contents requires a certain context or framework, which Augustine 
understands as an incorporeal sort of light (ego enim existimo quod tanta tibi et talia, tam uera, 
tam clara, tam certa uideri sine luce non possunt).366 This light is beyond material categories, 
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apart from any sort of extension. As Augustine writes, “Look upon that light, therefore, in which 
you behold all other things, and see whether any glance of bodily eyes can draw near to it. 
Obviously, it cannot. Notice, also, and answer whether you see in it any dimensions or limits of 
space. You will find no such thing there, I think, if you are careful to exclude from your inner 
vision whatever corporeal images the senses of the outer man bring in.”367 Such a recognition 
relies upon a distancing of oneself from images and similitudes of physical and temporal things.368 
Augustine speaks of the carnal habit as irritating one’s interior eyes, suggesting that this irritation 
prevents one from seeing spiritual truths, in particular because one is unable to conceive of 
spiritual things as non-extended substances (inruit enim de consuetudine carnalis uitae, in ipsos 
quoque interiores oculos turba phantasmatum in similitudinibus corporum).369 As R. Coyne 
writes, Heidegger reads Augustine on purification as pertaining to removing “objectifying” 
notions of God from the self, of understanding God as the object of some detached enjoyment.370 
Augustine cites his tortured cry, Spiritus est Deus, as an attempt to remind himself of God’s divine 
nature and to draw himself from corporeal categories.371  
 
4.2.2.6 Results 
 
After an extended treatment of the question of God’s visibility, Augustine summarises 
his conclusion in the following way. God can be seen, and this is clear from the testimony of 
scripture: “If you ask whether God can be seen, I answer: He can. If you ask how I know, I answer 
that we read in Scripture, the source of truth: ‘Blessed are the clean of heart, for the shall see 
God,’ and other passages of like tenor.”372 Once again, we see Augustine appealing to the 
authority of the Bible, and in particular Christ’s words recorded in Matthew 5:8. Furthermore, we 
also see how Augustine takes this passage to encapsulate and express essentially the same point 
as other locations (et caetera talia).373 Of course for as many “other such passages” he may find, 
he also has to deal with the problem of God’s invisibility which is also challenged by the 
theological tradition to which Augustine adheres. This of course is the rub throughout ep. 147, 
and now we can see more clearly how this question can be answered, given the distinctions and 
hermeneutical treatment Augustine has provided. He succinctly expresses his position in the 
following way: “If you ask how he is said to be invisible if he can be seen, I answer that he is 
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invisible by nature, but he is seen when he wills and as he wills. He has been seen by many, not 
as he is, but under such aspect as it pleased him to appear.”374 As we have seen, for instance with 
respect to Augustine’s exegesis of the OT theophanies, God’s nature was not seen. In this respect, 
he is very much a faithful student of Ambrose. God’s invisible nature does not place some sort of 
insuperable limitation on him, or on his ability to reveal himself. God’s will is not frustrated by 
human limitations; he selects corporeal forms as a meeting point, a place of encounter in which 
he can manifest himself, simultaneously being perceivable and yet hidden, an action which he 
takes in a supreme way in the Incarnation. Indeed, insofar as Augustine sees the OT theophanies 
as anticipating the Incarnation, he also sees the modality of those theophanies as likewise 
anticipating that of the Incarnation, insofar as the invisible God takes a visible form, yet is still 
only seen by those who are able to perceive him.375 In the incarnation, Christ was indeed appearing 
in a visible, corporeal way to bodily eyes (quando corporalibus oculis uisibiliter apparebat).376  
Succinctly put, Augustine’s argument contains two moments. First, he distinguishes 
between God’s nature itself, which is invisible, and between a form that he may adopt for a 
particular reason. Secondly, these forms were taken by God by his own will, so that he could 
provide a way of being perceived by those whom he had chosen: “they saw–those of them who 
did see God–because to whomever he wished, and as he wished, he appeared in that form which 
his will chose, even as his nature remained hidden.”377 In other words, though the passage from 
John 1:18, “No one has ever seen God,” and the OT accounts of theophany seem to contradict 
one another, they actually pertain to different “ways” of seeing God.378  
Augustine’s reflections on vision in ep. 147 raise a variety of compelling insights of 
constructive theological import. As in Gn. litt. 12, he emphasises the holistic character of sight. 
In other words, sight is a nuanced faculty which admits of various interconnected parts. Aside 
from our act of looking and our act of seeing, there is also an initiative on the other side, on the 
side of God. Augustine appeals to John in order to make this point, citing John 14:21, in which 
Christ says that he will show himself to those who love and worship God.379 
The importance of the will comes to the fore in this epistle as well. Augustine reads 
Ambrose as saying that a certain desire to see God is necessary, which is interpreted with respect 
to Matthew 5:8; those who lack the will to cleanse their hearts do not wish to see God. Augustine 
asks rhetorically, “what else does [Ambrose] wish us to infer but that he who is unwilling to 
devote to the cleansing of his heart an effort worthy of so great an aim does not wish to see 
God?”380 For Augustine, the desire to see God is a mark of the saints. He locates in Moses’ request 
to see God (ostende mihi teipsum, ut uideam te) this pious desire, which he links with two other 
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scripture passages, one in the OT (Ps 16:15), and one in the new (Jn 14:8).381 What is also 
interesting is that Augustine views these individual passages expressing the same desire (eodem 
desiderio) “with which Moses burned, which left him unsatisfied with speaking to God face to 
face, and made him say: ‘Show my thyself openly, that I may see thee,’ as if he were saying what 
is expressed about that desire in the psalm: ‘I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear.’ With 
that desire also, Philip burned and longed to be satisfied, when he said: ‘Show us the Father and 
it is enough for us.’”382 Citing a passage from John 17, the high priestly prayer of Christ, 
Augustine links eternal life, that is, the knowledge of God, with the vision of him. In the eschaton, 
Christ will reveal himself to those who love him and his Father, showing them the divine nature 
itself (sed sic quomodo promisit ostensurum seipsum dilectoribus suis cum Patre unum Deum, 
non quomodo in hoc saeculo in corpore uisus est a bonis et a malis).383 
In contrast to those who possess the pious desire of beholding God, there are the impious 
who refuse (noluerit) to see God (Quantos beatos iam numerauerat, et tamen uidendi his Deum 
non promiserat facultatem! Si ergo ii qui mundo sunt corde, Deum uidebunt; utique alii non 
uidebunt. Neque enim indigni Deum uidebunt; neque is qui Deum uidere noluerit, potest Deum 
uidere).384 As in trin. 1, Augustine contrasts those who will see Christ only in the form of a 
servant, that is, in his human nature, only as a man, with those who will see Christ in the form of 
God (illam Dei formam).385 In order to substantiate this point, he refers to a locus in the Corpus 
Paulinum, in which Paul writes of Christ’s kenosis. In the very next sentence, Augustine links 
this divine form with the Johannine language of sicuti est, namely stating that those who will see 
God in his divine nature in eternity will see him “as he is.” So with Paul, Augustine identifies 
Christ in his divine nature, prior to and apart from the Incarnation, and with respect to the allusion 
to John, Augustine writes that this will be the same object of vision for the blessed, even though 
this divine form will be co-extensive with his human nature, the form of a servant.386 
On a final note, Augustine suggests a crucial distinction between seeing and 
comprehending: “It is one thing to see; it is something else to grasp (comprehendere) the whole 
by seeing.”387 From the observation that Augustine understands vision and reason as somehow 
dependent upon factors which exceed “pure reason,” we can identify a number of interesting 
conclusions. For one, sometimes things hide from us in plain sight; they are there, but we do not 
“see” them, even if we see them in a bodily way. This could involve some initiative on the side 
of the object of cognition, so to speak, a point which I shall address in Part III, in particular in 
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terms of nature “speaking” to one. There is also the question of one’s will; one must want to see 
a particular object, or be attuned in such a way as to be able to see it. Likewise, there are some 
who choose not to see something, even if it is in front of them. Finally, and perhaps most notably, 
Augustine distinguishes between having some knowledge of something or an aspect of it and 
comprehending it. The latter can never apply to God, due to the incorporeality of the divine nature. 
Reason and vision are conditioned by Augustine’s theological commitments, and challenge the 
categories of “faith and reason” which are so prevalent today amongst those of various 
persuasions. The emphasis on eschatological vision is also strong in this epistle, a point which 
constitutes the major focal point in book twenty-two of ciu. 
 
4.2.3 De Ciuitate Dei 22.29.1-6388 
 
In the first chapter I noted how the entire texture of Augustine’s theory of knowledge is 
eschatological. In other words, it terminates after this life on a qualitatively different level of 
existence. Holte confirms this idea when he writes, “Dans l’œuvre d’Augustin toute entière, la 
contemplation des Idées, identique avec la vision de Dieu, est donne comme la fin de l’existence 
humaine.”389 We have already seen how Augustine tries to think through this with respect to 
vision, and in particular the vision of God. In ciu. 22, the eschatological dimension to intellectual 
sight is foregrounded and elaborated more fully. Furthermore, as eschatology implies something 
ahistorical and atemporal, it is clear that Augustine here is discussing matters that primarily 
pertain to faith.390 Though the focus is narrowed here to the beatific vision, Augustine presupposes 
the categories and distinctions which he makes in earlier works. 
In his retr., Augustine mentions how he dealt with the question of the vision of God in 
De uidendo Deo, soon adding that he dealt with this very matter again in his ciu., in particular in 
the final book. As the third and final case study on vision, let us turn to this location, where we 
shall see that Augustine puts the final glosses on his understanding of vision, again framed in 
terms of how God can and will be seen. In this text, Augustine discusses the various types of 
vision less, or rather less technically, apparently presupposing the categories he has presented in 
previous works. Rather, he focuses more specifically on the eschatological aspect to the vision of 
God, and delves into some finer and more technical points in this respect. 
As he does in ep. 147, Augustine raises the question of what the vision of the resurrection 
of the dead will be like, when the saints (sancti) will inhabit new immortal and spiritual bodies 
(corporibus immortalibus atque spiritalibus).391 Augustine states that such a vision will not be 
according to the flesh (non enim hoc umquam per sensus corporis uidi) and suggests that it will 
be of a qualitatively different sort than our current earthly experience.392 We see a similar point 
in trin. 8, in which Augustine exhorts one to seek a mental vision of truth in its essence, sine ulla 
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mole, sine ulla mutabilitate.393 Although the state of the life to come may seem completely distant, 
we have some intimation of it now, specifically in virtue of our participation in the peace of 
Christ.394 
As we have seen in previous works, and especially with respect to his treatment of vision 
in ep. 147, Augustine takes as a basis for his thought the incorporeality of God, a tenet which 
forces him to think about how the eyes of our current bodies may undergo some form of change. 
Indeed, he says that God is not able to be seen by the eyes as they are currently constituted, 
immediately citing as a reason for this the non-extended nature of the divine essence.395 As 
Augustine writes, “For if even those spiritual eyes themselves will be able to see in the spiritual 
body only in that way, as much as these eyes the likes of which we have now see, I doubt little 
that God will not be able to be seen through them,”396 after which he immediately proceeds to the 
following point: “Their powers will be higher by far, if through them that incorporeal nature will 
be seen, which is not contained in a place, but is everywhere whole. Because we say that God is 
both in heaven and on earth (indeed, he himself said through the prophet, I fill heaven and earth), 
we shall not therefore say that he has one part in heaven and another on earth; but that the whole 
is in heaven, and the whole on earth, not at different times, but both together, which no corporeal 
nature can be.”397 Augustine emphasises the qualitatively distinct nature of this type of vision, 
contrasting it with a quantitatively superior form of vision which is attributed to certain types of 
animals.398 On the contrary, the vision of the saints will not be like this, in particular because 
however great this sharpness of vision may be, it still only allows them to see corporeal things 
(quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem quoque animalia nihil aliud possunt uidere quam 
corpora).399 The vision of God in the resurrection is a special gift, given specifically for the 
purpose of seeing God in his divine nature (sed ut uideant et incorporalia).400 In this respect, 
Augustine notes Paul’s image of the eye of the heart (oculum cordis), indeed, those eyes when 
they are illumined (illuminatos oculos … cordis uestri).401 Augustine attributes the beatific vision 
to these eyes, yet again substantiating this (Pauline) position by appeal to Matthew 5:8, a move 
which he also makes in ep. 147: “When he will be seen, no Christian doubts that God is seen by 
these eyes, who faithfully accepts what God that teacher said: ‘Blessed are the clean of heart, for 
they shall see God.’”402 
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402 ciu. 22.29.3, CCSL 48, p. 859: “Ipsis autem uideri Deum, cum uidebitur, Christianus ambigit nemo, qui 
fideliter accipit, quod ait Deus ille magister: ‘Beati mundicordes, quoniam ipsi Deum uidebunt.’”  
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Augustine re-states a point which he has made in previous works, namely that in eternity, 
we shall be able to look upon God face to face as the angels do, which is apparently only possible 
outside of time and space. He cites Paul’s famous passage about the looking glass as an expression 
of how the angels already see God: “For one should consider what such a great man said: … ‘We 
see now through a looking glass in an enigma, but then face to face.’ The holy angels already see 
in that way.”403 Thus when the eschaton is realised, men and angels will inhabit one city together, 
the holy and most sweet city of God (cum quibus nobis erit sancta atque dulcissima, de qua iam 
tot libros scripsimus, Dei ciuitas ipsa communis).404 Hence the vision of God which the angels 
enjoy already will be ours as well, though not yet: “Therefore just as they [=the angels] see, thus 
shall we also see; but we do not yet see in that way.”405 As support for this position, Augustine 
appeals to two passages of which he has made use in the past, namely the Pauline passage again 
concerning the “enigmatic,” indirect view of God, and the ultimate sight of him facie ad faciem, 
as well as 1 John 3:2, according to which we shall see God as he is.406 Augustine takes a moment, 
as he does in ep. 147, inter alia, to gloss the scriptural texts in questions, in particular to emphasise 
that they should not be taken to imply that God in his divine nature has corporeal features such as 
those to which we are here accustomed; rather, the face of God should be understood as his full 
self-manifestation.407 Augustine is less confident about what precisely this means, and is reticent 
to give any further details. Concerning the spiritual body and the sort of state that we shall enjoy, 
Augustine again refers this to faith, saying that this is something that he has not yet seen, but only 
believed (non dico quod iam uideo, sed dico quod credo).408 From this biblical faith he also 
maintains that the saints will in fact see God in the body (uisuri sunt Deum in ipso corpore).409 
Although Augustine spends a great deal of time discussing what our vision in the resurrection 
will be, he also says that at some point, rational enquiry and speculation must cede to faith and 
acceptance, as in this current earthly state, we are unable to understand all the things of God, and 
not all of the answers are made clear in the usual ways, namely through some authority.410 
Augustine distinguishes between seeing through the flesh (per carnem) and seeing in the 
flesh (in carne).411 In the resurrection we shall be in the flesh, that is, we shall possess glorified 
bodies. However, that does not mean that we shall see God by means of the flesh, or our bodily 
                                                          
403 ciu. 22.29.1, CCSL 48, p. 857: “Considerandum est enim quantus uir dicebat: […] ‘Videmus nunc per 
speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem faciem ad faciem.’ Sic iam uident sancti angeli.”  
404 ciu. 22.29.1, CCSL 48, p. 857. See also (ibid.): “Dei sunt, quia Deum non reliquerunt; nostri sunt, quia 
suos ciues nos habere coeperunt.” 
405 ciu. 22.29.1, CCSL 48, p. 857: “Sicut ergo illi uident, ita et nos uisuri sumus; sed nondum ita uidemus.”  
406 ciu. 22.29.1, CCSL 48, p. 857: “Propter quod ait Apostolus, quod paulo ante dixi: Videmus nunc per 
speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem faciem ad faciem. Praemium itaque fidei nobis uisio ista seruatur, de qua et Ioannes 
apostolus loquens: Cum apparuerit, inquit, similes ei erimus, quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est.” 
407 ciu. 22.29.1, CCSL 48, p. 857: “Facies autem Dei manifestatio eius intellegenda est, non aliquod tale 
membrum, quale nos habemus in corpore atque isto nomine nuncupamus.” 
408 ciu. 22.29.2, CCSL 48, p. 857. 
409 ciu. 22.29.2, CCSL 48, p. 857. 
410 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860: “Fide quippe acceditur ad Deum, quam cordis constat esse, non corporis. 
Sed quia spiritale corpus nescimus quantos habebit accessus (de re quippe inexperta loquimur), ubi aliqua, quae aliter 
intellegi nequeat, diuinarum Scripturarum non occurrit et succurrit auctoritas, necesse est ut contingat in nobis quod 
legitur in libro Sapientiae: ‘Cogitationes mortalium timidae et incertae prouidentiae nostrae.’” 
411 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860. 
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eyes.412 As in ep. 147, Augustine seeks to distinguish vision of God from bodily vision, suggesting 
that one can have vision even if the eyes are closed or if the body is absent. One can see physical 
things by the spirit, as is made clear by the testimony of scripture; hence, a fortiori, the risen saints 
will possess this capacity as well.413 
In contrast to the foregoing case studies, Augustine discusses a pagan philosophical 
position with respect to vision. Augustine sharply distances himself from the classical tradition 
concerning vision, citing the authority not simply of scripture but of “true reason” (uera ratio): 
“But both prophetic authority and true reason mock this reasoning.”414 Though God is spirit, it 
does not mean that he himself is unable to perceive physical things (Quis enim ita sit auersus a 
uero, ut dicere audeat Deum corporalia ista nescire? Numquid ergo corpus habet, per cuius 
oculos ea possit addiscere?).415 In fact, Augustine further develops his understanding of spiritual 
vision, claiming that one can see physical things by (means of) the spirit (Deinde quod de 
propheta Elisaeo paulo ante diximus, nonne satis indicat etiam spiritu, non per corpus, corporalia 
posse cerni?).416 Augustine cites the example of the scriptural passage in which Elijah has a vision 
of his servant receiving gifts. Elijah is not there in the flesh; he is in a rather distant place. 
Nonetheless, he is able to see this action taking place. It was surely a physical, corporeal action 
(utique corporaliter gestum est),417 which he nevertheless saw spiritually (non per corpus, sed per 
spiritum uidit).418 Augustine seems to suggest that this miraculous vision anticipates or presages 
the powers of the risen body in eternity, which will then be able to see spiritual things.419 
Augustine states that on earth, Christ was seen in the flesh, and that in the future, when 
he comes to judge the living and the dead, he will again be seen.420 Here Augustine suggests an 
approach in continuity with such locations as trin. 1, where he states that some will see Christ 
only according to the forma serui, that is, in his human nature, whereas others will see him qua 
Son of God.421 In particular, Augustine suggests that Simeon, who identified the baby Jesus as 
                                                          
412 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860: “Illud etiam, quod ait supra memoratus Iob, sicut in exemplaribus, quae ex 
Hebraeo sunt, inuenitur: Et in carne mea uidebo Deum, resurrectionem quidem carnis sine dubio prophetavit, non tamen 
dixit: ‘Per carnem meam.’ Quod quidem si dixisset, posset Deus Christus intellegi, qui per carnem in carne uidebitur; 
nunc uero potest et sic accipi: In carne mea uidebo Deum, ac si dixisset: ‘In carne mea ero, cum uidebo Deum.’” 
413 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 859: “quanto amplius in illo corpore spiritali uidebunt sancti omnia, non solum 
si oculos claudant, uerum etiam unde sunt corpore absentes! Tunc enim erit perfectum illud, de quo loquens Apostolus: 
Ex parte, inquit, scimus et ex parte prophetamus; cum autem uenerit quod perfectum est, quod ex parte est euacuabitur; 
uidit tamen Elisaeus accipientem munera seruum suum, ubi ipse non erat; itane cum uenerit quod perfectum est nec 
iam corpus corruptibile adgrauabit animam, sed incorruptibile nihil impediet, illi sancti ad ea, quae uidenda sunt oculis 
corporeis, quibus Elisaeus absens ad seruum suum uidendum non indiguit, indigebunt? Sed quanto amplius tunc omnes 
munere isto abundabunt, cum Deus erit omnia in omnibus! Habebunt tamen etiam illi oculi corporei officium suum et 
in loco suo erunt, uteturque illis spiritus per spiritale corpus. Neque enim et ille Propheta, quia non eis indiguit ut uideret 
absentem, non eis usus est ad uidenda praesentia; quae tamen spiritu uidere posset, etiamsi illos clauderet, sicut uidit 
absentia, ubi cum eis ipse non erat. Absit ergo, ut dicamus illos sanctos in illa uita Deum clausis oculis non uisuros, 
quem spiritu semper uidebunt.” 
414 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861: “Sed istam ratiocinationem et uera ratio et prophetica irridet auctoritas.” 
415 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861. 
416 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861. 
417 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861. 
418 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861. 
419 Cf. ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861. 
420 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860: “Illud enim quod scriptum est: Et uidebit omnis caro salutare Dei, sine 
ullius nodo difficultatis sic intellegi potest, ac si dictum fuerit: ‘Et uidebit omnis homo Christum Dei,’ qui utique in 
corpore uisus est et in corpore uidebitur, quando uiuos et mortuos iudicabit.” 
421 Cf. trin. 1.13.30, CCSL 50, p. 74. 
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the Christ in the temple in Jerusalem, saw God in the flesh, a vision which presumably not 
everyone enjoyed.422 In eternity, however, we shall see God in a completely incorporeal way, 
beyond time and space. Augustine substantiates this claim by appeal to Paul. As he does in ep. 
147, he discusses the vision of God facie ad faciem, and makes the qualification that this language 
should not be interpreted in some physical way. In God’s presence we shall see him as he is, being 
illumined by an incorporeal light.423 
As I have argued concerning Gn. litt. 12, Augustine has a very nuanced and holistic 
understanding of vision, one which is multi-faceted and is understood as one highly complex 
faculty, rather than a spiritual one which is somehow analogous to the bodily sense of sight. In 
addition, one finds evidence for such a position in the final book of ciu. The physical and the non-
physical are integrally linked. For instance, Augustine says that when we see a living person, we 
see the life as co-extensive with the body. Yet we do not see the life by the bodily eye, but through 
it. For we need to see the substrate, that to which the life is subjoined, in order to see the life itself. 
As Augustine writes, “For how do we discern living bodies from non-living ones, unless we see 
the bodies together with lives, which we are not able to see except through the body? However, 
we do not see lives without bodies by the corporeal eyes.”424 Augustine contrasts the current way 
in which we can have some indirect vision of God, citing two key Pauline passages.425 Now on 
earth we perceive God through creation, relying more on faith than on vision, but not so in 
eternity.426 Rather, our new bodies will allow us to see God spiritually, but through the body.427 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Gn. litt., Augustine presents a tripartite structure of vision which, I argue, should not 
be understood as three separate types of vision but rather three aspects of the same type of vision. 
We saw this with respect to his exegesis of Dn 5 and the famous “writing on the wall.” This 
discussion of vision reflects certain key points which Augustine makes with respect to vision in 
works completed by ca. 400. In ca. 414, when he composes his treatise on the vision of God, we 
see him relying upon the earlier framework he had established, though developed and applied to 
a more specific topic. In ep. 147, we see a further consideration of eschatology and the 
                                                          
422 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860: “Quod autem ipse sit salutare Dei, multa sunt et alia testimonia 
Scripturarum; sed euidentius uenerandi illius senis Simeonis uerba declarant, qui cum infantem Christum accepisset in 
manus suas: Nunc, inquit, dimittis, Domine, seruum tuum secundum uerbum tuum in pace, quoniam uiderunt oculi mei 
salutare tuum.” 
423 ciu. 22.29.4, CCSL 48, p. 860: “Et illud, quod ait Apostolus: Faciem ad faciem, non cogit ut Deum per 
hanc faciem corporalem, ubi sunt oculi corporales, nos uisuros esse credamus, quem spiritu sine intermissione 
uidebimus. Nisi enim esset etiam interioris hominis facies, non diceret idem Apostolus: Nos autem reuelata facie 
gloriam Domini speculantes in eamdem imaginem transformamur, de gloria in gloriam, tamquam a Domini Spiritu; 
nec aliter intellegimus et quod in Psalmo canitur: Accedite ad eum et illuminamini, et facies uestrae non erubescent.” 
424 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, p. 861: “Nam unde uiuentia discernimus a non uiuentibus corpora, nisi corpora 
simul uitasque uideamus, quas nisi per corpus uidere non possumus? Vitas autem sine corporibus corporeis oculis non 
uidemus.”  See also (ibid.): “Sicut ergo constat corpora uideri spiritu, quid si tanta erit potentia spiritalis corporis, ut 
corpore uideatur et spiritus?; Spiritus enim est Deus. Deinde uitam quidem suam, qua nunc uiuit in corpore et haec 
terrena membra uegetat facitque uiuentia, interiore sensu quisque, non per corporeos oculos nouit; aliorum uero uitas, 
cum sint inuisibiles, per corpus uidet.” 
425 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, pp. 859-61. 
426 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, pp. 859-61. 
427 ciu. 22.29.5, CCSL 48, pp. 859-61. 
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resurrection, a discussion which is continued in greater detail in ciu. 22, written ca. 427. In my 
estimation, the overarching link between these locations, aside from a clear focus on vision and a 
certain continuity with respect to the development of this theme, is the way in which the 
discussion of vision is a logical consequence of Augustine’s understanding of sapientia. Hence 
in addition to perceiving the rationes aeternae in the physical world, one also has to consider how 
the eternal wisdom, God himself, can be seen, the God who is above and beyond all corporeality. 
In addition to the historical element, I believe there are several elements here which are 
interesting from a contemporary systematic perspective. Augustine presents a notion of vision 
which is unified and yet differentiated. As the world contains marks of its sapiential source of 
being, so can one perceive something of this in the natural world. The notion of uestigium, aside 
from its own intrinsic meaning, is especially important for Augustine, as according to Giraud, this 
is the category according to which he thinks the material world, namely as a vestige of its 
Maker.428 As I see it, the implication of this is highly significant philosophically speaking, insofar 
as there is no such thing as the “purely material” or “purely empirical” for Augustine. I shall 
return this point in more detail in Part III. Similarly, one’s moral and spiritual disposition is 
relevant to what one does or does not perceive. This is especially the case with respect to Christ 
or the Son of Man; whilst some see only the latter, others see Christ in his human nature and in 
his divine nature. There is no opposition or mutual exclusion between these two; rather, they are 
two aspects under which one and the same person can be viewed. A further point of interest is the 
way in which Augustine ascribes to the intellect some sort of capacity to identify intelligible 
contents which stand in need of being further investigated, as well as how a reflection on our ways 
of knowing and seeing disclose the apparent normative and pre-given categories according to 
which we make sense of the reality around us. This world in which we are situated is therefore 
imbued with intelligible properties, contents which require investigation and interpretation in 
order to be fully realised and understood. In this way, Augustine views the world as inherently 
text-like. I shall say more on this in Part III. In the meantime, one can note that such an approach 
suggests a hermeneutical element to vision and reason. This point provides a fitting transition to 
the second part of this enquiry, namely into Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. 
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SECVNDA PARS 
GADAMER 
 
5. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS IN GADAMER’S THOUGHT 
AN INTERROGATIVE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Augustine’s thought I identified two major themes as it pertains to knowledge, namely 
the principal sense of illumination and the gradual sense. The former pertains to the capacity, 
common to all rational creatures, that provides one with the ability and the basic resources for 
reasoning. One’s ability is rooted in the creation of the soul ad imaginem Dei. As the entire 
universe is created in sapientia, one’s mind is inherently linked with the reality to which it is made 
to be perceptive. One perceives sapientia and its vestiges through an intellectual sense. However, 
though all persons have access to the divine light of wisdom, luminosa sapientia, each person 
differs in their capacity to perceive this light. Sometimes one’s eyes are blocked, or admit of some 
other ailment that prevents one from seeing. One major cause for this is sin, which damages but 
does not totally vitiate the soul’s divine image. For this reason, sapientia diuina takes flesh in 
order to heal and re-orient the fallen soul. One’s perfection of the rational faculty is a process 
which takes place gradually and requires moral and ascetic formation, the overcoming of sinful 
tendencies, and fides as a preliminary step to understanding and a means of cleansing one’s 
intellectual faculties. The soul’s purgation can be described as a dynamic process whereby one 
moves from faith to understanding, a movement itself which goes through temporal things to 
eternal things: “man is purged through faith in temporal things, so that he may perceive the truth 
of eternal things.”1 
The point I seek to establish in this second section is that in his own way, Gadamer 
suggests a theory of knowledge which balances both of the elements enumerated above: he has a 
place for a capacity which is universal to all rational agents, but at the same time requires constant 
effort in order to be perfected and most fully realised. A major point of contact between Augustine 
and Gadamer is the notion that one’s prior beliefs have a major part to play in one’s growth in 
knowledge. In critiquing the Enlightenment’s rejection of faith or prejudice, Gadamer argues for 
the essential aspect of this category in the overall reasoning process. Rationality ceases to be 
construed in purely neutral, secular terms. Augustine’s emphasis on the importance of faith and 
his admonition crede ut intellegas, rather than appearing to be a fideistic or obscurantist betrayal 
of reason, rather comes to be seen in a new light thanks to Gadamer, who frames the entire 
reasoning process as fides quaerens intellectum. As a result, the world comes to be seen not 
merely as consisting of a set of facts to be recorded, but rather of a set of truths to be discovered 
and discerned. 
                                                          
1 cons. eu. 1.53, CSEL 43, p. 59: “purgatur homo per rerum temporalium fidem, ut aeternarum percipiat 
ueritatem.” See also Io. eu. tr. 24.1, CSEL 36, p. 244: “Deum per uisibilia opera miraremur, et erecti ad fidem et purgati 
per fidem, etiam ipsum inuisibiliter uidere cuperemus, quem de rebus uisibilibus inuisibilem nosceremus.” Cf. trin. 
4.24; en. Ps. 43.16. 
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This conducts us to a further and even more radical link between Augustine and Gadamer. 
As a result of the foregoing section, I have begun to consider the possibility of conceiving of the 
universe as somehow text-like, that is, imbued with intentional properties which stand in need of 
being interpreted and understood gradually. One conundrum is whether in this day and age such 
a position could be independently motivated. The attempt to frame a contemporary constructive 
theological programme in these terms may appear quaint, but would also suffer from a suspicion 
of being ad hoc. But as Gadamer makes clear in his Wahrheit und Methode and subsequent 
publications, hermeneutics is about more than just texts; in fact, it is not even primarily about 
texts at all. Rather, hermeneutics pertains to the very fundamental way in which we interact with 
our world. This implies that the world itself is understood as a fundamentally intelligible structure 
which in a sense “speaks” to one. The upshot is that just as with Augustine, the world around us 
is understood to possess text-like properties, to be constituted by intelligible contents which 
require an interpretive process in order to disclose and comprehend them. One must first 
appreciate the importance of the distinctiveness of Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics, which 
in turn must be situated within the context of the “ontological turn” in this field effected by 
Gadamer’s tutor Heidegger. 
In this chapter, I discuss the “principal” elements to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, proceeding 
in three distinct stages. First, I situate Gadamer with respect to his philosophical and historical 
context within the tradition of hermeneutics. Secondly, I discuss the notion of questioning which 
is at the heart of Gadamer’s entire understanding of knowledge. Finally, I turn to his enigmatic 
understanding of language. It shall become clear that, in addition to relying on Augustine as a 
source, he also articulates ideas which, although originating in a different perspective and 
responsive to a separate dialectic, are nonetheless deeply congenial with Augustine’s theology of 
sapientia. It shall become clear that Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers a congenial framework in 
which to recuperate, update, and further articulate Augustine’s claims concerning knowledge and 
reason. 
 
5.1. THE (PHILOSOPHICAL) BACKGROUND OF GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS 
 
 If I am to make any progress in formulating a dialogue between Augustine and Gadamer, 
a critical point is first of all to address the question of whether Gadamer’s thought is particularly 
philosophical, or whether it is overtly hostile to philosophy. In her recent article on Gadamer, C. 
Hamlin suggests that there are two major ways that Gadamer has been read, due to the ambiguity 
inherent in his thought.2 Whilst some see hermeneutics as compatible with and even an aspect of 
traditional metaphysics and the search for truth (even with a capital T), others take Gadamer in 
the direction of Nietzsche.3 Whilst it is true that Gadamer’s thought has been developed in this 
direction by figures such as Rorty, Vattimo, and to a lesser extent Habermas, I believe that their 
readings obscure key facets of the hermeneutics Gadamer is proposing. One point I wish to 
establish is that Gadamer’s thought admits of a basic openness to philosophy in a traditional sense, 
and it is not in principle hostile to a theological approach taken by Augustine, for example. Indeed, 
it shall become clear that Gadamer’s entire hermeneutical programme rests firmly upon traditional 
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sources of this kind. A cursory overview of Gadamer’s sources can allow us to see the profoundly 
philosophical aspect to his work. As we shall see, Gadamer’s thought is shaped by classical 
philosophy and Christian theology, as well as Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s situation in 
the world. Hence it will become clear how hermeneutics has informed and may continue to inform 
“la pensée croyante.”4 
 
 5.1.1 Philosophical sources 
 
 To begin, one could simply note as a matter of fact that Gadamer was clearly conversant 
with and influenced by traditional philosophical sources. For instance, he locates in Plato the 
resources for thinking about human finitude, in particular in the latter’s conception of the soul’s 
participation in Beauty.5 Further influences on the thought of Gadamer and his tutor Heidegger 
include Augustine, Aquinas, and Dostoevsky.6 Moreover, as J. Zimmermann explains, Heidegger 
and Gadamer engage in “foundational” thinking, i.e., interrogating the fundamental concepts of a 
particular discipline or discourse, with a particular view to the way in which these are historically 
constituted.7 Above all, Gadamer is interested in what the world must be like in order for 
hermeneutics to work in the way it does, a highly metaphysical-epistemic question indeed.8 Like 
Heidegger, Gadamer also viewed theology itself as a prime resource for thinking about questions 
of a philosophical, and indeed an existential nature. As we shall see presently, Gadamer’s interest 
in theology pertains mainly to Christology. He sees this as a source of reflection for his own 
understanding of the relationship between thought and utterance.9 He especially appreciated the 
Christian notion of divine transcendence, insofar as it provides a normative correction against the 
modern tendency to isolate the self to the point of absolutising it.10 Furthermore, Gadamer was 
deeply influenced by Augustine’s Christology, his theory of illumination, and of the interior 
word.11 In particular, he invokes theological thinking concerning Christology to explain the 
essential compatibility of unity and diversity.12 Indeed, as Zimmermann writes, Gadamer 
understands the entirety of western thought as grounded in the Greek and the Christian notion of 
the logos.13 Gadamer’s hermeneutics possesses a metaphysical vector, as it orients one to 
questions of a more philosophical nature, a point which Gadamer himself acknowledged.14 
Recent scholars such as F. Lawrence, J. Grondin, and B. Wachterhauser have analysed 
the more ontological aspects to Gadamer’s thought. In his 2000 article, in which he seeks to 
determine the philosophical significance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics,15 Lawrence (who was 
                                                          
4 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 160. 
5 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 151. 
6 Jens Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in Recovering Theological Hermeneutics: 
An Incarnational-Trinitarian Theory of Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2004), 160-86, here 160. See also Di 
Cesare, “Hermeneutics as Philosophy,” infra.  
7 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 161-2. 
8 Gadamer, TM, 500; GW 1, 488. 
9 Eberhard, “Gadamer and Theology,” 289. 
10 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 166. 
11 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 167. 
12 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 170. 
13 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 166. 
14 Cf. Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 150; Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 479. 
15 Lawrence, “Ontology of and as Horizon,” 390. 
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Gadamer’s student at Boston College) argues that Gadamer is a truly metaphysical thinker, 
writing that the latter’s “ontology is postmodern yet genuinely metaphysical.”16 In particular, 
Gadamer re-introduces the metaphysics of light into present day discourse.17 Lawrence’s point is 
not only his gloss, as towards the end of WM, Gadamer even explicitly credits the metaphysics of 
light for informing his enquiry.18 As Grondin explains, Gadamer draws inspiration from the 
metaphysics of light, not so much in terms of the postulate of some absolute source of light and 
intelligibility (as in, for example, Augustine’s Soliloquia), but rather in terms of the overarching 
context and framework in which understanding occurs.19 Gadamer’s appreciation of this idea is 
encapsulated in his emphasis on human finitude and his construal of the implications of this in 
hermeneutical and philosophical terms.20 
According to D. Di Cesare, Gadamer never fully explained his stance with respect to 
metaphysics. According to the former, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is certainly not metaphysical in 
the traditional sense of the term and understands itself in such a way. However, contra certain 
readers of Gadamer, this does not thereby mean that Gadamer’s thought is anti-metaphysical. 
Rather, informed by the classical philosophical tradition, hermeneutics reconfigures it in 
developing it. Di Cesare describes this product as “non-metaphysical.”21 Her lucid explanation is 
worth quoting at length: 
 
As with most philosophers after Heidegger, Gadamer speaks of “ontology” rather than of 
“metaphysics.” Truth and Method ends with an ontological turn, which takes place following 
the guiding idea of language. But with this turn, hermeneutics distances itself at the same 
time from ontology altogether. For ontology is the logos that wants to say what Being is. But 
since Being cannot be grasped in an immediate intuition, hermeneutics will understand it, 
since Being is always linguistically mediated, as an infinite process in which per definitionem 
there can be no last word. With this turn, hermeneutics radicalizes Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology. There is no Being without the understanding of Being. If that is so, then ontology 
must recover itself in hermeneutics–which means at the same time reestablish itself as if after 
an illness, but also retreat or revoke itself. To put it differently: ontology necessarily becomes 
hermeneutics.22  
 
Gadamer recognises the immense influence Heidegger had on hermeneutics, in particular 
the “turn” he effected by thinking of hermeneutics in philosophical and phenomenological 
terms.23 Gadamer follows in his tutor’s footsteps, developing hermeneutics on a philosophical 
level.24  In his response to the epistemology of foundationalism espoused by the Enlightenment, 
Gadamer takes Heidegger’s notion of the hermeneutical circle a step forward, arguing that human 
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reason is inherently hermeneutical or interpretive.25 Hence in Zimmermann’s words, for Gadamer 
“to be human is to interpret.”26 According to Grondin, Gadamer raises hermeneutics to the level 
of philosophy and ontology,27 especially by attempting to account for human finitude by means 
of the concept of the horizon.28 M. Scraire too situates Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
within the context of Heidegger’s thought on Dasein, in particular how the latter emphasises the 
temporal and historical nature of understanding, resulting in a “metaphysics of finitude.”29 As 
Petit writes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics marks a break with the past, as the latter not only 
endeavours to go beyond method, but also to introduce a decidedly philosophical, universal 
element into consideration. Hermeneutics in Gadamer’s thought becomes something which 
pertains to human reason in general, and constitutes, in Petit’s words, “une interprétation de 
l’existence.”30 What Gadamer does is shift the realm of textual interpretation from a highly limited 
context to the broader world of human experience as such. As a result, “comprendre et 
interpreter,” Petit writes, “des textes n’est pas seulement l’affaire de la science mais appartient de 
toute evidence à l’expérience humaine du monde dans son ensemble.”31 Gadamer believes that 
textual interpretation via hermeneutics opens us to deeper dimensions of ourselves, wherein we 
are led not simply to an understanding of this or that text, but of more fundamental philosophical 
truths.32 Thus Hamlin: 
 
Gadamer is interested in a form of “existential self-understanding” (Palmer, 2006: 1) or in 
understanding as a mode-of-being of Dasein, a being-in-movement whose very instability 
and lack of self-transparency cannot provide the foundation of the idea of certainty that 
characterizes method. Hermeneutics thus appears as ontology, not as method. Human beings 
are a type of being whose existence is a problem to themselves and, in their endless attempts 
at self-understanding, they constantly modify themselves. In this way, experience and 
understanding can be seen as something that organizes subjectivity, rather than its effects.33 
 
Hamlin’s point strikes at one of the key points of continuity between Augustine and Gadamer. It 
is a struggle with the meaning of knowledge and the self in a finite world, a world of temporal 
and spatial extension. In another idiom, it is an attempt to analyse and describe embodied 
cognition. Rather than a method, hermeneutics becomes an integral part of our experience, which, 
in an Augustinian fashion, links self-knowledge with knowledge of the world.34 
 Another basis of Gadamer’s thought is also worth noting, especially as it has a significant 
part to play in a hermeneutical theory of knowledge. This is, according to Zimmermann, his 
Pietistic Protestant background. This furnished him with the idea that truth is realised by an act 
of interpretation. Truth is always perceived for someone, is always incarnated, in a particular way. 
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Truth’s adventitious character prevents his hermeneutics from sliding into subjectivism or 
relativism.35 Gadamer sees his philosophical hermeneutics as promising an alternative to 
premodern metaphysics and a theory of knowledge and reality informed by Cartesian principles. 
That is, the understanding of being as integrally self-revealing and self-speaking does not adhere 
to a metaphysics of substance, and in virtue of this it also does not eventuate in a sharp separation 
between subject and object, which for Gadamer is the denouement of philosophical approaches 
to the concept of substance.36 
 
 5.1.2 Heidegger’s reading of Augustine 
 
 Gadamer was a student of Heidegger and reports being deeply influenced by him.37 This 
in itself is not suprising, but what is more interesting is the way in which Heidegger approached 
early Christian theological sources, not least of all Augustine’s conf. and trin., respectively. The 
methods applied and conclusions drawn are instructive for Gadamer’s own approach to Augustine 
and the development of his hermeneutical programme. Heidegger located in Augustine a major 
source for a critique of post-Cartesian epistemology, the motivating theme of WM. Moreover, 
Heidegger discovered in Augustine key insights on the nature of human finitude and what this 
entails for one’s epistemic situation within the world. I shall deal with these points and the 
influence Heidegger may have exerted on Gadamer, especially in terms of the former’s reading 
of Augustine. I am aware that figures such as Kant and Hegel inter alia also exerted a profound 
influence on Gadamer’s thought. In addition, I do believe as well that Gadamer was an original 
thinker, and not merely following Heidegger in his articulation of fundamental hermeneutical 
concepts. Nevertheless, I also maintain that it is crucial to read Gadamer in light of Heidegger as 
it pertains to questions concerning the universality of hermeneutics and related issues, a view 
which I share with other scholars, as we shall presently see. 
Gadamer notes how he was truly inspired by the power of Heidegger’s intellect and 
especially the intensity thereof.38 He also credits Heidegger with leading him to the study of 
philology, which allowed him to appreciate the genesis of concepts,39 and reports that he received 
from Heidegger the desire to search for God.40 As Gadamer does too, Heidegger rejects all notions 
of dogmatic authority, even if he is informed by theological sources.41 In fact, as S.-J. Arrien 
writes, Heidegger resolutely held that a Catholic could not be a true scholar and scientist.42 
Nonetheless, there is a deep reverence for theological sources like Augustine in Heidegger’s 
thought. Indeed, the latter arrived at the concept of facticity as a result of his encounter with the 
tenth book of the conf.43 Coyne notes that Heidegger’s thought, though deeply influenced by 
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Augustine, existed in a certain tension with it as well.44 When Heidegger raises the question of 
the relationship between truth and life in conversation with Augustine, his enquiry is not “merely” 
historical, but oriented towards considering the existence of the human person in the world from 
a philosophical perspective.45 Though Heidegger looked to Augustine as a major source for his 
understanding of Dasein,46 the precise way in which he did so is not immediately obvious. 
According to Heidegger, Augustine’s attempt to answer the question of what he loves when 
he loves God discloses key insights regarding the nature of the self.47 The task of Heidegger’s 
1921 lectures on Augustine and Neoplatonism is to explain the process whereby Augustine came 
to understand himself as a question, moving from one way of viewing subjectivity to another.48 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger recasts the theological problematic of “God and man,” “de-
theologising” it and examining it under the aspect of Dasein and its relation to the world.49 Arrien 
concurs with this assessment, also stating that Heidegger “de-theologises” Augustine’s religious 
experience. In other words, Heidegger’s task is to analyse the basic framework of Augustine’s 
relation to the world from a “non-theistic” perspective.50 Heidegger is particularly interested in 
the way in which one experiences intimacy and contact with the divine, the phenomenological 
content of such experience. Heidegger wants to know what it is like, and is interested in how such 
an investigation reveals the “pre-theoretical” categories at work within one’s mind.51 According 
to L. Östman, Heidegger construes in philosophical terms Augustine’s theological concept of love 
in order to speak of Dasein’s facticity and its relationship to the world.52 Ultimately, the concept 
of Dasein is informed by theology, in particular Augustine’s anthropology.53 This is no accident 
for Heidegger, as he sees himself continuing the thought of earlier theological sources in his 
philosophical speculation in Sein und Zeit.54 
Östman notes that in the early Heidegger (1921-1922) there is an emphasis on philosophical 
readings of theological concepts, a trend which continues in his later thought.55 Heidegger sees 
theological sources as a key locus for philosophical reflection, insofar as the former were oriented 
towards a dialectic concerned with the human person and its situation in the world. In recognising 
and framing the problem, such theological sources implicate philosophical interests as well. This 
is why Heidegger sees such value in Augustine. Thus Östman: 
 
These important Christian thinkers are all central to Heidegger not because of their piety, but 
because they accentuate the concept of world. They thereby contribute to Heidegger’s Dasein 
analysis, i.e. Dasein as being-in-the-world, and his conviction that central issues in 
philosophy were formulated first in the realms of theology. Heidegger observes that this 
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intimacy between theology and philosophy is not only a mere historical insight into the 
history of philosophy and theology. Since theology addresses “the anthropological problem 
of the being of human beings,” it allows Heidegger in Sein und Zeit to construct the platform 
from which his Dasein analytic focusing on facticity and world can be built.56 
 
One can see an example of Heidegger’s “de-theologised” approach to Augustine in terms 
of the dissolution of the self in the world. For Augustine, one is “poured out” into many things as 
a result of one’s situation within time. Similarly, Heidegger sees the self as dispersed in “la 
multiplicité ambiante de significations mondaines dans laquelle il vit.”57 Likewise, Augustine’s 
response to this distention, namely continentia, receives a Heideggerian gloss in terms of 
Gegenbewegung, or “counter-movement.”58 Coyne too notes that Heidegger views Augustine’s 
sources under a particularly philosophical and ontological aspect, reading them in a “de-
theologised” way.59 Coyne makes clear the significance of this methodological approach: “The 
early Heidegger invested Christian theological sources, Augustine as well as Paul, with a strictly 
ontological relevance. Read properly, Heidegger argued, these sources would yield an entirely 
new philosophical approach to subjectivity.”60 The resources promised by Augustine, in particular 
in terms of anthropology, for Heidegger invited one to examine the former’s sources.61 Above all, 
early Christian sources became for Heidegger a key resource for challenging the post-Cartesian 
worldview.62 
Heidegger found Augustine to be a useful source in his early days, writing especially on 
the conf.63 In Grondin’s estimation, the treatment that Augustine receives in Sein und Zeit is quite 
favourable, which is also interesting in light of the fact that Augustine was apparently exempted 
from Heidegger’s trenchant critique of the western metaphysical tradition.64 Heidegger found in 
Augustine’s understanding of language a prime resource for critiquing the idealising tradition of 
metaphysics.65 As Grondin writes, Heidegger’s sympathetic reading of Augustine left a major 
mark on the young Gadamer.66 Grondin further specifies that in a lecture which Gadamer 
attended, Heidegger described doct. chr. in glowing terms, as a seminal hermeneutical treatise.67 
Heidegger saw this text as the basis for a dynamic hermeneutics, grounding this reading in 
Augustine’s distinction between the simple understanding of a text (Textverstehen) on the one 
hand, and the intentional, cognitive state of someone who is in the process of understanding 
(Haltung des Verstehenden) on the other.68 The latter is grounded in the normative weight one 
attaches to a text, one’s care or Sorge, which then impels one to search for truth.69 
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Heidegger saw in Augustine’s thought a radically existential approach to language which 
went beyond the grammatical and syntactical level.70 From this the idea comes the basis for 
modern hermeneutics, namely that all understanding involves an understanding of the self, and 
that no interpretive procedure can be accomplished in a purely detached manner.71 The idea is 
that the semantic content of the word(s) cedes its importance to the full cognitive content, what 
the words really “mean” at a deeper level.72 The particular linguistic signs which incarnate a 
content serve as a vehicle by means of which the content may be conveyed, without thereby 
exhausting or transforming it.73 That which is contained within the Aussage but which is 
irreducible to it is for Heidegger hermeneutical.74 
In his 2011 article, Coyne seeks to specify the influence of Augustine on Heidegger, in 
particular that which the former’s Confessiones exerted on the latter’s 1921 lectures on Augustine 
and Neoplatonism.75 Coyne draws a direct link between the 1921 lectures and Sein und Zeit, 
arguing that the concept-clé of the latter, namely Dasein, is anticipated in the concept of 
facticity.76 In his 1921 lectures, Heidegger construes individual human being as something 
groundless, as a sort of “nihility.”77 To be a self for Heidegger is constantly to be in a state of self-
questioning.78 Heidegger’s objection to the Cartesian cogito does not pertain to the cogito as such, 
but rather Descartes’ move to designate the self or the subject as a thing, a res cogitans.79 In the 
process of self-doubt enumerated by Descartes, one still encounters and even presupposes a 
subject which is doubting.80 The challenge is thus to think of the self in a way which is entirely 
“objective” and devoid of any of the phenomenological content of the thinking self.81 But for 
Heidegger, for whom the knowing subject is best characterised as “nihility,” thinking of the self 
as some absolutely definite form of being, let alone as the sure basis of knowledge, is a non-
starter.82 In his reflection on subjectivity and the process of searching oneself, Heidegger suggests 
something which approaches Gadamer’s own understanding of radical finitude and being cast 
into a world, arriving at oneself belatedly, as it were.83 
For Heidegger, Western philosophy exhibits a “forgetfulness” of being insofar as it fails to 
acknowledge the unique mode of being proper to Dasein, or proper to the individual thinking 
subject.84 He believes that it is necessary to understand the self as a particular type of being in its 
own right, and thus to conceptualise it on its own terms, not viewing it in terms of an object or a 
thing.85 Thus Coyne:  
                                                          
70 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 27. 
71 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 27. 
72 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 27. 
73 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 28. 
74 Grondin, “Gadamer und Augustin,” 28. 
75 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 365-6. 
76 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 367. 
77 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 367. 
78 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 373. 
79 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 370. 
80 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 374. 
81 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 371, 372. 
82 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 372. 
83 See Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 374. For the terminology of “belatedness,” I am indebted to S. Hannan. 
84 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 370. For more on this topic from a theological perspective, see Schindler, 
The Catholicity of Reason. 
85 Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity,” 370. 
Principal Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
184 
 
What Heidegger calls the “perversity” of Descartes’ epistemological resolution is perhaps 
best captured by this last phrase, which identifies the ego as a “res … existens,” or an existing 
thing. The formula conflates two ways of Being that Heidegger takes to be fundamentally 
divergent – namely, concepts have been designed to handle thinghood, whereas existence 
remains more or less undiscovered or forgotten in Western thought. Along these lines, to 
“reverse” the cogito thus means to study the “I am” as a unique way of Being in its own right, 
first, by refusing to interpret it as a “thing” and, second, by developing a whole new set of 
categories meant to express the “I” as a unique way of Being. In order to accomplish this 
task, Heidegger argues that he must first “destroy” the modern philosophical subject, by 
uncovering the historical and philosophical origins of its inadequate conceptual scaffolding.86 
 
The result is that Heidegger credits Descartes with a profound psychological insight, but rejects 
the latter’s interpretation thereof.87 This insight consists in his recognition of one’s immediate 
access to one’s consciousness.88 
According to Coyne, Heidegger locates in Augustine an emphasis on one’s radically finite 
nature, indeed, as “nihility.” To be a subject therefore is to exist in a tensile relationship with 
some form of otherness. Such a reflection underscores for Heidegger the opportunities implicit in 
Augustine’s text for an anti-modern polemic against the reified Cartesian cogito and, more 
positively, for thinking about one’s finite situation within the world as constitutive for Dasein. 
Heidegger did not see Augustine as a proto-Cartesian; in fact, he saw these two thinkers as 
opposites, insofar as they offer radically different conceptions of what it means to be a self.89 
Indeed, he sees Augustine’s reflections on his inner experience as anticipating a critical response 
to the specifically modern understanding of subjectivity.90 Heidegger bases this view on the 
primarily interrogative character of conf.91 For Heidegger, Cartesian scepticism fails when one 
realises that one’s very nature is, in Augustine’s words, to be a question to oneself.92 In a certain 
sense, for both Augustine and Heidegger, the self is ground-less and profoundly unsettled on 
account of its finitude.93 To be a self is to be question-able (Fraglichsein).94 Dasein is given to be 
as nothingness and questioning.95 In contrast to the Cartesian self, Heidegger’s understanding of 
the Augustinian self paradoxically grounds its being in its nothingness before God.96 According 
to Coyne, Heidegger holds the “radically finite and historically particular nature of the first 
person. In each and every case, the ‘I’ somehow has itself ‘to-be’ (zu-sein). It has its own Being, 
in the sense that it has been delivered over or thrown upon this Being, which it must then 
appropriate or project before itself as a task to be achieved.”97 One most truly possesses oneself 
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by not possessing oneself. This dynamic reflects Christ’s utter kenosis on the Cross.98 Moreover, 
in this way, Heidegger suggests, the Cartesian absolutisation of the self can be overcome.99 
Further to existing primarily in the form of a question, one realises one’s true nature the 
more one enters into a practise of self-interrogation.100 Following Augustine’s approach to 
interiority, Heidegger states that self-questioning is realised as Unruhigkeit, restlessness.101 
Constituted by its “questionability,” the self realises itself as it prepares to counteract the 
restlessness engendered by its ontological situation.102 In Coyne’s words, for Heidegger, the 
“reversal of the statement ‘I am’ into the question ‘Am I?’ or ‘Am I truly?’ is having-a-self.”103 
This “interrogative spirit” is best encapsulated as a refusal to “univocalise” the self, to envision it 
as a particular autonomous entity.104 In virtue of being a created being, the tendency if not the 
temptation to the definition and thereby the absolutisation of oneself is virtually unavoidable.105 
Pride consists in the failure to attain the all-important knowledge of oneself as nothing.106 Here 
the foregoing discussion of sapientia superba can be cast in a new light, as well as indexed to 
trin. 4.1.107 In this latter passage, Augustine says that knowledge of oneself is far more important 
than knowledge of e.g., how the stars move. Without true self-knowledge in this Augustinian 
sense, other knowledge can become worthless, if not pernicious. Paradoxically, Heidegger sees 
the recognition of one’s nihility as the source of securing oneself.108 This is the lesson that he 
derives from Augustine’s conf., reading the latter as presenting an account of one’s coming to 
oneself by recognising one’s nothingness, a process enabled by confessio.109 On this view, human 
persons Have nothing merited, nor can perform aught whereof [God] hath need.110 The upshot of 
Augustine’s interrogation of memoria is that God cannot be defined, that is, designated by 
limitations or brought into definition as some type of thing.111 “The task for Heidegger in glossing 
Confessions X.30-39,” writes Coyne, “consists in showing how, given this secrecy, the soul lets 
God be God precisely by letting God remain unfound.”112 The result of this is that Augustine is 
led to interrogate himself, not in the sense of some narcissistic self-indulgence, but to investigate 
what if anything is obstructing his ability to think correctly about God.113 In other words, he is 
seeking to identify the blockages which prevent him from seeing what is already there. 
In addition to the conf., Heidegger also drew heavily on Augustine’s trin. What both of 
these works have in common is a preference for questioning as primary, as the basis for the 
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revelation of truth. According to G. McCullough, Heidegger held the view that affirming the 
priority of questioning in the search for truth would serve as the answer to a particularly 
technological way of knowing.114 In addition, the contrast that Heidegger draws between 
knowledge as a forced interrogation and as an open if guided questioning is reflected in 
Augustine’s contrast between the attempt to “univocalise” particular things and allowing them to 
reveal themselves.115 
Heidegger also appreciates in Augustine’s thought the balance of subjectivity and 
objectivity. In other words, the same message may be addressed to a variety of persons, but not 
everyone understands or accepts the message in the same way. As Arrien notes, Heidegger is 
specifically interested in the reasons that one does or does not recognise and receive such a 
message.116 In his Contra Faustum, Augustine notes that one arrives at truth as a result of love. 
This passage influenced Heidegger profoundly.117 In other words, the truth is not always “self-
evident”; rather, its acquisition presupposes something else.118 Indeed, Heidegger did not see 
“faith” and “reason” as two mutually exclusive opposites in competition with one another.119 For 
Augustine, one’s love implies a fundamental orientation towards the world and hence a desire to 
know.120 “Augustine accentuates,” writes Östman, “the concept of world as co-constituted by the 
human being.”121 Östman continues, noting that “The bond between Augustine and St. Paul is 
especially tight and thus important to Heidegger as they both accentuate the unification of caritas 
and world.”122 
In Heidegger as in Augustine, there are some objects of knowledge which are not 
possessed in a purely theoretical or propositional way.123 After Descartes, being came to be 
understood only in terms of the univocal, that is, that which is certain and pellucid,124 a point 
which both Gadamer and Heidegger found troubling. Heidegger reacts against the Cartesian 
tendency towards an “extreme pelagianism of theoretical knowing,”125 understanding modern 
epistemology as “a form of Pelagianism.”126 At certain points Heidegger’s thought bespeaks a 
veritable longing for a pre-industrial age and the mode of knowing associated with it. This is the 
kind of mild nostalgia for “enthymematic” argumentation that one finds in Gadamer.127 In 
addition, Gadamer inherited several key concepts from his tutor. One was a suspicion towards a 
technological mind-set which had become regnant from the Industrial Revolution. Technology 
itself was not the problem, but the way in which it affected thinking patterns and behaviour.128 
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Technology exists in such a way as to be at one’s beck and call, meaning that one is in control 
and demands information at will. The result for knowledge is crucial, for as McCullough explains, 
“Heidegger believes that [modern machines] reveal themselves in a qualitatively different way 
from their ancient counterparts and, thus, that modern technology involves a qualitatively 
different kind of knowing.”129 As Gadamer states, Heidegger understands knowledge as an 
unveiling and an uncovering.130 Heidegger follows the Greek tradition of understanding truth as 
aletheia, an unveiling or a revelation of the object to the knower. However, such a mode of 
approaching truth is eclipsed by the modern technological mind-set.131 
 
 5.1.3 The historical development of hermeneutics 
 
The foregoing paragraphs have been intended to establish Gadamer’s basic familiarity 
with and sympathy for traditional metaphysical sources and Heidegger’s mediation thereof. But 
in order to understand his own approach to hermeneutics, this must be situated within the tradition 
of hermeneutics in early modernity, and the revolution effected therein by Heidegger.132 
 Though hermeneutics in its current form is a relatively new phenomenon, one could make 
the case that it is a field the roots of which are located in the early Christian period, if not earlier. 
Petit identifies Augustine, Luther, and Schleiermacher as three major figures marking transitional 
points in the history of hermeneutics.133 Indeed, the work of figures such as Philo, Origen, and 
Augustine is hermeneutical insofar as the question of interpretation and textual understanding is 
a major focus.134 For example, a key principal of patristic hermeneutics was that the text was like 
an onion which required continuous interpretive work to reveal its layers of meaning.135 
Though hermeneutics was present inchoately in early Christian exegesis, its modern 
theological history began much later. The term hermeneutica first appeared in the 17th century. In 
the early modern period, hermeneutics developed as a method for reading and interpreting texts, 
whether in religious or legal contexts. The thought was that the text contained a meaning which 
could be elucidated by the application of universal principles.136 Such a method reflected 
modernity’s desire for clarity and verifiability.137 In the 19th century, Schleiermacher marked a 
turning point in this field which would have repercussions for Gadamer. According to Petit, 
Schleiermacher is crucial for hermeneutics insofar as he expands this to include understanding 
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more broadly.138 Gadamer credits Schleiermacher as the first to speak of the hermeneutical 
circle.139 However, Schleiermacher’s work implies that hermeneutics remains about applying 
rules to the interpretation of texts, and that the text itself is already there apart from our encounter 
with it.140 Gadamer himself rejects Schleiermacher’s “psychologising” approach to hermeneutics 
in favour of the subject matter itself, which is transmitted via the medium of the text.141 When we 
read a text, according to Gadamer, we read it to know the sense contained in the text itself, not 
the author’s mind.142 Hamlin, who situates Gadamer’s hermeneutics within the German Romantic 
critique of Enlightenment, sees his approach as different insofar as he refuses to pursue the 
subjective course taken by the Romantics.143 This crucial move allows Gadamer to see 
hermeneutics not as a mere method for interpreting texts but as a framework in which to 
understand reason itself.144 Hermeneutics for Heidegger and Gadamer consists not in analysing 
and interpreting the author’s consciousness, but rather something openly available, a common 
object (“visée commune”).145 
Prior to Heidegger, hermeneutics was meant to replicate the scientific precision of the 
empirical sciences. Early modern hermeneutics dealt with a “method” for interpreting texts, 
namely prescribing certain general rules that could be applied “universally” and “scientifically” 
in order to determine the meaning of a text.146 Moreover, hermeneutics was seen as a purely 
“theoretical” activity, separated from its “practical” counterpart of exegesis, of applying the 
lessons of a particular text to contemporary circumstances.147 With Heidegger comes the novel 
idea that hermeneutics is really much more profound and fundamental, as it is about the person’s 
relation to the world.148 Gadamer credits Heidegger and Husserl with introducing ontological 
considerations into hermeneutics.149 Heidegger inaugurates the key turn for hermeneutics in the 
20th century, namely seeing interpretation as ontologically significant.150 Petit notes Heidegger’s 
influence on Gadamer in terms of the mode of being of Dasein, namely that understanding is 
constitutive of the identity of a rational agent. Hence for Gadamer, understanding came to be 
understood as “an act of existence.”151 As Petit explains, “comprendre n’est pas pour le Dasein 
une activité parmi d’autres mais définit la manière dont il existe dans son monde : le Dasein existe 
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comprenant.”152 For Heidegger, the hermeneutical circle, that is, the dynamic of one’s orientation 
to a particular content as directed but not entirely determined by prejudices or pre-understanding, 
represents the basic structure of human interaction with the world.153 Hermeneutics could no 
longer be seen as “merely” a method.154 For Heidegger, and Gadamer after him, being human 
means being hermeneutical.155 
A further point from Gadamer’s thought, and one which is particularly important for this 
enquiry, is the inherently passive aspect to the nature of knowledge acquisition within 
hermeneutics. As Scraire writes, the turn which Gadamer effects in hermeneutics is one of 
expanding or deepening the understanding thereof to include the dimension of experience and 
event. Hermeneutics is not merely a technique or a method for drawing out the correct meaning 
from a text. Rather, it becomes an integrally holistic encounter. In other words, whenever we 
understand something, we are interpreting it in some deeply hermeneutical way.156 The novelty 
of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, according to Lawrence and Eberhard, consists in the 
blending of “traditional” hermeneutics, namely an Augustinian approach to interpretation 
grounded in faith, and the “hermeneutic of suspicion,” which seeks to question and even 
deconstruct faith commits of any kind. The upshot of Gadamer’s delicate fusion is that his 
hermeneutics is at its heart consistent with the dictum of fides quaerens intellectum.157 
This may seem like a shocking claim, not least of all because Gadamer would not be 
sympathetic to it.158 However, I think we have to bracket contemporary notions of “faith” which 
define it as the opposite of reason, or even as anti-intellectual. I think Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
could be interpreted accordingly, as long as fides is understood in a particular or some of its 
particular Augustinian senses. Indeed, Augustine himself employed this term in a number of 
ways.159 For example, as we shall see later in this study, in s. 43 Augustine describes faith as 
something which is not so much a decision to endorse a particular proposition, but rather 
something in which we already find ourselves. We come to ourselves already possessed by faith. 
If we take faith here as tradition in Gadamer’s sense, then I think we not only have an apt parallel 
but a strong connection.160 
Similarly, as E. TeSelle remarks, Augustine speaks of faith or belief as a gradus, a step 
to understanding.161 As we shall see in the next chapter, Gadamer understands prejudice as an 
initial orientation to a content which when addressed properly can lead to deeper knowledge or 
understanding. Furthermore, both Augustine and Gadamer see a place for legitimate authority, 
although that is not to say that just any authority should be followed.162 Augustine also 
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distinguishes between faith as an “act” (TeSelle’s term) or a mode, as opposed to faith as a 
content.163 In this case, it appears to me that Gadamer would have less objection to thinking of 
faith if it were used in the former sense of the term. In fact, I think we could even go a step further, 
and say that faith is a “rational,” if not unavoidable disposition for a finite being in the world. In 
any case, it is also important to recall that for Augustine, faith is always oriented towards arriving 
at truth,164 and that reason is always involved in every act of faith.165 Both figures see the search 
for understanding as admitting of a deeply personal, even introspective element, and possibly 
even of an element of indefinite or inexhaustible depth.166 So Gadamer’s hermeneutics could be 
seen as a fitting expression of Augustine’s theory of knowledge grounded in faith, provided that 
faith is understood according to a sense of being seized by something and a mode of being and 
searching. 
From the foregoing overview, we can see that Gadamer’s thought is congenial to 
Christian epistemic-theological categories. An awareness of this setting prepares us to understand 
more clearly what is “really” happening with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. As we have seen, 
Gadamer follows Heidegger in raising hermeneutics to the philosophical level, or “universalising” 
it. In exploring in more detail the meaning of this, we shall be led to encounter a clear point of 
contact with Augustine and a promising place for dialogue in the hopes of developing a 
contemporary sapiential theology. 
From the foregoing considerations I derive the following conclusion: If one does not 
understand this philosophical, and indeed, highly ontological dimension to Gadamer’s thought, 
which is none other than his stated intention, one fails to understand Gadamer altogether. In fact, 
he explicitly states that his purpose in writing WM is philosophical.167 In the years after this work’s 
publication, Gadamer continued to emphasise the “philosophical” character of his enquiry.168 
Indeed, it is with respect to the foundation of a classical metaphysical view of participation that 
one must understand the ontological aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.169 Hence with some of 
the background and the context for Gadamer’s hermeneutics established, we can pursue a more 
focused account of his thought. 
 
5.2. GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS AS A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY 
 
In the previous section we learned what hermeneutics is “all about” for Gadamer, namely 
that it is about a way of being in the world, a mode of existence. In this section, I shall explain 
this in greater detail and seek to disclose points of theological interest. 
In his Wahrheit und Methode (1960), Gadamer discusses the notion of the “universality” 
of hermeneutics.170 This discussion is prepared in Part I, though only hinted inchoately. He 
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broaches this topic toward the end of Part II where speaks of questioning, and develops this 
position in Part III, in particular by emphasising that hermeneutics is not simply a methodological 
exercise to be applied to texts, but is rather about the whole of human experience. Gadamer 
elaborates on similar themes in a series of lectures he delivered in French at the University of 
Louvain in 1957 as the occupant of the Cardinal Mercier chair at the Higher Institute for 
Philosophy.171 These were later published in French in 1963.172 According to Grondin, this 
material served as preparatory for WM,173 although the original German manuscript on which 
these lectures were based has been lost.174 Gadamer saw the logical approach to language as 
overlooking the true nature of wording as responsive to an implicit question, as related to 
something more basic, the “Antwortkarakter des Wortes.”175 This position is also present in 
Gadamer’s 1957 essay, “Wahrheit des Wortes.”176 In this work, Gadamer grounds his 
understanding of linguistic universality in a more basic, universal, inner capacity for thought.177 
Similar ideas are present in his “Was ist Wahrheit?” of the same year. Gadamer confirms and 
elaborates upon his view of hermeneutics several years later in 1966 in an article entitled, “The 
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem.”178 Shortly after this, in 1971, Charles Taylor 
published an article on the meaning of understanding with regard to the humanities, in which he 
speaks of hermeneutics in similar terms, namely that one’s rational capacity for questioning 
underlies any particular enquiry, no matter how concrete or abstract it is.179 As Grondin notes, 
though a robustly metaphysical framework informs and grounds Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this 
dimension of his thought has often been overlooked in the literature, and fewer still have discussed 
the notion of “questioning” as he presents it in WM and beyond.180 What we shall explore below 
is how Gadamer seeks to emphasise the importance of viewing hermeneutics in a philosophical 
and universal way. 
Gadamer holds that one of the essential characteristics of hermeneutics consists in the 
capacity to perceive the intelligible content constitutive of the world and one’s experience of it. 
A question implies an answer, but a proper question can only be raised when one has a certain 
pre-sentiment of the intelligibility and the coherence of the object of one’s questioning, and can 
even identify an object at all. Gadamer places the cart before the horse, viewing objects of enquiry 
as containing the answers to questions not yet formulated, which when articulated for the purpose 
of interrogating a certain intentional object will facilitate the disclosure of truth. Therefore, for 
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Gadamer, “The hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in part 
so defined.”181 
Gadamer emphasises the primacy of the question as opposed to the statement.182 Every 
question is itself already an answer as well, due to the dialectical character of language.183 One 
cannot understand a statement without a sense of the conditions in which it was articulated and 
what gave rise to it.184 The full significance of the question is not contained within it.185 The 
articulation of questions within a scientific setting represents an instance of a much more basic 
reality.186 Although he does not endorse their entire programme, Gadamer credits American 
Pragmatism with a valuable insight, namely that every question bespeaks a framework of meaning 
that implicitly points beyond itself.187 Gadamer goes a step further, claiming that both question 
and answer are forms of address (Anrede), in virtue of which they are hermeneutical.188 Gadamer 
invokes Heidegger’s renewed emphasis on the Greek understanding of truth as aletheia, and sees 
this as the mark of true knowledge and science.189 For Gadamer, the world presents itself to us in 
terms of obscurity and hiddenness.190 It is the job of the scientist to dispel this confusion and 
introduce clarity.191 Gadamer describes questioning as the capacity to set something in the open, 
especially when this reveals to us the preconceived notions that quietly control our thinking.192 
“Fragen sehen heißt aber,” Gadamer writes, “Aufbrechen-können, was wie eine verschlossene 
und undurchlässige Schicht geebneter Vormeinungen unser ganzes Denken und Erkennen 
beherrscht.”193 Gadamer sees science itself as grounded in this logic of question and answer, and 
seeks to return science to an understanding of itself.194 No science, no language consists in the 
memorisation of rules and techniques, but rather in the interplay of question and answer, call and 
response, a situation in which one arises and finds oneself.195 
Though Gadamer treats of the sciences as admitting of a necessarily interpretive 
component, or put another way, as requiring hermeneutical sensitivity, this idea, according to 
Taylor, is found even earlier in figures such as Dilthey.196 The idea is, as Taylor writes, that 
hermeneutics is applied to texts or text-analogues which admit of some cognitive content, 
heretofore undisclosed, a hermeneutical treatment of which resolves the apparent confusion such 
that what was once obscure or ambiguous becomes clear.197 In other words, the text or the text-
analogue admits of a certain content or meaning which is elicited through a particular gradual 
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mode of enquiry, or an “interrogation” of the object itself.198 In my estimation, what is implied 
here is a dependence on a more basic capacity for vision, yet one which cannot be purely 
“empirical.” 
Taylor identifies three characteristics of this notion of meaning which is contained within 
objects of enquiry. First, he emphasises the subjective character of meaning, that is, that meaning 
is intentional.199 Secondly, Taylor writes that intelligible content requires a base in which it is 
realised, a “substrate.”200 As Harrison puts it, “the factum contains the mysterium,”201 or in the 
words of the analytic philosopher R. Wedgwood, “states of affairs instantiate values.”202 This 
point concerns the distinction between information/fact on the one hand and meaning/content on 
the other, that is, that the latter is somehow instantiated in the former yet ultimately irreducible to 
it. So every “object of a science of interpretation” contains a certain sense or meaning, distinct 
from its instantiation or expression.203 Finally, Taylor writes that facts only come to admit of 
meaning and significance within a broader framework. According to Taylor, “things only have 
meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the meanings of other things.”204 For instance, the initial 
experiences of an infant represent something like a stream of consciousness. Eventually, as one 
matures, one begins to assimilate and make sense of these sense impressions. The child 
experiences no qualitative difference in terms of sense data, but rather develops the rational 
capacity to parse and discern the underlying meaning of information, and this is done in relation 
to a variety of other facts and factors.205 This final point is especially remarkable in light of 
Gadamer’s assertion that to see a relation, rather than a mere coincidence of things, presupposes 
normative categories.206 It is also worth noting that in addition to the reality of number itself, 
Augustine maintains that the various arithmetical relations that obtain between particular numbers 
are perceived by the “light of the mind.”207 
Gadamer understands this aspect of hermeneutics, namely identifying particular objects 
and the relations between them, as occurring according to the framework of questioning. Hence 
the logic of a question is constitutive of human experience. It is the capacity for questioning that 
allows us to identify particular objects in the first place.208 According to Gadamer, “One has no 
genuine experiences without the activity of questioning.”209 This capacity for questioning 
involves identifying particular objects within a general field of conscious experience, a process 
which Gadamer describes with respect to the earliest functioning of a child.210 At a certain point, 
the perceptions of a child begin to acquire distinction and definition. As Gadamer explains, 
“Clearly we do not mean that he was previously blind. Rather, when we say ‘to know’ [erkennen] 
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we mean ‘to recognize’ [wiedererkennen], that is, to pick something out [herauserkennen] of the 
stream of images flowing past as being identical.”211 
The act of questioning constitutes the foundational principle at the heart of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical programme. It represents the actualisation of the capacity for growth in knowledge, 
and also provides the resources for sustaining such a personal intellectual development.212 
Questioning is not so much an act performed on an external object; rather, the act of questioning 
just is constitutive of the revelation of a content.213 Understanding something thus involves 
comprehending the content as an answer to an implicit question.214 The speculative, hermeneutical 
mind uses questioning as an instrument of disclosure, allowing a relationship between oneself and 
the world to be defined,215 that is, given form and definition, to become real and intelligible.216 
The capacity to see that which is susceptible to questioning is in itself already a form of 
questioning.217 Meaning is the other side of the coin of questioning, as it were, as a content is 
always already a response to a question.218 A true understanding of an object or a claim means 
that one sees the question to which it is an answer, for which reason Gadamer can say that “the 
logic of the human sciences is a logic of the question.”219 The beginning of understanding is an 
internal question, which precedes and discloses the subject matter.220 Of further interest is that 
Gadamer appears to suggest that questioning is about a fundamental mind-set or approach to 
reality. The capacity for raising individual questions seems to presuppose a “questioning” mind. 
As Gadamer writes, “To understand the questionableness of something is already to be 
questioning.”221 This implies a distinction between questioning as a cognitive state, an outlook on 
the world, as opposed to the act of producing individual questions. 
The true act of discovery is not so much the determining of an answer, but the formulation 
of a question to which the answer is responsive and allows for the dislodging of that previously 
unknown content.222 Questioning for Gadamer is directed towards the unveiling of previously 
unknown truth.223 The orientation of our “questioning” selves results from (the knowledge and 
appreciation of) our finitude, specifically an appreciation of the philosophical implications 
thereof.224 There is a certain non-cognitive direction to the question on Gadamer’s account, as the 
one who genuinely enquires has a desire to know, and hence acknowledges one’s ignorance.225 
The ability to discern that which admits of the possibility of being known, of being questioned, is 
the result not of any intellectual learning or training, but requires a profound acknowledgement 
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of one’s own limitations.226 For instance, as Augustine writes in Gn. litt. 12, the Babylonian king’s 
simultaneous seeing and not knowing directed him to question the meaning of a particular phrase 
in a language unknown to him.227 A similar example could be made with respect to mathematics: 
the knowledge of certain formulae can point one in the direction of locating truth, or help one 
determine what sort of calculations need to be performed. 
 
5.2.1 The Fraglichkeit of the world 
 
The foregoing account of questioning from “our” side of things implicitly includes an 
account of the world “outside” of us and what it must be like. Gadamer states that questions serve 
as the occasion for eliciting a “response” from reality, a response which takes the form of the 
disclosure or revelation of meaning, a content which is always responsive to a question and 
complements and completes it, in a sense.228 The effect of proper questioning in Gadamer’s sense 
is making something an object of science in the original sense, of providing the necessary 
conditions for identifying a content as susceptible to further enquiry.229 “Questioning,” Gadamer 
says, “means setting in the open.”230 Gadamer encapsulates his hermeneutical understanding of 
questioning and the significance thereof in the following way: “It is constitutive of the meaning 
of questioning to lay open the thing in question in its questionableness [Fraglichkeit].”231 In other 
words, the question “ana-lyses” something, in the etymological sense of the Greek verb analuo, 
that is, “cutting something up,” as it were.232 
A question orients one’s attention, it provides direction to a particular enquiry both by 
focusing on a particular object and by intimating the type of answer that is appropriate.233 
Gadamer suggests that the very reasoning process itself is one which is guided by a capacity for 
questioning. Our grasp of meaning is always oriented in the direction of a question.234 Yet 
questions do not arise in a vacuum; they are always occasioned by something in the world. One’s 
question is occasioned by a confrontation with the object in its alterity.235 Understanding results 
from our interaction with and implication in a particular object, not apart from it.236 Hence 
hermeneutics finds its firm basis by being about the things themselves.237 
Gadamer views a properly formulated question as the invitation to a particular truth 
content to disclose itself. Therefore the capacity for questioning is at the foundation of all enquiry. 
As Gadamer writes,  
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The real power of hermeneutical consciousness is to see what is questionable. Now if what 
we have before our eyes is not only the artistic tradition of a people, or historical tradition, 
or the principle of modern science in its hermeneutical preconditions but rather the whole of 
our experience, then we have succeeded, I think, in joining the experience of science to our 
own universal and human experience of life.238  
 
There are two major points here on which I would like to focus. The first is this sense of 
imagination as a capacity to see that which is intelligible, which yields the promise of rewarding 
an enquiry properly undertaken. The second is the notion of unity suggested by the phrase “the 
whole of our experience.” Gadamer seems to be moving towards Taylor’s idea that meaning exists 
in an interrelated web of other meanings. This implies that the world presents itself to us as a 
unity; there is a primordial intuition not simply of the intelligibility of the universe but also of its 
coherence.239 It is not so much that one projects this onto the world or even discovers it. Rather, 
one simply conducts oneself as if it were true, and one’s commitment to this idea is confirmed 
continuously through experience. In fact, it is this underlying unity, latent and hardly noticed, that 
allows for the possibility of intelligible experience at all. Such a realisation is a result of one’s 
“intellectual vision,” one’s capacity to see what is questionable, or in other words, what is 
intelligible. Much later in his life, in an interview, Gadamer defines hermeneutics, or perhaps the 
“hermeneutical sensibility” (my gloss), as the idea that the other has something to say to us (Die 
Möglichkeit, daß der andere was zu sagen hat),240 that another perspective may be correct. This 
is called learning to listen.241 What is also interesting here is the implicit idea of both our finitude 
and our integral relationship to the world around us. These assumptions enable and sustain our 
listening and our questioning, which are in a sense one and the same. 
Gadamer speaks of a fundamental aspect of hermeneutics as one’s capacity to discern 
intelligible contents present in the world around one.242 As he writes, “It is imagination that is the 
decisive function of the scholar. Imagination naturally has a hermeneutical function and serves 
the sense for what is questionable. It serves the ability to expose real, productive questions, 
something in which, generally speaking, only he who masters all the methods of his science 
succeeds.”243 In this regard, Taylor makes a similar point, claiming that a certain sense of “insight” 
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is indispensable for every enquiry, not simply because it allows one to make sense of recorded 
observations, but also because it provides the condition of the possibility of engaging in enquiry 
in the first place.244 According to Taylor, “in a hermeneutical science, a certain measure of insight 
is indispensable, and this insight cannot be communicated by the gathering of brute data.”245 In 
fact, it seems that even the mere possibility of the collection of such data presupposes this sense 
of intellectual vision. 
This understanding of questioning is illuminated by and reflected in the thought of R. G. 
Collingwood. In his autobiography, Collingwood describes his understanding of questioning as 
fundamental to all enquiry. This is a position he developed in reaction to key sources of the 
Enlightenment.246 In his autobiography, Collingwood notes how his intellectual encounter with 
works such as Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode led to new realisations concerning the nature 
of truth with respect to propositions.247 Collingwood reacted against the basic tenets of logic in 
his time, averring that rather than propositions, a set of questions and answers was the proper 
locus of truth.248 Collingwood invokes figures such as Plato and Kant, who saw questioning not 
only as primary, but indeed as a necessary aspect of rational activity.249 The meaning in a 
particular text or a statement cannot be ascertained without some knowledge of the question to 
which it is responsive, even if implicitly.250 One can only truly determine whether two 
propositions px and py contradict one another if one knows the question or questions to which these 
respective propositions are responsive.251 “Whether a given proposition is true or false, significant 
or meaningless,” Collingwood writes, “depends on what question it was meant to answer; and 
any one [sic] who wishes to know whether a given proposition is true or false, significant or 
meaningless, must find out what question it was meant to answer.”252 For Collingwood, “a logic 
in which the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic.”253 
So hermeneutics is ultimately about much more than the interpretation of texts or 
artworks. In fact, these practises are simply more specific applications of a more fundamental, 
indeed “universal,” capacity, a species of a genus. As Gadamer explains, “hermeneutics is, as we 
have seen, a universal aspect of philosophy, and not just the methodological basis of the so-called 
human sciences.”254 Such disciplines as art and history represent in Gadamer’s mind certain of 
the modalities according to which understanding takes place; they are more specific realisations 
of the fundamental capacity for hermeneutical understanding.255 Gadamer describes the result of 
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his enquiry as an “ontological turn” (ontologischen Wendung).256 This leads him boldly to 
describe the scope of hermeneutics as “universal” (universell).257 By universal, Gadamer means 
to denote that the entire programme of rational activity requires interpretive insight in order to 
lead to knowledge and truth.258 For Gadamer, “to know is to interpret,”259 and therefore “the 
hermeneutical dimension encompasses the entire procedure of science.”260 In our very way of 
existing in and interacting with the world, we are engaged in an interpretive mediation with 
reality. Hermeneutics is based on the acknowledgement of the “caractère interprétatif de tout 
rapport au monde.”261 A crucial point which follows from this claim is that rational enquiry cannot 
be construed as an outside actor neutrally investigating an inert object, but the process of enquiry 
must be understood as integrally involving the subject.262 As Gadamer’s hermeneutics frames the 
entirety of human life in interpretive terms,263 interpretation and understanding come to be 
inseparably bound.264 Hermeneutics is universal insofar as it applies to the totality of human 
experience. Thus it encapsulates and indeed enables and is required for any type of enquiry 
whatsoever.265 That applies also to the empirical sciences. Gadamer’s account in this respect 
serves to challenge some of our preconceived notions about the concept of “science” itself. 
 
5.2.2 The universality of hermeneutics in relation to science 
 
Drawing inspiration from Aristotle, Gadamer says that a problem is something which 
cannot be resolved “purely” by the presentation of particular facts or demonstrations. This 
situation occurs when the case for both sides is sufficiently strong such that the “proofs” presented 
are not ultimately decisive.266 (Gadamer appears to echo Kuhn, who states that certain questions 
of the correctness of one scientific paradigm over and against another is ultimately not 
demonstrable by appeal to facts.)267 Gadamer provides the example of statistics, ostensibly a 
source of empirical data that speak for themselves. However, this identification of statistics with 
facts can be misleading. For one, such data can only be collected with a prior framing providing 
the context and the scope of the data gathered. In other words, one’s investigation is framed in 
terms of a question which can conceal as much as it discloses, can prevent certain insights from 
coming forward as much as it reveals. It is not immediately obvious to what types of questions 
the relevant data are responsive, and how they might change based on a variety of other 
circumstances, or as Gadamer puts it, “other possibilities are concealed by abstraction.”268 The 
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initial capacity to discern such a question bespeaks a hermeneutical mind-set, the ability to 
perceive an intelligible area for study and to articulate a question directed at the matter in order 
to acquire an answer.269 Moreover, a proper analysis and evaluation of the data is not simply a 
matter of mechanical processing, but requires rational agents in order to make sense of it, and 
these agents must use their minds. They cannot blindly follow a rubric in order to interpret 
empirical data.270 The upshot, according to Gadamer, is that statistics appear “to be a language of 
facts, but which questions these facts answer and which facts would begin to speak if other 
questions were asked are hermeneutical questions. Only a hermeneutical inquiry would legitimate 
the meaning of these facts and the consequences that follow from them.”271 
Taylor too considers empirical studies and the way in which one interprets the data they 
deliver. He suggests that the way in which the questions are framed could be just as if not more 
important than the answers they elicit. Thus Taylor:272  
 
But how did we design the questionnaire? How did we pick these propositions? Here we 
relied on our understanding of the goals, values, vision involved. But then this understanding 
can be challenged, and hence the significance of our results questioned. Perhaps the finding 
of our study, the compiling of proportions of assent and dissent to these propositions is 
irrelevant, is without significance for understanding the agents or the polity concerned. 
 
Therefore in addition to asking and defining, a hermeneutical sensibility is required to understand 
the significance of the data in question and render an intelligible, coherent, and meaningful 
conclusion.273 
How is it that we can discern in a scientific theory, for instance, parsimony, simplicity, 
and elegance? Let us briefly consider Albert Einstein’s renowned theory of relativity as an 
example. Prescinding for the sake of argument from considerations of the accuracy of this theory, 
scientists would agree that it is an elegant theory which accounts for phenomena in a parsimonious 
manner. Scientists can honestly say of it that it is a “simple” theory. But what, forsooth, is so 
simple about it? Is it the mathematical formulae that figure in Einstein’s arrival at e = mc2? Surely 
it is the way in which we can now conceive of time as passing more slowly when relative to the 
speed at which one travels? Surely not. Even if it were the case that the language of the theory 
were simple or some other factor, that would not account for why the theory itself is “simple.” 
This is a conceptual judgement, an intentional judgement. Gadamer argues against the sharp 
division between fact and value. Similar to Polanyi, Zimmermann states that scientific facts are 
enabled and embedded within a broader framework of ideas and assumptions.274 Like Augustine, 
Gadamer’s thought brooks no opposition between the physical and the normative.275 For 
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Gadamer, reality as given, mediated through tradition, precludes any possibility of a separation 
between the thing as it is and the thing as we experience it.276 
These examples suggest a broad notion of interpretation, one which encapsulates all fields 
of human activity. Gadamer’s concern is to demonstrate the inescapably hermeneutical character 
of every scientific enquiry, and indeed, its universal scope with respect to human life. He 
discusses empirical studies and the collection of empirical data, which, he argues, are always done 
according to a certain set of criteria, that is, they are always framed in a certain way. Any 
particular approach to a set of data inevitably runs the risk of concealing “other possibilities for 
questioning” (andere Fragemöglichkeiten) as well as isolating certain facts from others within 
the relevant framework which would facilitate the disclosure of the true meaning contained in 
those facts.277 This happens, for example, whenever someone’s words are taken or quoted out of 
context.278 
 
 5.2.3 Linkage 
 
Gadamer’s thought implies a certain fundamental, preconscious connection between the 
human mind and the world it seeks to know. There has to be a sense in which one is already able 
to perceive what can be known before one actually does the work necessary to know it. Whilst a 
certain attention to data, observations, and records is necessary in order to arrive at truthful 
conclusions from facts, the very possibility of gathering data at all relies upon a hermeneutical 
consciousness. Understanding does not result, Gadamer claims, from any practise of particular 
rules but from an openness to encountering truth. In other words, understanding cannot be 
taught,279 one cannot “learn” the capacity for questioning in a methodological way.280 At the heart 
of Gadamer’s thought is the conviction that no method can be followed blindly to truth. An 
understanding agent must implement the method, but on its own the method is useless. Method 
may hone or advance this vision, but it cannot produce it or realise its proper effects.281 For 
Gadamer, the search for truth relies upon a deeper sensibility, the capacity to see the intelligible 
content latent in a particular state of affairs and to formulate the requisite thought in order to 
disclose it.282 Hence Gadamer grounds his understanding of hermeneutics, and thereby of human 
reason, in his own particular conception of questioning.283 This notion of insight is characteristic 
of what it means to be a rational being.284 Indeed, as Lawrence writes, Gadamer sees questioning 
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as essential to human reason, it is “primordial” and beyond any particularities of the human 
condition.285 Zimmermann links Gadamer’s account of the experience of truth as an event with 
Augustine’s presentation of understanding in his De magistro. For Augustine, understanding 
occurs as a result of an inner teaching or illumination, which can be expressed more concretely 
as a basic comprehension of something which allows one to connect words with the realities they 
signify. Explanation or demonstration have no effect without someone’s basic ability just to “get 
it.”286 
 
5.2.4 Passive 
 
One of Gadamer’s concerns in emphasising the ontological nature of hermeneutics is to 
show how all of our enquiries are occasioned and directed by questions which are adventitious to 
us.287 “Questioning seeks intelligibility,” as Lawrence writes, or is even itself the realisation of 
intelligibility.288 Yet understanding in hermeneutics is not so much an action but an experience 
which affects us.289 Questions are not so much formulated or invented by rational agents, but they 
impose themselves upon us, they address and call to us in a certain way. In “interrupting”290 us, 
the question provides the insight needed to resolve a particular area of obscurity.291 Gadamer 
locates in classical philosophy a certain aspect of hermeneutical truth, insofar as the Greeks 
conceived of understanding as adventitious to one, rather than the result of a deliberate activity.292 
As he explains, in the hermeneutical experience, “The speaker (der Redende) is put to the question 
(zur Rede gestellt) until the truth of what is under discussion (wovon der Rede ist) finally 
emerges.”293 Particular questions address us, they impose themselves upon us.294 A work calls us 
and summons us, and regardless of our particular affective response to it, the work somehow 
commands our attention.295 Gadamer suggests that the reason for this is the inherently cognitive, 
intelligible assertion which the content of the work communicates to the perceiver, a call which 
strikes at something very fundamental to one.296 Gadamer has a place for the will in one’s 
acquisition of knowledge, in particular by obediently responding to the summons of the question-
able.297 Gadamer in this respect also shows his indebtedness to his tutor Heidegger, for whom 
thinking was synonymous with being attentive. We do not so much arrive at ideas as we allow 
them to come to us, allowing ourselves to encounter what is already there.298 
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Furthermore, ideas come to us already oriented in a particular direction.299 Our experience 
of the world is pre-framed in meaningful categories.300 Our “empirical” experience of something 
is inseparable from our “normative” approach to it, indeed, our interpretation of it. For Heidegger, 
our interest in something precedes our experience or knowledge of it as an object of “scientific” 
enquiry. D. Vessey writes about this point, describing it as “a central theme of Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, that things can be disclosed to us hermeneutically or apophantically [sic]. Our 
hermeneutical awareness of something as something precedes and motivates our propositional 
awareness of something.”301 Gadamer’s thought does not follow the representationalist school, 
according to which thought consists of creating ever more accurate pictures in the tabula rasa 
which is the human mind.302 Picture-thinking involves the comparison of an “external” object 
with an “internal” one. Lawrence writes that this also involves conceiving of the mind as an 
object.303 Gadamer notes how Scheler describes “objective” being as always possessed of some 
human meaning. Though the reality of being is beyond and apart from us, it always presents itself 
to us intelligibly and with a certain direction or interest.304 We do not first experience a rainy day 
as a change in air pressure but as dreary and gloomy. The significance of this point is that a purely 
neutral understanding of the human mind as a tabula rasa struggles to account for certain 
observations made by thinkers like Gadamer.305 There is not the world on the one hand and our 
experience of it on the other; rather, they are integrally connected, especially because we (and our 
rational faculties) are part of the world. As Taylor writes, “Foundationalism is undermined 
because you can’t go on digging under ordinary representations to uncover further, more basic 
representations. What you get underlying our representations of the world–the kinds of things we 
formulate, for instance, in declarative sentences–is not further representation but rather a certain 
grasp of the world that we have as agents in it.”306  
What Gadamer wants to say is that one is interacting with a thing already as a particular 
type of thing, and this is the case even at the most rudimentary level. It is not so much that the 
physicist “should” adopt a particular affective or normative stance towards an object of enquiry, 
be it a particle or a property or what have you. One finds oneself in a framework of interaction 
and mediation which is already determined in certain fundamental respects, apart from any 
conscious wish of the scientist. We are already implicated in a world in which our interactions 
with things are framed in terms of our experiences of those things as particular types of things. In 
this sense as well one can see how Gadamer’s main objective is description rather than 
prescription. Science qua science, that is, practises such as observation and experimentation, rely 
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upon more basic categories. According to this conception, science as such does not determine 
meaning apart from any philosophical input.307 
The meaning of a text or an object of enquiry seizes us apart from our conscious 
intentions. We are first addressed and subsequently respond. A content acts upon us, and in this 
way the presence of truth can be seen as addressing us.308 (What Gadamer seems to be suggesting 
is that in some way, normative or intentional categories exercise control over us.)309 The entire 
process of hermeneutics in general, as well as the experience of beauty “interrupting” one both 
bespeak the finite character of human thought:310 “The tradition asserts its own truth in being 
understood, and disturbs the horizon that had, until then, surrounded us.”311 Just as experiences 
often take the form of surprise, in particular when our expectations are thwarted, so too does a 
question seem to imply a passive rather than an active aspect. In particular, questions arise as the 
result of anomalies which can no longer be ignored or dismissed. “A question presses itself on 
us,” writes Gadamer; “we can no longer avoid it and persist in our accustomed opinion.”312 
This is possible, according to Gadamer, since there is always some fundamental link 
between the world and our minds, between Dasein and the matters it wishes to comprehend.313 
Hermeneutical consciousness exists in a tensile position between familiarity and strangeness. For 
Gadamer, strangeness presupposes a more fundamental unity. As Scraire explains, the strangeness 
of a thing is not that which leads us to understanding but rather that which we share in common 
with it, even in the midst of the strangeness.314 What allows for the pre-understanding of the 
interpreter is a certain deeper commonality between the interpreter and the interpretanda, what 
Scraire calls “une certaine communauté de vie de l’interprète avec les choses.”315 As Petit 
explains, “L’interprétation est tout à la fois une exigence de la chose à comprendre elle-même et 
la façon dont l’interprète l’accueille.”316 This stems from our simultaneous situation within a 
tradition, but at the same time our (capacity for) critical distance from it.317 True understanding, 
and hence true conversation, involves sufficient sympathy with one’s interlocutor that one can 
reasonably understand what the latter says, the content of the claim.318 
The implication of this position, writes Scraire, is that prior to any particular piece of 
knowledge we may acquire, we already have some insight; we know how to know. In Scraire’s 
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words, “une praxis, un savoir-faire précède ontologiquement le savoir proprement dit, et cela 
vient du fait que le Dasein n’est pas tout à fait étranger aux choses auprès desquelles il est jeté et 
vers lesquelles il aurait à frayer le chemin.”319 One’s life therefore, one’s mode of being in the 
world, consists in a continuous hermeneutical encounter with the world and the objects of 
meaning contained therein. Thus Scraire:  
 
Le Dasein est d’abord au monde sous le mode du souci ; il interprète et s’interprète lui-même 
sans cesse, en visant toujours l’accord de son interprétation à la chose, c’est-à-dire la vérité 
sur les choses sur lesquelles il a déjà ‘une idée.’ La tâche de l’herméneutique, c’est-à-dire de 
l’interprétation (Auslegung), n’est autre que l’explication de ce qui est ainsi saisi d’avance 
et prealablement compris, l’élucidation des anticipations qui gouvernent la compréhension 
(pre-acquis, pre-visée et pre-conceptualité).320 
 
 5.2.5 An interrogative theory of knowledge as questioning 
 
From the emphasis on the passivity or the “suffering” integral to hermeneutics, one can 
derive an interesting conclusion with respect to theories of knowledge. A proper question balances 
determinacy and indeterminacy. In other words, it defines something as an object of enquiry, but 
does not itself provide the answer, even if it does provide the direction appropriate to discovering 
an answer.321 As Gadamer puts it, “The openness of a question is not boundless. […] It becomes 
a question only when its fluid indeterminacy is concretized in a specific ‘this’ or ‘that.’ […]  
Posing a question implies openness but also limitation.”322 In the search for meaning, questioning 
is directed towards discovering answers and accounting for observations. This hermeneutical 
sense of questioning serves as a prophylactic against univocalisation;323 quaero, non affirmo.324 
In fact the reality is quite the contrary: Because hermeneutics places no a priori limitations on 
questioning, one must continuously seek to grow in knowledge.325 Furthermore, there is an 
indeterminacy to the way in which knowledge can grow and expand, without disintegrating into 
sheer relativism or pluralism.326 “Conscious intentionality as questioning,” Lawrence writes, 
“safeguards meaning from becoming a closed totality, while not completely forsaking all 
definition.”327 True hermeneutical questioning does not pre-ordain an answer but is truly open to 
whatever answer may be given. It is a placing of one’s very self in jeopardy, anxiously awaiting 
the response of truth. The challenge is to be able to receive it, as it may conflict with one’s prior 
beliefs.328 The openness initiated by the question’s disclosure is never absolute, but circumscribed 
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by the horizon of the question(ner).329 Questioning, though not unlimited, is nonetheless 
characterised by an opening of a number of possibilities.330 In other words, finite human searching 
for the infinite is open to a certain spectrum of possibilities in its questioning.331 One might even 
describe questioning as resulting in an undogmatic openness to truth.332 The indeterminacy of 
questioning must be understood in contrast to the unyielding dogmatism of vain opinion, doxa, 
the rigidity of which is challenged by a proper question.333 Gadamer’s interrogative approach to 
hermeneutics and reason furnishes us the opportunity to think about how theology can be so 
framed as to be genuinely open to the infinite and the transcendent without falling into tautology 
or circular reasoning. In Part III, I shall make a move to reconcile Gadamer’s account of 
questioning with Augustine’s interrogatio of the created world. Augustine speaks of his 
questioning of reality in terms of interrogation, a directed if undogmatic approach to rational 
enquiry which prizes the place of the question and the agent’s responsiveness to the address of 
being. 
Furthermore, the hermeneutical mind-set is implicated in a continuous dialectic of 
questioning.334 At the foundation of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy is questioning, enquiry, 
continued engagement with reality in an attempt to attune one’s mind to it.335  Like Augustine, 
Gadamer’s understanding of knowledge includes an inherently normative aspect; that is, 
knowledge involves prizing what is correct and rejecting what is incorrect and false.336 Part of 
what is involved in arriving at a proper answer to a question is judging between alternatives based 
on a “preponderance” (Überwiegen) of the evidence for the positions at stake.337 According to 
Lawrence, “Hermeneutic philosophy acknowledges a project of inquiry, reflection, and 
deliberation that goes beyond every finite and determined totality in an attempt to correspond 
with being in light of a primordial Zugehörigkeit or affinity.”338 Gadamer sees questioning at the 
heart of hermeneutics, which is to say that for him, reason itself is essentially “interrogative” in 
nature.339 However, the finite human mind is unable to “intuit” or comprehend an idea 
immediately, but rather must gradually work towards such an understanding.340 Hence in 
Lawrence’s words, for Gadamer “thinking is essentially asking ever-further questions.”341 Hence 
we see some aspects of the “principal-gradual” schema reflected in Gadamer. As for the former, 
Gadamer speaks of a capacity to “see” intelligible content, as well as a normative style of thinking 
in the search for truth. As for the latter, the hermeneutical consciousness is a starting point, and 
not an end in itself. One’s capacity to ask a question involves pursuing that line of thought 
indefinitely. I shall address this further in the following chapter. 
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5.2.6 Summary 
 
From the consideration of Gadamer’s understanding of questioning at the heart of 
hermeneutics, we have seen how for him, as for Heidegger, hermeneutics is not simply a method 
or a technique, but rather describes and encapsulates our entire way of knowing and interacting 
with the world. To put it provocatively, hermeneutics for Gadamer becomes a metaphysical-
epistemic theory. It is certainly a theory of knowledge: When we discover something intelligible, 
we formulate questions in order to disclose a further meaning and investigate one particular thing 
in a definite way, defined against the backdrop of all reality. This capacity for questioning cannot 
be taught or learned. Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics also bespeaks a view of reality which 
is not simply neutral or vacant of meaning, but even interacts and dialogues with us in the path to 
knowledge. Knowledge and truth come to us just as much as or even more than we discover or 
go to them. 
Though Gadamer begins from a reflection on art and history, he sees the results of his 
enquiry as leading him inevitably to a reflection on the overall way in which we interact with the 
world in its entirety.342 This is the reason he critiques the various forms of intellectual elision that 
can occur as a result of methodologies which diminish the importance of a truth content and 
instead focus on secondary properties, as in the case of aesthetics.343 The encounter with an 
artefact or an artwork is first and foremost about being seized by a truth content.344 As he explains, 
“language that expresses meaning is not only art and history but everything insofar as it can be 
understood. The speculative character of being that is the ground of hermeneutics has the same 
universality as do reason and language.”345 Our minds are in principle receptive and attuned to 
everything which can be understood.346 In this light Zimmermann suggests that we can “read” or 
“interpret” nature hermeneutically.347 (I shall return to this point in Part III.) The how of this 
process is behind Gadamer’s esoteric and often misunderstood theory of language, to the 
consideration of which we now turn. 
 
5.3. THE MEANING OF “LANGUAGE” FOR GADAMER AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR HERMENEUTICS 
 
Gadamer observes that the modern approach to linguistics, inaugurated by Herder and 
Humboldt, deals with the individual differences between languages.348 He is ambivalent about 
Humboldt’s approach to each individual language as a representing a particular viewpoint on 
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reality. He agrees that every language manifests something of one’s thoughts, and even represents 
a worldview,349 but is concerned that Humboldt is too indebted to an individualistic metaphysics 
which results in devaluing the link between thought and language.350 Gadamer locates in 
premodern metaphysics the resources necessary to maintain the integral link between world and 
word.351 Grondin situates Gadamer’s take on language within the tradition of premodern 
metaphysics. In fact, in reacting against the view of language as enjoying some form of subjective 
dominance over being, Gadamer wishes rather to re-integrate language and being in a more 
“metaphysical” and participatory manner.352 Gadamer formulated his revised conception of the 
inner word as an alternative to other theories of language, namely Konventionalismus, according 
to which language is nothing more than an arbitrary set of signs, and Abbildungstheorie, which 
holds that language enjoys a direct correspondence to objects in the world.353 Just as Heidegger 
did, Gadamer perceived resources in Augustine’s trin. which allowed one to challenge 
specifically modern philosophical positions. 
 
5.3.1 The independent reality of language 
 
If hermeneutics takes a Nietzschean path, in which the object of thought is no longer 
being but one’s interpretations, then being itself could not stand as an object of interpretation. 
Despite claims to the contrary, Grondin argues, this nihilist position is not what Gadamer and 
even Heidegger would want to maintain.354 Indeed, the former is critical of the nominalist or 
constructivist approach to language. For Gadamer, these positions instrumentalise language, 
making it a tool of giving meaning to an otherwise meaningless world.355 He rejects constructivist 
conceptions of interpretation, emphasising that interpretation, understood hermeneutically, 
realises and re-presents the interpretatum.356 The recognition that our contact with the world is 
mediated need not result in relativism.357 The reality of being and the knowledge thereof is more 
basic than any linguistic particularity.358 Hermeneutical questioning is in principle unlimited, as 
it designates the totality of being as its object.359 
The difference becomes clear in light of the readings of such figures as Rorty and 
Vattimo. The former holds that all of our experiences of the world are constructions in language, 
and that there is no way to go “beyond” these to a thing itself; the thing itself does not really exist, 
but simply our words about it.360 For Rorty, hermeneutics results in the exclusion of any 
ontological ideas or categories altogether.361 Language is not understood as reflecting something 
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which could be deemed true or more or less adequate. Utility becomes the criterion for “correct” 
language.362 Similarly, Vattimo interprets Gadamer as positing a direct identification with being 
and language.363 The identification of being with language means that there is no truth outside of 
language or other cultural determinations.364 For Vattimo, “l’être ne serait rien hors de notre 
interprétation.”365 However, Gadamer does not wish to say that our language “constructs” reality. 
He fully accepts that without rational agents, things would exist and function, though their 
meaning would either not exist or not be realised, due to the absence of observers.366 “What exists 
in itself,” writes Gadamer, “is independent of one’s own willing and imagining.”367 
According to Holston, in contrast to certain “relativist” readings of Gadamer, notably by 
philosophers such as Rorty, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is profoundly realist, insofar as he believes 
in the possibility if not the reality of true knowledge of the world.368 Indeed, one must not overlook 
the fact that Gadamer speaks of the hermeneutical method as moving towards truth.369 Gadamer’s 
cryptic pronouncement on being and language should be situated within an ontological context, 
which in turn would make it clear that Gadamer is interested not simply in what one might think 
of as a “hermeneutical” statement but one which is about being generally.370 Indeed, he reacts 
against the subjectivistic and instrumentalising tendency with which modernity approaches 
language.371 According to Grondin, Gadamer is diametrically opposed to the nihilistic 
interpretation of hermeneutics often attributed to him by figures such as Rorty and Vattimo. 
Language is not a prison, but allows one to communicate and to expand one’s horizon 
indefinitely.372 If anything, Gadamer is resolutely against the “totalising” of language, according 
to which language is seen as simply an artefact of human anthropology, a mere construction 
without any intrinsic meaning or basis in reality. Not only does the world become whatever we 
make of it, or rather, call it, but any particular designation has only contingent meaning or value.373 
Further insight can be gleaned on this matter from Gadamer’s distinction between 
environment and world. Animals and humans alike live in an environment, which consists of the 
descriptive state of affairs in which one is spatio-temporally embedded. Rational agents alone, 
however, can possess the latter; to have a world implies that one is not simply beholden to one’s 
environment, but can distance oneself from it, if not physically, then certainly mentally.374 
Gadamer understands this distancing not so much in terms of spatial movement but the intention 
or the aspect under which one views the world, and indeed, the changes which one makes in this 
respect.375 The potential for self-distancing from the world, in a sense, transcendence, is a result 
                                                          
362 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 471, 475. 
363 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 475. 
364 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 475. 
365 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 475. 
366 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 473. 
367 Gadamer, TM, 466; GW 1, 454: “Was an sich ist, ist unabhängig von dem eigenen Wollen und Wählen.” 
368 Holston, “Two Concepts of Prejudice,” 184-5, 188. 
369 Gadamer, TM, 506; GW 1, 494. 
370 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 475. 
371 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 477. 
372 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 183-4. 
373 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 476. 
374 Gadamer, TM, 460; GW 1, 447-8. Cf. Io. eu. tr. 20.11-13, in which Augustine speaks of transcendence of 
creation. Cf. infra. 
375 Gadamer, TM, 461; GW 1, 448. 
Principal Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
209 
of the “linguistic constitution of the world.”376 Our situation within the world is characterised by 
“freedom from environment” (Umweltfreiheit),377 insofar as we are not ineluctably bound by the 
conditions of our being, whether natural or otherwise. Thus Gadamer:378 
 
[T]he verbal constitution of the world is far from meaning that man’s relationship to the world 
is imprisoned within a verbally schematized environment. On the contrary, wherever 
language and men [sic] exist, there is not only a freedom from the pressure of the world, but 
this freedom from the environment is also freedom in relation to the names that we give 
things […]. 
 
Gadamer describes one’s orientation (Verhalten) as constitutive of one’s existing in the world. 
This direction simultaneously relates one to the world, such that it is familiar, but also allows for 
the possibility of critical distance.379 Gadamer sees rational and irrational creatures as 
distinguished by the former’s capacity for “mental language,” the locus of which is within one’s 
heart or mind.380 By means of the mind’s powers, one can distance oneself from the objects to 
which one is directed and investigate them.381 Environment provides the basis for world; they are 
not opposites but related asymmetrically.382 It becomes clear from this quotation that Gadamer 
does not endorse a nihilistic understanding of the “linguisticality” of the world. Rather, our 
relation to the world is verbal and linguistic in nature. We come to the world as “worded.” As 
Gadamer puts it, “hermeneutic experience is verbal in nature.”383 Language is that which both 
enables and constitutes our “world.”384 So without language, there is no world for Gadamer. 
Moreover, language derives its reality from the presentation and realisation of the world in 
itself.385 
Gadamer notes that for the Greeks, language and reason were seen as integrally linked, 
for it was the things of the world that were encapsulated in our utterances.386 Gadamer links the 
deceptive quality of being with that of human speech; in fact, this suggests for him an intrinsic 
connection between being (Sein) and speech (Rede).387 This commonality between the world and 
our language “ein ursprünglicher Zusammenhang zwischen wahrem Sein und wahrer Rede. Die 
Unverborgenheit des Seienden kommt in der Unverhohlenheit der Aussage zur Sprache.”388 We 
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see here an ontological dimension to language, as it is itself revealing of being; what we say 
“unveils” being and reveals the truth contained therein to our minds.389 
But if Gadamer is not to be read as a nihilist, nor too should he be read as advocating a 
neutral and abstract vantage point which has especially been advocated in the analytic world, 
notably by Thomas Nagel and Adrian Moore. Gadamer rejects the notion of a “view from 
nowhere,”390 as well as the ad hominem argument according to which the unconditional 
prohibition against any notion of absolute universality is self-defeating.391 Gadamer argues that 
the realisation of one’s limitations does not represent a surpassing or a nullification of those very 
conditions.392 Gadamer rejects any notion of a non-human viewpoint of the world, insofar as the 
world is expressed in and constituted by language.393 However, he does suggest the possibility 
that such a “neutral” view of the world could serve as a normative guide for our statements.394 
Gadamer accepts the reality of differences in understanding due to language, context, time period, 
and such like. Nonetheless, he does not see these as insuperable impediments to mutual 
understanding.395 He accepts that different worldviews are mutually “translatable.”396 Despite the 
indubitable existence of cultural and linguistic particularity, Gadamer suggests that reason is in a 
sense “universal,” since the language(s) in which we find ourselves admit of various possibilities 
of expansion.397 As he writes, “Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of our being, which 
is evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite dialogue is opened in the direction of the 
truth that we are.”398 To be human is to articulate and determine oneself with respect to a broader 
foregoing tradition, the vestiges of which are found within one’s own mind.399 Hence our identity 
is constituted in part by the continuous dialogue with things which are simultaneously other and 
not other. 
 
5.3.2 Language as intelligible being 
 
If we are to understand what Gadamer means by language, we must bracket our pre-
conceived notions of the meaning of the term “language” itself. By language, Gadamer does not 
primarily mean the various languages in which we think, speak, or write, the “natural” languages, 
and by word he does not primarily mean the constituents of those languages. Rather, language 
essentially is that which is intelligible and can be understood. It is not that our human languages 
are the primary bases of understanding, but that language itself, understood in this deeply 
ontological sense, is essentially intelligible. Things which we can understand, things which are 
intelligible, are so because they are linguistic. By language, Gadamer means the following: “That 
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which can be understood is language. This means that it is of such a nature that of itself it offers 
itself to be understood.”400 Gadamer sees the world as “language speaking for us.”401 As Grondin 
writes, “le langage est pour Gadamer celui des choses avant que d’être celui de notre pensée.”402 
Natural human languages are neither generative of nor exhaustive of reality in themselves. 
Gadamer identifies being with language, the latter of which he describes as “self-presentation,” 
describing his view as “ontological” in nature.403 The impression of the thing in the world 
becomes in our mind the inner word, which is later expressed in our natural languages.404 
Therefore, in the words of Llanes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics implies that “los seres de esto mundo 
son, ontológicamente hablando, lenguaje, palabra, verbo.”405 One who speaks is oriented towards 
the truth, and therefore towards being.406 Furthermore, when Gadamer speaks of the word (Wort), 
he means it in the sense of that which is possessed of meaning, that which has a content or a 
message addressed to one.407 As Grondin explains, “The Wort of which Gadamer speaks is not 
the ‘word’ understood as a linguistic entity (the plural form of this in German is Wörter), but the 
word which seizes us, which makes sense, which speaks (the plural in German is Wörte).”408 
Simply in virtue of be-ing does being speak itself.409 
 Here we find the significance of Gadamer’s emphasis on language as the basis of 
intelligibility. This being which is constituted by “language” in Gadamer’s sense of the term 
presses upon us and influences us, to the point that it emerges in our (natural) language(s), in our 
utterances. The revelation of beauty and its “speaking” itself is common to all being, and likewise 
truth.410 In this way, being is able to be understood. Through linguistic utterances, the world, 
which is of itself linguistic and meaningful, is presented in another communicable form; for 
Gadamer, human “speech brings the world into language.”411 As Eberhard explains, “reason is 
our way of participating in the structure of the logos of the world […]. This rational participation 
takes place in language.”412 In virtue of the possession of language one can relate to the world.413 
For Gadamer, “verbally constituted experience of the world expresses […] what exists, what man 
recognizes as existent and significant.”414 Individual contents present themselves as intelligible to 
                                                          
400 Gadamer, TM, 491; GW 1, 479: “Was verstanden warden kann, ist Sprache. Das will sagen: es ist so, daß 
es sich von sich aus dem Verstehen darstellt.” 
401 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 143. 
402 Grondin, “La thèse de l’herméneutique sur l’être,” 479. For another take on how language excedes our 
spoken and written words, consider for instance Alessandro’s aria in Handel’s Tolomeo, re d’Egitto (HWV 25): “Non 
lo dirò col labbro, che tanto ardir non ha. Forse con le faville dell’avide pupille, per dir come tutt’ardo lo sguardo 
parlerà.” 
403 Gadamer, TM, 502; GW 1, 490. 
404 Llanes, “Gadamer y la igualdad sustancial,” 157-8. 
405 Llanes, “Gadamer y la igualdad sustancial,” 158. See also V. Muñiz, who writes, “en el hombre habla la 
voz del ser.” Vicente Muñiz, Introducción a la filosofía del lenguaje. Problemas ontológicos (Barcelona: Anthropos, 
1989), 64, quoted in Llanes, “Gadamer y la igualdad sustancial,” 146. 
406 Oliva, Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik, 30. 
407 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 144. 
408 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 144. 
409 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 145. 
410 Gadamer, TM, 502; GW 1, 490-1. 
411 Gadamer, TM, 461; GW 1, 448: “sein [i.e., human] Sprechen die Welt zur Sprache bringt.” 
412 Eberhard, “Gadamer and Theology,” 296. 
413 Gadamer, TM, 469; GW 1, 457. 
414 Gadamer, TM, 472; GW 1, 460: “in der spachlichen Fassung der menschlichen Welterfahrung […] das 
Seiende, wie es sich dem Menschen als seiend und bedeutend zeigt, zu Worte kommt.” 
Principal Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
212 
us; they are foregrounded from the general whole of our hermeneutical vision.415 Gadamer 
understands language as the medium in and through which meaning is manifested and realised.416 
According to Gadamer, “man’s relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally verbal in 
nature, and hence intelligible.”417 This emphasis on intelligibility relies upon the notion of a “pre-
linguistic” inner word. 
Gadamer’s understanding of language and the linguisticality of the world must be 
construed, Grondin writes, in an ontological sense, which is to say that being is expressed in 
language.418 Linguistic formulation and articulation allows for being to become real for us.419 In 
what Gadamer terms the “speculative movement” (spekulative Bewegung) of being, one is seized 
by a meaningful content, which is then realised subjectively in linguistic formulation.420 In this 
movement, one produces a question which can be directed at an object in order to investigate it 
further. “Pour Gadamer,” Grondin writes, “c’est l’être lui-même qui en vient donc à se refléter et 
à se déplier dans notre langage.”421 Language represents for Gadamer the realisation and the 
manifestation of being in an intelligible and communicable form. It is not some grid imposed 
upon a formless world,422 nor are our interpretations as such constitutive of reality. 
As we have seen with respect to Gadamer’s notion of Fraglichkeit, we have the capacity 
to identify meaningful content in the world and express it in language.423 This is what is behind 
Gadamer’s statement that “language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs.”424 
Gadamer’s linguistic understanding of the world means that hermeneutics is about more than the 
interpretation of texts or the evaluation of cultural artefacts.425 Artefacts and even apparently 
inanimate things can possess a language, such as nature itself.426 Gadamer states that all things, 
insofar as they are intelligible, are linguistic, and that rational agents relate to these objects as 
interpreters of the “languages” in question.427 
What Gadamer intends to say is that when we understand something we understand it 
linguistically. For Grondin, this need not be explicitly formulated in the words of a natural 
language, but could be understood simply within the silent recesses of the mind.428 Language 
receives its determinate structure in virtue of its articulation and presentation in a word.429 (This 
makes more sense if we understand language not in terms of our natural languages, but rather as 
anything which is intelligible; that which can be understood is linguistic, and is articulated through 
words.) The light of the word (das Licht des Wortes) draws material reality into an intelligible 
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formulation.430 The word does not “imbue” something with intelligibility as such, but rather 
makes that potency actual in the mind of a rational agent by means of language. In fact, this 
speaking about being is initiated by a call from being itself, to which the word is a response. The 
articulation of an interpretation is occasioned by the speaking of the subject matter itself, which 
questions the subject, causing the question to arise in one’s mind.431 This question is then directed 
at the text in the hopes of eliciting further information in order to facilitate understanding.432 
Hence Gadamer speaks of the facticity (Sachlichkeit) of being, as it is facts or independent 
states of affairs which are realised in language. This point is crucial, for Gadamer here says 
nothing about the human creation of meaning ex nihilo, but rather suggests that it is uncovered or 
disclosed by us. He is not speaking of human language constructing the world but revealing it, a 
point which is made especially clear by the fact that he stresses the alterity of the facts and the 
factuality expressed in language.433 Thus Gadamer: 
 
From the relation of language to world follows its unique factualness (Sachlichkeit). It is 
matters of fact (Sachverhalte) that come into language. That thing behaves [sic] (eine Sache 
verhalt sich) in various ways permits one to recognize its independent otherness, which 
presupposes a real distance between the speaker and the thing. That something can 
foreground itself as a genuine matter of fact and become the content of an assertion that others 
can understand depends on this distance.434 
 
Gadamer views the essence of language as connected with thought and the thing which is thought 
in reality.435 Thought and language, aside from themselves enjoying an integral link, also enjoy 
an integral link with being on Gadamer’s account. Thought is not the product of various 
observations, but is an “emanation” from being itself. Moreover, (the intelligibility of) being 
grounds the condition of the possibility of (meaningful) language.436 Gadamer takes a realist 
approach to the relationship between world and mind. The word from which utterance is produced 
reflects the subject matter,437 such that in language, being becomes present.438 When we discuss 
the intelligible content of the world in our linguistic utterances, we do not so much speak about 
the world as speak the world itself.439 Human words in the Gadamerian sense are disclosive of 
being.440 As Gadamer writes, “in linguistic communication, ‘world’ is disclosed.”441 For 
Gadamer, “Realized experience is active openness to being, and wording is the disclosure of 
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being.”442 Being is present in our understanding, and it is these vestiges of the thing itself which 
encourage us to seek the source of these ideas.443 Hence our interpretations, and indeed, the very 
act of interpreting, is not separable from the thing being interpreted. As Grondin puts it, 
“L’interprétation ne jouit d’aucune autonomie par rapport à l’être.”444 The utterances of our words 
presuppose a meaningful content which is to be embodied in them.445 The spoken or written word, 
or put another way, a word which is constituted in some physical manner, is meant to embody the 
content it is expressing.446 
 
 5.3.3 The movement of being represented by the concept of the inner word 
 
 Gadamer was deeply informed by Augustine in the development of his theory of 
language. The latter’s presentation of the inner word analogy relates the Incarnation of the eternal 
Word to the “incarnation” of human thought in outer speech.447 As Oliva notes, following Bavaud, 
Augustine distances himself from prior fathers by speaking of the difference between the inner 
and the outer Word of God in terms of Incarnation, rather than creation.448 That is, the utterance 
of God’s Word consists in its manifestation in the physical, material world.449 Hence the creation 
of the world is proper to the Son’s divine nature, whereas his salvific or re-creative actions are 
proper to his human nature.450 
According to Oliva, Augustine’s early works reflect an understanding of words as related 
to that which is spoken and defined in terms of his semiotics.451 Initially the term uerbum/a is 
generally used in the plural and as such could not be applied to the divine Word.452 Once 
Augustine’s conception of uerba develops to the point of a cordial word, the term comes to admit 
of the possibility of a Christological dimension.453 Oliva locates this development in Augustine’s 
thinking to the composition of his De trinitate between 399 and 419.454 Furthermore, the novel 
ideas which Augustine introduced in his trin. concerning language are also those that Gadamer 
appropriated.455 The basic idea, as Oliva explains, is that Augustine locates the source of all 
spoken or written language in something more basic and interior.456  
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The notion of the inner word is inchoately present in two locations prior to the beginning 
of the composition of trin., namely Augustine’s doctr. chr. and his commentary on Romans.457 
As Oliva explains, in the former, Augustine speaks of a uerbum quod corde gestamus458 in a 
Christological context.459 In the latter, Augustine speaks of a word conceived or produced in the 
heart; here the context is ethical.460 Oliva notes the work of Duchrow concerning the origins and 
the development of Augustine’s understanding of the inner word.461 Though Duchrow sees four 
distinct senses in which the notion of an inner word appears, he argues that the concept is basically 
an ethical one, in that an inner word constitutes a decision about an outward action, a notion which 
he ascribes to Stoic influences.462 
Following C. Panaccio, A. Romele presents an analysis similar to Oliva’s.463 This analysis 
is separated into three phases.464 The first, which includes works prior to 395, contains no real 
doctrine of the inner word.465 In the second phase, we see a nascent conception of the inner word, 
in particular in Augustine’s Epistula ad Romanos inchoata expositio.466 The third phase begins 
roughly 417, and Romele notes the eighth book of trin. as the turning point.467 Here we see a 
notion of the inner word coming to fruition which is identified as something anterior to particular 
worldly languages.468 However, as Romele stresses, one must recall that this word is formed on 
the basis of mutable creation.469 Furthermore, the inner word does not pertain to one’s thinking in 
words, but rather something more basic. Augustine distinguishes between the spoken outer word, 
the word recited in the soul in a way which imitates outer speech, and then the inner word itself, 
which he identifies with the image of God.470 
As Oliva explains, the latent ambiguity in the Latin term notitia also comes to be reflected 
in the notion of uerbum interius.471 The term notitia can either mean a content (Wissensinhalt) or 
the execution or completion of a thought (Wissensvollzug).472 Hence there are two different sense 
of the inner word.473 One refers to the thought within one’s mind, either as it is present there or as 
it is produced by an object.474 The other sense pertains to the inner word as the capacity to produce 
speech and other signs, which implies a gradual, “processual” character.475 The inner word thus 
also reflects the two main activities of language, namely the apprehension of a particular object 
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which will later be expressed, as well as one’s inner creativity, by means of which it will be 
expressed.476 
We have seen how Heidegger takes a “de-theologised” approach to Augustine’s 
speculative philosophy and theology. This is much the same way that Gadamer discusses the 
notion of the inner word in Augustine. Gadamer shows a particular appreciation for Christian 
thought concerning language, over and against a classical philosophical view. In particular, he 
locates in early Christian theology a turn towards linking thought with language in an organic and 
integral unity.477 The word which one utters is not something distinct from thought, but is the very 
expression of thought itself: “that which emerges and externalizes itself in utterance is always 
already a word.”478 The inner word, in particular in its fruition as a realisation of a content in the 
mind, is analogous to the procession of the Father from the Son in the specific sense that the 
emergence of the inner word does not deprive the mind or the memory of any particular content, 
but rather represents the flowering of those mental contents:479 “The inner mental word is just as 
consubstantial with thought as is God the Son with God the Father.”480 
As Grondin states, Gadamer’s view of linguisticality does not so much pertain to our 
statements in a natural language (Aussage), but rather with what exceeds our ability to speak in 
the first place.481 Indeed, it pertains to our attempt to express what is held within that we struggle 
to articulate: “Die wesentliche Sprachlichkeit des Verstehens äußert sich weniger in unseren 
Aussagen als in unserer Suche nach Sprache für das, was wir in der Seele haben und aussagen, ja 
heraussagen wollen.”482 Linguisticality is thus constituted by the dynamic process of bringing the 
unsaid and the unsayable into the realm of the spoken, even if the latter never totally captures or 
exhausts the former.483 
For his discussion of the inner word, Gadamer is informed especially by Augustine’s 
discussion of this theme in the fifteenth and final book of trin. Herein the bishop of Hippo avers 
that there is an interior word of the soul, prior to all language, and even to any particular thought 
itself.484 As Oliva writes, this independence from any natural language reflects the connection 
between the inner word and the imago Dei within the human soul.485 The inner word precedes all 
the words which one utters, and is generated (gignitur)486 from the knowledge within oneself to 
the outer world, whilst that knowledge remains intact in the soul.487 From our internal knowledge, 
we generate a word, which is very similar to the thing that we know; the content is manifest in 
the inner word itself.488 This is the word we speak when we speak what we know.489 The inner 
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word is the image of knowledge, begotten from it.490 The spoken articulation of an inner word 
does not change the word itself but rather conveys it and realises it.491 In addition to language, 
this word is incorporeal, separate from all sounds, which course through temporal intervals.492 As 
Augustine puts it, “But our word, the one that has neither sound nor thought of sound, the one 
that belongs to the thing we utter inside as we see it and thus not to any language.”493 Our inner 
words are utterances of thought: “our true most inner word is not spoken except by our 
thought.”494 One can be said to “speak” by one’s thoughts without pronouncing words in sound: 
“For even if words do not sound, the one who thinks speaks in his heart.”495 This mode of thought, 
which could be loosely described as a language of its own, is anterior to and is presupposed by 
all individual languages.496 This uerbum in corde, is, according to D. Vessey, “not in any actual 
language. It is simply grasping a meaning with our heart, which could later be externalized in a 
language.”497 Augustine sees this inner word as a sort of universal human capacity linked with 
our capacity for reason, indeed, illumination. The multiplicity of languages is rooted in a more 
common shared inner word.498 As Vessey writes, “all humans, by divine inspiration, share the 
same mentalese: the Word of God.”499 Our capacity for inner thought is also linked with the fact 
that we are made in the image of God.500 
Gadamer argues that the inner word within one’s mind contains the thing intended; it is 
not a thought about a thought.501 The inner word in entering language is neither diminished nor 
destroyed.502 Rather, the content of the outer word just is that of the inner word.503 As P. Eberhard 
puts it, “[The inner word’s] being lies in its revealing and saying the Sache.”504 Though one 
certainly has the capacity to reflect on one’s own thoughts as objects, thoughts as such are not 
necessarily results of one’s thinking, but rather reflections of something in the world,505 “for the 
word is not expressing the mind but the thing intended.”506 Furthermore, Gadamer sees the inner 
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word as the dynamic unity of thought and utterance.507 The (inner) word is not merely the product 
of thought but the process of thought being brought to the realisation of truth.508 Gadamer 
describes the inner word not as any novel product of thought but as the summation of thought, or 
the logical result of thought, consciously realised by a thinking subject; the inner word follows 
“ut conclusio ex principiis.”509 In a sense, it represents a different perspective on what is already 
present in one’s mind. Theological analogues, when taken with a pinch of salt, can be of use here. 
For instance, God’s act of creativity is not so much something separate from his nature, but rather 
the expression of his mind in extension.510 Similarly, in the Incarnation, God enters the world 
without forsaking his divine nature.511 As Gadamer explains,  
 
the process and emergence of thought is not a process of change (motus), not a transition 
from potentiality into action, but an emergence ut actus ex actu. The word is not formed only 
after the act of knowledge has been completed–in Scholastic terms, after the intellectus has 
been informed by the species; it is the act of knowledge itself. Thus the word is simultaneous 
with this forming (formatio) of the intellect.512  
 
Hence it becomes clear why Gadamer states that a word is already present within one prior to any 
external utterance. The product of one’s “inner dialogue” still stands in need of further refinement, 
which the mind does through inquisitio and cogitatio, so that its thoughts may be appropriately 
couched in intelligible form.513 
According to Grondin, Gadamer does not wish to diminish the significance of the spoken 
word, but rather to situate it within its proper context.514 The interplay of both “types” of words 
are themselves the completion of human speaking.515 As Oliva writes, the inner and the outer 
word are both “konstitutive Aspekte des Sprachphänomens.”516 Gadamer wishes to return the 
focus of the theory of language from that which is spoken to that which precedes and motivates 
the spoken.517 In other words, Gadamer identifies the original context of speech with conversation 
(Gespräch), and not with the statement (Aussage).518 The latter is an abstraction which does not 
correspond to one’s lived experience.519 In order to understand one’s words, one must understand 
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them in terms of what makes them meaningful, namely the implicit question to which they 
respond.520 Thus language both originates and finds its completion in collective speech.521 
The movement of being into human language is what Gadamer has in mind by the notion 
that hermeneutics deals with an experience or an event. That is, the articulation of meaning in and 
through language likewise possesses the character of an event.522 As Lawrence writes, “the 
breakthrough to a notion of truth in its primordiality is achieved by uncovering our primordial 
horizon and implies a normatively freighted notion of experience. This is the movement of 
disclosure, which is the dynamic vector of Gadamer’s entire enterprise.”523 We seek to articulate 
our inner lives, indeed, our experiences, via targeted linguistic formulations. The significance of 
this observation, according to Gadamer, consists in the fact that the deliberation over a particular 
word or phrase reflects how language “real-ises” a certain state of affairs, how words make 
something present in external reality via language. The reality and the word which mediates it are 
never fully separable.524 The linguistic formulation of a particular content does not represent 
something new or different; it is not another thing. Rather, for Gadamer, there is a mere distinction 
between the thing and the presentation thereof, a distinction which ultimately disappears from the 
perspective of philosophical hermeneutics.525 
 The doctrine of the inner word also provides a foundation for the universal character of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics.526 Situating his discussion of the inner word within the context of 
Christian theology, Gadamer wonders whether it is intelligible to speak about some inner 
language of thought or reason.527 Every natural language, according to Gadamer, has a common 
source in the “universal language” of thought.528 External utterance is always understood with 
respect to the inner word.529 In his analysis of Aquinas, Gadamer writes that an inner word does 
not refer to some finite form of a word from a natural language, but rather represents the forma 
excogitata, the fruition of an idea in one’s mind.530 Hence for Gadamer, the inner word and the 
word of articulate, external speech are not radically, essentially different.531 Gadamer understands 
language and understanding as two aspects of the same mental process.532 His entire programme 
assumes the coextension of understanding and language, as well as language’s “universality” with 
respect to particular natural languages.533 For Gadamer, language is not some product or result of 
thought, something “secondary” to the thought itself.534 According to Grondin, there is a certain 
affinity between Augustine and Gadamer with respect to the unspoken, internal source of external, 
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spoken language. Every utterance is always based in and presupposes an “unsaid” source, a source 
which is never fully exhausted by any finite linguistic utterance.535 
Nonetheless, interpretation makes real and present a content which is already in the 
text.536 This is the same dynamic which occurs when being is expressed in language.537 Gadamer 
notes Aquinas’ understanding of the inner word as a reflection as in a looking glass of the subject 
matter about which one is thinking. Whilst the reflection is itself not the object, it is a nearly 
perfect realisation of the content in an intelligible medium, which simply reflects the reality to 
which it refers.538 Gadamer draws upon Hegel’s understanding of philosophical concepts in order 
to demonstrate what he means by the speculative. On this view, in the proposition X is Y, Y is not 
so much a quality predicated of X, nor a category in which X is situated as in a genus (e.g., Brown 
is honest, Brown is a businessman). Rather, the predicate reflects the subject; it says something 
about the identity of or the nature of the subject without being tautological. It is not the ascription 
of a property but a statement about something’s essential identity. Gadamer himself presents the 
example God is one.539 God’s very essence is that of unity itself. The statement tells us something 
about God’s identity.540 As Gadamer writes, “The word emerges as the perfection of thinking, 
letting the subject matter become present in it as in a mirror.”541 
 Gadamer describes interpretation as speculative, insofar as interpretation relies upon the 
subject matter, yet also realises something apparently distinct from it.542 It pertains to the 
relationship between the world and the speaker. Gadamer’s notion of the Spiegelverhältnis is 
applied to language; in language is produced an image which reflects the world and our interaction 
with it.543 Hence the relation is dyadic, produced by the two coming together.544 The speculative 
person realises that an object always presents itself to one’s consciousness as something, under 
some aspect or form or in a particular way. This leads to the further realisation that the qualities 
one experiences in it or ascribes to it are not merely intrinsic properties of the thing itself, but are 
generated in the relational interaction between subject and viewer. They result from this 
speculative interaction: the property does not exist “by itself” without a human agent to view it, 
but it is not “merely” generated by one’s act of looking, as the agent’s experience is grounded in 
the object itself.545 According to Gadamer, the hermeneutical circle is generated by a reader and 
a text, and hence challenges the categories of “objective” as opposed to “subjective.”546 A 
hermeneutics grounded in Gadamer ever acknowledges “l’activité coproductrice de 
l’interprète.”547 For example, a work or a musical piece is partially constituted by interpretation.548 
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The agent’s encounter with a Sache is productive of something which exceeds the sum of its parts, 
which also implies that every hermeneutical endeavour is unique. Gadamer captures this when he 
writes that “transformation into a ‘signification’ founds a new intentional object.”549 
 Similar to Heidegger, Gadamer also argues that his hermeneutical enquiry leads to the 
conclusion that the subject-object dichotomy is untenable.550 In fact, this is a consequence of his 
understanding of linguisticality.551 Gadamer is critical of the Cartesian emphasis on the self, a 
point which for him leads to serious epistemic difficulties. He is more sympathetic to the 
premodern dispensation, which did not envision a sharp division between subject and object, but 
rather conceived of thought as somehow integrally connected with the objects towards which it 
was directed.552 As Plato would have it, our thinking does not arise in a vacuum and then seek the 
outside world, but rather is ultimately founded on a relationship to the world.553 In this respect, 
Gadamer sees knowledge as entailing some form of self-knowledge, though he does not situate 
this within Augustine’s theological understanding of this claim.554 The mind is present to itself 
precisely in virtue of the various things it thinks.555 One’s own self, and thus knowledge of oneself, 
is always implicated in knowledge of a particular thing. For this reason, Gadamer sees method as 
inadequate, insofar as it attempts to nullify the self, which is nothing other than the very means 
of enquiry. However, one should note that he sees method and science itself as two different 
things, arguing that the latter must acquire a method of interrogation in order to arrive at truth in 
a more holistic and indeed reliable way.556 Furthermore, for Augustine, true knowledge involves 
a love of that knowledge, it is always a notitia cum amore.557 Moreover, this understanding along 
with love is constitutive of an inner word.558 Augustine’s understanding of the inner word as cum 
amore notitia is “erotic,” as it arises from the very depths of one’s being, is spoken “aus ganzem 
Herzen.”559 Cilleruelo notes how Augustine takes the erotic notion of knowledge from the 
Platonists and transfigures it, particularly by means of his understanding of memoria.560 That is, 
Augustine describes the production of an idea in sexual terms, that is, of conceiving, incubating, 
and ultimately birthing a product of “procreative” activity.561 
 Such thoughts also help us to see that the inner word does not tend towards the purely 
subjective. The inner word in Augustine’s thought establishes the possibility for communication 
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in the sense of abiding with someone, for as the inner word does not leave the speaker behind 
when it is uttered, so too can it remain with the hearer, even if it also returns to the original 
speaker.562 The implication of the Verbumlehre is not solipsism but rather of the possibility of 
continuous communication between individuals at a profound level.563 Thus for the human person, 
one “ha la capacità,” in Ferri’s words, “attraverso la sua parola, di muoversi verso l’altro e 
rimanere nell’altro, pur senza abbandonare se stesso.”564 In this way, the Augustinian inner word 
is, as Arthos puts it, “trans-subjective.”565 But beyond other persons, our language encourages us 
to seek its source, namely the divine Word.566 Here Oliva too denies that the inner word has 
anything to do with solipsism, as the inner word always disposes one to relate to one’s divine 
source, and provides the capacity to do so.567 Both Augustine and Gadamer hold in some way that 
the activity of the inner word relates us to others, whether to the external world, other persons, or 
even God. 
 
 5.3.4 Conversation as a result of finitude 
 
Through conversation, being is manifested and realised linguistically.568 Augustine and 
Gadamer can basically agree that truth is discovered through questioning and dialogue.569 
Gadamer maintains that language is not so much constituted by the collective individual 
utterances of rational agents, but their collective speaking together. Language achieves its full 
potential in conversation and dialogue, whereby it represents the process of understanding, 
allowing truth to emerge from the world into human comprehension in language.570 Language 
itself constitutes the enactment of understanding.571 “Conversation is a process of coming to an 
understanding.”572 “Reaching an understanding in language,” Gadamer writes, “places a subject 
matter before those communicating like a disputed object set between them.”573 Gadamer 
envisions genuine communication as constituted, not prevented, by the interaction of various 
linguistic frameworks.574 Dialectic in its proper sense implies identifying not the weaknesses of a 
particular claim or argument but rather its strengths.575 According to Gadamer, in conversation a 
truth is allowed to emerge which exceeds the sum of the individual contributions of the individual 
participants in the conversation.576 
                                                          
562 Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 47. 
563 Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 47. 
564 Ferri, Gesù e la verità, 48. 
565 Arthos, “Hermeneutic Anticipations,” 107. 
566 Oliva, Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik, 24. 
567 Oliva, Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik, 24. 
568 Gadamer, TM, 461; GW 1, 448. 
569 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 174, 176. 
570 Gadamer, TM, 462; GW 1, 449. 
571 Gadamer, TM, 463; GW 1, 450. 
572 Gadamer, TM, 403; GW 1, 389: “Das Gespräch ist ein Vorgang der Verständigung.” 
573 Gadamer, TM, 462; GW 1, 450: “Sprachliche Verständigung stellt das, worüber sie stattfindet, vor die sich 
Verständigenden hin, wie einen Streitgegenstand, der zwischen den Parteien in der Mitte niedergelegt wird.” 
574 Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” 157; GW 2, 231. 
575 Gadamer, TM, 376; GW 1, 373. 
576 Gadamer, TM, 376, 478; GW 1, 373-4, 466. On this, see also Michael Fishbane, Sacred Attunement: A 
Jewish Theology (University of Chicago Press, 2008); cf. Part III, infra. 
Principal Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
223 
Utterances convey a coherent content without being able to express it completely.577 For 
Gadamer, individual (inner) words can completely comprehend a particular content or idea, but 
no one particular word encapsulates the entirety of one’s mind. One is never totally present to 
oneself qua self, but rather present indexically, as it were, present in knowledge of x.578 This 
distention is realised across a variety of words and is a result of our finitude, which in turn grounds 
the need for multiple words, whereas an infinite mind knows no such need.579 When we speak in 
language, we speak one word, but due to our extension in time and space it is revealed 
successively.580 Zimmermann expresses this point in a theological modality when he writes that 
“God allows human reason to intuitively grasp truths without being fully able to articulate 
them.”581 Our intellect is divided and distended, resulting in our need for many words as opposed 
to God, who in his divine unity speaks one word, perfectly in unity with his mind.582 For Gadamer, 
“All human speaking is finite in such a way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning 
to be explicated and laid out.”583 Human utterances are “overdetermined” in Desmond’s sense of 
the term, namely insofar as they contain and indefinite depth of content which stands in need of 
being understood and explained further.584 Though we do grasp the “thing itself,” our linguistic 
approximations of it never fully exhausts the content of the Sache itself.585 The speculative sense 
of language for Gadamer “evokes that ‘truth of the word’ that is able to allow the resonance of a 
meaning that goes beyond what is said.”586 Habermas has referred to the “porous” quality of 
language on Gadamer’s account, whereby he denotes the openness of language to self-critique 
and re-evaluation.587 In Grondin’s words, “Human language is thus characterized by a perpetual 
self-transcendence.”588 Our linguistic utterances are the means for correcting or revising our 
portrayal of being in language itself.589 Language as such, regardless of its particular version, is 
constantly in formation and seeks better to grasp the truth of the world which constitutes it.590 
Statements about the world are always moving toward an ever closer approximation of the world, 
but always in and through a particular tradition or language.591 The dialectic integral to human 
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language bespeaks the limitations of language itself.592 In this sense, language is finite and the 
mark of our finitude, insofar as it implies a conceptual movement from less knowledge to more.593 
Here again we see a direct link between Gadamer’s thought on the inner word and that of 
Augustine. Grondin argues that Gadamer’s hermeneutics must be read in light of Augustine’s 
notion of the inner word, in particular the tenet that in its external utterance it is continuously 
striving for perfect articulation.594 For the latter, the word we produce in speech only partially 
resembles the reality about which it is spoken.595 The inner word, however, can capture a reality 
sicuti est.596 Indeed, the great virtue of the uerbum cordis consists in its adequation to and 
reflection of the content in question. There are many things we can understand without being able 
to explain them. Indeed, in my estimation, this experience is what motivates equivocal uses of 
language in various literary genres such as poetry, as well as the plastic arts. The artist uses a 
work as a medium for the communication of a cognitive, intelligible truth claim. The medium 
should not be understood as a mere generic container, but as a unique reflection of the inner word, 
moulded and shaped by it, such that its structure is inherently designed to convey something of 
the content. The inner word captures something as it is.597 However, when it is articulated in 
speech, it is not communicated as it is but as it may be heard and understood by others.598 One 
may recall here Augustine’s discussion of his search for a dignum uehiculum for communicating 
the grandeur of the Incarnation.599 Hence it is possible that something of the content is lost in the 
transmission process.600 The content of the inner word is conveyed to others by means of spoken 
language, which transmits information through the medium of corporeal sounds and signs.601 The 
interior word (uerbum) is actualised in and through linguistic utterance: “Hence the word which 
sounds outside, is the sign of the word which shines within.”602 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Now with this clarification of Gadamer’s account of language, the deeper significance of 
his theory of questioning and Fraglichkeit can be seen in full relief. As Zimmermann notes, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is based on the idea that understanding is an experiential event.603 
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Gadamer speaks of one’s interaction with truth and beauty in highly experiential terms, as well 
as in dynamic and interactive terms. That is, beauty and truth call one to be open to a different 
reality and to adjust one’s horizon or revise one’s prejudices. In fact, questions seem to arise 
within the rational subject; in this way, as Lawrence emphasises, “Questioning is the experiential 
core of such horizon-change, a change which may be said to be done to one even as one performs 
it oneself.”604 One allows oneself to be placed in a state of questioning, as the question summons 
one.605 A hermeneutical approach to knowledge means that knowledge comes to us more than we 
come to it; it is adventitious to the human knower, and constitutes, in Gadamer’s words, “an 
activity of the thing itself, an action that, unlike the methodology of modern science, is a passion, 
an understanding, an event that happens to one.”606 The hermeneutical experience whereby we 
understand is, according to Gadamer, “not our action upon the thing, but the act of the thing 
itself.”607 The understanding of truth is as an event which irrupts within one’s consciousness, 
impinges upon one from without, compels one’s attention.608 Gadamer speaks of a content 
expressing and presenting itself to one.609 Interpretation is not so much something that we initiate 
but something that calls us. Hence it is also the case that our interpretations are always already 
pre-framed by the way the text impinges on us, the specific questions it raises.610 That which is 
addressed in sounds, whether in terms of literal sound or something metaphorical, is unique in 
that it impinges upon us apart from our willing. The content speaks to us and we cannot entirely 
ignore it. Whereas we can close our eyes or look in another direction, we cannot, in Gadamer’s 
words, “hear away.”611 The path which Gadamer pursues in his hermeneutical enquiry leads him, 
by his own admission, to the very same problems of the classical Greek philosophers, especially 
in terms of the notion that understanding should be understood in terms of an event or an 
experience, in other words, in a more passive sense, as opposed to the predominantly active 
understanding espoused in this day and age.612 This also reflects Gadamer’s preference for an 
“enthymematic” form of reasoning as complementary to a “mathematical” or “univocal” one.613 
Gadamer’s apparent reversal of the dynamic of knowledge results in an ontological 
conclusion. In other words, because it is not so much we who impose ourselves on nature, 
determining it and dominating it, but rather nature which reveals its meaning to us who then 
articulate it, he states that this says something about the nature of being itself, that is, that it admits 
of a linguistic character is intelligible. “We can now see,” writes Gadamer, “that this activity of 
the thing itself, the coming into language of meaning, points to a universal ontological structure, 
namely to the basic nature of everything toward which understanding can be directed.”614 
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The upshot is the following: From a hermeneutical standpoint, the rational agent is not 
the primary agent of rational enquiry. The universe imposes a question upon one, speaks to one. 
Gadamer attributes to an object of meaning, of language broadly construed, the initiative in 
coming to knowledge.615 We see here a certain continuity with Heidegger, who drew upon the 
classic understanding of truth as an unveiling of sorts.616 According to U. Lincoln, “Martin 
Heidegger enthüllt die Figur des Sehen-Lassens als das metaphysische Ideal des philosophischen 
Wahrheitsbegriffs.”617 As we can see, the interrogative approach to knowledge suggested by 
Gadamer reverses the received view of enquiry as actively investigating a passive object. This 
insight provides further meaning to the notion that knowledge is about seeing what is already 
there. 
The importance of the foregoing consideration of language is the discovery that for 
Gadamer, being can be said to speak to us in a very real and meaningful sense. In particular, it 
speaks to us in and through our language, in which being is instantiated. This occurs when a 
particular content or Sache seizes us, and when we continue to articulate and come to a deeper 
knowledge of it. So far I have discussed the “principal” aspect to Gadamer’s theory of knowledge, 
which is of course never separable from the “gradual.” Gadamer’s hermeneutical account of 
reason can be described as “principal” insofar as he posits a basic capacity for perceiving 
cognitive objects, that is, something which is intelligible. Furthermore, in ways similar to 
Augustine, Gadamer maintains that there is a felicitous connection between the human mind and 
the reality it knows, thus establishing an initial link from which to pursue the search for truth. So 
even though truth may be discerned, it often requires a continuous unveiling and unravelling, 
hence the gradual sense of knowledge. Furthermore, Gadamer is well aware that even though all 
persons possess some hermeneutical capacity for knowledge, this is realised in different ways, 
according to the individual. 
What is it about the Sache that allows it to speak to us? It is a certain familiarity, borne 
out of history and tradition, in which someone recognises something of oneself. This is the nature 
of prejudice, whereby we are enabled to hear tradition speaking to us. With the foregoing 
treatment of the “ontological” character of Gadamer’s hermeneutics in mind, we are prepared to 
see more clearly the significance of Vorurteil in his thought. Gadamer offers a theory of 
knowledge which envisions prejudice as playing an integral role in the process of arriving at 
knowledge. The result is a reversal of the post-Cartesian, even somewhat intuitive understanding 
of knowledge that one generally espouses, namely that knowledge results primarily if not totally 
from a voluntary act initiated by a rational agent. One derives knowledge from a content which 
does not interact in any way with the observer. For Gadamer, as we have seen, the matter is the 
reverse: we can only begin to think and investigate once we have been addressed by something. 
We are addressed in virtue of a certain familiarity we have with the content in question. This 
familiarity is pre-eminently constituted by our prejudices. Let us proceed therefore to a basic 
investigation of the meaning and the significance of Vorurteil for Gadamer, and the critical 
rehabilitation of this concept which he effected in WM. 
                                                          
615 Gadamer, TM, 500; GW 1, 488. 
616 Ulrich Lincoln, Die Theologie und das Hören, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie 65 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 4. 
617 Lincoln, Die Theologie und das Hören, 4; cf. Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” GW 2, 46. 
Gradual Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
227 
6. GRADUAL ELEMENTS IN GADAMER’S THOUGHT 
PREJUDICE, HORIZON, AND THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Thus far we have seen the “principal” elements in Gadamer’s thought. One possesses the 
capacity to perceive objects of knowledge and one is equipped with the resources to investigate 
them. In a word, the principal aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics consists in the way in which the 
human subject exists in the world as an understanding, interpretive entity. Though one has the 
capacity to understand and make sense of the world, knowledge is often not a matter of immediate 
intuition, and requires the active input of the seeker of truth. Indeed, more often than not, one also 
has to allow truth to come to one by removing the various obstacles in place on account of one’s 
finitude. 
Having considered the “principal” elements of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, 
we now turn to the “gradual” elements, represented by the concepts of Vorurteil and the 
hermeneutical circle, respectively. I identify in Gadamer a striking parallel to Augustine’s own 
thought on the gradual sense of reason. Gadamer sees us as inherently finite and limited. There is 
some way in which we must struggle to overcome the obstructions placed in our way, whether by 
our limitations as such or by hermeneutical obstacles.1 In other words, one must recognise and 
address one’s prejudices. In the process of doing this, one is implicated in the hermeneutical 
circle, which expresses in a positive way the sense of continuous growth in knowledge. In this 
chapter, I discuss these two “gradual” elements in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, preparing for Part 
III, in which I construe them in ontological terms. 
In what follows, I shall first expound Gadamer’s understanding of prejudice, especially 
as it is presented in Part II of WM. We shall see that Gadamer conceives of prejudice as an 
ineluctable aspect of our reasoning process; due to our finitude, we must start with 
presuppositions. This observation is intended to be primarily descriptive, and not normative. 
Prejudices are elicited by one’s contact with a Sache, a content or a subject matter. These 
prejudices orient one to the thing itself and enable one to begin an investigation. One’s pre-
judgments can be recognised only in this process of confronting them with the subject matter, 
which initiates a dynamic of continuous revision and critique. In a word, this is what Gadamer 
describes as the hermeneutical circle, which involves a gradual and theoretically indefinite growth 
in knowledge. As I bring this chapter to a close, I shall summarise the results of my findings 
concerning Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and then lay a foundation for the third and final part of this 
enquiry, namely a systematic and constructive engagement with both Augustine and Gadamer. 
 
6.1. PREJUDICE 
 
In Part II of WM, Gadamer rehabilitates the concept of Vorurteil and restores it as a 
category to the process of acquiring knowledge. He sees it as a matter of fact that we are situated 
within an historical context and that many of our initial ideas are formed beyond the boundaries 
of conscious experience. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as prejudice in its etymological sense 
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simply involves a pre-judgement. This implies that prejudices are necessary parts of the 
knowledge process. They are the ideas which are activated in response to an outer stimulus and 
enable the hermeneutical process to begin. However, prejudices must be continuously critiqued 
in light of further evidence. This is done in the process known as the hermeneutical circle, 
whereby one’s horizon is expanded and adjusted to fit the new findings of one’s enquiries. 
 
6.1.1 Gadamer’s rehabilitation of Vorurteil 
 
One must first understand Gadamer’s approach to Vorurteil within the context of his 
critique of Enlightenment. He argues that the Enlightenment dispensed with the original positive 
notion of prejudice. Gadamer holds that one’s prejudices are not necessarily–that is, simply in 
virtue of being prejudices–irrational or unjustified, or at least unjustifiable.2 Gadamer is taking a 
clear stand against a specifically modern notion of prejudice, one which he finds to be incorrect 
and problematic. On this view, the Enlightenment conceived of prejudice as exerting an inherently 
limiting function on knowledge. Indeed, Descartes inaugurated modernity by reflecting on 
whether he could find a truth of which he could be absolutely certain, a truth which he could not 
reasonably doubt. Any knowledge at which one arrived by way of some sort of unproven 
assumption was considered as contaminated and not authentic knowledge.3 Gadamer criticises 
the scientific emphasis on certainty, stating that this criterion leads to the exclusion of many forms 
of knowledge, especially if they do not allow one to increase in one’s power over the world.4 He 
wishes to show that the criterion of objectivity proposed by the empirical sciences is not proper 
to the humanities, and indeed, neglects certain fundamental facets of how we understand in the 
first place.5 We have already seen how Gadamer conceives of questioning at the heart of all 
enquiry. This is a matter of fact, a matter of describing the way that a finite rational agent interacts 
with the world. Gadamer’s thought suggests a parallel with Augustine, the latter of whom seeks 
to reflect on his phenomenological experience of being a finite rational agent. 
Gadamer believes that the empirical sciences cannot provide the proper criterion for all 
types of knowledge.6 He grounds this claim in an historical and etymological consideration of the 
term Vorurteil, from which he seeks to derive a philosophical conclusion. He questions the 
exclusively negative connotation of the term “prejudice.” Examining the word from an 
etymological perspective, one can note that, as the English term suggests, a prejudice is nothing 
other than a pre-judgement. Hence in the most basic sense, it is a general principle or opinion 
which is formulated before an investigation has taken place. The meaning of the term is in 
principle purely descriptive, and does not admit of a primarily normative sense. It is because of 
the Enlightenment critique of religion, claims Gadamer, that prejudices came to be identified with 
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only the negative sense, implying that a pre-judgment was always an illegitimate judgment, 
unfounded, and hence irrational.7 
According to Bernstein, one of the distinctive elements in Gadamer’s thought is his 
critique of 19th-century hermeneutics.8 Gadamer sees Dilthey’s response to John Stuart Mill as 
self-defeating.9 Mill had argued that the humanities are simply an extension of the natural sciences 
and should be treated as such in terms of method and technique.10 In response, Dilthey attempted 
to secure an alternative basis for the Geisteswissenschaften.11 Gadamer suggests that rather than 
trying to find an alternative to the natural sciences, Dilthey should have looked more critically at 
the claims of Mill concerning the natural sciences and in particular that the “univocal” methods 
and standards thereof were entirely appropriate to the content of the Geisteswissenschaften.12 
Like Heidegger before him, Gadamer reacts against the Cartesian anxiety of 
Enlightenment,13 namely the division posited between the interior and the exterior, and more 
specifically the assumption that sensory experience is inherently or primarily misleading.14 He 
argues against the possibility of a theory of knowledge secured against any contingency of 
“doubt.”15 He takes issue with what he calls the Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice, 
founded on Descarates’ method of radical doubt.16 As Wachterhauser puts it, Descartes requires 
of a norm that we are able to become “second authors,” that is, that we could derive it for ourselves 
from our own reason, and not from any other source, including tradition.17 Citing Milton, 
Zimmermann describes the search for a Cartesian ground of knowledge as tantamount to a 
prideful attempt to play God and to deny our human limitations.18 
As Wachterhauser explains, one of the significant implications of Gadamer’s thought is 
the way in which it undermines what he calls “foundationalism.” Thought it admits of various 
forms, the basic principle of this view is two-fold. Wachterhauser presents it in the following 
way:19 
F1: All claims about the world must be justified beyond all doubt. 
F2: The process of justification must be explicable as to eliminate any further doubt. 
 
In other words, rational agents must be able to secure themselves against the contingencies of the 
world and to learn about it in such a way that any possibility of error is eliminated. However, due 
to our finitude, we can never fully understand the ways in which we think and communicate. 
Because we just do inherit these resources, we must trust them to a certain extent, a thought which 
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is repugnant to a sceptic and seems to justify a continuous doubt about the truth claims at which 
we arrive. 
What Gadamer wants to show, however, is not that scepticism is the eminently plausible 
theory over against foundationalism, but rather that the foundationalist criterion for knowledge is 
excessively demanding. It is an ineluctable part of our nature that we make claims and form beliefs 
without fully examining every possible piece of evidence or considering other perspectives; we 
do so on a daily basis, and this in itself is not sufficient to invite concerns over scepticism or 
doubt.20 As Wachterhauser puts it, “From the fact that we cannot attain certainty, it does not 
follow that we cannot attain knowledge.”21 Positing certainty, whatever that would mean, as a 
sine qua non of knowledge also runs the risk of excluding certain forms of knowledge which may 
not be susceptible to a univocal form of reasoning. As Taylor writes, “a rule of thinking which 
would prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really 
there, would be an irrational rule.”22 Gadamer wishes to demonstrate the ways in which the 
Enlightenment’s requirements for knowledge lead to dubious conclusions, the realisation of 
which motivates an alternative.  Wachterhauser explains very well this key Gadamerian point:23 
 
Once the criterion of absolute certainty is seen as irrational and surrendered as the mark of 
all legitimate knowledge, then the fact that many or all spheres of human knowledge fail to 
live up to this standard ceases to be alarming. The fact that knowledge is always dependent 
on historical, linguistic, and normative conditions, which constitute a relative standpoint, is 
not an inherent danger to knowledge, but a condition of its possibility. 
 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics reverses our thinking about presuppositions. These come to be about 
affording one a perspective first and foremost, not about blinding one. A complete grasp and 
understanding of the basis of our beliefs is never fully possible. Our historical finitude prevents 
us from completely viewing the ground of the standpoint which we occupy.24 The prejudices of 
which Gadamer speaks are those received beliefs and traditions which influence our thoughts and 
which constitute our standpoint(s) in the world. But it is precisely in virtue of such standpoints 
that one is given access to the world.25 Prejudices are simply a necessary part of historical reality 
which provide our conditions for entering into our human traditions and communities, growing 
in them, and understanding them.26 Nietzsche reminds us of the historicity of our knowledge, 
especially in warning us about the ease with which such truths can be neglected. However, 
whereas Nietzsche couples this insight with a hermeneutic of suspicion, according to which 
anything taken for granted is immediately subjected to dispute, and pursues a sceptical and 
deconstructive path, Heidegger and Gadamer seek to interpret this insight concerning historicity 
by grounding knowledge in experience.27 
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According to Wachterhauser, Gadamer is reacting against views according to which 
rationality is grounded in or can attain to some transcendent, context-independent viewpoint. He 
wants to emphasise the historically situated character of the human person as the starting point 
for any rational reflection.28 Gadamer critiques the Enlightenment search for some universal, 
purely neutral ground upon which to adjudicate and settle disputes. For if there is an integrally 
“non-rational” character to our rationality, in particular in the form of prejudice, then the Cartesian 
ideal is nothing more than an illusion.29 
In the previous chapter we saw how Gadamer brings to light the importance of the passive 
character of our knowledge, the way in which it is shaped by factors beyond our complete control. 
Our prejudices determine who we are just as much if not more so than our conscious, deliberate 
commitments.30 Hence “nous ne cessons par conséquent jamais d’être dans la tradition, et d’être 
conditionnées par elle.”31 Gadamer wishes to emphasise how we are formed by various historical 
factors before we come to ourselves as “selves.” Before any conscious reflection, we are already 
highly moulded and shaped by factors which are, in a sense, more intimate to us than we are to 
ourselves.32 It is important to recall that Gadamer sees this as a matter of fact; he sees himself as 
describing what is already the case with respect to human activity, whether we realise it or not.33 
Prejudices are pre-given, and do not result from our own conscious activity.34 In a letter to Emilio 
Betti, Gadamer emphasised the ineluctable character of prejudice, and how these are formed in 
us apart from our willing our knowing.35 (However, this is not to say that prejudice represents a 
fault in one, even when these prejudices influence our reflection on historical questions.36) As 
Wachterhauser suggests, prejudice exerts a “sub-conscious” influence over one’s reason in “non-
propositional” form.37 The significance of the “non-propositional” character of prejudice is that it 
remains ever elusive and incapable of being reified or isolated as an object of reflective 
interrogation.38 One’s presence to oneself is always  presence in the form of a thought about a 
particular thing. We are always moving epistemically from one intellectual perspective to another. 
Much of this takes place apart from our knowing or willing.39 
For Gadamer, we are deeply historical beings, that is, situated. We arise in a particular 
historical situation and inherit various traditions. Prejudices are constitutive of our identity40 and 
define us to a great extent.41 Manifold states of affairs exert a strong influence on our cognitive 
activity long before we become self-critical and reflective. This point underscores the nature of 
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human finitude, that human cognition is by its very nature limited prior to any particular 
prejudicial obstruction.42 Our prejudices determine the way in which we interact with the world.43 
Gadamer further bases his argument on the claim that the Enlightenment has not only 
misunderstood the notion of prejudice, but is not free of its own prejudices as well. According to 
Gadamer, the Enlightenment is characterised by the rejection of all prejudices as a foundation for 
knowledge. Yet this rejection is itself a prejudice, an absolute presupposition which governs the 
process of reasoning and influences the conclusions that one draws.44 
The upshot of the initial rehabilitation of Vorurteil is to turn one’s attention to one’s 
situated-ness and one’s finitude. The essential point is that we are located, historically and 
hermeneutically, and as such are always implicated in the process of our respective enquiries. On 
Gadamer’s view we can have no purely “objective” knowledge of a situation, since the very 
notion of a situation implies our presence within it, a participant of sorts, and not an outside 
observer. The epistemological implication Gadamer draws, therefore, is that “knowledge of 
oneself can never be complete.”45 However, rather than spelling doom and gloom for any robust 
theory of knowledge, Gadamer’s thought on prejudice lays the foundation for a dynamic if 
challenging conception of reason. Due to our situation, we are constantly seeking to grow in and 
confirm or challenge whatever knowledge we have. In this way, we see a further “gradual” aspect 
to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. We begin from the prejudices we have received from “tradition,” 
broadly understood. (We shall return to this point in due course.) Gadamer’s understanding of 
prejudice is behind his conception of the human situation as one looking into the distant horizon. 
He employs this metaphor to continue to think about the possibility of human knowledge and the 
way in which the search for it can be facilitated or frustrated. One can see how such ideas are 
congenial to an Augustinian theory of knowledge, a theologically grounded rationality which 
pursues truth asymptotically and is only completed in the eschaton. We shall return to this point 
in Part III, in particular in terms of Augustine’s discussion of transcendence. 
 6.1.2 Prejudice as positive 
 
 Gadamer’s descriptive analysis results in demonstrating the importance of prejudice in 
the reasoning process. Whilst this concept is no longer understood in exclusively negative terms, 
an intrinsic ambivalence remains. That is, prejudice as such is simply a descriptive term which, 
given the particular situation, can admit of positive or negative aspects. As for the former, 
Gadamer wishes to emphasise two particular positive aspects to prejudice. The first is general and 
fundamental: in virtue of being situated in a particular way, we are just given an outlook on reality. 
Prejudices simply constitute the way in which we perceive the world.46 We should be aware of 
this, but not scandalised by it. Secondly, particular beliefs or commitments can be useful and even 
necessary in the process of reasoning itself, allowing us to divulge further information or insights 
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within the context of a particular enquiry.47 Therefore, prejudice becomes an essential part of 
rationality itself.48 
Our presuppositions also determine, albeit obliquely, that which is novel to us, allowing 
us to identify new sources of experience and reflection, and indeed challenges, some perhaps even 
welcome, to our ways of thinking. As Gadamer writes,49 
 
the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, 
constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases 
of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something 
– whereby what we encounter says something to us. 
 
As Grondin explains, prejudices constitute “conditions of understanding.”50 Our prejudices also 
provide the conditions which make us sensitive to new sources of knowledge, which reveal to us 
what is subject to further scrutiny and questioning.51  
One of Gadamer’s main conclusions regarding hermeneutics is the ineluctability of 
prejudice. He sees his hermeneutics as a description of what a reader does in the encounter with 
a text. And it seems completely unavoidable that a reader will bring some prior thoughts and 
experiences to the reading of the text which in turn will influence one’s interpretation. Such 
considerations are behind Gadamer’s claim that “all understanding inevitably involves some 
prejudice.”52  
 Prejudices are also necessary parts of the interpretive process. The prejudices of a reader 
are crucial to the disclosure of the meaning of a text.53 (This still leaves open the question of the 
extent to which this should take place.54) When we understand something, we do so within the 
setting of a tradition in which we participate.55 Because meaning is only realised in a rational 
agent,56 some prejudices are not only legitimate but even useful. Gadamer speaks of “enabling 
prejudices” (tragender Vorurteile),57 prejudices without which a certain type of content will not 
be completely understood or apprehended. Helpful, enabling prejudices facilitate understanding, 
whereas false or disabling prejudices lead to poor or misunderstanding.58 Just as it could be the 
case that some px is a disabling or obstructive prejudice, so too some py could be an enabling 
prejudice, or presupposition which allows one to identify a particular content within the text itself 
which would otherwise remain hidden to the reader.59 Rather than trying to escape our traditions, 
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Gadamer exhorts us to take advantage of the contact with the things themselves, although always 
cognisant of the fact that these things are mediated by the tradition, and that our prejudices come 
from the same source.60 Prejudices provide us with a template against which to judge the novel 
and the challenging.61 They provide the basis for the past to be experienced as somehow different. 
They enable us to be alerted to the potential communication of the past within the present.62 As 
Gadamer writes, “we are possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are opened up 
for the new, the different, the true.”63 We are simply influenced and predisposed to certain 
viewpoints in virtue of our traditions, indeed, of being human. Therefore, openness to a particular 
content does not consist in an overcoming of oneself or an ideal neutrality, but in acknowledging 
and “foregrounding” our presuppositions.64 This is the crucial step, and sometimes it is simply in 
virtue of the encounter with alterity that our presuppositions are brought to the foreground of our 
consciousness. Then once we have acknowledged the ideas which influence us, we can critically 
transcend them through dialogue.65 
 So in and of itself, prejudice denotes something positive. As Holston writes, “Gadamer 
views our historical embeddedness as the helpful lens through which we come to know reality but 
which always approaches that reality from a particular, and thus limited, perspective.”66 The 
primary function of a prejudice is not to obscure but to facilitate and allow for vision in the first 
place.67 As Gadamer writes, “The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can 
be seen from a particular vantage point.”68 One’s horizon provides one with an initial point from 
which to view reality. Though it represents the limits of our understanding and our knowledge, it 
is nonetheless not completely fixed, but rather fluid. We move within our horizons, but we also 
move in such a way that our horizons are shaped and moved themselves. As Weinsheimer puts it, 
“To acquire a horizon means that we acquire a far-sightedness which, though limited, is not 
merely myopic.”69 In other words, it constitutes a certain standpoint or perspective on the world.70 
As G. Warnke explains, one’s horizon consists of a variety of factors, most notably one’s 
worldview, that is, the assumptions, beliefs, and values inculcated in one by a variety of sources.71 
Furthermore, our horizons influence our approach or our “orientation” to reality.72 Finally, they 
are also influenced by our spatial and temporal situations, and not just in the role these play in 
the formation of our hermeneutical frameworks.73 One’s horizon is constituted in part by 
experience as an embodied agent in the world, such that it represents the “actually functioning 
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framework of our experience.”74 Language, for example, is constitutive of our horizon, and places 
us in relation with the world.75 Grondin captures very well the positive sense of horizon when he 
writes, 
 
What is a horizon? What allows us to see, whilst at the same time also indicating the limit of 
what we are to see. But the horizon also moves with us. We can enlarge our horizon, find 
other words, better silences to say the whole being that would like to be able to be said, but 
there is no horizon to think of the horizon as such.76 
 
Of course Gadamer is no fool; he realises why prejudice has such a mixed reputation.77 
Though prejudices can and often do conceal truth, he believes that we can overcome or at least 
mitigate the obscuring effects of prejudice. However, there is no a priori way to know which 
prejudices are false and which are true. Rather, one must discover this in the hermeneutical 
encounter with the Sache, the subject matter in question. 
 
 6.1.3 Experience 
 
Prejudices provide the rational subject with a basic orientation towards the world and 
assist us in arriving at truth. Sometimes this takes place obliquely when our assumptions are not 
confirmed. It is precisely in the encounter with a text, the engagement with a content and the 
concomitant attempts at understanding that the discernment and critique of prejudices may take 
place.78 One of the particular ways in which our conscious reflection on prejudices may be 
facilitated is through the interplay of call and response. As we saw in the previous chapter, for 
Gadamer, works “address” us; in our engagement with a text, the latter adopts the form of a 
question, such that our presuppositions are implicated in our response; something in the text 
provokes them. And in this engagement between text and reader, the “foregrounding” of our 
prejudices occurs.79 (As I see it, Augustine recounts such experiences in his discussion of 
incorporeality, more about which anon.) True interpretation involves the transcending of 
prejudices, revising them in the pursuit of truth.80 As is the case with prejudice and authority, 
Gadamer maintains that there is no contradiction between a tradition and the critical acceptance 
of it, for the reason that one’s understanding enters into the hermeneutical encounter.81 The upshot 
therefore is that whilst prejudices are ineluctable, they are not inescapable; ignorance is 
corrigible.82 Interpretation is a process, directed towards understanding, and one of the ways we 
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grow in understanding is when we discover the inadequacies or the failings in our prejudices and 
jettison them.83 
Prejudices play an active role in understanding, in particular when they are put into play, 
when they are called into question.84 Gadamer understands experience as constituted by a contrast 
experience, an interruption of one’s expectations. The result is not destructive but constructive; 
in these experiences of surprise and difference, new insights are allowed to emerge and one is 
enabled to grow in knowledge.85 Hermeneutical enquiry begins when something seizes our 
attention; this can take the form of the challenging of a prejudice.86 When one reads a text, for 
example, one projects a meaning based on one’s previous understanding and prejudices. When 
the text conflicts with these, these must be placed in critical suspension. If this is done 
successfully, the subjective obstructions to truth will vanish, allowing the truth to come to one.87 
The negation of one’s prejudices is simply the other side of the coin of understanding, as it also 
results in clarification.88 When our prejudices are called into question, it involves our suspending 
our commitment to them, but this itself also implies a recognition of a prejudice as a prejudice, 
to which we were previously blind.89 
In addition to one’s conscious, deliberate efforts to refine one’s prejudices, the very fact 
of one’s finitude ensures that one’s prejudices are always in a state of flux as well.90 We are 
constantly forming our horizon(s); although much of a horizon is pre-given, it is not totally given, 
and we have a hand in shaping it continuously.91 Our prejudices are called into question when a 
content imposes itself on us as a question, or we experience it in the form of a question, of a being 
questioned.92 However, this questioning is middle-voiced, insofar as we raise the question about 
ourselves and our thoughts, a question the origin of which is our contact with something outside 
of us.93 As Gadamer writes, “In general the disruption comes about through some new experience 
in which a previous opinion reveals itself to be untenable. But the basic prejudices are not easily 
dislodged and protect themselves by claiming self-evident certainty for themselves.”94 We have 
noted that Gadamer holds that prejudice is constitutive of our rationality and therefore influences 
the direction it takes in its investigations. That being the case, how is one to discern between 
different types of prejudice, especially when one does not even realise that something is a 
prejudice in the first place? Gadamer holds that our prejudices, left unchallenged, remain hidden 
and concealed from our conscious sight. He states that it is in one’s “encounter with tradition” 
that a prejudice may be excited from one, called into question, put into play.95 Our prejudices are 
challenged when they are questioned, when some evidence from our experience presents itself in 
                                                          
83 Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,” 32. 
84 Scraire, “L’événement de la compréhension et la tâche herméneutique,” 245-6. 
85 Lawrence, “Ontology of and as Horizon,” 403, 404; Gadamer, WM, 338-9. 
86 Cf. Gadamer, TM, 480-1; GW 1, 468-9. 
87 Gadamer, TM, 481; GW 1, 469. 
88 Gadamer, TM, 480; GW 1, 468. 
89 Scraire, “L’événement de la compréhension et la tâche herméneutique,” 246. 
90 Wachterhauser, “Prejudice, Reason and Force,” 236, 250. 
91 Scraire, “L’événement de la compréhension et la tâche herméneutique,” 245. 
92 Scraire, “L’événement de la compréhension et la tâche herméneutique,” 246. 
93 Eberhard, “Gadamer and Theology,” 298-9. 
94 H.-G. Gadamer, “Semantics and Hermeneutics,” in David E. Linge (ed.), Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 92, quoted in Wachterhauser, “Prejudice, Reason and Force,” 236. 
95 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 167. 
Gradual Elements in Gadamer’s Thought 
237 
the form of a question, namely by challenging our beliefs. Thus begins the path of understanding. 
As Petit writes, “la première chose avec quoi la compréhension commence est que quelque chose 
nous interpelle.”96 Gadamer is not so much interested in ridding ourselves of prejudices, for it is 
these very prejudices which allow a subject to be presented to us in the first place. Rather, Petit 
writes, Gadamer wants to use a particular enquiry as an occasion for us to become aware of our 
prejudices, and in foregrounding them to place them under critical scrutiny.97 We are provided 
with the mental distance necessary to understand how our own ways of thinking and seeing 
determine to a certain extent what and how we experience the world. We are given the opportunity 
to obtain a critical distance from the conditions of our own thoughts and truly to entertain 
alternatives and other possibilities. 
I shall return to the philosophical significance of prejudice in Part III. Indeed, we shall 
see that our finitude constitutes the most fundamental prejudice of all, not to mention that the very 
concept of “horizon” also bespeaks a certain fundamental human prejudice. 
 
6.2. HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 
 
The foregoing section has in a certain sense been about the hermeneutical circle. With 
this in mind we are now prepared to take a more holistic look at this process, as well as to see 
how it could be theologically interesting, and not simply as regards reading strategies for 
canonical sources. 
Simply put, the “hermeneutical circle” is the dialectical process of understanding, namely 
between part and whole. That is, when we encounter a particular part, for instance a text, we relate 
it to the context in which it arises and in which it is intelligible, so for example, a type of literature 
or a genre. Based on this foreknowledge we anticipate to a certain extent the meaning of the 
particular piece, yet we attempt to make sense of it on its own terms, and then relate that particular 
meaning back to the whole. The tradition in which a text arises and indeed in which it is 
meaningful and intelligible is the provider of enabling prejudices which allow one to make sense 
of a text, anticipate its message, and understand its meaning.98 Gadamer writes that understanding 
consists in both 
  
the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning 
that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the 
commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed 
in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we 
produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, 
and hence further determine it ourselves.99 
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In a series of lectures delivered in Louvain (Leuven) in 1957 as the occupant of the Mercier Chair, 
Gadamer described the hermeneutical circle in the following terms: “Il s’agit du rapport circulaire 
entre le tout et ses parties: la signification anticipée par un tout se comprend par les parties, mais 
c’est à la lumière du tout que les parties revêtent leur fonction clarifiante.”100 One’s projections 
and interpretations await confirmation from the object of one’s enquiry.101 The hermeneutical 
circle involves a continuous dialogue with the subject matter, in virtue of which one’s ideas are 
gradually revised and made more accurate.102 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics reflects a deeply Augustinian element, insofar as that which one 
is to explain or elaborate is already implicitly understood in some way, even if partially.103 This 
is derived from Heidegger’s claim, that hermeneutics rests upon the prior understanding of 
rational agents. As Zimmermann notes, Heidegger leaves open the possibility that our initial 
experience of something may conceal some deeper facet of it which is not immediately 
perceptible to us.104 One is always already implicated in an interpretive discussion, possessing an 
initial direction in the search for meaning and understanding, a comprehension which is to be 
confirmed and refined with attention to the things themselves.105 In fact, as Scraire explains, any 
interpretation already presupposes some pre-understanding.106 We are already seized by a content 
before we become totally aware of it. Truth, mediated via texts and traditions, calls to us and 
addresses before we even have the opportunity to distance ourselves from it. It seizes us, or 
something in us, and hence is an experience and an event.107 (As we shall see, this is a crucial 
aspect of Augustine’s approach to faith.) However, this initial seizure is not understood as vicious 
or imprisoning, but rather as liberating, as one truly encounters something “other” in the world. 
Gadamer invokes Heidegger’s defence of the hermeneutical circle from Sein und Zeit, arguing 
that the circle is indeed virtuous and not vicious.108 This claim is based on the fundamental 
orientation of hermeneutics to “the things themselves” (les choses elles-mêmes), as well as the 
imperative to allow the text to speak in its own terms.109 For Heidegger, attention to the Sache is 
the “tâche première, permanente, et dernière” of hermeneutics.110 
All understanding implies that one intuits or possesses some fore-knowledge of 
meaning.111 For Gadamer, understanding always arises out of a fore-understanding, which in turn 
is conditioned by various historical facets of one’s life.112 We have a presentiment of the whole 
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from a part or a partial perception, a “fore-conception of completeness,”113 which in turn 
determines our hermeneutical approach to a content.114 This unity is independent of us; it seizes 
us, calls us in virtue of being coherent and intelligible. Gadamer even goes on to state that a 
prerequisite of a content’s intelligibility is some unity.115 Our intuition of coherence, according to 
Gadamer, implies that something of truth is transmitted by the text.116 Assuming that a text is 
coherent, its content is in principle indefinite, even inexhaustible.117 When one encounters a 
Sache, one’s own experiences, beliefs, values, and suchlike precede the text and thus anticipate 
or even project a certain interpretation onto the text. Then one checks this initial interpretation 
against one’s reading and interpretation of the actual text. Based on one’s reading and 
experiences, one revises one’s initial interpretation. This procedure can be repeated 
indefinitely.118 As Warnke explains, the prejudices which inform one’s initial anticipatory reading 
are those which are received from a tradition. The “texts” become those ideas and beliefs in which 
we arise, our “narratives” or traditions. Furthermore, we are directed and conditioned to think in 
particular ways such that our initial interpretations of a particular text are influenced by our 
“effective history” (Wirkungsgeschichte), that is, the way in which we are moulded by our 
cultures, traditions, and prejudices.119 
The hermeneutical circle is intended to capture the process whereby we interpret 
something in light of our fore-understanding, moving thereby to comprehension.120 The content 
is present in the parts as the structuring principle. The form is the result of the shaping activity of 
the content.121 The hermeneutical process operates according to a continuous dialectic of question 
and answer.122 Following the Platonic tradition, Gadamer describes dialectic not as the art of 
argumentation, but rather as one of learning how to think and question, that is, how to conduct a 
true dialogue.123 This means that a true dialogue is not necessarily limited to “human” subjects, 
but rather that true dialogue takes place between rational agents and a subject matter, given form 
and definition by a question. Truth requires balancing the part with the whole, that is, in speaking 
one truth relating it to the whole of the backdrop of being from which it arises.124 In this way, 
hermeneutics is fundamentally about one’s relation to the world in its unity and its wholeness, 
from which follows the possibility of relation to the individual contents within the world,125 as 
the whole is prior and primary to its constituent parts.126 A correct interpretation expresses the 
content of the text about which it is an interpretation, specifically as it allows for the finite, definite 
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conveyance of an inexhaustibly valuable content.127 The gradual aspect of reason is valorised by 
hermeneutics, as for Gadamer, hermeneutical anticipation, as understood as part of the 
hermeneutical circle comes to be understood as constitutive of human rationality.128 
 
6.2.1 Textuality 
 
For Gadamer, texts call to us, they address and question us, and because of similarities in 
our own circumstances, we often find that we are implicated in something relevant to a different 
historical time period, even though there are countless differences between ourselves and our 
forefathers. But in virtue of sharing a common historical horizon and indeed a common human 
horizon, the discovery of truth in older texts is not only possible for Gadamer but indeed 
necessary.129 For Gadamer, texts are, to use Desmond’s term, “overdetermined.” In other words, 
they possess an indefinite store of intellectual content. A text is something which is inherently 
greater than itself. This is a paradoxical way of putting Gadamer’s point.130 A less obscure way 
would be to invoke the idea that the meaning or the content of a text is not circumscribed by the 
intentions of the author, or for that matter the historical circumstances in which it arises. As 
Gadamer writes of a legal text, for instance, it is not simply a document which is intended for the 
immediate audience, but also holds a greater relevance and applicability beyond its own temporal 
boundaries. This is an essential aspect of a text for Gadamer; texts make claims on us, claims to 
truth, the extent of which is indefinite.131 From this point follows Gadamer’s next idea, namely 
that in order to read and understand a text, the task is to bring to bear the meaning that the idea 
has for today, in other words, to apply the text.132 The way to do this is through a process of a 
fusion of horizons, of discerning the principles at work in a text and the deeper meaning, beyond 
but not separated from the historical circumstances of a text’s provenance. Gadamer grounds the 
possibility for this exercise in the common human nature shared by all people, as well as the 
common, overarching historical horizon of human history. Indeed, we engage with an historical 
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text from our own perspective(s). The fusion of horizons does not so much consist in a middle 
meeting point but in the discovery of a new meaning, a new message in a text, but grounded in 
that text nonetheless.133 As Weinsheimer explains, “Law and Scripture cannot be understood 
merely aesthetically or merely historically because their claim on the present, their claim to be 
applicable, is part of what they are.”134 This theme of application certainly resonates with the 
Augustinian idea that human rational activity is “co-constitutive” of truth,135 a position which 
seems to be in keeping with the implications of Heisenberg’s famous double slit experiment.136 
The interesting point here is that, paradoxically, a text as an entity is inherently relational. 
These two latter terms appear to be oxymoronic when placed next to each other. But it is just the 
nature of a text to be so constituted in virtue of its meaning not just for its own temporal location 
but for others as well, a meaning which is discovered through application. So understanding is 
not something separate from application, but is rather an integral part of a greater hermeneutical 
whole which also consists of interpretation. Furthermore, texts exert claims over us; they are 
heteronomous, imbued with authority. It is not so much that we interpret them but that they bring 
their contents to bear on us. One does indeed bring one’s own prejudices to the reading of such 
texts, but not uncritically. Hence Gadamer argues that one should allow for one’s own views to 
be shaped and moulded by the content of the text itself. There is a correct understanding to a text, 
or rather, a set of correct understandings, but these understandings are only acquired in particular 
situations. In other words, it is not so much a question of what the text means in itself but of 
whether a text has been correctly applied.137 This implies that a text admits of a possibly indefinite 
number of compatible meanings, a point which echoes Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis in conf. 
12.138 
 
6.2.2 Multivalent meanings 
 
Gadamer is informed by Augustine’s theology of creation insofar as the former seeks to 
reconcile diversity with a deeper unity.139 Zimmermann describes Augustine’s approach to truth 
as “an event that is conceived in its entirety but that we can see only with the mind by exploring 
it from various angles.”140 We observe a similar dynamism in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. A 
particular content can be reflected in various and sundry ways.141 Gadamer understands different 
interpretations as the realisation of the manifold dimensions and possibilities of one and the same 
thing.142 For Gadamer, the one and the many are two parts of the same reality and are always 
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implicated in a reciprocal dialogue.143 Several interpretations of a particular text can all be true 
and need not compete with one another.144 
Gadamer holds that every interpretation discloses some aspect of the interpretatum.145 
Fortin-Melkevik perfectly if pithily encapsulates this point when she writes, “Le sens est dans le 
texte.”146 One discovers the meaning in the text itself. Even if the informed perception of a viewer 
is required for meaning to be disclosed, it is first and foremost responsive to and grounded in the 
Sache itself.147 As Scraire writes, “la visée de sens, par anticipation, est ce qui determine 
authentiquement la compréhension ; loin d’être une method circulaire au terme laquelle seulement 
est atteinte la compréhension parfait de ce que l’auteur voulait dire, l’attente, la visée de sens fait 
déjà partie de la compréhension et la guide vers son accomplissement authentique.”148 This point 
is apropos of Gadamer’s understanding of the Spiegelverhältnis.149 According to this model, the 
reflection of one object in another, e.g., a castle in a pond, relies upon the informed gaze of a 
rational agent; the relationship of being reflected has no “intrinsic” reality.150 Similarly, the viewer 
does not “create” meaning out of thin air; the generation of an image requires something to be 
there already, apart from the viewer and the act of looking. As Lawrence puts it, “an actual 
relationship of mutual mediation among distinct factors is the necessary and sufficient cause of 
the mirroring relationship.”151 The three factors involved, namely the original object, the object 
which reflects it, and the viewer are all mutually dependent on one another and required for the 
Spiegelverhältnis to obtain.152 
Despite the limitations of human reason, our knowledge always results from an 
engagement with the Sache itself. Hence we are always disclosing further aspects of it. As 
Wachterhauser explains, “for Gadamer our historical involvement makes possible a revealing of 
an aspect of the thing; we never can see the whole truth but only a partial truth or a perspective 
but a truth about the thing itself nevertheless.”153 This is what it means to speak about “finitely 
grasped truth,”154 an understanding of a content which is of an actual content but devoid of total 
comprehension.155 Interestingly, we see a parallel with Augustine’s distinction between seeing 
and comprehending in ep. 147.156 Following Aristotle, Gadamer wishes to acknowledge the 
limitations inherent in human reason on account of our finitude, without thereby dismissing all 
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normative claims whatsoever. Rather, the practical import of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is that one 
always tests one’s conclusions hermeneutically and self-critically.157 
 
 6.2.3 Dialogue, conversation, fusion 
 
One can call the interpretation of a text a conversation (Gespräch).158 This is because both 
conversation and interpretation share a common element, namely their reciprocal character, which 
is constituted by the dialectic of question and answer.159 One’s interpretations are always revised 
in light of one’s encounter with the thing or the text itself.160 The fusion of horizons takes place 
in conversation or in the reading and the interpretation of a text.161 A conversation must involve 
a common element understood by all participants and be guided by this same topic.162 Gadamer 
suggests that hermeneutics is about gaining an understanding of and a common agreement on the 
meaning of an exterior subject matter, something beyond any particular interpreter. Moreover, it 
is this common element which links spoken conversation and interpretive reading.163 When one 
reads and interprets a text, the two partners in this dialogue, namely the text, or indirectly, the 
author thereof, and the reader, are both focused together on a common subject matter.164 
 Gadamer is influenced by theology’s emphasis on the idea that most of the time, we do 
not acquire a direct knowledge of something, but rather develop and realise it gradually.165 For 
Gadamer, the process whereby this is realised is an inner dialogue, which is not necessarily 
extended temporally.166 Gadamer sees us as embedded in the world and gradually growing in 
understanding of it, in particular through the “fusion of horizons,” the Horizontverschmelzung.167 
Gadamer also describes dialectic in the Platonic tradition as moving in unity towards a common 
understanding of truth, of “seeing things in the unity of an aspect.”168 The fusion of horizons 
reflects the dynamic of an authentic conversation, being guided by the common focus on a 
particular content. As the conversation proceeds, the truth in question is gradually disclosed to 
the interlocutors.169 Conversation in its normative form is something which is greater than the 
sum of its parts, enjoys some sort of independence from them, such that one is caught up in a 
conversation, rather than planning and executing it. From this dynamic form of conversation, 
some new content can emerge.170 
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The formation of our normative ideals aspires to what Rawls has called “reflective 
equilibrium,” in which one’s prejudices and new experiences or insights are balanced with one 
another in a continuous dialectic.171 As Wachterhauser explains, the formation of, e.g., our moral 
points of view in the process of reflective equilibrium is a species of a more general movement 
of our reason. It is present in our entire life as a way of interacting with the world, balancing 
preconceived notions with new insights.172 Hence, in Wachterhauser’s words, “a potentially 
infinite dialectic between prejudice and critical reflection operates in all understanding.”173 
Furthermore, Gadamer sees the human condition as one of being implicated in this process, 
performing it without totally being aware of it. Rather, we later come to a realisation that we have 
been interacting with reality in this way.174 
Gadamer does not see hermeneutical enquiry in terms of Enlightenment neutrality; one 
is always somehow placed at stake, at least in questions of a certain type. “To reach an 
understanding in a dialogue,” writes Gadamer, “is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward 
and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in 
which we do not remain what we were.”175 In addition to the movement away from “neutrality,” 
Gadamer also points to a holistic and indeed transformative character of rational enquiry. The 
participatory understanding of reason, according to which the knower becomes closer to and 
united with truth, recognises and upholds finitude, as it balances both the transcendence or 
inexhaustibility of the object on the one hand, yet its immanent presence on the other.176 As 
Grondin writes, Gadamer sees knowledge not in terms of mental domination but rather 
participation in being itself.177 By our hermeneutical contact with an object of interpretation, we 
“participate” in the meaning present in it.178 
 
6.2.4 Empirical evidence 
 
Before bringing this chapter to a close, I would like to address the question of empirical 
data. In particular, I would like to know whether and to what extent research in cognitive science 
confirms or challenges Gadamer’s hermeneutical position. The reason for looking at this field is 
that if Gadamer is correct, then one would expect to see some continuity between how we think 
and how our brains operate when we are thinking. Simply put, what if any empirical evidence can 
be offered for Gadamer’s view? In this respect, I look to a recent study from Niker et al. on the 
question of how one comes to change one’s opinions, adopt a different worldview, etc. Findings 
in recent neurological studies allow for a conversation between science and philosophy.179 Indeed, 
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it even appears that neurological research has provided evidence to substantiate Gadamer’s 
account of prejudice. 
Niker et al. begin from the intuition that in some sense, experiential factors influence the 
beliefs we hold. If this is the case, then it is crucial to understand how we can remain autonomous 
and yet be susceptible to such outside influence.180 Hence the authors seek to draw upon the most 
recent findings in neurobiology in order to inform philosophical thought on the nature of rational 
autonomy.181 They examine studies of what processes occur in the brain when beliefs are 
incorporated or updated,182 exploring the how of the changing of one’s mind, both philosophically 
and neurologically.183 Following Baumann, Niker et al. want to avoid two particular extremes, 
namely “that persons are ‘caught up in themselves’ as well as that they are ‘caught up in 
society.’”184 Neuroethicists speak of “pro-attitudes,” that is, normative beliefs and values which 
are constitutive of one’s worldview.185 Niker et al. use the term “pro-attitude incorporation” as an 
umbrella term to denote the updating, incorporation, or revision of normative beliefs.186 
Niker et al. hold that although processes which involve the acquisition and revision of 
pro-attitudes are highly normative and intellectual, they are nonetheless realised in and enabled 
by the activity of the brain. Hence they are motivated to examine the findings of neuroscience in 
order to inform philosophical thinking on the matter of one’s reasoning.187 Hence Niker et al. 
write that any account of autonomy should be basically compatible with the current neurological 
picture of the human brain.188 These authors are not convinced that current philosophical 
approaches to autonomy have adequately addressed how new beliefs are incorporated or 
previously held ones are revised or jettisoned.189 The authors believe that the findings of 
neurological research can help to explain the mechanism for pro-attitude incorporation.190 
Blöser et al. make a distinction between the evaluation of pro-attitudes in light of (other) 
pro-attitudes on the one hand, and in light of relevant experience on the other. The importance of 
the latter, namely experience-responsiveness in a non-trivial sense, consists in the fact that 
experience can truly serve as an impetus for the revision of beliefs, rather than merely re-
confirming one’s previously held worldview.191 The experience-responsiveness condition 
construes experience in broad terms, the common factor being that in some way, some form of 
evidence compels one to re-evaluate one’s pro-attitudes.192 The intuition is that experience should 
play an influential part in our thinking; this needs to be feasible in some meaningful sense in order 
for a change of mind to be able to be effected by external factors. Without this, one could simply 
use evidence to support one’s previously held assumptions in a circular form of reasoning.193 
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According to Niker et al., our set of pro-attitudes, or priors, can interact with novel sense 
data in one of two ways. First, these two sources of information, namely the pro-attitudes and the 
new experiential data, may be integrated with one another to form a new hybrid product, or 
secondly, the new information will update the pro-attitudes themselves, though the latter will not 
blend per se with the novel data.194 Human reasoning, Niker et al. suggest, is implicated implicitly 
in a Bayesian structure.195 In fact, they even say that Bayes’ theorem provides an “overarching 
framework” for thinking about the interaction of new data with priors and the results of this 
interaction.196 Following Blöser et al., Niker et al. describe a reasoning process which one could 
call “hermeneutical.” The idea is that an agent who possesses some state of normative beliefs is 
led to revise those beliefs when encountered with evidence which challenges or seems to conflict 
with what those pro-attitudes predict about the world.197 
A major upshot of Niker et al.’s findings is that pro-attitude incorporation, that is, the 
updating of one’s fundamental beliefs and worldview, cannot be explained as a merely conscious 
phenomenon.198 This claim is consonant with empirical research in other fields, which provides 
evidence that human reason is not reducible to one particular area of the brain or the operation of 
one particular circuit; rather, it relies upon the multifarious operations of several parts of the 
brain.199 Our deliberate cognitive activity does not exhaust the mental activity which causes the 
revision of one’s pro-attitudes. Although certain philosophical researchers suggest that belief 
revision is a purely deliberate process, Niker et al. state that the neurological data suggest 
otherwise. As the authors write, “it is entirely consistent with the extant neurobiology that we 
incorporate new pro-attitudes below the level of conscious awareness, in much the same way that 
we make many everyday decisions and that perception ‘automatically’ – i.e., without top-down 
reflection – arises from the integration of sensory evidence with prior beliefs.”200 
As I see it, there are two interesting results of this insight. The first is that Gadamer’s 
understanding of prejudice seems to be consistent with empirical scientific research, insofar as 
the shaping of our worldviews is a process which is never totally under our conscious control, 
though we do have a key role to play in it, no doubt. The second point is that the beliefs we hold 
and the data which go into shaping them (again, a process which we do not entirely control) 
influences and determines to a certain extent what we do or do not see in the world. Niker et al. 
also attest to this latter point when they write, “our expectations, represented by priors, influence 
our perception of the outside world.”201 Hence there is evidence to conclude that the acquisition 
and the adjustment of priors and pro-attitudes is neither vicious nor totally determined. 
 
6.3 BALANCE 
 
The results of the enquiry to this point can be summarised as follows. The critical 
investigation of Augustine’s understanding of sapientia led us to think of knowledge as including 
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an inherently passive quality, and as admitting of two integrally related yet distinct aspects. On 
the one hand, there is an element to human reason which is common to all rational agents, and on 
the other, this is exercised in varying capacities, due to human limitations. Furthermore, grounded 
in a theology of wisdom, we were also led to think of the world as somehow a repository of 
intelligible content, awaiting the disclosure by means of the intentional activity of a rational agent. 
This historical and theological enquiry laid the foundation for a contemporary attempt to re-
evaluate this approach to knowledge in the present day. Following Schumacher’s summons to 
search for ways of thinking about Augustine’s concepts in contemporary philosophical 
language,202 I turned to Gadamer as a candidate for such a project of recovery.  
The results of this Part II of this investigation are as follows. A careful reading of 
Gadamer’s own sources, not least of all key sections of Part III of WM, reveals a thinker who is 
clearly situated in a philosophical context. Influenced by Heidegger, Gadamer seeks to raise 
hermeneutics to a universal ontological level: hermeneutics ceases to be about rules for 
interpreting texts or cultural aretfacts and becomes a descriptive account of how we as finite 
rational agents interact with the world and come to know truth. In this respect we can discern a 
resonance with what I have called the principal sense of reason. 
Our capacity for reason is grounded in a fundamental capacity for perceiving what is 
questionable, what admits of intelligible content which stands in need of being understood. This 
capacity cannot be taught, nor can it result from the application of a method or a set of rules. One 
simply sees, in virtue of having a rational mind. From this claim, I derived the following insights 
of theological significance. First, Gadamer argues for a primordial sense for what is meaningful. 
We perceive first an intelligible, coherent whole of our world, from which we gradually derive 
particular objects and foreground them from our overall experience. These are presented to us as 
objects which can be further interrogated and understood. Secondly, if this claim is correct, then 
it also implies something about the nature of reality itself in its Fraglichkeit. That is, reality is so 
constituted as to be intelligible, to be presentable to a rational mind. Being is inherently 
meaningful, in virtue of which it is also communicative. That led to a critical re-examination of 
Gadamer’s understanding of language and linguisticality. 
 Again we had to disabuse ourselves of some of the false readings of Gadamer on 
language. Far from being an endorsement of a nihilistic or constructivist position, Gadamer seeks 
to rehabilitate a classical Christian understanding of being and language as inherently connected. 
Language for Gadamer is not primarily the set of our natural languages which we use to 
communicate with one another in speech or writing. Rather, and with clear appeals to both 
Augustine and Aquinas, Gadamer describes language as that which is capable of being 
understood. Hence a Wort is reconceived in terms of a content possessed of meaning.203 This 
meaningfulness first addresses us, seizes our mind, and emerges in our thought, and then in our 
linguistic utterances. Not only is language itself raised to an ontological and universal level, but 
it also becomes the initiator of a dialogue. Gadamer effects a reversal of the usual way in which 
we conceive of the process of knowledge. Drawing upon a theme of classical Greek philosophy, 
Gadamer views human knowledge and enquiry as beginning in an initial summons from the 
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world. We are called and invited to participate in the meaning of the cosmos, constituted and 
conditioned apart from our conscious awareness, and to grow in our attunement to it. 
With this “ontological” reading of Gadamer in mind, we were prepared to explore the 
“bread and butter” of his thought, always bearing in mind the fundamentally philosophical aspect 
to his hermeneutics. Furthermore, in light of the foregoing treatment of Augustine, we were able 
to understand how these fundamental facets of Gadamer’s hermeneutics are congenial to the 
gradual sense of reason and illumination. Gadamer begins from the belief that we are conditioned 
and situated within the world and enjoy a certain relationship to it. Particular things address us in 
virtue of our familiarity with them. The call of reality compels us to recognise our presuppositions, 
our prejudices, which are formed in us by the process of history and as a result of our finitude. By 
recognising this as a matter of fact, Gadamer seeks to problematise the concept of Vorurteil itself. 
Our prejudices supply us with an outlook on reality which, though generally positive, must also 
be recognised and critically acknowledged lest it obstruct our hermeneutical search for truth. 
Remarkably, Gadamer wishes to maintain that in certain cases, holding a certain presupposition 
may be a precondition of arriving at understanding. However, whilst some prejudices are helpful, 
others can be harmful. In the process of enquiry itself, our prejudices are called into question, and 
by relating our readings generated in part by these prejudices to the matter at hand, we can further 
refine our interpretations and determine whether and to what extent our prejudices are actually 
helpful. 
 This is the process known as the hermeneutical circle, whereby one presents an initial 
reading of a text, a pre-understanding of the whole, which then is analysed in terms of the 
individual parts, which enable a revised understanding of the whole. Gadamer views this process 
of reading and interpreting a text as continuous and dynamic. In virtue of possessing different 
prejudices and a different place in the overall scheme of reality, one is able to perceive particular 
meanings in a text which may not have been available to others. Rather than understanding this 
as relativism, Gadamer sees this as plumbing the inexhaustible depths of a text, seeing what was 
always present there but latent. Due to this “depth dimension”204 to a text, many different 
meanings can be held in a creative tension with one another. These readings are confirmed by 
continuous confrontation and conversation with the interpreter and the Sache. A meaning is not 
merely a thought concocted by an individual but is derived from the thing itself, indeed, is even 
initiated by it. This process of continuous but not thereby futile dialogue and conversation with a 
Sache, as we have already noted, is understood by Gadamer as ontologically significant, as 
descriptive of our situation with respect to the “text” of reality itself. 
 From this it should be clear how Gadamer’s thought can be theologically significant, and 
not simply as it can be applied to strategies for reading scripture. In fact, the ontological aspect to 
hermeneutics promises to form a felicitous parallel with certain areas of Augustine’s own thought, 
and provide some fascinating suggestions for further constructive efforts. 
As we have seen, Augustine understands reason as admitting of two distinct yet 
inseparable aspects. One is the principal sense of reason, according to which we share a common 
capacity for knowledge. All of us have eyes to which the light is present in principle. However, 
our eyes are not of the same quality; we participate in reason according to our own capacities. 
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Whilst everyone is situated and limited in some way, some are more capable of growing in 
knowledge than others. As I see it, Gadamer provides us with a creative way to think about this 
schema in a contemporary idiom. The universal character of hermeneutics elaborated by Gadamer 
is consistent with this basic reasoning capacity. The thought about a common rationality is not a 
mere postulate, but is seen in the way that both Augustine and Gadamer understand reality as 
presenting itself to us as intelligible and in-formed. Both thinkers have a sense of the world as 
speaking to us, as communicating with the human subject. We shall explore this aspect of 
Augustine’s thought in more detail presently. What is interesting is that beginning from very 
different interests, Gadamer’s arguments suggest that reality is intelligible in a way that would be 
consistent with Augustine’s understanding of creation in sapientia. Arthos writes that the 
intersection of Augustine and Gadamer is all the more interesting for this very reason, namely 
their different interests, contexts, and starting points.205 Similarly, both thinkers show a profound 
appreciation of the limitations of human reason and the importance of thinking about how we are 
prevented from arriving at knowledge, in part because of our own epistemic sinfulness and in part 
because of our inherent limitations as finite human knowers, as a result of which we interact with 
the world in an intrinsically hermeneutical, interpretive way. Hence for Augustine and Gadamer, 
human finitude is at the basis of their respective theories of knowledge and reality, even if the 
matter is approached from different perspectives. For Augustine, we are conditioned by the 
infinite and are cast into corporeal creation, in virtue of which we strive to know the timeless in 
and through time. Our created being places certain restrictions on our reasoning abilities. For 
Gadamer, our finitude implies that our knowledge is never complete and rather involves a 
continuous, possibly indefinite process, in which case our hermeneutical relationship to the world 
is grounded in the fact of our finitude. 
Both figures also have a sense for “overdeterminacy,” for that which exceeds the 
complete univocal comprehension of a human subject, not simply de facto but de iure. Gadamer 
sees a text as a source of indefinite if not inexhaustible depth. In virtue of our finitude, there is 
always more for us to understand; reason never finds satisfaction on this side of the veil. 
Augustine too wishes to maintain this asymptotic element to reason. Of course for the latter, the 
search for truth is a search for Truth itself, which is the infinite and ineffable Word. It is no wonder 
then that Augustine would encourage a continuous and gradual encounter with the depths of 
God’s Wisdom, a task for which Gadamer’s understanding of the hermeneutical circle can provide 
further insight and resources for articulation. 
Gadamer states that prejudices just constitute our way of perceiving reality, our way of 
thinking about the world at all. Prejudice as such is a result of our finitude, a point which both 
thinkers appreciate in their own ways. Finitude is both a condition of the way we are present to 
the world, but it is also a potential source of confusion and obscurity. Augustine wants us to 
appreciate our created nature, whilst Gadamer wants us to foreground our prejudices and 
appreciate them for what they are. As I see it, the result is that both of our thinkers, far from 
advocating a quixotic flight from spatio-temporal reality, call upon us to recognise it as a 
condition of our knowing which must be critically foregrounded in order to pursue knowledge. 
Following Gadamer, we can say that Augustine calls on us to foreground our ontological 
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prejudices of time and space, prejudices borne out of the fact of our created-ness and finitude. 
This point we shall explore more deeply in due course. 
However, at this point a clear problem arises. The comparison of historical figures is of 
course a vexed question. Yet aside from the obvious differences in historical context, there are 
clear differences if not outright disagreements in terms of commitments and confession between 
Augustine and Gadamer. I do not think they are insurmountable, but I also do not think that they 
are trivial, either. They need to be critically and responsibly addressed. As I bring this second 
section to a close, that is precisely what I shall do. I shall attempt to show that a thorough 
examination of Gadamer’s thought does in fact provide us with the resources for thinking about 
Augustine’s sapiential theology today, even if his thought prevents certain apparent obstacles, not 
least of which his hostility towards a notion of transcendence and eternity, a concept which 
appears to be a sine qua non of “mere Christianity.” It is to this grave and weighty topic that I 
now turn. 
 
6.4 CRITICAL DIALOGUE 
 
At this stage, I am beginning to transition to the specifically systematic, hermeneutical, 
and constructive part of my enquiry. Hence it is fitting that now my Interlocutor introduces a 
different and critical perspective; he will return periodically throughout the rest of this work.206  
I find your attempt to formulate a dialogue between Augustine and Gadamer quaint, but 
altogether unambitious. Why not choose another topic, such as predestination? Why do you limit 
yourself to questions of knowledge? Seeking to rehabilitate Augustine on certain points may be 
fashionable, but what about the less desirable elements of his thought? 
You raise a crucial point about the foundation of my project. I believe that the thought of 
both Augustine and Gadamer, both individually but especially in tandem, is responsive to a 
contemporary dialectic pertaining to the nature of reason and knowledge. It is not so much that I 
chose them, but that the contemporary circumstances motivated a critical examination of their 
thought on a particular topic. Moreover, one must note a crucial distinction between the 
intelligibility of what, e.g., Augustine has to say about, e.g., knowledge, and the truth of those 
statements. In may well be the case that Augustine’s ideas are intelligible or coherent; it is quite 
another question whether they are true. The truth of his claims is indexed to and assessed in light 
of the relevant scientific standards. 
I am surprised for another reason at your attempt to integrate hermeneutics and 
Augustine’s theology, as it seems that this synthesis is doomed to flounder on the conflict between 
Augustine’s emphasis on infinity and the necessarily finite emphasis present in hermeneutics.207 
Gadamer was no religious dogmatist and viewed revelation and religion ambivalently at best. 
Heidegger said that theologians must recognise their own finitude and situated-ness, a task which 
you have obviously failed to complete.208 Furthermore, a brief look at the development of 
hermeneutics in the latter half of the 20th century clearly demonstrates that it has been taken in a 
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direction antithetical to metaphysics. Even those who endorse a more traditional metaphysics, 
figures such as Grondin, have trouble reconciling hermeneutics with their philosophical 
positions.209 Even the work of your own theologians condemns you: Eberhard and Zimmermann, 
for example, point to Gadamer’s hermeneutics as useful for theology, but for completely different 
reasons than you. For them, hermeneutics has the capacity to correct Christianity’s pretensions 
to absolute truth by introducing an emphasis on the “incarnational” nature of understanding.210 
Zimmermann also acknowledges the fundamental conflict between the Christian commitment to 
eternity and transcendence on the one hand, and the hermeneutical emphasis on finitude and 
particularity on the other.211 Try as you might, you cannot get away from the fact that Gadamer 
is a thinker fundamentally tethered to the here and now; you cannot avoid dealing with context 
and human tradition. 
As much as Augustine discusses the soul’s intimate contact with the divine ideas, he is 
adamant that human knowledge is inherently limited in this life. If anything, Christian theology 
provides a firm basis for thinking about our finitude, not only in terms of the emphasis which 
appears in such writings, which is simply an apparent fact, but also in terms of grounding this 
finitude in our very nature, indeed, our created nature. 
One must also remember the original context of Gadamer’s critique of reason and its 
pretentions to a neutral standpoint. First and foremost, this is directed against a secular view of 
reason. At the heart of Gadamer’s critique of Enlightenment is the latter’s “forgetfulness of 
finitude.”212 Gadamer describes modern pretensions to absolute certitude as a criterion for 
knowledge as resulting from an “ontological prejudice” (ontologischen Vorurteil).213 The 
ambition of the Enlightenment was to aspire to a purely neutral, abstract language which would 
reflect the totality of the world as it exists “objectively.”214 Though he does not believe such a 
language is fully attainable due to certain human limitations, he nonetheless does not dismiss the 
ideal of some purely neutral language altogether. In fact, Gadamer sees scientific development as 
moving asymptotically towards the realisation of this goal.215 Such a language would be a 
language of mathematics, shorn of the particularities of individual cultures.216 By thinking 
mathematically and logically, the human mind aspires to a universality of thought. This is based 
on the fact that one develops conclusions based upon a set of conceptual relations which are not 
derived from experience.217 
In addition, Gadamer’s thought is essentially philosophical and grounded in “traditional” 
sources. Figures such as Holston, Wachterhauser, and Grondin argue that Gadamer’s thought can 
be seen as arising from the western metaphysical tradition, beginning with the Greeks, and 
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seeking to further their thought in a modern way. The remarkable upshot therefore is that rather 
than espousing the postmodern fetish with particularity, as many of Gadamer’s followers seek to 
do, the actual purpose of WM, inter alia, is to reconcile particularity and universality, rather than 
annihilate the latter by means of the former.218 
Whilst Gadamer does not unequivocally embrace a doctrine of transcendence, such a 
claim ignores other key aspects of his thought. There is a certain openness and direction in 
Gadamer’s thought towards “transcendent” properties and a “metaphysics of finitude.”219 
According to Scraire, though Gadamer rejects a Hegelian notion of Absolute Spirit, he is 
nonetheless open to a Platonic account of something infinite, absolute, and transcendent, and even 
suggests that hermeneutics must ever strive for this, even if only as a normative goal.220 (In this 
respect traditional sources for negative theology can be particularly helpful.) Like Grondin, 
Lawrence describes the upshot of Gadamer’s thought as “a metaphysics of finitude that is 
undogmatically open to the infinite.”221 Moreover, Gadamer’s emphasis on finitude and the 
implications thereof for human knowledge is in principle consistent with a Christian notion of our 
situation in the world and fides quaerens intellectum.222 In fact, interpreted strictly, Gadamer’s 
emphasis on human finitude and the limitations of reason becomes an uncontroversial 
reformulation of the Christian notion of our created nature.223 But it is just this transience and 
movement of created being that testifies to God, albeit obliquely: its very finitude suggests an 
infinite source of its being. Indeed, for Augustine our finitude is conditioned by and and even 
bespeaks the infinite. Taylor captures this idea when he writes, 
 
[I]t couldn’t be that, understanding myself as finite first, I then constructed by my own 
powers of conception the idea of a being who would represent the negation of myself and 
hence would be infinite. On the contrary, it works the other way around. I wouldn’t have the 
notion of myself as finite unless I already had implanted within me this idea of infinity and 
perfection. But to understand myself as doubting and wanting is to see myself as lacking in 
some respect, and hence as finite and imperfect. So my most basic and unavoidable modes of 
self-understanding presuppose the idea of infinity.224 
 
On a final note, a hermeneutic of suspicion can be useful regarding this issue, as it seems 
that you take for granted that the eternal, the incorporeal, the timeless cannot be real, and must be 
excluded from theology or philosophy. If you are to be consistent, you must recognise that this is 
a fundamental assumption, taken for granted, and it must be critically addressed with suspicion.225 
All you have said may be convincing; but it is also irrelevant. The arguments above may 
be sufficient to  justify a belief in infinity, eternity, transcendence, or whatever you want to call it. 
But now you are simply putting it forth as a posit, a sort of Kantian assumption, granted made on 
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a logical basis, but with little relevance for us as human actors. The real crux of the problem, in 
particular for you, is how we can know something of the infinite in a finite way. Let us grant that 
there is an infinite; you still have no way of knowing anything non-trivial and substantive about 
it. And this is a problem for you, insofar as you wish to present a theory of knowledge which 
includes as an essential part some transcendent, divine source of truth. 
 Here you touch upon a major issue which has seldom been addressed in the literature, but 
which I think is of crucial importance for an enquiry of this kind. The foregoing reading of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in principle gives us no reason to exclude transcendence from a theory 
of reality, nor to exclude altogether the human capacity for contact with it. One would want to 
say perhaps that this contact is always mediated, or somehow incomplete because of our finitude. 
But nothing in such an emphasis as such conflicts with Augustine’s own admonitions to remember 
our frailty and weakness when we try to conceive of the infinite and immutable God, not to 
mention the hindrances caused by sin.226 It is important to note here that Gadamer distinguishes 
between comprehension and understanding. The former pertains to the Sache in itself. So 
Christian doctrine is incomprehensible, even if the articulations of it in language are 
understandable. One cannot completely comprehend the divine, but that is not to say that 
something is not adequately stated in human language.227 Furthermore, for Gadamer, language 
reflects being. But for Augustine, even in immanent, finite being, transcendence is present. 
Gadamer presents no reason to suppose that the transcendent cannot mingle with the immanent. 
To appeal to the idea that the transcendent and the immanent are mutually exclusive would be to 
beg the question, let alone conflict with the general tenor of reacting against the epistemology of 
the Enlightenment. 
 Gadamer in his discussion of Plato’s approach to beauty provides an example for how 
this dynamic of perceiving “ideal” properties in reality might be understood. Whereas the ancients 
viewed beauty as a property of nature coextensive with symmetry, order, harmony, parsimony, 
etc., the modern dispensation approaches beauty as reserved for the arts. The idea behind this shift 
is that if beauty proceeds from some intelligible source, then only persons can be creators of 
beauty, as God has been eliminated or marginalised, since nature no longer possesses beauty but 
is simply a neutral field of observation.228 Beauty is meant to be realised;229 it is attractive in the 
sense that it seizes the soul and draws one to it.230 The Platonic separation of the ideal from the 
material is not so much an ontological gulf but a distinction. In fact, these are reconciled in the 
understanding of formal properties such as beauty, which are manifest in sensible matter.231 The 
self-presentation of the beautiful is part and parcel of its identity.232 As Grondin writes,  
 
The essence of beauty is to manifest itself, to illuminate, to shine. The Beautiful thus 
expresses the necessary manifestation of the Form in the sensible, whilst preserving its 
transcendence […] In Gadamer’s terms, there is a separation (chorismos) between the Form, 
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the Beautiful, and the sensible, but at the same time here it is abolished. The Beautiful is thus 
the being which ‘shines’ at the centre of the sensible.233 
 
Though Gadamer places an emphasis on the particularities of history and culture, he 
nonetheless sees these contingencies as united in a more basic, shared framework, a “primordial 
horizon.”234 According to Zimmermann, Gadamer uses the terms “tradition” and “human reason” 
interchangeably.235 Hence the use of the term tradition should not be understood in merely 
anthropological or social terms. The reason for this is the fact that despite one’s particularity, it is 
the world itself which is mediated through language and cultural tradition.236 Contrary to 
Habermas’ claims regarding Gadamer’s understanding of tradition, this concept for Gadamer 
extends beyond the merely cultural. Indeed, it encompasses our entire experience of reality, which 
is reflected in our rationality.237 According to Zimmermann, Gadamer’s understanding of tradition 
cannot be restricted only to encompassing what we consider anthropological or cultural 
categories.238 Rather, “Gadamer uses ‘tradition’ almost synonymously with ‘human reason.’”239 
Gadamer himself makes this clear when he writes, 
 
For we live in what has been handed down to us, and this is not just a specific region of our 
experience of the world, specifically what we call “cultural tradition” which only consists of 
texts and monuments and which are able to pass on to us a linguistically constituted and 
historically documented sense. No, it is the world itself which is communicatively 
experienced and continuously entrusted (traditur) to us as an infinitely open task.240 
 
Furthermore, as Scraire claims, Gadamer’s understanding of our historicity does not thereby 
preclude the possibility of arriving at “eternal” truths, but rather shows it that we seek higher 
truths in and through history.241 As Scraire writes, “Or qui s’ouvre à un autre horizon ‘y transpire,’ 
y est impliqué, s’y intéresse, il dépasse sa propre sphère de compréhension en vue d’en élargir les 
frontières ; acquérir un horizon signifie alors une véritable élévation à une universalité 
supérieure.”242 Although he does not endorse the idea that there is only one true religion, Gadamer 
does support the endeavour of the (asymptotic) search for transcendence.243 
Gadamer’s “agnostic” approach to questions of transcendence is also seen later in his 
life.244 In 1993, Gadamer told Die Zeit that he did not believe in an afterlife (Jenseits), or at least 
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not in the way that a typical religious person would understand it.245 In another interview, 
Gadamer expresses some ambivalence about the notion of some traditional understanding of 
heaven, stating that it is possible (möglich), but that he also thinks that various human concepts 
thereof need to be examined critically.246 He also says that he does not believe in a life after death 
(Leben nach dem Tode), but sees how one could.247 Gadamer sees the reason for his agnosticism 
about heaven as a result of his childhood, in which he lost his mother at an early age. He reports 
how he never felt the tender, visceral love of his mother, which is so essential to the formation of 
faith.248 Furthermore, this kind of experience must be lived for oneself; it cannot be imagined or 
approximated.249 
Despite his lack of affective attachment to religion in the form of piety, Gadamer viewed 
it as significant in intellectual or hermeneutical terms. For example, Gadamer suggests that 
philosophy admits of an inherently religious aspect, that it is geared towards searching for that 
which lies behind our complete comprehension, indeed, the limits of our knowledge, as was the 
case with Heidegger.250 As C. Vincie notes, following J. Haught, science and religion are both 
grounded in the orientation towards questions of deeper truths, that is, explanations and 
aetiologies.251 Gadamer also sees a certain convergence of faith and philosophy, insofar as both 
confront the limitations of human existence.252 Gadamer suggests that ritual acts as a sort of 
interruption of one’s prejudices pertaining to quotidian life.253 It teaches one “über wichtige Dinge 
nachzudenken.”254 Ritual and religion witness at a very basic level to the “overdeterminacy” of 
the world, and confront one with this inconvenience within the midst of one’s typical existence. 
The questions and the enquiries engendered by ritual are always subject to doubt, especially for 
the theologian, a fact that one must also learn to accept.255 Gadamer goes so far as to suggest that 
the task of the philosopher is to demonstrate that religion responds to a deeper dimension of the 
human person which can never be totally ignored or eliminated. Put differently, Gadamer thinks 
that the search for a Religionsersatz is vain and futile (unerfüllbar).256 
Nonetheless, Gadamer’s thinking remains essentially “horizontal,” and I use that term 
deliberately, not as a pun, even if that suggestion is inevitable. I think that Gadamer’s thought 
betrays a gentle bias towards the immanent and the mundane. Though this is not a critique per se, 
it can lead to problems of the following sort. Gadamer’s understanding of being’s speaking to one 
and the growth in the understanding of this content is helpful, but it does not take into account 
what we are to do if the message we hear being speak is a decidedly transcendent, metaphysical 
one. If we hear a message being spoken to us through the world but with respect to something 
which exceeds it, Gadamer’s thought will be helpful, but only provisionally. The metaxological 
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quality to this message already indicates that we must engage in thought which is not only 
methodologically and hermeneutically nuanced, but even nuanced in ontological and epistemic 
terms. I believe that Augustine’s ideas can be informative in this respect. 
Let us grant these arguments for a moment ex hypothesi. Even if they are true, you still 
cannot avoid the fact that you are clearly dealing with Gadamer in a way that he does not accept. 
How can you possibly feel justified in appropriating the thought of Gadamer in ways that he 
would never recognise as authentically hermeneutical? Surely your presentation of him has 
reduced him to nothing more than a puppet for your own vicious ventriloquy. 
 Granted, I do intend to appropriate Gadamer’s thought in ways which he would not 
endorse. However, as I see it, my reading is consistent with Gadamer’s thought as it appears in 
writing and as it is logically thought out. As an example of this approach, we can look to Holston, 
who seeks to problematise Gadamer’s notion of prejudice, seeing it deployed in both a normative 
and a descriptive sense.257 Though Gadamer himself argued against such an interpretation, it 
appears that his approach to prejudice includes a normative element. Indeed, according to 
Holston, his hermeneutics requires it in order to be tenable.258 The key question according to 
Holston is whether Gadamer locates in tradition, prejudice, and history a content which ought to 
shape our thinking and behaviour in the here and now. For Holston, Gadamer’s thought essentially 
follows a Burkean trajectory, insofar as tradition is imbued with normative weight on account of 
its record of success and the accrued experience of various persons across time. Hence it should 
influence us in the present.259 Holston proposes to read Gadamer in a Gadamerian way. That is, 
though Gadamer himself disavows any normative intent, that may not be sufficient to solve the 
matter. For as Gadamer himself maintains, the intentio auctoris never exhausts the meaning of a 
text; rather, the Sache is primary and exceeds the author’s own mind.260 Hence one must analyse 
the content of Gadamer’s writing and whether the results conflict with the author’s own 
analysis.261 So paradoxically, I use Gadamer against Gadamer. 
 However, I am not alone in this Gadamerian critique of Gadamer. Other recent scholars 
have argued that the fundamental principles of his thought suggest conclusions other than what 
he himself drew. Even those who are sympathetic to Gadamer’s hermeneutics have been critical 
of his apparent exclusion of a place for a more universal form of reasoning. For example, 
Wachterhauser expresses the concern that the refusal to look for common ground is tantamount 
to ceding to relativism and arbitrariness, where “might makes right.”262 Despite his sympathies 
for Gadamer, Wachterhauser calls into question the complete rejection of any universal character 
to reason. In fact, the latter seems to think that this is necessary, especially if we are to avoid what 
he sees as the inevitable outcome of Gadamer’s programme, namely intellectual impasse which 
gives way to violence and coercion.263 Remarkably, Wachterhauser suggests that hermeneutics, 
rather than overcoming or superseding epistemology, can actually represent a stage in its 
development.264 
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 Your response still raises further questions than it answers. I am particularly concerned 
about the underlying motivation for formulating a dialogue on this specific point, or rather with 
the specific theological figure you choose. If the foregoing argument is correct, then that still does 
not explain why Augustine is in the picture. In other words, my concern is the following: you 
locate a relatively interesting contemporary figure to “colonise,” using him as a puppet for your 
own thought, or even for the thought of someone else, in this case Augustine. Then you marshal 
Gadamer’s authority for different conclusions. One has no choice but to conclude that the 
dialogue between Gadamer and Augustine is ad hoc and unmotivated. 
 An underlying principle of this enquiry is that Gadamer can provide a framework for 
thinking about Augustine’s theology. However, this project is framed in terms of a dialogue, not 
a soliloquy. As other scholars have noted, Christian theology can supplement Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics.265 Gadamer’s thought may have something to say, writes Grondin, about the 
exclusion of the divine and meaning from the “disenchanted” world.266 Nature came to be 
evacuated of its meaning and was no longer seen as a source of intrinsically intelligible content.267 
Gadamer does not revere the “naturalistic fallacy,” but sees the normative as an inherent aspect 
of his hermeneutical conception of reason, insofar as rational enquiry is always directed towards 
practical ends.268 
Grondin and Zimmermann have argued that Gadamer’s hermeneutics requires a broader 
logical framework in order to remain coherent, that a Christian account of creation is the proper 
environment for hermeneutics.269 Grondin frames the question in the following way: “qu’est-ce 
qui nous assure que l’être tel qu’il se présente dans nos interprétations correspond bel et bien à 
l’être lui-même ?”270 Scientific enquiry is a “fiduciary act,”271 but is this faith element justified? 
A Christian hermeneutics, indeed a sapiential hermeneutics, would ground this epistemic faith in 
the “lien primordial” established by the Creator.272 Zimmermann makes the strong claim that  
Gadamer’s hermeneutics only works in a theological context, especially insofar as he places faith 
in reason and the possibility of truth.273 What Zimmermann is suggesting is that Gadamer, 
motivated by a variety of observations, arrives at certain conclusions which, despite their purchase 
and plausibility, require a further element in order to be justified or justifiable, and this element 
happens to be a distinctively religious, theological one. Without this theological grounding, there 
would be no warrant to the claim that we actually uncover truth, or that there is any truth to be 
found in the first place.274 Thus Zimmermann:  
 
Philosophical hermeneutics, then, confesses faith in language and meaning. Unless one is 
satisfied with fideism, with faith in faith, Gadamer’s faith, as I have tried to show, is plausible 
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only in a theological context that can account for this trust in our meaning-making abilities. 
For Augustine faith in meaning is not blind but grounded in the incarnate Word of God. 
Augustine does not believe in a preverbal word either; for him, in a much more concrete and 
yet at the same time more profoundly mystical sense, reality is defined by the divine incarnate 
Logos.275 
 
Christian theology, grounded in a belief in the logical ground of reality, provides the most 
nurturing context for hermeneutics.276 Indeed, Zimmermann sees it as no accident that some of 
Gadamer’s most fundamental ideas are shaped by Christian theology, especially Augustine,277 as 
his own hermeneutics is grounded in a theology of creation.278 
However, I am not sure it is fair to Gadamer to criticise him for not pursuing a line of 
enquiry which is not his stated aim. Pace Zimmermann, it is not clear why Gadamer would need 
to respond to such a dialectic. Instead of claiming that hermeneutics only makes sense within the 
context of a Christian worldview, a more modest proposal would be to claim that these two 
systems of thought can engage in a constructive exchange on common points of interest. The 
difference in approaches of these two thinkers provides an interesting meeting point for a 
contribution from Augustine. Indeed, the sustained discussion of sapientia and creation in the 
early part of this study can now assume a new significance. Gadamer provides an account of how 
we think and interact with the world at a fundamental level. Augustine provides a plausible way 
of thinking about what would be required for Gadamer’s view to make sense. The result is a 
fruitful locus for exchange between these two very different figures on a topic which overlaps 
with their respective interests. This observation shall serve as the basis for the third and final part 
of this study, in which I discuss how the insights derived from Augustinian sapientia and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics may be further developed and applied. 
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TERTIA PARS 
A SAPIENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL THEOLOGY 
 
This entire enquiry has been framed in terms of two themes, which I envision as related 
asymmetrically, namely the principal and the gradual, respectively. These represent two integrally 
related facets of human knowing, as well as aspects of how being reveals itself to the mind. 
Having identified these elements in the thought of both Augustine and Gadamer, I am prepared 
to implement the insights derived from the foregoing investigations and apply them to a 
constructive theological project. But first, let me briefly summarise the results thus far. 
In the first section I discussed Augustine’s notion of sapientia and some of the key points 
of epistemic significance which follow from it. Augustine understands sapientia primarily as the 
Wisdom of God, Christ, through whom the world is created and re-created. This understanding 
of creation is important for knowledge insofar as the created universe reflects the mind of God, 
and hence truth itself. In virtue of being created to the image of God, we are endowed with a 
rational capacity to perceive and interrogate this order present in the world. However, we are 
hindered in this progress by the two-fold obstruction of sin and ignorance, the latter of which 
could be broadly understood as the finitude of our creaturely status. This juxtaposition of finitude 
with transcendence provides the focal point for certain reflections on the nature of knowledge 
throughout Augustine’s oeuvre. Grounded in a biblical theology of the incorporeality and the 
eternity of the divine Word, Augustine is compelled to make sense of how we can know the 
timeless in and through time, and how we can see the visible vestiges of the invisible Creator. 
The upshot is a theory of knowledge which, though ultimately grounded in an eternal source of 
intelligibility, nonetheless takes great account of human finitude and knowledge in time and 
space. 
In the second section, I addressed Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, explaining how 
the specifically ontological construal thereof is highly significant for theories of knowledge. The 
major point which one must understand is that for Gadamer, hermeneutics is intended as a 
description of the way we interact with the world. Hermeneutics is therefore universal in the sense 
that we perceive things as questionable, as capable of being investigated and understood. This 
implies a hermeneutical sensibility which cannot be reduced to Cartesian representationalism. 
Furthermore, I have sought to clarify the oft-quoted if seldom understood saying by Gadamer 
concerning the meaning of language. What Gadamer means by language is not so much what we 
generally consider language. Rather, that which is intelligible and presents itself to our rational 
minds as such is already “language.” Furthermore, this linguistic and intelligible content imposes 
itself on us and through our rational reflection is instantiated in our spoken language; being 
realises itself through us. In a sense, therefore, being speaks to us, and we are “spoken” by the 
world around us. Such a conception of the human rational agent as “passive” with respect to 
rational enquiry is a challenging one, not to mention how one can truly understand what being is 
saying to one in this epistemic event. 
 The discussion of Gadamer’s “ontological turn” in hermeneutics prepared the way for a 
more profound re-reading of the fundamentals of his thought, in particular as concerns Vorurteil, 
horizon, and the hermeneutical circle. Though reading a text provides a paradigmatic example for 
the hermeneutical process, one must always keep in mind that it is meant to describe a much more 
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fundamental reality, namely the way we carry on in the world. I concluded this section by 
discussing some of the critiques of Gadamer’s work in its reception and appropriation, especially 
in theological and philosophical circles. The essential point was that in order for Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics to maintain its coherence, it must be grounded in a metaphysics of sapientia, that 
is, a theology of creation, in which the world is endowed with intrinsic order by an infinite mind. 
Otherwise we would have no reason to trust the hermeneutical process or its results. The upshot 
is a reversal of the familiar charge of “fideism.” 
The modern dispensation posits a world evacuated of meaning, in which sheer 
geometrical measurement suffices for the discovery of truth. This action takes place in one 
direction: man himself initiates an interrogation of nature and compels it to disclose its secrets. 
Moreover, these facts are assumed to fit within a “finite” framework; the place of transcendence 
or anything immaterial is precluded a priori. What Augustine’s theory of knowledge suggests, 
and what Gadamer helps us to think in a contemporary idiom, is that one can never truly separate 
the “empirical” from the “intentional” or the “normative.” Moreover, in contrast to the habitués 
of a post-Cartesian outlook, Augustine does not see immanence and transcendence as absolutely 
opposed; rather, immanent material reality provides a locus for the realisation of transcendence. 
The upshot of this synthesis of Gadamer and Augustine is a sapiential-hermeneutical theology. 
Now we arrive at the challenge to think of the universe as text-like and how it may be 
read and interpreted hermeneutically. We have seen how two different roads converge on and 
intersect at this common point. We have seen how Augustine’s understanding of sapientia leads 
one to an appreciation of the intelligibility of the universe and its capacity to communicate that 
content to us. Creation becomes a summons, an invitation, something which calls and addresses 
one in virtue of its formation in sapientia. The concern at this point is whether a constructive 
project in the present day would find a solid scientific basis. In other words, would taking this 
Augustinian approach be simply ad hoc? Could such a strategy be independently motivated?1 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy provides warrant to answer the latter question in 
the affirmative. He brings us to a similar point, beginning from a non-theistic, independent track. 
In other words, from Gadamer we find an independent motivation for thinking of the universe as 
text-like, and a contemporary idiom for thinking of Augustine’s theory of knowledge today. So 
the search for a point of contact between Augustine and Gadamer in the hopes of developing a 
dialogue and setting a foundation for a new look at Augustine’s theory of knowledge has been, I 
argue, successful. Following Schumacher’s proposal, I investigated Gadamer as a figure whose 
thought could provide opportunities for a contemporary reception of Augustine’s theology. Now 
the task is to take this dialogue a step forward and develop a constructive theological programme. 
In general, this theory of knowledge balances two aspects of the reasoning process which 
must be held together. In Augustine’s theory of knowledge I identified two major currents which, 
though related, are nonetheless distinct. One is what I called the “principal” sense of knowledge. 
This pertains to one’s basic capacity for reason, which one possesses in virtue of being created to 
the image of God. The term principal, in addition to indicating conceptual priority, also evokes 
the link with creation in principio: the world is created in sapientia and reflects its origin, which 
one can perceive not by a bodily sense but by the mind and reason. However, Augustine also 
speaks about reason and knowledge in gradual terms. We are obstructed from perceiving truth by 
                                                          
1 The formulation of these two questions is indebted to P. Ebert. 
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various limitations, in particular sin, whether original or personal, and general ignorance or 
finitude. Both of these can be overcome, but it requires effort, time, and especially assistance. 
Augustine also speaks of the necessity of a proper orientation in order to apprehend truth. Our 
creaturely status frames our knowledge in certain ways, and also means that our acquisition of 
knowledge always admits of the possibility of being deepened as long as we are still in this life. 
As I see it, these two major themes are also present in Gadamer’s thought, though in less 
obvious ways. The argument is not that there is a direct correspondence, but rather a resonance 
and a mutual relation. This would not be terribly surprising, given that Gadamer was certainly 
familiar with Augustine’s thought, as we have seen. As for the principal sense, Gadamer wishes 
to speak about the universal character of hermeneutics, in particular the shared relationship each 
thinking person has to the world, a relationship realised in the form of prejudices and one’s 
horizon. With the hermeneutical consciousness, one is able to perceive the intelligible content of 
the world which summons one to further investigation. This leads to a gradual hermeneutical 
engagement with a content. One must work continuously to arrive at truth which, due to our 
finitude, is never a completely accomplished task. Moreover, Gadamer speaks of prejudices as 
potentially obstructive to one’s growth in knowledge. These can and in some cases must be 
overcome. 
In terms of the overarching history of knowledge, one could associate the term “principal” 
with an emphasis on universality, neutrality, commonality, and immateriality. The “gradual” on 
the other hand pertains to contingency, lack of uniformity, progress and regress, and finite 
situated-ness. Again, to speak in broad strokes, the principal sense more clearly aligns with a post-
Cartesian epistemology, one which posits a universal capacity for reason which can lead to 
consistent and clear results.2 The postmodern reaction to modernity aligns more closely with the 
gradual sense, insofar as the postmodern mind fixates on particularity, difference, and limitation.3 
Rather than representing mutually exclusive options, I believe that these two tendencies could be 
seen as admitting of a deeper consistency and inter-digitation. In fact, given the limitations which 
have been well documented with respect to modernity, and some of the extreme iterations of a 
postmodern consciousness, a great virtue of a theory of knowledge would be to balance both of 
these aspects of human thinking and knowing. I believe that in its essential form this is what we 
have in both Augustine and Gadamer, a point which is not surprising, considering that Gadamer 
was deeply informed by the wisdom of the ancients, and put this insight to use in his reaction 
against Modernity, and in this way was a disciple of Heidegger. Furthermore, I believe that we 
could see both modern and postmodern tendencies as contained within premodern thought in 
some form or other.4 This is certainly the case with respect to Augustine, for whom reason is a 
universal human capacity, although individual persons differ in their individual exercise thereof. 
Both thinkers also imply or even present outright a nuanced view of vision. The post-
Cartesian world has conceived of vision and reason in terms of foundationalism and picture 
thinking, according to which we construct ever more accurate images based on the outside world 
                                                          
2 Cf. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 36. 
3 For more on the differences between the modern and the postmodern, see Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 
31-5, 171-5. 
4 Here I am informed by the ideas of A. MacIntyre, R. Brague, and to a lesser extent B. Gregory, all of whom 
in their own ways claim that we never totally left the middle ages behind, especially insofar as particular concepts 
which were at home in a mediaeval dispensation were extracted from the context which made them intelligible. This is 
the dynamic I see at work with respect to theories of knowledge. 
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around us. There is no longer any organic link between our minds and the objects to which they 
are responsive. In a world evacuated of meaning and value, intentional or normative properties 
cannot be seen or empirically detected. However, a significant amount of scholarship in different 
fields has critiqued this view, arguing essentially that it is impossible completely to separate the 
normative and the descriptive in reality, and likewise in our sense of vision. Augustine explicitly 
discusses this point in a variety of locations. The key catalyst for this reflection is a theology of 
creation: how can we see the vestiges of the incorporeal God in created reality? How can we be 
said to see the God who is invisible and unseen, even though this vision is promised to us in the 
scriptures? An analogous question can be raised with respect to the Incarnation, namely how one 
can see and yet not see God in the person of Christ. Gadamer’s own take on vision begins with 
his understanding of the questioning mind: The capacity to “see” the intelligible content and to 
give it definition with respect to reality as a whole implies a sense of vision which is not “merely” 
empirical, but rather includes a sense in which certain intentional properties are instantiated in the 
world around one. A careful study of Augustine and Gadamer compels us to re-evaluate the 
concept of vision itself as it pertains to reason. The key point of significance is that I believe that 
this problematised understanding of vision and sight also promises us a way of thinking about the 
possibility of transcendence within immanence, a way of viewing the finite and the infinite not as 
mutually exclusive but as, in certain ways, co-extensive. 
A shocking claim from the perspective of modernity is that knowledge acquisition is 
partially passive. Gadamer’s discussion of the historically effected consciousness is related to this 
point, but I think we can dig even deeper. Invoking the classical views of the earliest philosophers, 
Gadamer conceives of knowledge as something which is adventitious to one, which imposes itself 
on one. Being speaks to the mind, and the growth in knowledge is first and foremost something 
which the mind “suffers” from outwith. Truth emerges within one in the form of a question, which 
is directed at a particular object which is given further definition by the hermeneutically attuned 
rational mind. Investigation begins as the result of a summons from the speaking of the world. In 
this way the hermeneutical endeavour overall can be understood as dynamic, reciprocal, 
conversational, and dialogical. Augustine too wants to maintain an essential aspect of the 
heteronomy of knowledge, that we are led to know just as much as we discover things under our 
own powers. In fact, for Augustine, the human search for truth is doomed to failure if it is 
undertaken on our own powers, a thought which finds resonances in Gadamer. Similarly, 
attentiveness and an attitude of acceptance towards being is crucial. Drawing on both Augustine 
and Gadamer, I endeavour to show how one might think of the human rational subject as 
implicated in a dynamic movement to truth, in interpreting and reading the textual “fabric of the 
cosmos” (B. Greene’s term). Such sensitivity to the created world requires a nuanced mind-set, 
the esprit de finesse, the disposition which Michael Fishbane has elegantly encapsulated with the 
felicitous term “attunement.” 
 Once we have become attuned to the speaking of being, have situated ourselves 
appropriately, what do we hear it saying? One of the major points which Augustine notes is that 
being speaks its dependence on God and his creative activity; being speaks of its finitude. 
Finitude? The term pushes us back on ourselves. We are led to reflect and recognise our 
limitations, the way in which we are situated in a variety of ways, which we shall enumerate 
presently. All of this sounds like what Gadamer says regarding the suspension of judgement with 
respect to prejudices in the hermeneutical process. One discovers one’s prejudices in the very act 
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of interpretation. Previously one had not seen them. Human finitude comes to be understood as a 
meta-prejudice, as a feature of our being which both provides us with a standpoint for viewing 
reality, but also conceals and obfuscates our view of this same reality. This “ontologisation” of 
Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil is placed in dialogue with Augustine’s attempt to overcome or 
counteract the distending effects of time in the conf. My claim is that in passages such as these, 
Augustine shows a profound and vatic awareness of and appreciation for human finitude and the 
epistemic implications thereof. For Augustine, human finitude is realised in extension, and all 
human knowledge is situated within time and space, within the corporeal, created world. Hence 
our ontological-epistemic prejudices are those of time and space. Even if we can never fully 
jettison our prejudices, Gadamer suggests methods and means for counteracting their disabling 
effects, and Augustine provides resources for thinking about how prejudices of a more 
fundamental nature might be mitigated. The upshot is to recognise and challenge our “ontological 
prejudice” of finitude, realised in our spatio-temporal experience of the world. By confronting the 
Sache of reality around us, we are led to conclude that true knowledge consists in thinking beyond 
our four-dimensional frame of reference, and indeed, beyond that of “postulatory finitism” itself. 
We strive to think in five-dimensional terms, viewing the four-dimensional world of our existence 
from a meta-dimension,5 all the while cognisant that the fullness of Truth admits of no 
dimensional nature whatsoever. 
Augustine and Gadamer can basically agree that the ultimate measurement of truth and 
knowledge is not the acquisition of sheer facts, data, and information. Rather, some interpretive 
element is required to make these individual data meaningful.6 More remarkable still is the view 
that our predispositions have a certain effect on the facts we do or do not perceive. There is no 
such thing as “just the facts” on this view. One’s prior assumptions influence what one sees or 
does not see, and therefore what one knows and how one develops or fails to develop in 
knowledge. This is not to say that our assumptions are fixed and non-negotiable, or that we are 
bound to them. Rather, our assumptions are tried in the crucible of hermeneutical experience, and 
adjusted appropriately. But the capacity to do so requires a clarity of mind and a humility of spirit 
which transcends the mere boundaries of “intellect” as it is understood today. If we take seriously 
what Augustine and Gadamer have to say, then we also have to think very carefully about a notion 
of knowledge which includes and even prizes detachment and neutrality.  
What we have here are two thinkers, different to be sure, but who nonetheless advocate 
theories according to which being speaks to us, it summons and calls us, and we learn more about 
it and grow in truth when we investigate and interrogate it further. Augustine provides a 
theological ground for thinking about knowledge in nuanced and challenging ways, and Gadamer 
provides, among other things, an independent and non-theistic motivation for some of the 
conclusions and claims Augustine ventures. Gadamer also provides a compelling contemporary 
                                                          
5 I am grateful to M. Lamberigts for this insight. 
6 In other fields there is an awareness of how information and facts require some form of an interpretive 
process in order to become meaningful. As J. Hautala and J. Jauhiainen write, “Interpretation transforms information, 
or a chain of marks or a product, into meaningful and applicable knowledge.” Johanna Hautala and Jussi S. Jauhiainen, 
“Spatio-temporal Processes of Knowledge Creation,” Research Policy 43 (2014): 655-68, here 657, and Thomas H. 
Davenport and Laurence Krusak, Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1998), 2-6. See also Marcos Alexandre Alves, “Da hermeneutica filosofica a hermeneutica da 
educacao,” Acta Scientiarum:Education 33.1 (2011): 17-28. 
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idiom for thinking about knowledge and reason in ways which upset the divisions of modern, 
premodern, and postmodern. 
The result therefore is that we are led to think of the world in interpretive, dialogical 
terms. We must learn to “read” this “text” of nature, written in the language of sapientia, and 
apply Gadamer’s hermeneutical principles to this interpretation, which is really to say to apply 
them to our rational lives. In this third and final part of my enquiry, I shall hazard a constructive 
theological project, in which I synthesise Augustine’s thinking on sapientia with Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. Augustine will again be the major source, but now, instead of treating 
of the content under an historical-critical aspect, my approach will be more systematic and 
constructive in nature, reading his texts with a view to their “theological generativity.”7 Hence I 
shall look to expand upon Augustine’s ideas, formulating my own arguments, grounded in the 
text itself. What I shall suggest in the closing pages of this enquiry is that an account of the 
universe suggested by a sapiential-hermeneutical theology possesses superior explanatory 
capacity to those which conceive of the world as devoid of meaning and value. 
Before beginning the third part in earnest, it is important to have a sense of what 
“hermeneutical theology” actually means, as it is this sort of endeavour in which I seek to engage. 
In this day and age, an important task for theology is to find an alternative to the 
framework of objectivism as opposed to relativism.8 A major motivation for theologians to 
examine hermeneutics is that it promises an alternative to an objectivism which evacuates the 
world of meaning and a relativism which evacuates it of truth.9 In my estimation, a great virtue 
of hermeneutics as applied to theology is that it allows for a balancing of the two elements to 
reason, the principal and the gradual. For reasons such as these, theologians have looked to 
hermeneutics for inspiration.10 For example, F. Lawrence and R. Williams both advocate an 
“integral Christian hermeneutics,” according to which human reason tout court is construed as 
fides quaerens intellectum.11 In my estimation, theology can learn crucial lessons from and even 
advance and further elaborate the concept of hermeneutical universality. In this respect, 
Zimmermann calls on theologians “to embrace the hermeneutical nature of our existence.”12 
Zimmermann believes that for theological hermeneutics to be successful, it must be grounded in 
a notion of truth as interpretation,13 and in this respect describes Gadamer’s programme as the 
best hope for grounding a contemporary theological hermeneutics.14 Theology’s approach to this 
                                                          
7 See Ticciati, A New Apophaticism, 10. 
8 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 164. 
9 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 161. I derive inspiration here from the thought of 
R. Bernstein. 
10 A. Fortin-Melkevik identifies three basic questions at the heart of hermeneutical theology, namely (i) the 
relation between text and meaning; (ii) the way in which history figures in facilitating or preventing access to such 
meaning; and (iii) the extent to which the reader influences the meaning of a particular text. Furthermore, the differences 
between the hermeneutical and the narrative approaches to theology, respectively, consist in the fact that the former 
prizes history and diachronicity as conditions for understanding doctrine and sacred texts, whereas the latter focuses 
more on synchronic readings. The differences between the hermeneutical and the narrative approaches to theology, 
respectively, consist in the fact that the former prizes history and diachronicity as conditions for understanding doctrine 
and sacred texts, whereas the latter focuses more on synchronic readings. See Fortin-Melkevik, “Le rapport de la 
théologie aux sciences humaines,” 224. 
11 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 185. 
12 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 165. 
13 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 161. 
14 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 179, 183. 
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field is distinctive in that it relates the philosophical construal of hermeneutics to the centre of the 
Christian mysteries,15 encouraging one to conceive of Christianity as a particular framework for 
understanding human finitude and its being-in-the-world.16 
In his Sacred Attunement, Fishbane engages in a hermeneutical-theological enquiry 
guided by the Jewish theological tradition and the Torah. According to Fishbane, hermeneutical 
theology by definition finds its source in scripture and life experience.17 Moses’ teaching 
represents a hermeneutical communication of the Torah.18 As a result of his theophanic encounter, 
Moses was called to “embody” to some extent the infinite being of God.19 The search for truth is 
viewed in holistic terms. The source for Moses’ announcement of the Torah on Sinai was a 
profound experience of the Godhead which began with different sounds invested with meaning, 
or rather the experience of the sounds enabled a meaning to be communicated, a content which 
was expressed non-linguistically. Moses experienced sounds beyond language, then put them into 
a coherent linguistic account, itself rooted in God’s torah kelulah.20 Indeed, in its normative sense, 
the Torah is the eternal utterance of God’s holy name.21 In the Decalogue, Moses draws upon his 
own ineffable experience of the divine in order to articulate in language a truth which applies to 
human affairs, a truth which he has received from God.22 In the holistic hermeneutical encounter 
with truth, one is enabled to bridge the gap between transcendence and immanence. One engages 
one’s very person with the text in question: “It is only when the textual content is humanly 
appropriated as a living truth of existence that our own life fills out its exegetical challenge and 
possibility. Then the scriptural text offers models of theological living, of life lived in the context 
of God, and we live a citation-centered existence.”23 Reflection on experience is informed by and 
in turn informs our reading of scripture.24 The prayerful reading of scripture provides the occasion 
for being opened to transcendence.25 A hermeneutical encounter with a particular text, Fishbane 
writes, offers us a glimpse of “deeper perceptions of life.”26 One sees the same thing under a 
different aspect or in a more informed way, allowing one to perceive what is already there. One 
must become like a desert in order to receive the Torah, which is to say that one must empty 
oneself and engage in a heroic exercise of spiritual poverty.27 This is why Moses and the people 
received the Torah in the desert. Once one has received the Torah as one’s own, one must proceed 
through a process of continuous growth and ascent to full knowledge of the Torah.28 “Hence the 
task of a hermeneutical theology is to interpret sacred scripture in ways that sharpen our religious 
                                                          
15 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 165. 
16 Fortin-Melkevik, “Le rapport de la théologie aux sciences humaines,” 225. 
17 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 63. 
18 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 47-8. 
19 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 58. 
20 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 99. 
21 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 61. 
22 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 58. 
23 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 63. 
24 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 63. 
25 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 64. 
26 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 63. 
27 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 148. 
28 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 147. 
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awareness for the sake of a God-centered life, and to allow our reinterpreted lives to disclose ever-
wider and deeper spiritual realities of God’s torah kelulah.”29 
Although God’s covenant contains a social element, this relies upon the personal 
acceptance and enacting of the covenant by individuals.30 The Torah becomes “real” or is “real-
ised” in individual human persons.31 Divine reality in a sense depends upon the free response of 
human agents.32 As Fishbane pithily expresses this point, “[the text] is dependent on us, for the 
text does not speak by itself; and we are dependent on it, for the text is not our own speech.”33 
Here we see Fishbane echoing what Gadamer calls the speculative character of hermeneutics. We 
have a crucial role to play in the continuous instantiation and realisation of God’s eternal Torah 
on earth.34 By performing good actions enjoined by scripture, we provide a point from which 
something of the divine may be manifest in our world.35 We are even given the tremendous 
privilege of being able to counteract by our theologically active lives the damage done to reality 
by evil, as the world is itself saturated with the divine life.36 
One’s attentiveness to being, in disclosing something of ineffable meaning, is 
simultaneously realised as an individual summons or call.37 Living in a way which is responsive 
and attentive to God involves a transformation of the self.38 One must internalise the Torah, 
Fishbane writes, and meditate upon it, the result of which will be personal transformation. The 
Torah must become central to one’s entire life.39 The fulfilment of God’s word is ultimately a 
hermeneutical task, realised in the activity of the faithful.40 Fishbane exhorts one to a life 
characterised by hishtavut, which denotes the mode of life which is truly theological. This spirit 
is based on one’s attunement to the world as a divine gift, and the way in which we receive it and 
are receivers before anything else.41 Our recognition of this truth begins at the empirical level, 
which yields deeper divine dimensions veiled within it to the one who is spiritually attuned.42 For 
Fishbane, embodiment is deified, as gestures and bodily dispositions come to be seen as so many 
interpretive instantiations of the infinitely variable divine life.43 “Becoming ever attuned to the 
alphabet of creation,” writes Fishbane, “for the sake of serving God’s creative happenings, is the 
ultimate aim of hermeneutical theology.”44 
 Now we are prepared to see how I take this specific methodology as a point of departure 
and apply it in my own way to the dialogue of Augustine and Gadamer. 
 
 
                                                          
29 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 64. 
30 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 55. 
31 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 51-2. 
32 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 54. 
33 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 71. 
34 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 203. 
35 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 208-9. 
36 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 208-9. 
37 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 54. 
38 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102. 
39 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 48-9. 
40 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 208-9. 
41 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 206. 
42 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 206. 
43 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102. 
44 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 64. 
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7. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A SAPIENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL 
THEOLOGY 
AN INTERROGATIVE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
7.1 STATUS QUAESTIONIS 
 
The task of this section is to situate my constructive enquiry both in its historical and its 
systematic context. With respect to the former, I discuss the notion of the “book of nature” and 
its subsequent decline over the centuries, an intellectual development directly linked to 
theological understandings of God’s transcendence. This will allow us to see the particular 
novelty of attempts by philosophers and systematic theologians to rehabilitate a notion of the 
world as imbued with meaning and engaged in a conversation with the human knower. Then I 
shall identify and discuss certain particular contemporary scholars whose work will serve as a 
model for my own. 
 
7.1.1 Historical 
 
In her 1995 article on the reception history of the analogy of nature and scripture, W. 
Otten discusses the foundations, the history, and the eventual decline of this analogy. She looks 
first and foremost to Augustine’s De doctrina christiana as a basis for the understanding of nature 
as analogous to a text. In this work, Augustine takes the radically novel step of identifying both 
words and things as potentially significant, that is, as signs which point to a greater reality, namely 
the triune God.1 Augustine’s oeuvre yields similar ideas in a variety of other works, such as the 
latter three books of his Confessiones, in which he treats of Genesis and the creation of the world, 
and thus the universe as reflecting not simply the being, but even the goodness and the glory of 
its Creator.2 
In her article, Otten continues briefly to trace the reception history of this theme through 
figures such as Dionysius the Areopagite and Scotus Eriugena.3 As Otten notes, Scripture itself 
provides a basis for supposing that one can discern vestiges of God in creation.4 Following this 
tradition, mediaeval theologians too saw Scripture and Creation as two complementary ways in 
which God reveals himself.5 Creation therefore served as a sort of alternative testament to the 
pagans, to whom God was speaking in a certain way through the world. However, towards the 
end of the middle ages, according to Otten, the understanding of nature as analogous to a text 
became gradually attenuated. Small but significant theological shifts of the late middle ages laid 
a foundation for the “disenchantment” that followed in the early modern period.6 It was around 
this time, according to B. Gregory, that the tendency to understand the divine as somehow still 
                                                          
1 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 261. For more on this theme, see Susannah Ticciati, A New Apophaticism: 
Augustine and the Redemption of Signs, Studies in Systematic Theology 14 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013). 
2 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 261. 
3 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 261-2. 
4 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 262. 
5 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 262-3. 
6 Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 264ff. 
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located “within” our universe originated,7 thinking as though God were spatial,8 and thus 
succumbing to a “univocal metaphysics.”9 As Gregory writes, the implication is that “the 
‘spiritual’ presence of God is itself being conceived in spatial or quasi-spatial terms.”10 As the 
theologian V. Austin pithily explains this point, “God is not a being (amongst beings) but the 
cause of all beings.”11 In his divine nature, God is not a “type” of thing which could be compared 
with other sorts of things, and thereby exclude the possibility of being present to and within the 
created order.12 God cannot be located as a (type of) cause alongside other factors within the 
universe; rather, it is his divine providence which is the very fundamental condition of the 
possibility of intelligibility and causality.13 This theological understanding of God’s creative 
activity helps to explain Augustine’s apophatic reflex, an aspect of his theology which, as S. 
Ticciati rightly notes, is about far more than simply saying No.14 The result is a subtle but 
significant reduction of God to exercising a causal role within the universe itself, as opposed to 
“beyond” it,15 such that one loses the notion of creation ex nihilo. For example, the philosopher 
D. Dennett discusses, critiques, and rejects the notion of God as a sort of “craftsman,” a notion 
which on Gregory’s view does not correspond to that of Genesis.16 
Gregory looks to Protestantism as a major source of the decline of the idea of nature as 
imbued with vestiges of its divine author, in particular through its rejection of ecclesial 
sacraments, but even more so, a notion of God as capable of being known through the natural 
world.17 In other words, the decline of the analogy between nature and scripture represents, in 
Gregory’s words, the overcoming of the “sacramental view of reality.”18 A further implication 
which Gregory identifies as arising within 19th century theological circles is the bifurcation of the 
sciences, according to which the empirical sciences increasingly come to be seen as the realm of 
the cognitive, that is, the objective, fact-based, and univocal, whereas matters pertaining to 
religion were considered non-cognitive, that is, merely concerning emotion, feelings, and 
ineffable thoughts.19 
The upshot of this episode in the history of ideas is that being comes to be seen as 
disenchanted, as dumb and inert, upon which man imposes a grid in order to elicit understanding. 
There is no longer an “overdetermined” charge of value and meaning which is discovered in the 
world, or which imposes itself upon us. The search for truth becomes one of a monologue, an 
evaluation of material which of itself does not speak to the human knower. 
 
 7.1.2 Systematic 
 
                                                          
7 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 45; cf. conf. 12.7.7. 
8 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 67. 
9 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 64. 
10 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 43. 
11 Austin, Up with Authority, 13; cf. Ibid., 10-13. 
12 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 42-3. 
13 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 67. 
14 Ticciati, A New Apophaticism, 25-6. 
15 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 43. 
16 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 67-8. 
17 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 41. 
18 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 66 (cf. n. 128). 
19 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 65. 
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Despite the disappearance of an analogy between nature and scripture, recent thinkers 
have revisited this idea from a variety of perspectives. Within the last three decades, three major 
monographs have appeared on this subject. The common denominator amongst these works is 
that each of them develops a constructive philosophy or theology according to which one 
advances in knowledge, in particular knowledge of God, by means of a sort of dialogue with or 
hermeneutical investigation of the natural world, not simply for its own sake, but as a sign of the 
transcendent within the immanent realm. The first of these is Jean-Louis Chrétien’s L’appel et la 
réponse,20 in which this phenomenologist, drawing upon various historical sources, not least of 
all Augustine, construes one’s philosophical encounter with reality in terms of a dialogue of the 
mind with beauty itself as it is instantiated in the world, yet always pointing to something which 
exceeds it. Michael Fishbane’s Sacred Attunement21 represents an attempt to bring Jewish 
theology into the present day. Though his method is hermeneutical, it is one which does not 
primarily depart from Gadamer or other contemporary figures, but rather takes its cue from the 
Jewish tradition, especially the multi-faceted torah, which forms the substantive basis of his 
thought. Mats Wahlberg draws upon contemporary analytic philosophy in order to develop a 
constructive theological approach to nature as creation.22 Wahlberg wishes to recover an account 
of the world expressed by and grounded in sources such as Romans 1:20, according to which the 
fact of creation by God is obvious (his term) on the basis of the highly complex properties endemic 
to the world.23 
I situate my own work with respect to the foregoing three monographs in particular. My 
approach is distinctive insofar as it is (i) grounded in patristic theology, namely Augustine’s 
doctrine of sapientia; (ii) developed primarily according to a hermeneutical method as found in 
Gadamer; and (iii) designed to complement and confront a contemporary scientific picture of 
reality and to challenge our fundamental “ontological” prejudices with respect to the world. These 
three aspects of the following enquiry will serve to provide meaningful articulation to what it 
could mean to “read” the world. Furthermore, my contribution, both in terms of content and 
method, can provide an enriching complement to these fine pieces of scholarly work, which have 
informed my own approach to this question in crucial ways. As Chrétien and Fishbane will 
                                                          
20 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, passim. In this context, ethics may have a contribution to make as well, 
insofar as ethicists are always engaged in a hermeneutical enquiry which takes into account abstract principles and 
particular circumstances and situations. 
21 Michael Fishbane, Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). See also: Willemien Otten, “On ‘Sacred Attunement,’ its Meaning and Consequences: A Meditation on 
Christian Theology,” The Journal of Religion 93.4 (Oct 2013): 478-94; H. Tirosh-Samuelson and A. W. Hughes (eds.), 
Michael Fishbane: Jewish Hermeneutical Theology, Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers 14 (Leiden: Brill, 
2015); and David Vincent Meconi, SJ (ed.), On Earth as it is in Heaven: Cultivating a Contemporary Theology of 
Creation, Catholic Theological Formation Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016); W. Norris Clarke, Person and 
Being, The Aquinas Lecture 57 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993). 
22 Mats Wahlberg, Reshaping Natural Theology: Seeing Nature as Creation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). See 
also James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000). 
23 Wahlberg, Reshaping Natural Theology, 1-2. Wahlberg is not a “creationist” in the sense that he believes 
that an account of the development of human life, for instance, in evolutionary terms is false and incompatible with a 
theological account of creation. Indeed, one of the main tasks of his monograph is to disabuse his audience of the false 
dichotomy between “creation” on the one hand and “evolution” on the other. He also rejects “intelligent design” theory. 
See, for example, Wahlberg, Reshaping Natural Theology, 181: “Today, however, we know that God did not build 
organisms by ‘hands-on-design.’” See also ibid., 1-2, 12, 181, 188. 
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provide models for this part of my enquiry, let us take a brief look at the fundamental positions 
they adopt.24 
 
7.1.2.1 Chrétien on the call and the response of beauty 
 
 Chrétien’s work possesses a certain Augustinian quality, and this philosopher is deeply 
informed by the bishop of Hippo. Like Augustine, Chrétien believes that the inner senses do not 
respond to the same logic as those of the body.25 Hence there is a holistic character to the call of 
beauty, which is addressed to the entire person.26 He also wonders whether there is a voice interior 
to our own voice, which sounds in our mind apart from any of our own input, something like a 
conscience.27 Furthermore, Chrétien cites Augustine when he writes that the forms which provide 
the basis of the world’s intelligible structure speak to one, making themselves known.28 Chrétien 
is intrigued in particular by Augustine’s discussion in the tenth book of conf., in which the latter 
recalls how he found himself in dialogue with the created world. One of the ways in which nature 
speaks for Augustine is in its “apophatic” or negative response, namely that it is not God.29 That 
is, creatures speak their finitude and their dependence on the Creator. However, Chrétien’s 
historical interest extends well beyond Augustine. For instance, he also discusses how Philo of 
Alexandria interprets the deeds of God in Ex 20:18 as words of a kind, such that one could “read” 
or “interpret” these actions.30  
Though Chrétien is primarily engaged in phenomenology, his work has a certain 
resonance with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. For him we are always already engaged in the world 
whenever we speak.31 We do not respond unless first addressed.32 In articulating this notion of 
the interplay of call and response, Chrétien dedicates a significant amount of his monograph to 
beauty, noting that the Platonic tradition understands beauty as a call to the soul.33 We are able to 
identify something as beautiful, Chrétien writes, when we are engaged in a dialogue with it, a 
dialogue initiated by the call of the beautiful itself.34 For Chrétien, beauty calls to us and addresses 
us; it is the truly “visible voice.”35 This initial summons from beauty begins a dialogue between 
the world’s beauty and the human mind. Indeed, this is a truly reciprocal engagement, and not 
merely a monologue.36 The significance of this notion of a summons is that it calls us to some 
form of activity. Even if we first encounter the beautiful as an experience or an event, we cannot 
remain passive. Rather, we must interrogate beautiful objects.37 In this way we truly participate 
                                                          
24 Because the work of Wahlberg is not as immediately pertinent to my own, I shall not deal at length with 
him in this chapter. 
25 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 12. 
26 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 11. 
27 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 12. Our interior voice would only be interior with respect to that of our 
body. Hence we ourselves represent a dialogue with our bodies. 
28 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 48-9; ciu. 11.27.2. 
29 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 46; conf. 10.6.9. 
30 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 52-3. 
31 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 9. 
32 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 9. 
33 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 11. 
34 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 11. 
35 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 47-8. 
36 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 47-8. 
37 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 47-8. 
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in the dialogue with the world. As Chrétien writes, “Les choses mêmes nous appellent et nous 
invitent à les interroger. Leur beauté appelle en répondant et répond en appelant.”38 One of the 
key messages communicated to us is the overabundant beauty of the origin of natural things, 
displayed in their apparent excess.39 We shall return to this work in due course, as it offers a 
helpful view on the topic of questioning. 
 
7.1.2.2 Fishbane’s contemporary re-appropriation of the PaRDeS 
 
We can also glean certain lessons for a hermeneutical theology from Michael Fishbane, 
who has sought to construct a specifically Jewish hermeneutical theology, grounded in the Torah. 
Fishbane views hermeneutics as integral to the tradition of Jewish theology, in particular in its 
attempt to negotiate the dialectic between God’s infinitude and the implications thereof for human 
life with the exigencies of new contexts and situations. In other words, grounded in a fundamental 
awareness of the relevance of the transcendent, ineffable God to quotidian human existence, one 
must seek to understand how the Torah is applicable in circumstances not explicitly addressed by 
Moses or other earlier figures.40 I shall provide here a fairly substantive treatment of Fishbane, 
motivated by the following reasons. For one, Fishbane’s insights and arguments often parallel, 
complement, or enhance points which I am making. Secondly, Fishbane is engaged specifically 
in hermeneutical theology, a method which I also wish to espouse. Thirdly, Fishbane also grounds 
himself in the sapiential tradition, albeit from the Hebrew Bible. (As we have seen, Augustine has 
engaged with the sapiential tradition in a variety of ways as well.) I see a fundamental link 
between Fishbane’s work and my own, insofar as we both engage in a sapiential-hermeneutical 
theological enquiry. 
In Sacred Attunement, Fishbane seeks to blend a traditional Jewish theological approach to 
scripture and the principles thereof with contemporary hermeneutical theology. Moreoever, there 
are hints in his work of raising these hermeneutical principles to a more “ontological” level, such 
that one’s entire interaction with the world assumes an aspect of attunement. Encapsulated by the 
acronym PaRDeS, which denotes the various reading strategies for scripture as a garden, the four 
major modalities of scriptural interpretation in the Jewish tradition are peshat; derash; remez; and 
sod, respectively.41 What unites these theological interpretive approaches to scripture is that 
individually and in tandem they promote a deeper awareness of God and his presence in the 
world42 and serve to guide one to wisdom.43 The interpretive strategies of the PaRDeS can be 
deployed individually or in a plethora of combinations.44 Fishbane notes the importance of 
balancing all aspects of the PaRDeS. Each has its own unique goals and is directed to different 
                                                          
38 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 49. See also Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 48: “Augustin définit ici la 
beauté comme réponse.” Chrétien notes the interesting example of Roger Piles, an artist of the 17th century who echoes 
this sentiment in a treatise on the principles of painting. 
39 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 50. 
40 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 60. 
41 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 64-5. 
42 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 65. 
43 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 104. 
44 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 104. 
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facets of the mind.45 However, it seems that it is impossible to eliminate one strategy without 
eliding the others.46 
Fishbane proposes to (re-)appropriate the PaRDeS for a contemporary audience. He begins 
by suggesting that its constituents can be seen as “rites of passage” whereby one is led to a deeper 
understanding of some facet of human existence.47 By practising an intertextual reading strategy, 
Fishbane writes, “we may attune ourselves to [the Torah’s] wider resonances and teachings.”48 
The practises involved in reading and interpretation can inform and influence one’s life and 
thought as a whole.49 As Fishbane writes, a spiritually informed life recognises and affirms the 
divine presence in the world.50 This spiritual realisation represents the essence and goal of 
theology.51 
Let us briefly consider Fishbane’s treatment of the four components of the PaRDeS, which 
in particular will allow us to see how he incorporates interpretive principles into his overall 
theology of attunement. From this we shall also see the clear affinity of Fishbane’s thought with 
that of Augustine and Gadamer, respectively. 
 
7.1.2.2.1 Peshat 
 
Peshat, which deals primarily with the literal and linguistic meaning of a text, i.e., its 
“original” meaning in its “original” context, requires true humility on the part of the reader.52 
Peshat involves attention to the significance of the text qua text.53 It also implies an acceptance 
of the text as it is given.54 Any proper interpretation of the scriptures must first take into account 
the words as they appear.55 As Fishbane writes, one of the distinctive characteristics of peshat is 
its attention not simply to the words as they appear in written form, but also the rhythm and the 
melody of the words themselves when spoken, an appreciation of which can clarify or even 
disclose further meanings.56 Despite the focus on these given properties of the text, it still requires 
the informed engagement of another person in order for its true significance to be achieved.57 
One’s active engagement activates and realises the dormant content of the text and allows the 
properties of rhythm, for example, to be realised.58 The theological-hermeneutical activity of a 
reader results in “a distinct shaping of consciousness through the act of scriptural interpretation–
for the sake of life and theology.”59 One must also bear in mind that one cannot realise this 
                                                          
45 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102-3. 
46 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102-3. 
47 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 104. 
48 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 76. 
49 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 104. 
50 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102. 
51 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 102. 
52 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 66. 
53 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 71. 
54 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 71. 
55 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 66. 
56 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 67. 
57 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 71. 
58 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 66. 
59 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 71-2. 
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awareness on one’s own. A teacher is necessary in order to grow in and cultivate one’s expertise 
with the scriptures.60 
Because texts are products of intentional activity, one reads them with a general 
expectation of coherence, an expectation which serves as a hermeneutical principle.61 Fishbane 
applies this textual principle at a more fundamental level. The world is presented to us a unity, 
but a differentiated unity, in which there is a diversity, if not a hierarchy of goods. These goods 
are truly good in virtue of their divine source, which is echoed in the being of these things, though 
never to a completely perfect degree. The proper attunement to the divine presence in the natural 
world is the main goal of peshat,62 an attunement which enables one to see the world as a result 
of God’s action.63  
 
7.1.2.2.2 Derash 
 
Derash involves the exploration of the potential meanings or significances of the Torah, 
going beyond the literal meaning sought in the peshat.64 With derash the focus is on the meaning 
for the reader of the text. Such an interpretation represents the ongoing voice and verve of Torah 
in subsequent ages, as the text is inherently something which has meaning for new generations.65 
The Torah originates at a particular point in history, yet it is an ever-present reality.66 According 
to Fishbane, “the voice of Sinai was ceaseless, unendingly turned over and over to find all that is 
in it.”67 This point can be clarified by noting that derash is related to the rabbinical technique of 
Midrash.68 Midrashic readings disclose the unity of the oral and the written Torah, as the 
interpretation of the latter results in an instance of the former.69 Furthermore, derash is given 
meaning in part by the context of the reader.70 For derash, the question is not so much the meaning 
of the text in its literal sense, but what it teaches us now.71 Of course, the latter cannot be divorced 
from the former. Fishbane suggests that peshat and derash are inseparable when he writes:  
 
Here then is a delicate simultaneity: the derash guards against the stultification of the peshat, 
while the peshat grounds the derash in the common world; the derash is a prophetic voice 
decrying fundamentalistic reductions, while the peshat keeps counsel with the basic truth that 
circumstances require choices about values and meaning. In the fullest sense, the derash 
helps God remain God in our world by keeping the vastness of possibilities alive through the 
Oral Torah; but just as vitally, the peshat of the common world reminds us that we must 
                                                          
60 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 66-7. 
61 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 67. 
62 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 73-4. 
63 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 105. 
64 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 74. One concern that may be raised about Fishbane’s treatment is the extent 
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65 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 75. 
66 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 49. 
67 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 76. 
68 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 77. 
69 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 78. 
70 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 81. 
71 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 76. 
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always act in the here and now, and that this is the domain where Divinity may become actual 
and humanly real. Both factors must be held in mind; both are truths of a living theology.72 
 
One of the specific techniques of a derash reading is intertextuality. Moving beyond the 
relationships of words in the individual passages, one searches for relationships between other 
passages as well.73 In addition to scripture itself, one also draws upon the traditions of 
interpretation and exegesis.74 In Fishbane’s words, “new possibilities are disclosed through 
creative combinations or reformulations of scriptural language.”75 Derash introduces one to the 
potential for novelty and creativity.76 By standing in the overarching tradition of the Torah, one 
discloses new meanings of the text.77 “Scripture is deemed an ever-flowing fountain with diverse 
meanings expressed through the mouths of its teachers.”78 Fishbane’s treatment of derash evokes 
the sense of complementarity that is so crucial to a sapiential-hermeneutical theology, a point to 
which I shall return presently.79 
Another aspect to derash is understanding the relationship between similarity and 
difference.80 This process is significant not only for contents both interpretanda and interpretata, 
but also for questions of method and technique: the process of determining and identifying 
similarity and difference in one context can inform that process in another.81 Besides questions of 
similarity in texts, derash cultivates within the attentive reader a sense of God’s similarity to 
aspects and facets of our world as we experience it, and how they reflect him, all the while 
preserving his infinite dissimilarity from the world.82 Derash also sustains the delicate effort to 
navigate this theological metaxu (Desmond’s term), namely by avoiding banality and verbal 
laziness. The attempt to imagine God must not univocalise images, nor deteriorate into vacuous 
hyperbole.83 A derash reading reminds one, for example, that in this world we are only afforded 
fleeting glimpses of God, and these not as he is, but as a vestige, as if indirectly from the cleft of 
a mountain, just as God passed by Moses.84 
 
7.1.2.2.3 Remez 
 
Remez, the third of the four interpretive strategies, pertains to a deeper layer of textual 
significance, hidden beneath the surface meaning, perceptible only to the “initiated.”85 As 
Fishbane explains, remez is not totally separable from peshat; the former involves discerning the 
signs in the latter which gesture towards something deeper, such as a grammatical oddity 
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unbecoming eloquium dominicum.86 Even more relevant are descriptions of God which are 
theologically problematic when limited to the literal sense, such as the attribution of appendages 
to the deity. Metaphor has the power to shift our attention between different modalities or facets 
of our being, a point made clear by different genres.87 Curious equivocities of this sort turn the 
attentive reader to the true significance conveyed by the “verbal vehicles” of the passage.88 In this 
way, scripture’s contents impel us to challenge our “ontological” prejudices.89  
Interestingly, Fishbane argues that remez is actually a species of the more general way 
we carry on in our lives. We formulate hypotheses which are later revised as a matter of course; 
it is simply our way of interacting with–indeed, of reading–the world.90 Fishbane speaks of 
applying hermeneutical strategies to things in the world, and especially other persons. In 
interacting with someone, one is engaged in a hermeneutical process, confronting one’s fore-
understandings with the evidence before one, all the while trying to discern images of the inner, 
hidden self in the outer expressions.91 
 
7.1.2.2.4 Sod 
 
Although the rabbinical tradition is replete with different approaches to the PaRDeS, one 
can generally agree that of all these, sod is normative.92 Sod concerns the divine source of 
scripture, reflected in or veiled by the discussion of mundane reality.93 Sod is informed by the 
idea that language, particularly when directed towards discussing God, simultaneously conceals 
as it reveals.94 According to pious tradition, as the torah kelulah informs and is reflected in the 
written scriptures, the latter reflect and instantiate the former.95 The Written Torah reflects all 
aspects of the divinity, from the heights to the depths.96 Hence hermeneutic and theological 
sensitivity and attunement to the language of the scriptures applies also to one’s overall religious 
understanding. Sod involves opening one to the “unthinkable vastness […] through silent hints of 
unsayability.”97 Sod also implies that one must liken oneself unto the scriptures in order to 
understand them.98 Hence, as Fishbane phrases it, “The sod of scripture is thus not so much a level 
of reading as a mode of reality and being. Reading is a spiritual rite of passage into this truth so 
that it may be enacted for God’s sake, in the most ultimate sense.”99 
Fishbane applies the method of sod to the biblical passage concerning the dream Jacob 
had concerning a ladder. The interpretive conclusions he draws are consistent with the sapiential-
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hermeneutical theology in question here. From sod one learns that all of being is invested with 
the divine presence. One can discern this truth by attention to being in its various distinctions, 
hierarchies, and relations. Additionally, we ourselves are reflections par excellence of this 
divinity, to which we have access by ascending the ladder of wisdom. It also suggests that our 
mind, our faculty which makes us most like God, is in a sense heavenly.100 
From the foregoing survey of Fishbane’s thought, we can note the following. By prayerful 
and attentive reading of the scriptures, one is gradually trained to realise ever more deeply the 
divine presence in the world and what that entails for our behaviour and activity. The action of 
interpretation trains one for overall action, and these hermeneutical principles become 
universalised. 
 
7.1.2.3 Fishbane on sacred attunement 
 
As we have seen already, sod serves to preserve one’s awareness of the transcendent 
source of the entire Torah, God’s infinite torah kelulah, placing an emphasis on the 
comprehensively incomprehensible mystery encompassing all of reality.101 Fishbane’s theology, 
according to Otten, attempts to confront us with a notion of nature as somehow distinctive in its 
own way, as offering something for our consideration.102 Indeed, “creation comes to us,” Otten 
writes, “as a world ready to be explored for Fishbane, to whose rhythm we must become attuned 
in an experiential process that allows us to explore science freely without thereby sacrificing the 
values of the divine from (written and oral) scripture.”103 Fishbane writes that one of the 
foundational principles of Judaism is the “formlessness” of the divine, a tenet the sources of which 
he locates in Deuteronomy 4:12, according to which God was simply a voice and not some body 
or structure which could be perceived.104 Furthermore, he also interprets God’s enigmatic self-
revelation in Exodus 3:14 as signifying his transcendent, incomprehensible, ineffable nature; in a 
word, God is “Illimitable.”105 This eternal, incorporeal character of God grounds Fishbane’s 
theology of attunement. Here we see a reflection of Augustine’s own theology. Furthermore, the 
logical counterpart to the concept of the illimitable is finitude, which Gadamer emphasises and 
appreciates in his own way. It is incumbent upon adherents to the Torah to view the world as a 
reflection of the “illimitable” God.106 Hence attention to the world can be disclosive of its 
supernatural source. This sort of reflection challenges our preconceived notions of the world and 
its structure or meaning.107 As Fishbane writes, a reflective focus on the “vastness” of nature can 
lead to its being “experienced with such acuity as to seem supernatural to one’s normal 
sensibility.”108 “Through each point in the world,” writes Fishbane, “one can touch something of 
the mysteries that pervade all Being.”109 
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One can truly access these points by opening the cordial “gates of spiritual imagination 
and consciousness.”110 The reflectiveness engendered by a contemplative reading of a scriptural 
text can detach one from one’s normal way of vision and attune one to other aspects of our seeing 
in a deeper and more holistic sense.111 The spiritual sense of vision one enjoys is not natural, but 
is nonetheless grounded in the natural world.112 We may be directed to the knowledge that the 
individual things we perceive are sourced by a deeper reality.113 Sometimes we can see the divine 
instantiated in the mundane.114 This reminds us, says Fishbane, of God’s continuing creative 
presence in the world.115 Fishbane also finds scriptural support for the idea that God 
communicates through nature. In the Sinai theophany, God communicates with Moses in a non-
linguistic way; the revelation of his power and majesty is addressed to the very core of Moses’ 
person.116 Fishbane derives the following lessons from Moses’ theophanic encounter: Worldly 
reality can speak to us of the divine, yet this knowledge must be balanced with the awareness that 
God is never completely grasped by our own (finite) categories.117 God simultaneously manifests 
himself to us, yet remains elusive.118 The result of such a realisation is aptly expressed by 
Desmond: “We must abdicate the claim to have categories to determine finally what itself 
outstrips every categorial determination.”119 
This overview of Fishbane’s theology of attunement has prepared us to engage in a 
sapiential-hermeneutical theology. Given his situation within the wisdom tradition, his 
application of hermeneutics to theology, and the clear resonance of his thought with our two main 
dialogue partners, I shall return to Fishbane on occasion to emphasise and substantiate certain 
points of my own. 
 
7.2 INTERROGATIO 
 
It is our vision, our basic capacity to see intelligible realities in the world, which allows 
us to make progress in knowledge. Augustine believes that one has the capacity to judge such 
properties in virtue of the presence of divine ideas to the mind. For example, he identifies the 
innate knowledge of number as a sign of the divine imprint on the soul. The presence of number 
in the world reflects the fullness of Wisdom and Beauty, according to which God has created and 
disposed the world.120 As we have seen supra, such an ability is part and parcel of the principal 
sense of illumination. We have also seen how Gadamer thinks of hermeneutics as the ability to 
see what is questionable, and then to proceed to question it. The apprehension of the questionable 
results from the hermeneutical event of being seized by something from outwith. Our questioning 
results from a being questioned, and in our own utterances we perceive the locus of “call and 
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response” itself. In other words, the summons is realised as a summons in our act of responding. 
In addition to discussing a sense of vision which allows one to perceive objects of intellectual 
interest, Augustine also discusses the way in which we are engaged in a dialogue with the objects 
of our intellectual perception, how we are encouraged to interrogate them and to listen to their 
responses in the hopes of arriving at truth. One can perceive a felicitous parallel between 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Augustine’s theory of sapientia. We have seen how Gadamer views 
hermeneutics as a basic reasoning ability, related to the world as a whole which is understood as 
inherently linguistic. Augustine understands created things as signs and seeks to interpret them 
accordingly.121 Furthermore, he sees uestigia as a particular type of signum, and it is the former 
which especially direct the mind to God. 
 
7.2.1 The World as Language 
 
7.2.1.1 Signa, res, uestigia 
 
In the second book of De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine presents his definition of 
signum with respect to particular objects (res). Signs may be literal or figurative, and of course, 
some realities may in turn be signs for something else.122 A sign in doct. chr. is defined as that 
which calls some other thing to mind: “For a sign is a thing apart from a type which impresses 
itself on the senses, which is something making from itself something else come into thought.”123 
Signum is presented as a generic category of which “verbal” and “non-verbal” are species.124 
Signs signify realities which are (likely) absent, and their function is to direct the mind to those 
things by means of some logical or conventional connection. For example, one can perceive 
beauty and truth, says Augustine, through the words which convey them to others.125 However, 
in doct. chr. (3.5.9), Augustine can write that a serious epistemological error consists in the 
conflation of a sign (signum) with that which it signifies, namely its res.126  In order to attain to 
sapientia, one must not concentrate on the words themselves, but on the realities which they 
signify. The truly wise person is not concerned with words as such, but rather with the things 
themselves.127 
Despite their distinctness, Augustine still maintains an inherent, logical connection 
between signum and res. He states in doct. chr. that in order to know a thing, one must also have 
knowledge of its sign(s).128 A signum can take many forms, although there is always a material 
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medium involved,129 as the proper locus of the signum is the sensible world.130 Augustine sees 
this as the positive aspect of signs, that they indicate, point to, gesture towards other realities.131 
The vestige is a species of the genus sign, the particularity of the former of which resides in its 
mental productivity, that is, causing one’s mind to be directed to some-thing (res) else.132 
For Augustine, there is a certain dynamism to a sign; it is not a “mere” referent, something 
which simply points to something else, or is itself devoid of content. Whilst a sign is always 
something sensible (“Le signe augustinien est toujours sensible offert aux sens”), as a material 
object its full cognitive potency lies dormant.133 Signs gain their meaning for Augustine through 
the directed, intentional activity of rational agents. The movement from sign to reality involves a 
distinctive, holistic method which summons the resources and energies of one’s entire person.134 
Giraud captures something of this dynamism when he writes of the “element mental constitutif 
de tout signe : il n’y a de signe que perçu, c’est-à-dire ayant engendré son effet in cogitationem, 
dans la pensée.”135 This relationship is particularly intense with respect to uestigia. As a uestigium 
for Augustine refers one back to its source, there is both a formal and a causal link between the 
vestige and the creator thereof, such that one can never totally separate the vestige from its origin. 
Thus Giraud: “Le vestigium augustinien, ce n’est pas seulement la trace laisée, l’indice (par 
exemple, le sang), c’est l’empreinte, la marque en laquelle persiste et transparait visiblement la 
cause qui l’a laissée.”136 Hence there is a certain ambiguity or “metaxic” (Desmond’s term) quality 
to the uestigium, which represents a “mi-chemin entre la signification et la manifestation.”137 
Epistemically speaking, the result of this for Augustine is quite remarkable. Because one 
need only “see” the footprint, for example, to know that a particular animal has recently passed 
by, so too for other things, not least of all God, does one simply need to look and see his vestiges 
in creation in order to “see and know” something of him. As Giraud explains, “Il ne s’agit plus 
tant de prouver que de voir.”138 For Augustine, in my estimation, the question is not so much 
whether one can know God by reason alone, or whether one can deductively reason to him, 
following some form of logical argument. Indeed, the question is not even whether we can see 
and know something of his presence by an investigation of reality. Rather, the question is how 
can one not see God, given that one can “see” the world. The issue is whether one has sufficiently 
clear intellectual vision such that one can see what is already present to one (the light is present 
to us, but we are not present to it);139 one must cleanse the doors of perception.140 As I see it, in 
drawing on his own experience, Augustine is also getting at something of the highly intentional 
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nature of human sight. To speak of the “merely” empirical (granted, using a rather modern term) 
is not sensible for Augustine, for whom sight admits of the possibility of divergence between two 
viewers looking at the same object, in much the same way that two readers can disagree over the 
proper interpretation of a particular text. In a word, when one truly sees a vestige, one sees what 
is already there.141 
According to Giraud, Augustine’s theory of the investigation of nature and the ascent of 
the soul thereby is grounded in his theology of creation as a vestige of the divine wisdom, the 
agent who accomplished God’s act of making the universe.142 Creation by its very nature and 
architecture, not to mention its orchestration, (be)speaks God, its origin.143 The fact that creation 
reflects and instantiates something of the divine ideas provides a basis for a mystical ascent to 
God by way of mundane realities, or more specifically, in virtue of the beauty which they 
instantiate.144 As Harrison writes, the Plotinian notion of per corporalia ad incorporalia is 
fundamental not only to Augustine’s notion of beauty, but to his entire theology.145 Augustine 
writes that Wisdom (sapientia) speaks through its vestiges (uestigiis) in the world, and that within 
one, one possesses the standards (pulchritudinis leges) of judging these beautiful forms.146 Certain 
forms such as justice are present to the mind, the further investigation of which relies upon the 
soul’s acknowledgement of its emptiness, its confessio.147 Heidegger here would speak of a 
recognition of human be-ing as human nihility.148 Intelligible objects only become meaningful 
when they become subject to an informed act of viewing. The form in the world is not “there” for 
a non-rational agent, but a rational agent can in fact perceive these forms and make them “come 
to life” in virtue of possessing these standards of judgement within. As Giraud explains, “Il n’y a 
de beauté que pour un esprit qui mesure, estime, apprécie en vertu des lois transcendantes de la 
beauté divine dont l’âme porte intrinsèquement la marque. En un mot, il n’y a de vestigium-
signum que pour un vestigium-imago.”149 However, Augustine is also careful to note that both 
elements, namely the vestige in creation and the capacity to perceive it in a rational subject are 
essential parts of the cognitive process. This point is apropos of the aforementioned “co-
constitution” of reality by the subject.150 This does not mean that we are the creators of meaning 
and truth, but it also means that we do not merely unveil it either. If we have learned anything 
from Heisenberg, it is that there is no purely neutral or objective world apart from us, insofar as 
we are an inherent part of what is already there anyway.151 In other words, in his famous double 
slit experiment, Heisenberg noticed to his surprise that whether he took a measurement or made 
an observation influenced the outcome of the test. Light particles behave one way when they are 
observed and measured, and another when they are not. Rather than leading to the scandals of 
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relativism or nihilism, this realisation demonstrates the integral part played by rational agents in 
knowledge creation. We are partners, not masters, in the uncovering of truth. Put yet another way, 
the dichotomy between creating truth and discovering it dissolves.152 
But before this process of examination and observation can begin, there must be a thing 
there to be seen and cognised.153 In a sense, the Augustinian vestige is the keyhole, awaiting the 
input and turning of the key by the rational mind.154 One of the most important divine vestiges in 
the world, and one which attracts the mind’s attention, is its beauty or form, its pulchritudo or 
species. This beauty is intelligible and cognitive; the form seizes the mind and addresses it. Hence 
Augustine’s understanding of wisdom and cognition is inherently linked with considerations of 
what we would call (abusiue, perhaps) aesthetics. 
 
7.2.1.2 Pulchritudo 
 
As Giraud explains, aesthetic categories are central to Augustine’s theory of knowledge. 
Contrary to our post-Kantian biases with respect to “aesthetics,” for Augustine this does not 
represent some non-cognitive source or form of knowledge, but is a different and perhaps even 
pre-eminent aspect under which to view truth.155 The Augustinian understanding of beauty as a 
call leads one to self-reflection, for it is there that the standards for judging beauty are discovered, 
and without which no divine vestige may be perceived. Thus Giraud:  
 
La beauté n’est pas là pour fasciner, mais pour “rappeler” (reuocare), faire “chercher” 
(quaerere), à faire “comprendre” (intellegere). De quelle façon ? En ramenant chacun à soi-
meme. Pourquoi soi-meme ? Parce que là, à l’intérieur, “intus,” “in interiore homine,” se 
trouvent les lois qui nous permettent de voir cette beauté, de l’apprécier, de la contempler, de 
désirer la posséder. Les lois du jugement esthétique, ces fameux “nombres du jugement” dont 
parle le De musica, sont precisement ceux sans lesquels rien de beau ne saurait être vu.156  
 
The world’s reflection of God invokes the images impressed upon the soul which, although 
obscured by sin, are still present.157 The divine uestigia thus initially address the soul, initiating a 
hermeneutical process.158 Aesthetic beauty is a mark of the divine and thereby a mark of truth. 
Augustine understands beauty primarily in terms of proportion, form, order, unity, and such like. 
Timeless and eternal forms of beauty are instantiated in material objects and states of affairs. 
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God’s beauty, his order and number, etc., are constitutive of creation as a whole and each 
individual created thing, in virtue of which they can be considered uestigia.159 
The way in which God communicates through the various forms and structures of the 
created world must be understood with respect to their ultimate inadequacy and lack of being with 
respect to their source. Harrison points to Plotinus as a major source for Augustine’s thought in 
this respect. In Ennead 1.6.6, Plotinus describes the ascent of the soul to the One, one of the 
requirements of which is to eschew one’s excessive attachment to worldly realities.160 In Ennead 
5.8.9, Plotinus writes that being is integrally linked with beauty, and that one loves something 
which is because of the beauty one discerns to be present therein. That is, one may “see” the form 
of the beautiful instantiated in a particular thing, which, through one’s gradual participation in it, 
inculcates in one the desire for its source.161 In trin., Augustine writes that the movement of 
rational enquiry takes one from the vestiges of the Creator to the Creator himself.162 This 
movement entails a gradual relinquishing of worldly things. However, due to its ontological 
limitations, the soul suffers from a myopic moral vision, which leads one to flee from the superior 
for the inferior and become attached to corporeal things.163 (I shall have more to say about this in 
the following chapter, especially in terms of a “transvaluation of values.”) Indeed, the origin of 
sin is found in the soul’s inordinate attachment to temporal, provisional goods, such that the 
hierarchy of creation is neglected.164 However, Harrison argues that it does not do justice to 
Augustine if one sees his thought as implying a devaluation or a diminishment of the goodness of 
the material order.165 These things are not evil, they are good. But they are not absolute goods, 
and they are subordinate to other goods. Hence one must guard against the dangers of pride and 
curiosity that lead one into these snares.166 
Augustine’s cataphatic theology of signa with respect to the created world is checked by 
an apophatic reflex, though both of these streams have a common font, namely in the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo.167 For instance, in book six of De musica, Augustine writes of the way in which 
the soul may discover and love the beauty of forms in creation, yet after thoughtful reflection will 
come to the conclusion that these are mere shadows (extremam umbram uestigiumque) of the 
source of all form and order.168 Augustine condemns the error whereby the vestiges of God 
(uestigiis tuis) are prized over their source.169 When God is abandoned for his signs, the entire 
“hermeneutical key” is lost and perverted. The order of the world acts as a sign, leading one back 
to God, but only if one is properly attuned to perceive the order and to act accordingly.170 God is 
always speaking to the soul through his created order, but the soul must be able to recognise these 
messages, aided by the situating of them in the proper framework, that is, being understood as 
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reflections of God’s being and majesty.171 (I shall develop this point in the following chapter.) 
Nonetheless, as created beings, God bids one to come and seek him through the things he has 
made. Thus Giraud describes the created order as a call in the sense of an invitation to seek its 
source, “comme un geste d’invitation qu’il nous fait à travers les choses.”172 In a word, as Giraud 
writes, “La beauté est un appel.”173 
 
7.2.1.3 Faith as response to a call 
 
 Even in Augustine’s own theology we can see the fundamental importance of the dynamic 
of call and response, supported by the fundamental importance that one first believes and then 
proceeds to understanding. We have seen that for both Augustine and Gadamer, human reason is 
something which is first addressed and conditioned, and which one pursues in the form of a 
response, or indeed, in the form of questioning. This is a concept Augustine elaborates within the 
context of his discussion of fides, faith. For Augustine, faith begins from an initiative or a 
summons from without; it is very much a free response to a call. Here I want to draw on a parallel 
with Gadamer, for whom the thinking subject responds to an address (Anrede) from without.174 
For Augustine, those who are implicated in a conversation about some point of faith, for instance, 
are already grasped in a certain way by that very same faith. As he explains, “For if they would 
have believed in no way, they would not be here. Faith has led them, so that they may hear. Faith 
has made them present to the word of God.”175 Faith has spoken to them in some way, has already 
silently touched them, such that they are led to place themselves within the context of God’s word. 
As Gadamer writes, one finds oneself in a conversation.176 One does not so much deliberately 
choose to enter it but realises that one is implicated in a hermeneutical exchange, which of course 
always presupposes another party.177 However, there is a difference between being led to explore 
a particular issue and being truly receptive with an open heart. Faith must be cultivated and 
enabled to grow: “but that very faith which has bloomed needs to be watered, nourished, 
strengthened.”178 According to E. Hill, Augustine’s entire approach to faith is one of indefinite 
searching and investigating.179 In this respect, his understanding of faith differs from the modern 
approach, insofar as faith serves as a starting point to enquiry, rather than its completion. For 
Augustine, any rational enquiry which does not presuppose some element of faith is 
unsustainable.180 Indeed, faith does not obviate the need for reason but rather supports it.181 
Augustine cites the example of Peter’s cry, adiuua incredulitatem meam, as the model for one’s 
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own growth in knowledge: One has some sentiment of truth, but must be continuously aided in 
order to persevere.182 The gift of faith is not a panacea for the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune.183 Though one walks in faith (iam ambulat in fide), one is nonetheless assailed by a 
variety of temptations and challenges, though ever aided by faith.184 For Augustine, the refusal to 
accept anything on authority or faith eventuates in absurdity; faith is a necessary and ineluctable 
part of rational enquiry.185 
 From this it should be clear that faith for Augustine is not based on sheer voluntary force; 
it is not a Kierkegaardian leap. Rather, there is always something which provides at least some 
minimal substrate for reasoning, should one be properly attuned. As Augustine states, “He who 
called you so that you might believe has not abandoned you. Although he enjoins you to believe 
that which you cannot see, he nevertheless does not send you away seeing nothing, from which 
you may be able to believe what you do not see.”186 As a response to his imaginary interlocutor’s 
demands for demonstrable proof, Augustine takes a different approach. It is not always possible 
in Augustine’s mind to present evidence for something. Rather than presenting something to one, 
Augustine suggests that the truth is already in front of us, though we are not yet prepared to see 
it.187 
In this respect, Augustine alludes to the miracle recounted in John 2, in which Christ 
changes water into wine. I treated of this theme supra as Augustine glosses it in the eighth tractate. 
Here we can see a further point of significance to his analysis. Whilst those present were stupefied 
by this act, Augustine states that it is equally marvelous that these things even existed at all, and 
that all the various processes of nature occurred to produce the water which would become 
wine.188 Augustine wants us to see reflectively, and to reflect perceptively, and thereby come to 
see what was already before us in the first place. One can be present to something, and yet not 
see, in particular if one’s interior aspect is not properly attuned. Augustine speaks of this as a 
window being open (namely, the eye of the body), but no viewer to peer through it.189 But if Blake 
is to be believed, this is an error, as you are led to believe a lie, when you see with, not thro’ the 
eye.190 In particular, Augustine proposes natural bodies for contemplation, such as the fecundity 
of the earth, the order of times, and other things which God has made.191 The sight and subsequent 
reflective gazing upon the things of the world should lead one to faith in God.192 One should 
investigate and examine more closely those things which one sees, and through this investigation 
be led to those things which one does not see: “Gaze upon what you see, and seek what you do 
not see.”193 Augustine also sees faith as an agent of a sort of intellectual purgatio (itaque 
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priusquam mens nostra purgetur, debemus credere quod intellegere nondum ualemus, quoniam 
uerissime dictum est per prophetam: nisi credideritis, non intellegetis).194 Here we see the gradual 
sense of illumination at work, with the principal sense assumed in the background. 
The foregoing observations may be clarified by the following distinction, located in en. 
Ps. 65 (dated to Lent 412). Here Augustine has in mind a more precise way of looking. This 
distinction does not so much concern different forms of vision in an intellectual sense, but rather 
focuses on the affect with which one sees. Augustine suggests a distinction between adspexi on 
the one hand and conspexi/respexi on the other. Simply put, the latter two terms denote a sense of 
looking with sympathy upon someone or something. Augustine uses the example of saying 
respice me. He states that it would seem strange for someone to say this to another person who is 
looking right at them. But the gaze of respectio differs from other forms of seeing insofar as there 
is an added element of sympathy. Furthermore, aspectio pertains to the presence of an object of 
vision to someone, mere seeing without any affective element. Augustine suggests this by his 
discussion of sin and one’s looking upon it in the heart. The sight of sin (aspectio) is not a problem 
in itself; it is when one looks upon it with sympathy, when aspectio becomes respectio, that one 
entertains its presence and therefore prevents the Lord from speaking: “Therefore he did not say: 
‘If I have looked at (adspexi) iniquity in my heart,’ for no iniquity at all is furnished to the human 
heart. There it arises, the suggestion does not cease; but do not let it become respectio.”195 
In addition to en. Ps. 65, Augustine presents a similar point concerning intellectual vision 
in his s. 159, delivered ca. 418. Whereas in sources such as Gn. litt. 12, Augustine maintains the 
connection between various levels of vision, he draws a sharp contrast in s. 159 between the eyes 
of the body and those of the heart, in particular for the sake of making an ethical-epistemic 
point.196 Discussing those who advance in righteousness, he states that they have critically 
examined the judgements of the eyes of the flesh and have rejected them in favour of those of the 
heart.197 The former may describe something as beautiful, whereas the latter judges it as evil and 
repugnant.198 This “transvaluation of values” which Augustine describes here in s. 159 is 
encapsulated in the words of the scriptures, Men judge appearances, but God judges the heart.199 
Augustine makes clear that the ethical judgement concerning, e.g., the preference for 
righteousness over riches, is rooted in the former’s superior ontological status, that it endures and 
cannot diminish, whereas gold can diminish or disappear.200 He also describes justice as sweeter 
and more lightsome than gold.201 However, Augustine does not deny that worldly goods are 
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indeed goods.202 Indeed, he even says that if he were to deny this, he would dishonour God (nam 
si pulchrum negauero, Creatori iniuriam facio).203 Augustine wants us to appreciate finite, 
created goods, but not to immerse ourselves in them. As Ferri explains, “il raggiungimento delle 
verità eterne richiede necessariamente, per l’uomo (composto di anima e corpo), un’ascesa che 
non scavalchi il sensibile, ma lo attraverso pur senza fermarsi ad esso.”204 The question is which 
is more beautiful or valuable, e.g., aurum or ueritas.205 Sometimes one may have to choose 
between these.206 Such choices will be influenced by and further influence the normative 
framework which one applies to one’s experience of the world. The first step to acquiring justice 
is subjugating all earthly delights to the love of righteousness, even those which are legitimate or 
permitted (licitas delectationes).207 In order to love invisible, beautiful things, one must reject 
those things which prevent one from loving it with a singular and indefatigable love.208 One places 
righteousness above other delights by means of delighting in it (delectando praeponenda est 
[iustitia]).209 
The upshot is that one can look and yet not see, or see in a different way. This of course 
is based on a theory of creation in sapientia. Hence the task is to arrive at the Creator through the 
creature, a point which Augustine substantiates by appeal to Romans 1:20.210 Christ in his 
incarnation provides the hermeneutic for reading the universe. His miracles not only demonstrate 
his power in a strikingly tangible way, but also serve a further function, namely of revealing the 
miracles all around one. As Augustine explains, “because those things had become banal to you, 
[Christ] came to do things to which you were not accustomed, so that also in the accustomed 
things themselves you might discern your maker.”211 
 
 7.2.2 Augustine on the speaking of nature 
 
Augustine’s understanding of creation in sapientia leads him to conclude that it is only 
logical to expect that the things made by the maker will reflect him and testify to him.212 The 
divine wisdom is infused into the created order, and as the source of order and intelligibility is 
always communicating through particular creatures.213 The beauty instantiated in individual 
creatures reflects God’s “art” (ars diuina) through which he speaks to us.214 According to Giraud, 
Augustine’s theology of creation could also be viewed as the doctrine of the vestiges of the divine 
wisdom expressed in material form.215 As we have seen with the notion of uestigium in particular, 
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the forma impressa is communicative, causing an intentional and cognitive operation in the mind, 
calling it to think of its origin. This is the sense in which Augustine is said to speak of the created 
world as that which addresses the rational agent. An intentional, rational disposition is a 
prerequisite of being held or seized by the intelligible order in which one finds oneself. Thus 
Giraud: “la création que considère Augustin est l’œuvre de Dieu et, comme telle, transparence à 
nous adressée de son Verbe.”216 As Bochet puts it, “le monde crée est signe du Createur.”217 
But precisely what does the world signify? What does it say to us, and how? For 
Augustine, one of the specific things the world speaks is praise, confessio. Creation in virtue of 
its disposition and inherent goodness praises God. It is good and beautiful in its order.218 
Augustine states in en. Ps. 148 that the beauty (pulchritudo) of nature constitutes its confession 
to God: “In a certain way, beauty is the voice of all of those things, of those confessing God.”219 
Here Augustine condemns the idea that God only concerns himself with “higher” things and is 
not concerned with or does not govern “lower” things.220 If we are attentive to nature, it tells us 
that it is not the source of its own being. It tells us that God made it. This is its voice speaking to 
our hearts: “Heaven cries out to God: ‘You have made me, not I.’ The earth cries out, ‘You have 
formed me, not I.’”221 Even changeable, created reality can lead us to the praise of God. In a sense, 
these things exhort us to consider them, whereby we can praise God.222 The admiration of created 
things always serves a referential function, insofar as when we consider them we are led to a 
knowledge of their creator, which must then develop into praise. When we express this, inanimate 
creation praises God in our voice.223 “How do those things cry out? When they are considered, 
and this is discovered, they cry out from your consideration, they cry out from your voice.”224 
Augustine conceives of nature as a locus of contact between the human and the divine, as 
it is created in God’s wisdom. Hence it is intelligible, and Augustine describes its manifestation 
of itself to the soul as speech of a sort. We can see a brief treatment of this in Augustine’s two 
enarrationes on Ps 18, the first composed in 392, and the second delivered as a sermo ca. 412-
415. Augustine states that Ps 18, in which it is stated that the heavens declare God’s glory, is 
about Christ.225 Augustine links Ps 18 with the Johannine prologue, stating that the glory which 
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the heavens declare is that same glory which was seen in the incarnate Christ, namely the glory 
tamquam Unigeniti a Patre.226 Employing the language of the Johannine prologue, Augustine 
states that all things were made through this Word, which is identical with God’s wisdom.227 
Within this context of creation in sapientia, Augustine immediately proceeds to discuss the 
speaking of nature.228 The heavens should and indeed do announce the glory of the Lord and his 
deeds. The language which Augustine uses is that which is often associated with speaking, 
especially in terms of explaining or expounding something (e.g., annuntiat, exponunt).229 When 
the heavens declare God’s glory, Augustine claims, it is especially a declaration of one’s 
nothingness and one’s utter dependency on God.230 As Augustine punctuates this point, “‘Not to 
us, O Lord, but to your name give glory.’ Those heavens had known this, which declared the glory 
of God.”231 The heavens serve to remind us that God is the Creator, and not we (ipse fecit nos, et 
non ipsi nos).232 In other words, the heavens are saying that we are finite, and God infinite. The 
revelation of the word during the day, Augustine states, symbolises the announcement of the 
eternal Word. It is about this that the earth can be said to speak.233 Night symbolises the mortality 
of the flesh, which for Augustine can point towards futuram scientiam.234 The key point which I 
draw from this is that Augustine sees the earth not simply as testifying, but of testifying to 
something which transcends it. 
 Now let us consider in more detail two particular locations in which Augustine describes 
the world as speaking to him, from which he is able to learn something about God from his 
creation. 
 
 7.2.3 Case Studies 
 
7.2.3.1 Conf. 10 
 
In conf. 10, Augustine writes that his “method” for searching for God involves an active, 
directed searching, an interrogation. He says that he began with the creatures of the exterior world, 
and that he asked, or interrogated (interrogaui) them,235 specifically to discover whether any one 
of them was God. Augustine depicts apparently inanimate natural objects as speaking, 
responding, and indeed, confessing. This metaphorical and highly imaginative image of nature 
speaking is portrayed as a dialogue between Augustine’s soul and the world, to which he gives 
some interpretation when he writes, “my interrogation is my intention, and their beauty is their 
                                                          
226 en. Ps. 18.2.2, CCSL 38, p. 106. 
227 en. Ps. 18.2.3, CCSL 38, p. 107. 
228 en. Ps. 18.2.3, CCSL 38, p. 107. 
229 en. Ps. 18.1.2, CCSL 38, p. 102. 
230 en. Ps. 18.2.2, CCSL 38, p. 106. 
231 en. Ps. 18.2.2, CCSL 38, p. 107: “Non nobis, Domine, sed nomini tuo da gloriam: hoc illi nouerant coeli, 
qui enarrauerunt gloriam Dei.”  
232 en. Ps. 18.2.3, CCSL 38, p. 108. 
233 en. Ps. 18.1.3, CCSL 38, p. 102. 
234 en. Ps. 18.1.3, CCSL 38, p. 102. This is interesting as in the second enarratio on this same psalm, 
Augustine interprets nox nocti in different, and indeed, negative terms. In the latter, Augustine compares Christ to the 
day and Judas to the night. See en. Ps. 18.2.4, CCSL 38, p. 108. 
235 conf. 10.6.9, CCSL 27, p. 159. 
Principal Elements of a Sapiential-Hermeneutical Theology 
289 
response.”236 In the third chapter we encountered Augustine’s understanding of intentio, and a 
further significant aspect of it reveals itself here. In other words, Augustine’s act of interrogation 
is an expression for his directed, focused enquiry into particular realities, guided by a pre-
sentiment of their intelligibility, whilst the “response” he “hears” from various natural bodies is 
their species, their form or their beauty, a property which he is able to perceive by means of his 
intellect. Augustine writes that natural creatures speak to him, specifically for the purpose that he 
may be brought to love of God: “But both heaven and earth, as well as all things which are in 
them, behold, everywhere they speak to me, so that I may love you.”237 Moreover, Augustine 
claims that this speaking is constant, without cessation, and that it is directed to all people 
(omnibus), which for him implies that those who do not acknowledge this are inexcusabiles.238  
We also see the language of intentio at work in Augustine’s dialogue with the natural 
world as he searches for God. In contrast to animals (non enim praeposita est in eis nuntiantibus 
sensibus iudex ratio),239 man possesses the capacity of reason, which for Augustine is distinctive 
specifically in its capacity to interrogate and to serve as a judge of the reports of the exterior world 
(homines autem possunt interrogare).240 Augustine notes that animals have some capacity for 
memory in the way that people do. What differentiates them is not so much the extent of the 
memory but the operation it supports in the human knower, namely that of reasoning, which 
Augustine likens to judging or interpreting the reports of the senses. Though he perceives and 
“hears” the responses of corporeal creation in one way, namely through his bodily senses, 
Augustine notes that there is an interior and indeed, qualitatively superior sense at work, judging 
the reports of the senses and interpreting them in a certain way.241 
Thus it becomes clear that the brief account of Augustine’s interrogatio of created reality 
is something which takes place within himself. Augustine is not talking to himself or day-
dreaming; rather, he is calling to mind the various images and memories, unifying them as a 
certain substrate, and then enquiring further into them. In addition, as Nightingale writes, “This 
implies not just the reproduction of past images or ideas but creative imagination: one comes up 
with new thoughts by recourse to past ideas and experiences.”242 The intellect’s faculty of 
intention aspires to unity, parsimony, synthesis, and simplicity, which reflects God’s own eternity 
and immutability. It serves as a faculty by means of which one can begin to overcome the 
disorienting multiplicity of corporeal reality, enabling one to possess a pure and simplex cor.243 
This beauty of the world’s responses inherently includes a double aspect, as whilst they 
contain some positive, assertive content, that is, in terms of their beauty, the initial responses 
which Augustine records are negative and apophatic, or at least responses which direct Augustine 
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beyond the very realities he is interrogating and investigating. As for the latter, we read, “I 
interrogated the sea and the depths and the creeping things of living souls, and they responded: 
‘we are not your God, seek above us.’”244 There is the apophatic response (we are not God), 
coupled with the referential element (seek above us). So as the particular natural realities 
“confess,” they simultaneously confess their beauty and their lack thereof, or rather their utter 
dependence upon God for all that they possess and are. We see this especially when Augustine 
brings his natural investigation to a conclusion by asking creation to say something to him about 
the God he is seeking: “and I said to all things, which stand around the doors of my flesh, ‘Tell 
me something about my God, which you are not, tell me something about him.’ And they 
exclaimed in a loud voice, ‘He made us.’”245 The failure of Augustine’s external search conducts 
him to self-enquiry, to asking himself who he is. 
Giraud locates in conf. 10 the inherently “hermeneutical” character of human reason on 
Augustine’s view (“Le soi qui constitue l’image est ainsi hermeneutique en son essence”). 
Engaged in enquiry, the soul is led from the outside world to a knowledge of oneself, which in 
turn entails a knowledge of the soul’s origin from elsewhere.246 In virtue of discovering the truth 
about oneself, one is also led to knowledge of the world. Giraud explains this link when he writes, 
 
L’interrogation du monde sensible et l’accès au soi intellectuel ne suivent pas des voies 
divergentes. La relation de l’extérieur et de l’intérieur n’est pas d’opposition mais 
d’implication et d’approfondissement. Foris et intus, loin de s’entraver ou de se nier, se 
relancent mutuellement, des lors que la trace de Dieu dans le monde ne peut etre suivie que 
par la trace qu’il a laissée en moi, qui me constitue et que je suis.247 
 
This image is realised within one, and is thus concrete. From the inner movement Augustine 
realises that there is an interior and indeed, qualitatively superior sense at work, judging the 
reports of the body’s senses and interpreting them in a certain way.248 
In addition to God himself speaking through the works of the world, Augustine also 
suggests that creatures themselves speak, but when they do, it is nonetheless on God’s behalf, and 
always directed back to him.249 In the famous sero te amaui passage of the Confessiones,250 
Augustine describes God as beauty (pulchritudo), and the source of all beauty, in particular the 
limited instantiations of beauty in creation. Augustine threw himself into these, even though their 
beauty was inherently limited and less than that of God himself.251 The prior context of the conf. 
makes clear that the motivation for Augustine’s inward move was the fact that he had discovered 
that God was present within and to him, in particular through the memory. 
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In discussing Augustine’s understanding of creation and formation, he seems to suggest 
what I have elsewhere called a theology of re-creation.252 Christ restores the intellectual vision 
with which we were created and which has been wounded by sin. The fulfillment of this is 
eschatological.253 Through free will, the human person has sinned and become a defective symbol 
of God. Thus the Incarnate Christ restores fallen man, making him once again a fitting symbol 
through which the creator can communicate, and which will complement the other divine signs 
present in the world.254 
The specific weakness of the inner sense was that it was not able to perceive God, as it 
was looking at the wrong things and looking at them in the wrong way, a fault which God himself 
corrects by acting on the soul.255 Moreover, the language of interiority also serves to make clear 
Augustine’s argument that the perception of God and truth is often a matter of clearing the 
blockages and the prejudices of our own minds, or re-orienting our intellectual vision so as to be 
able to see what was already present and available to perception.256 However, though all rational 
creatures possess this capacity for judgement, some use it to a greater or more excellent extent 
than others. Hence nature is also saying or speaking something, but one person “hears” it, whilst 
another does not. The difference between the two, according to Augustine, is that the one who 
really “hears” the testimony of nature compares the reports of the senses with the truth which 
resides within one: “Indeed, better still, [the world’s species] speaks to all, but they understand, 
who compare its voice received from the outside with the truth on the inside.”257 We have 
encountered this point already as regards the principal sense of illumination, and now one of its 
specific aspects can be seen. That is, the truth within tells one that no particular physical thing is 
God. The upshot of Augustine’s external search is that God is not any particular type of “body,” 
that is, a corporeal, sensible object, nor is he reducible to one: “for the truth says to me, ‘Your 
God is not heaven and earth, nor is he any body.”258 Of course we have seen this point already, 
but now we are prepared to ask a further question: if God is not like any of the aforementioned 
things, then what is he like? This challenges our ontological prejudice of thinking of the real in 
terms of time and space;259 now we are asked to think of things which are not only outside of our 
familiar dimensions, but apart from dimensionality altogether.260 
 
7.2.3.2 s. 241 
 
We a similar line of thought in sermo 241, delivered in Hippo ca. 405-410. For his 
understanding of nature’s intelligibility, Augustine appeals to Paul’s letter to the Romans 1:19-
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21. In this homily Augustine credits the philosophi with a valid and genuine knowledge of God 
derived from nature (de operibus artificem cognouisse), a knowledge which did not come as a 
result of the revelation vouchsafed to the chosen people (prophetas non audierunt, legem Dei non 
acceperunt).261 Augustine affirms that God was addressing these philosophers through creation 
(eis Deus quodam modo silens ipsius mundi operibus loquebatur, et eos ad quaerendum artificem 
rerum, mundi species inuitabat).262 This divine call, which echoes through the natural world, is 
ever present to the soul, ever calling and beckoning: this way, mortal, bend thy eyes.263 
Augustine’s understanding of creatio ex nihilo places nature on a par with scripture, a point which 
is demonstrated by his assertion that the philosophers are inexcusabiles because they did not 
worship God as they ought.264 
One can see how Augustine understands the potency and the power of the created world 
to communicate the divine, even if one can be deaf to its address. Having condemned the pagan 
philosophers for their rejection of the revelation vouchsafed to them by God through his works, 
Augustine proceeds to suggest how God can be known through creation, instructing his audience 
to “interrogate” the beauty of nature, and to enquire into it as one pursues knowledge of the divine. 
Thus Augustine: 
 
Interrogate the beauty of the earth, interrogate the beauty of the sea, the beauty of the wind 
which spreads and blows, the beauty of the sky, the order of the stars, the sun which illumines 
the day by its light, the moon which by its splendour tempers the darkness of the following 
night, the animals which move in the seas, which roam about land, which fly in the air; 
interrogate hidden souls, and visible bodies; visible things needing to be ruled, invisible 
things governing.265 
 
Augustine identifies these as particular objects against the backdrop of creation and in defining 
them can hear what they are saying to him. As Chrétien puts it, “Augustin définit ici la beauté 
comme réponse,”266 a point with which Giraud concurs when he explains that for Augustine, “La 
beauté est un appel.”267 One should behold beauty and be held by beauty, that is, to allow oneself 
to be grasped by something beyond one’s control.268 
As created beings, God bids one to come and seek him through the things he has made. 
Thus Giraud describes the created order as a call in the sense of an invitation to seek their 
source.269 Contrary to a Kantian aesthetic of enjoyment, the Augustinian understanding of beauty 
as a call leads one to self-reflection, for it is there that the standards of judging beauty at all are 
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discovered, and without which no divine vestige may be perceived.270 Even in his much later ciu., 
Augustine writes that the basic principles constitutive of the world speak to and address one.271 
This calling of the world’s pulchritudo initiates a dialogue with the soul, which entails a certain 
reciprocity and dialectic which can be continuously extended and deepened.272 This speaks to the 
excess of worldly things, showing forth beauty of their origin, what Desmond calls the 
“overdeterminacy” of being,273 the sapiential saturation of material reality in virtue of its origin 
in God’s creativity. Like Gadamer, Augustine sees nature as replete with “question-able” content, 
which stands in need of being disclosed by directed enquiry. 
Augustine’s protreptic to interrogation in s. 241 is consummated in the following 
crescendo: “interrogate those things, all of them respond to you: ‘Behold, look, we are beautiful.’ 
Their beauty is their confession.”274 Augustine establishes a clear link between beauty and truth: 
pulchritudo eorum, confessio eorum.275 He even says that creation “speaks” to one, saying “We 
are beautiful.”276 On Augustine’s view, the world is engaged in a dialogue with the human heart, 
and the language it speaks is that of beauty.277 Augustine’s understanding of “interrogating” the 
beauty of the universe and natural phenomena provides a deeper source for thinking about the 
notion of questioning and insight which we have encountered in Gadamer. Moreover, Augustine’s 
understanding of pulchritudo is interesting here, as he understands it in profoundly cognitive and 
intelligible terms. But more importantly, in order for one to be able to see this beauty requires an 
initial vision or intuition which is not ultimately reducible to “empirical” observation; rather, the 
latter presupposes the former. So just as is the case with sapiential knowledge, the understanding 
of beauty requires a concerted effort on the part of the seeker of truth, which is both intellectual 
and ascetical. However, this intellectual perception presupposes an even more basic faculty, 
namely that of the mind’s gaze, the capacity for discerning objects of intellectual vision and of 
seeing what admits of the possibility of being interrogated. In other words, pulchritudo at a very 
basic level represents something which admits of intelligible content which can be further 
disclosed by means of focused and concentrated enquiry; in a word, instantiations of beauty in 
the created world, or indeed, the created world itself, represents, in Taylor’s words, a “text-
analogue,”278 or an object of enquiry which is, as Gadamer puts it, “question-able.”279 The very 
capacity to interrogate reality presupposes the capacity to see what can be questioned, and indeed, 
what is inviting one to question, that which draws one’s attention. Such an epistemic model, as 
we have seen, is grounded in a cosmology informed by Genesis and the concept of creatio ex 
nihilo. The locus of Augustine’s interrogatio is none other than within himself. Hence the act of 
                                                          
270 Cf. Giraud, “Signum et vestigium,” 268; lib. arb. 2.16.41; mus. 6.7.17. 
271 ciu. 11.27.2, CCSL 48, p. 347; Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 48-9. 
272 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 47-8. 
273 Chrétien, L’appel et la réponse, 50. 
274 s. 241.2, PL 38, p. 1134: “interroga ista, respondent tibi omnia: ecce uide, pulchra sumus. pulchritudo 
eorum, confessio eorum.” Einstein too was apparently affected by beauty, even to the point of something like a 
transcendent or mystical experience of the divine. See Denis Brian, Einstein: A Life (Wiley, 1996), 193, cited in Max 
Jammer, Einstein and Religion (Princeton University Press, 1999), 19 (n. 6). 
275 s. 241.2, PL 38, p. 1134. 
276 s. 241.2, PL 38, p. 1134. 
277 Cf. Cilleruelo, “‘Deum uidere’ en San Augustín,” 8. 
278 Taylor, “Interpretation,” 3. 
279 Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” 154; GW 2, 228. 
Principal Elements of a Sapiential-Hermeneutical Theology 
294 
interrogating creation is an act which is grounded in a sapiential account of human reason as 
divine illumination. 
The use of the term interrogare in s. 241 is striking, and bespeaks a certain theological, 
and indeed, hermeneutical approach to the content in question. According to Burton, this term 
admits of two senses, one of which involves a directed question, one which seeks to elicit a binary 
response, a Yes or a No. Augustine was aware of this sense of interrogare, and a discussion of 
this term is also located in Cicero’s De fato 28.280 The use of the term interroga as applied to the 
beauty of nature is particularly interesting here for another reason, as Augustine uses this very 
term when he exhorts his audience to “interrogate” a particular person or biblical book (e.g., 
Isaiah, John, or Paul, “the apostle”) in order to elicit an answer to a difficult question.281 Chrétien 
emphasises that we must interrogate the beauty of nature, that is, to look with direction and 
purpose. We cannot look with a simple passivity.282 In other words, an interrogation is a dynamic, 
reciprocal process. In my estimation, one only interrogates someone who can respond 
intelligently. For instance, one cannot interrogate a cash point, but one can interrogate a person, 
a text, or some other sort of thing which is invested with intelligible content.283 Hence it is 
interesting that Augustine, who so often speaks of interrogating people and texts, would use the 
same term to impel his listeners to enquire into nature, even stating that it can “respond” to one. 
What I want to say is that the term interroga implies a committed sense of searching, even in 
response to a summons, and hence more than mere curiosity. In an interrogation, one does not ask 
open-ended questions, or at least has a particular sense of direction in which one is moving and a 
certain (type of) answer for which one is looking. In fact, in the directed-ness of question, a certain 
hermeneutical process is at work, for one has a presentiment of answer which one wishes to 
complete and to refine in light of further information, a point we have noted with respect to 
Augustine’s exegesis of Daniel 5 in Gn. litt. 12. 
We have seen how figures such as Gadamer, Collingwood, and Chrétien approach the 
theme of questioning from a primarily philosophical perspective. Augustine’s approach is 
consistent with this. We can glean further theological insight from a recent work which 
approaches the topic of questioning a biblical context. In his brief treatise What Do You Seek?, 
M. Buckley draws upon the questions Christ poses, in particular in the Gospel of John, as a locus 
theologicus.284 Buckley’s work can be seen as arising from the insight that “We are closer to God 
when we are asking questions than when we think we have the answers.”285 One of the main 
functions of a question, especially one posed by Jesus, is to confront one with oneself, to compel 
one to engage in self-reflection.286 Hence for Buckley, every question is a variation on the 
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question, Who are you?287 The source of such a question, being divine, one is drawn by something 
greater than oneself.288 The questioning which confronts us originates in the divine, and we are 
drawn by the divine and by the promise of our future.289 Questions give direction and meaning to 
human life, and the answers they elicit are often a lifetime in the making.290 
Buckley presents a theory of questioning similar to that of Gadamer, as for him, a properly 
formulated question leaves plenty of room for answers.291 Indeed, it opens one to the possibility 
of acknowledging the truth.292 As Buckley writes, “This summons to truth issues from the very 
heart of the question. To be brought to acknowledge the primordial imperative and supremacy of 
truth is to come to recognize the presence and claim of God.”293 Buckley touches upon one of the 
virtues of an “interrogative” theory of reasoning, as it forestalls any form of dogmatism and 
disingenuous argumentation. Moreover, a question is so simple, and yet so profound, as it 
provides the opportunity for us to see what is “already there.”294 In analysing a question and 
formulating responses to it, one may draw upon previous stores of data and yield new insights 
from them, or find a new shade of significance or a novel application or interpretation.295 The 
ability to ask a question or to entertain it seriously is to acknowledge one’s own ignorance and 
finitude.296 Questions can disrupt the prior patterns of life.297 In another idiom, they provide the 
opportunity for the challenging of one’s prejudices. 
The interrogative theory of knowledge elaborated here based on Gadamer and Augustine, 
among others, stands in stark contrast to the way that the modern dispensation understands 
questioning. Chrétien contrasts a truly open form of interrogation, one which presupposes an 
“overdetermined” source to all of reality, with a “modern” approach, according to which the world 
is viewed as an empty, neutral space. Such an approach also influences the genre of one’s enquiry, 
and hence the types of questions one asks. The result is that within the latter dispensation, any 
meaningful sense of dialogue is precluded, and the sense of questioning assumes the form of a 
forced response. In contrast, the former approach is realised in a certain “existential” way. 
Questioning is highly dynamic, as one opens oneself, puts oneself at risk, en jeu, as it were, and 
thereby becomes receptive to what may exceed one, may surprise one or challenge one’s 
prejudices. By questioning, one’s interlocutor is valorised, and allowed to speak with some 
freedom, in a way which is neither compelled nor forced. Chrétien contrasts this model of 
questioning suggested by Augustine with another way of questioning, which takes the form of 
forcing a particular (type of) response, rather than asking an open, though directed, question. Thus 
Chrétien: 
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Kant écrit, à propos de la physique, que la raison ‘doit obliger la nature à répondre à ses 
questions,’ et qu’elle est ‘comme un juge en fonction qui force les témoins à répondre aux 
questions qu'il leur pose,’ cette interrogation ne suppose pas une voix visible, ni que l'œil 
écoute en étant appelé, surpris et saisi, mais que ‘la raison ne voit que ce qu'elle produit elle-
même d’après ses propres plans,’ ce qui est le contraire d'écouter. La démarche expérimental 
est soliloque plus que dialogue. L’idée centrale n’est pas ici celle de question, mais celle de 
réponse forcée. La réponse ne saurait aucune façon excède notre question.298 
 
Chrétien’s take on the Kantian approach to interrogation suggests a certain imposition of “our” 
categories onto nature, an “epistemic violence.” In contrast, what I have aimed to show is that 
there is a dynamism and reciprocity to the Augustinian sense of interrogation, in which the world 
can also come to one. This movement involves an aspect of hermeneutical intuition: one is 
summoned, called, invited by the “question-able” reality in front of one. One simultaneously 
knows it and does not. One is invited to investigate it further and from that enquiry derive 
important cognitive knowledge. This whole process, though it certainly relies on “empirical” 
sense data, is enabled, as Augustine suggests in Gn. litt., by the direction of one’s intellect, of 
one’s perceiving of cognoscenda and one’s undertaking efforts to examine them further.299 
 One can find some support for this view from a surprising source. In his work on the 
history of scientific revolutions, T. Kuhn writes of the directed-ness to scientific enquiry, even at 
the most rudimentary level. One’s experiments are dictated by the theoretical commitments, and 
therefore the hypotheses, which one formulates.300 These insights, according to Bernstein, were 
occasioned by the growing awareness in the 20th century of the importance of interpretation and 
how it figures in every form of enquiry.301 One has a certain expectation, a fore-understanding of 
what one will discover, and accordingly one seeks to confirm or challenge it. Even the design and 
deployment of apparatus and instruments involve this intentional element. In addition, the 
appearance of anomaly, itself a driver of scientific advancement, only appears as such against the 
backdrop of some rational expectation.302 In other words, guided by a certain hermeneutical 
sensibility, one is able to see what is “questionable.” Indeed, this suggests a certain dialectical 
relation between the empirical and the intentional, insofar as “empirical” perception is already 
linked with the intentional and presupposes it, and further perception encourages theoretical 
revision and precision, which leads in turn to novel and different sense perceptions. The 
questioning aspect of scientific investigation is not completely open, but is rather directed and 
guided by particular standards and expectations.303 Moreover, certain implied restrictions are 
placed on the type or the scope of potential solutions to a given quandary, as well as on the 
methods appropriate to ascertaining an answer.304 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In chapter five, we encountered Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics in terms of 
interrogation and questioning. This insight gains further significance when placed into 
conversation with Augustine’s dialogue with the natural order. The result is a reversal of the way 
in which reason is understood. In other words, rational enquiry, even if guided by presuppositions 
and faith commitments, need not result in dogmatism, fideism, or question-begging. I shall have 
more to say about this in the following chapter. For now we can note two key points. First, one’s 
articulation of a question is a response to a summons from outwith. The beginning of one’s 
enquiry is framed by the reality present to one. Secondly, this framing is always incomplete, both 
in virtue of the inherent limitations of one’s personal knowledge and the finitude of the outside 
world. As a result, and this is the second key point, true novelty and interruption remain 
possibilities, whether in terms of discoveries in terms of content or the disclosure of previously 
unrecognised prejudices. Interrogation, as we have noted, involves a certain presentiment of the 
type of answer one expects to receive, but a true question allows room for surprise or difference. 
Previously I quoted Lawrence on the significance of questioning for hermeneutics, and now this 
sentence can assume deeper significance: “Conscious intentionality as questioning safeguards 
meaning from becoming a closed totality, while not completely forsaking all definition.”305 Here 
we also see a felicitous uia media between modern and postmodern versions of rationality. The 
dialogue effected here between Augustine and Gadamer results in a reversal, as we come to see 
rationality in terms of being addressed first from without, and subsequently responding. 
Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, this process is deepened and continued especially 
as one realises one’s prejudices as prejudices, foregrounds them so that one can understand what 
is already there. 
So grounded in our initial capacity to see in a way which exceeds the bonds of the 
“merely” empirical, we are led to a further dialogue with creation around us. In fact, we are led 
to recognise its beauty and grandeur, in virtue of its intelligibility. From this our soul conducts a 
dialogue with the world, as we have seen. What does it say to us? Creation speaks of its beauty, 
to be sure, but this declaration is always indexed to its source; Augustine reports the inherently 
apophatic, referential nature of the world’s speech. Above all, it declares the glory and the infinite 
source of its beauty, namely God. An attentive listener to the cosmos realises in this dialogue the 
nature of one’s limitations. We are directed towards the source not just of natural bodies, but of 
our own being and our rational faculties. This realisation may surprise us. In the hermeneutical 
process itself such prejudices must be distinguished one from the other.306 In this case of listening 
to nature, our prejudice of finitude is disclosed, which is to say our extension in space and time. 
Once the prejudice of our four-dimensional situation is foregrounded, remarkable leaps 
in knowledge and insight become possible. A close consideration of Augustine’s thought, 
analysed according to a Gadamerian hermeneutical method, have allowed us to make this 
realisation. However, Augustine goes further in what he has to say about our prejudices. He does 
not simply wish to challenge our prejudices of time and space, but even the notion of 
dimensionality itself, a result of created corporeality. 
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8. GRADUAL ELEMENTS OF A SAPIENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL 
THEOLOGY 
ACKNOWLEDGING AND TRANSCENDING OUR FINITUDE 
 
Deep into that darkness peering, long I 
stood there wondering, fearing, 
 
Doubting, dreaming dreams no 
mortals ever dared to dream before1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The foregoing part of this constructive enquiry has led us to the following point: we are 
finite. What may seem like a trivial or tautological observation is replete with epistemic meaning 
and significance according to both Augustine and Gadamer. We learn this from our dialogue with 
reality, the result of a more fundamental capacity to see its intelligibility and to listen to it speaking 
to us. Once we have realised this, we are now ready to deepen our attunement and engage in 
dialogue. What we have been told by being, however, is even more cryptic, concealing more than 
it reveals. In order to understand the importance of our finitude for a sapiential-hermeneutical 
theology, one can think of this as a meta-prejudice, applying Gadamer’s concept to our spatio-
temporal situation. 
In Part I, I characterised Augustine’s account of time as distentio as “re-descriptive.” By 
that I meant the following. Augustine at first blush is not putting forward a normative claim about 
what time should be, or what it should mean for human rationality. Rather, he is attempting to 
determine the way in which we interact with(in) time, and from there to determine what if any 
consequences there are for us as human beings, particularly for our knowledge and reason. From 
that descriptive basis, as Hannan also writes, one can be led to formulating prescriptive claims. 
Now having passed through the discussion of Gadamer’s approach to Vorurteil, Augustine’s re-
description of time can be cast in a new light. The very act of identifying time as distentio 
represents a foregrounding of one’s spatio-temporal prejudice. In turn, this also means 
recognising what is already the case, but that he previously failed fully to appreciate and 
recognise. By identifying a prejudice as a prejudice, one is then enabled to transcend it. This will 
be the focus of the following chapter, in particular how the foregrounding of our ontological 
prejudice is possible and the extent to which that allows us to transcend our finite spatio-temporal 
situation. 
My task in the following chapter is to raise the closely related concepts of prejudice and 
horizon to an ontological, philosophical level.2 I believe that Gadamer’s discussion of the 
implications of human finitude can allow us to view it as a meta-prejudice, the result of which is 
that our situation in space-time comes to be understood as a prejudice of an “ontological” nature. 
The result would be that growth in knowledge would require us to become critically aware of our 
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received “four-dimensional” ways of thinking and perceiving, yet without leaving this behind 
entirely. This is what a sapiential theology grounded in Augustine calls for, and even Augustine 
himself articulates a similar programme in certain locations. Gadamer provides us with a 
framework for thinking more concretely about how a dialogue with the world would take place, 
and how this dialogue would also be meaningful with respect to adjusting and changing our 
prejudices. Informed by Augustine, the result would be that in a genuine hermeneutical encounter 
with reality, one characterised by openness to being, one’s ontological prejudices are challenged, 
namely those of time and space. I believe that Augustine provides us with a template for such an 
experience from which we can draw lessons for a contemporary sapiential-hermeneutical 
theology. 
 
8.1 FINITUDE 
 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and in particular his understanding of finitude, is informed by 
a deeply religious element. In fact, some would claim that Gadamer’s understanding of historicity 
is in principle nothing more than an acknowledgement of human finitude, and as such compatible 
with a broadly Christian worldview.3 According to Eberhard, Gadamer noted the inner 
restlessness to which religion and philosophy respond.4 Gadamer locates in Platonism an inchoate 
albeit enduring understanding of human finitude with respect to knowledge.5 This is particularly 
evident, he writes, due to the way in which Plato’s understanding of beauty is reflected in 
hermeneutics.6 Gadamer’s thought is grounded in Socratic docta ignorantia.7 Here we see a link 
with Augustine’s sympathy for pia ignorantia, as well as the notion that the confrontation with 
the ineffability of the divine can serve a protreptic function.8 The openness necessary for 
challenging our prejudices and growing in understanding is based upon knowing that we do not 
know, which in turn provides the basis for our desire to know. We cannot wish to know something 
when we do not even realise our initial ignorance.9 For Gadamer, religion generally speaking, and 
Christianity in particular, also remind one of one’s ultimate finitude. A biblically-informed theory 
of knowledge recognises its historicity, especially because of scripture’s emphasis on transience 
and flux.10 
Gadamer sees certain facets of our human nature as requiring our acceptance.11 From 
such a realisation, Gadamer also attempts in WM to determine what this means for human 
understanding in actu,12 to investigate the “conditions of the possibility” of understanding.13 
According to Grondin, insofar as Gadamer is concerned with facets of our being beyond our direct 
control, his hermeneutics is “philosophical.”14 Indeed, Gadamer’s approach to prejudice is based 
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4 Eberhard, “Gadamer and Theology,” 288. 
5 Gadamer, TM, 502; GW 1, 490. 
6 Gadamer, TM, 502; GW 1, 490. 
7 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 168. 
8 s. 117.2.3; 3.5, PL 38, pp. 662-4. Cf. Heßbrüggen-Walter, “Augustine’s Critique of Dialectic,” 191. 
9 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 168. 
10 Zimmermann, “Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” 164. 
11 Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” 147; GW 2, 219. 
12 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 165. 
13 Petit, “Herméneutique philosophique et théologie,” 165. 
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on the idea that our reasoning is shaped by a variety of factors which mould us more than we 
mould them; even when we evaluate them and foreground them, something about our prejudices 
remains beyond our complete comprehension.15 Much of what constitutes our identity is given to 
us before we even become aware of it. Our finite, bodily nature therefore implies that complete 
understanding is never fully attainable. This applies as much to a particular content as well as to 
knowledge of oneself.16 This is behind Gadamer’s understanding of human finitude.17 
 
8.1.1. Fishbane on finitude 
 
Fishbane’s rich reflections and insights on finitude can complement and lay the 
foundation for my discussion below. Fishbane locates in the Torah a reminder of the ineluctable 
finitude of our bodies and our souls. The latter pertains to our concepts and the inherent limitations 
present in them, due to our spatio-temporal and historical situation.18 Fishbane speaks of 
“hermeneutical finitude” and “interpretive finitude” which impinge not only upon particular 
conceptions or ideas we generate, but on the very process of perception itself. Our finitude affects 
the lenses through which we view the world and the very categories according to which we think 
and judge.19 Remez serves to remind us of our hermeneutical limitations when we are confronted 
with an apparent insight.20 One must always be cognisant therefore that the entirety of human 
activity takes place within these limitations.21 
 As for bodily finitude, the very recognition of flux, of change, of increase and decrease, 
bespeaks our knowledge of our own finitude,22 symbolised in its ultimate form by death.23 For 
instance, human breath, understood theologically, reminds us of our smallness in the face of 
God,24 our integral relation to the world, and that God is the source of our life.25 Fishbane writes 
that attention to human breathing transfigures each instance thereof and reveals it as a primordial 
Yes to God and his gift of life. From this realisation, certain moral implications can be discerned, 
not least of all the need to make sod manifest in one’s peshat.26 The successive states of time 
involved in our hearing, Fishbane suggests, also remind us of our finitude and our temporal 
situation, of “duration as such.”27 Fishbane engages in a similar exercise of intentio, grounding 
an attentive reflection on lived human experience in light of the Torah. The recognition of and 
reflection upon our finitude leads us directly to a contemplative examination of the infinite.28 
                                                          
15 Wachterhauser, “Prejudice, Reason and Force,” 231-2. 
16 Eberhard, “Gadamer and Theology,” 286, 288, 291. 
17 Wachterhauser, “Prejudice, Reason and Force,” 232. 
18 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 202. 
19 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 202. 
20 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 106-7. 
21 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 203-4. 
22 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 202. 
23 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 204. 
24 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 207. 
25 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 100. 
26 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 101. 
27 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 99. 
28 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 204. 
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An attentive reading of scripture can result in what Fishbane calls “caesural moments.”29 
In a sense, these are events in which our prejudices are challenged, and we are awakened from 
our dogmatic slumber.30 At times, it is the very oddities of a text itself which motivate one to 
investigate other passages in the search for clarity and understanding.31 Furthermore, Fishbane 
also suggests a way of recuperating this lesson at a different level, as one’s experience of God 
challenges one’s “ontological” prejudices (my gloss).32 God and his majesty interrupt the 
quotidian experience of the world, and yet God uses material realities as a medium of 
communication.33 Fishbane notes Moses’ first theophanic encounter, namely God’s appearance 
in a bush which, though on fire, was not consumed. In this encounter, God’s presence is 
manifested in and through the natural world, but in a way which is disruptive of one’s ordinary 
experience.34 In fact, it is this peculiarity of the burning bush which seizes Moses’ attention in the 
first place.35 
 
8.1.2 Interpreting finitude as meta-prejudice36 
 
 The point I want to make is that our finitude, represented especially in terms of our spatio-
temporal extension, constitutes a prejudice in the Gadamerian sense of the term, insofar as it both 
offers a standpoint but also can run the risk of occluding our vision. In a word, this could also be 
described as Adam and Eve in exile. I find some support for this view in Zimmermann, who holds 
that Christian categories of human limitation due both to sin and to finitude are congenial to the 
hermeneutical commitment to the inherent limitations of reason.37 Under the influence of 
Heidegger, hermeneutics casts human finitude not as privation but as position.38 Our finitude is a 
finitude of indefinite openness.39 In this dialogue of Augustine and Gadamer I would like to take 
this insight a step further. As we have seen, part of the hermeneutical task for Gadamer is the 
challenging of our prejudices. Whilst these are useful and even necessary, they also in some cases 
stand be transcended, as they can obfuscate our vision, rather than facilitate our access to truth. 
According to Gadamer, the proper practise of hermeneutics relies on one’s critical evaluation of 
one’s own “hermeneutical situation.”40 This investigation will enable one to identify and isolate 
one’s preconceived beliefs and categories, at which point one will be enabled to investigate and 
assess the validity of these beliefs.41 Gadamer likens unexamined and unidentified prejudices to 
a light hidden under a bushel, that is, essentially worthless.42 It seems that what Gadamer is saying 
                                                          
29 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 82. 
30 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 82; “dogmatic slumber” is famously Kant’s term. 
31 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 76. 
32 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 60. 
33 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 52-3. 
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35 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 57. 
36 For a discussion of related themes in recent philosophical and systematic literature, see, e.g., Hud Hudson, 
The Fall and Hypertime (Oxford: University Press, 2014) and R. T. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, Oxford 
Studies in Analytic Theology (Oxford: University Press, 2016). 
37 Zimmermann, “Confusion of Horizons,” 97. 
38 Di Cesare, “Hermeneutics as Philosophy,” 180. 
39 Di Cesare, “Hermeneutics as Philosophy,” 185. 
40 Gadamer, Le problème de la conscience historique, 72. 
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42 Gadamer, Le problème de la conscience historique, 76-7. 
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is that prejudices provide an initial orientation towards a content and subsequent guidance, but 
this can only be realised if they are foregrounded within the dynamic of the hermeneutical circle 
itself. The interrogation of these prejudices results in a deepening of knowledge and 
understanding, simultaneously of the Sache and of oneself. On the basis of Gadamer’s 
observations, we can now proceed to the task of determining our “hermeneutical situation” in all 
of its ontological, existential radicality, and evaluate these preconditions of our understanding 
accordingly. 
As I see it, Augustine speaks of two major types of “prejudices” in Gadamerian terms, 
one of which is our finitude, that is, our created-ness, and the very fact that we have come into 
being from nothing and are utterly dependent at every moment on God’s providential care.43 As 
such, this prejudice is not necessarily negative, as it simply provides one with a Standpunt, a 
particular way of accessing the world. However, it still needs to be challenged in order to arrive 
at a more comprehensive view of truth. Secondly, our sinfulness constitutes a prejudice, insofar 
as it re-orients our thoughts and provides us with a starting point which obscures rather than 
deconceals truth.44 
Perhaps we could take an example from the game of baseball in order to illustrate this 
point. It is not a result of my colonial background that I select this example, but rather because 
baseball, and in particular the field on which it is played, is asymmetrical, unlike many other 
“major” sports. Even in baseball’s cousin cricket, the batter can put the ball in play behind him, 
an option unavailable to a batter in baseball. Our own “horizontal” experience of the world 
bespeaks an asymmetrical structure. This point concerning the significance of and the evolution 
of the concept of the horizon will be clarified anon. 
In the meantime, however, let us think for instance of a third baseman: his position 
situates him within a particular part of the diamond, such that he has a particular way of seeing 
the rest of the infield. He participates in the game in virtue of being a third baseman, and of being 
placed near the base itself. Moreover, his situation is inseparable from the overall field; there is 
no such thing as “third base simpliciter.” Without the overall field, “third base” is meaningless. 
In a similar way, one is given to be within a broader framework of meaning. It is in virtue of being 
situated within this framework that one “is” and interacts with the world. So one’s prejudices, 
derived from one’s standpoint, orient one’s attention to the world and are simply constitutive of 
one’s experience. 
 However, in virtue of revealing, a prejudice or a standpoint can also conceal. The third 
baseman cannot see the outfield behind him. He also has a particular orientation towards home 
plate, such that it is difficult for him to perceive the precise part of the plate towards which the 
pitcher is attempting to throw. So in virtue of being at third base, one is both afforded and denied 
certain perspectives. However, as we have already seen, third base is related to the rest of the 
playing field; hence the third baseman has to bear in mind his position relative to others, and how 
he should plan his actions. For instance, if a ground ball is hit to him, he will need to have a sense 
of the location of other bases, such as first base, as well as the man covering it. Taking this 
example with a pinch of salt, the lesson can again be applied to a hermeneutical interpretation of 
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our situation in reality. Our own perspective limits us, not just spatially, and stands in need of 
being challenged and overcome. We do this in particular by our linguistic capacity to distance 
ourselves from our environment. As we have seen regarding Gadamer’s approach to language, 
we have a certain mental capacity for motion of a sort. Even though we remain situated in our 
environment, we are not bound to it.45 Furthermore, it seems that because one is integrally bound 
to the world around one, one’s standpoint is always “more” than itself, so to speak. Hence there 
is a fundamental motivation to challenge one’s prejudice, to think beyond one’s situation in the 
world. This process of “moving” or re-orienting one’s perspective is not primarily a physical or 
spatial operation, but rather a mental one.46 
 Here the work of figures such as N. Trakakis on the concepts of time, space, and place 
from a theological perspective can be helpful. Trakakis’ concern is that the related but distinct 
concepts of space and place are neglected or diminished as theologically and philosophically 
unimportant, especially with respect to time.47 One of the major motivations for such a view is 
the observation that certain schools of philosophy and theology have placed a strong emphasis on 
absolute or essential truths in such a way that the importance of temporality for human knowledge 
has been overlooked.48 Trakakis also cites an example from conversations in 20th-century 
philosophy. In response to the “de-temporalising” (my gloss) project of Russell and Whitehead, 
A. N. Prior, inter alia, argued that tense can never be eradicated from language.49 Prior’s position 
serves as further motivation for Trakakis’ theological enquiry into the significance of time and 
space for human reason. 
Trakakis takes space to refer to extension or dimensionality,50 a definition which he 
derives from that of Malpas, according to whom space is “the realm of atemporal physical 
extension.”51 Following M. Augé, Trakakis understands space as that which constitutes the setting 
in which our development as persons can occur.52 The latter also follows E. Casey, according to 
whom “Nothing we do is unplaced.”53 In other words, be extended in time and space is part and 
parcel of what it means for us to be human, and by extension what it means to reason, think, 
experience, and know. In addition, it is crucial to note that for Trakakis, space is neither purely 
objective nor merely subjective, but results from the essential interplay between the two and is 
constituted by the inherent inter-digitation of subject and world.54 Similarly, Malpas holds that 
place does not so much come to one in experience but is constitutive of (the possibility of) 
experience.55 For Malpas, “place is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience.”56 
This view is derived from Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein,57 such that for both Malpas and 
                                                          
45 Gadamer, TM, 459-61; GW 1, 446-8. 
46 Cf. Gadamer, TM, 460; GW 1, 448. 
47 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 316. 
48 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 316. 
49 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 316. 
50 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 320. 
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54 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 321. 
55 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 321. 
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Gradual Elements of a Sapiential-Hermeneutical Theology 
305 
Heidegger, in Trakakis’ words, “place is constitutive of human existence, so that any 
understanding of the structure and possibility of human thought and experience is inseparable 
from an understanding and appreciation of the concept of place.”58 According to Malpas, one 
cannot separate the thinker, the thought, and the setting in which the thought occurs.59 Malpas’ 
understanding of human cognition envisions an integral link between subject and world, as well 
as between subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and space.60 Cognition is enabled and made possible 
not simply by the subject and the object, but by the situation of the subject within the world.61  
In light of the analysis of figures such as Trakakis, and in combination with the foregoing 
consideration of Gadamer’s understanding of prejudice, horizon, and the hermeneutical circle, we 
arrive at the following conclusion: We can raise prejudice to the ontological level, in keeping with 
the spirit of Gadamer’s entire hermeneutical programme. Could we therefore speak of a “meta-
prejudice,” that is, a condition of the possibility of prejudice, which is more basic and 
comprehensive than any particular prejudice, and even grounds those individual prejudices 
themselves? If so, our finitude would thus be interpreted as such a meta-prejudice. 
Gadamer views our temporal and historical situation itself as a key facet of 
hermeneutics.62 A hermeneutical way of thinking is distinctive of a finite mind,63 and this 
hermeneutical relationship to the world is a result of our finitude.64 An infinite mind would not 
think hermeneutically; it is a particularly spatio-temporal form of thought. “Hermeneutics,” 
Grondin writes, “is a thought about finitude […] This knowledge of the limit is one of our 
mortality, always present, but deferred.”65 Gadamer encourages us to remember that the 
interpreter’s access to an object is presented within a spatio-temporal framework.66 Citing Kant, 
Gadamer suggests that our knowledge is conditioned by the spatio-temporal world we inhabit.67 
In addition to Kant, Heidegger’s thought is at work here too.68 Scraire situates Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics in the context of Heidegger’s thought on Dasein, in particular how 
the latter emphasises the temporal and historical nature of understanding, resulting in a 
“metaphysics of finitude.”69 Grondin concurs, stating that the upshot of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics is indeed a “metaphysics of finitude,”70 in which Gadamer attempts to come to terms 
with the implications of the human situation in space and time and what this implies for our ways 
                                                          
58 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 321. 
59 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 322. 
60 Trakakis, “Deus Loci,” 322. 
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63 Gadamer, TM, 502; GW 1, 490-1. 
64 Gadamer, TM, 473; GW 1, 461. Cf. Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, 152. 
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of knowing, both individually and collectively.71 We shall remain with the former for the moment, 
and return to the latter anon, in particular under the aspect of complementarity. 
 Drawing upon the notion of a looking glass, a speculum, Gadamer speaks of the 
“speculative person” who does not take the mere appearances of reality as the final word with 
respect to the real. Such a mind is distinguished by its propensity for reflecting on and 
interrogating its experiences of the world and seeking the truth of what lies behind or beneath 
them.72 As Gadamer himself defines the term, “speculative signifies the exact opposite to the 
dogmatism of everyday experience.”73 In other words, one’s thoughts are always subjected to a 
critical review, the performance of which constitutes, in Gadamer’s words, the “speculative 
essence of philosophy.”74 As he explained it later in his life, the “speculative” reflex could be seen 
as a logical result of the nature of language itself, as a statement inherently includes an element 
of provisionality, contingency, and uncertainty, which stands in need of further interrogation, 
discussion, and learning.75 “The unaccustomed blockage that thought undergoes when the 
contents of a proposition compel thought to give up its cognitive habits constitutes, in fact, the 
speculativeness of all philosophy.”76 Gadamer speaks of a state of mind known as “insight,” 
whereby one disabuses oneself of a false notion or is liberated in a certain sense by truth.77  The 
speculative, hermeneutical spirit is that quiet voice within one which serves as the devil’s 
advocate in every sort of epistemic situation.78 Could I be wrong about this? Could I be missing 
something here? Is there an element of my own experience or perspective which is off in some 
way? These are the sorts of questions which are raised in minds which are healthily self critical. 
It is the mark of the pathological narcissist that everything must be interpreted in their own 
categories, and who lacks any sense of empathy for the perspective of another. The hermeneutical 
consciousness is fostered by what Fishbane calls “caesural moments,” in that every time one 
experiences a revelatory insight, one steadily becomes more and more attuned to the apophatic 
nature of reason. As soon as one becomes secure in one’s opinions, truth completely re-orients 
one and changes the entire paradigm in which one had been thinking. Rather than being the mark 
of the relativistic or the superficial, this is the mark of the one who is attuned to truth in an absolute 
sense, as well as the way in which it ever exceeds our finite cognitive grasp. 
 In contrast, the hermeneutical spirit, as we have seen, is one of continuous directed 
enquiry. The speculative “internal criticism” (as I call it) is represented most clearly by the act of 
questioning.79 According to Lawrence, a key aspect of the tradition of the metaphysics of light is 
the rejection of the empirically given as the extent of all there is or as comprehensively 
representing all there is.80 However, this epistemic discrepancy is a result of our own limitations: 
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The failure to perceive truth is a result of human limits, and has less to do with the thing itself.81 
The task of philosophy, in particular according to Heidegger, is to disabuse the mind of its false 
perceptions and interpretations, and to remove truth’s protective layers.82 Indeed, though a 
deconstruction, this process serves a positive, constructive purpose.83 
For Gadamer, hermeneutics is about one’s interaction with the whole of reality, one’s 
very act of understanding as such, in particular as situated within a finite world, the effects of 
which press upon us.84 One of the virtues of hermeneutics is its attempt to take seriously the place 
of human temporality in understanding.85 According to Scraire, Gadamer wishes to formulate a 
philosophy which does justice to the way in which finitude influences our knowing.86 Cognitive 
finitude bears implications for the content of what is evaluated. It can never be grasped at any one 
particular time.87 A hermeneutical consciousness requires a certain degree of intellectual humility, 
insofar as the truth is never under our total and complete control.88 Because of our finitude, we 
never truly arrive at a “final answer,” as our formulations never totally comprehend the subject 
matter. The “curse” of finitude can be realised as a blessing, Gadamer suggests, in the sense that 
our enquiries are in principle interminable, that our insights always stand in need of being 
deepened, refined, expanded, and more completely comprehended. Furthermore, such a 
realisation allows one to recognise the expansive possibilities of human rationality.89 
Therefore, one continuously and gradually grows in understanding.90 Gadamer locates 
within human thought a necessarily gradual, extended element, itself a result of our finitude; 
however, this is not to say that this extension is primarily temporal.91 Rather, Gadamer locates the 
“processual” element of thought with the associative process whereby one realises 
understanding.92 This is the true sense of the claim that reason is an inner dialogue of the soul, 
expressed in Plato and present in works by other figures such as Augustine.93 Our finitude requires 
us to strive for ever-greater knowledge, as in principle we cannot know all truth in our finite 
condition.94 The negativity of experience is both based in and leads us to the realisation of our 
finitude.95 One arrives at knowledge of oneself as a result of the “conversation which reality holds 
with the finite human subject.”96 Such a realisation also provides the basis for a growth in 
knowledge and an expansion or revision of one’s horizon. Cognisant of our finitude, and indeed 
in virtue of this, we are guided to search for truths which go beyond and transcend it.97 
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As the prejudices which figure in our judgements are not conscious,98 the realisation of 
one’s “prejudicial” framework represents the first step towards challenging one’s prejudices. This 
principle is crucial both to Gadamer and Augustine. According to Di Cesare, in being attentive to 
oneself, one becomes capable of surpassing oneself.99 This known as the disposition of 
Wachsamkeit, which enables one to transcend, to open oneself to the other.100 To have self-
knowledge means especially to realise one’s limits.101 Similarly, as D. Babin states, one can only 
enter the indefinite hermeneutical search for truth if one is congisant of one’s own ignorance, 
which implies an awareness of one’s finite position.102 One is always susceptible to being 
disturbed by the unknown which lies beyond oneself.103 “By encountering the other,” Di Cesare 
says, “one’s own finitude becomes perceptible.”104 In other words, “our” limits are not “ours” in 
the sense that they are under our control.105 Rather, they (and thus we?) are constituted by the 
intersection of an I and a Thou.106 Once we recognise this new avenues are opened.107 
For Augustine, in our attempt to grow in wisdom, we must recognise and accept our 
temporality and our finitude; in doing so we are afforded an opportunity to have contact with the 
infinite, but mediated through our earthly state.108 Moreover, it is precisely the encounter with 
Christ that enables us to recognise our finitude, according to Augustine.109 We see an example of 
the recognition of one’s limitations in the confessio laudis as opposed to the confessio peccati, 
that is, that one both praises God and accuses oneself.110 As Williger suggests, there is a deeply 
pastoral dimension to Augustine’s discussion of confessio, for it is in acknowledging one’s sins 
that one takes the first step in overcoming them and altering the course of one’s life.111 The 
acceptance of our state transfigures us, makes us enjoy a new form.112 In confrontation with 
something radically different, as in the case of a different culture, our prejudices and assumptions 
may be foregrounded.113 In fact, such experiences may begin to reveal to us the true extent of our 
ignorance.114 One is led to discern the conditions of understanding precisely in those moments 
when normal understanding seems not to work.115 It is only in the act of being challenged that one 
comes to recognise a prejudice as a prejudice.116 Then, when our prejudices are placed in doubt, 
we are able to distance ourselves from them critically, to isolate them as claims or positions which 
require investigation and vetting.117 In this way, the veneer of dogma vanishes. Of course, this 
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entire process of hermeneutics requires a certain preparation on the part of the subject. As we 
have seen, Gadamer holds that it is a recognition of one’s finitude that grounds the hermeneutical 
enterprise, the search for truth. One must acknowledge that one does not know and seek to know 
in order to begin this arduous process.118 
 Certain experiences and observations challenge our prejudices if we are ready, and some 
even make us realise the prejudices that are so fundamental that we hardly even think of them as 
prejudices. Indeed, Gadamer suggests that for Heidegger, the uncovering of prejudice has to do 
with the recognition and the appreciation of our temporality.119 For example, certain scientific 
advances in the 20th century have shown the highly relative and situated character of our 
perspective on the universe. Hence the way in which we experience time and formulate a 
succession of sounds, as in music, for example, is highly dependent upon the way in which we 
generally experience time. We are situated in the world of time and space, and situated therein in 
a particular way. But it could be otherwise. 
The finitude of our being constrains our perspective on the universe. Imagine, for 
example, that we did not perceive light according to the spectrum that we do, or if we lived on a 
planet which orbited its sun at a very different rate of speed, such that the measurement of time 
would be completely foreign to our own. Or imagine that we were not subject to the vicissitudes 
of time and space, requiring the progression of time in order to perceive, know, and make sense 
of something. What if we could look at something in five-dimensional terms, seeing all of it 
present before us, and yet at the same time, all of it contained within one unit, synthesised, and 
yet losing nothing of its inner diversity, or view one particular object under a variety of different 
aspects. Imagine “seeing” five-dimensionally, that is, situated in a meta-dimension, viewing time 
in extension just as the three dimensions of space.120 One would be seeing in a way which goes 
beyond our familiar categories which are even more basic than any beliefs or ideas that we have. 
Here in my opinion we have the essence of hermeneutics, alerting us to the fact that we “are” in 
one way and not another. Such a realisation is not simply of “academic” interest but rather 
impinges upon our entire self-understanding. Even the visualisation of a five-dimensional 
perspective is nonetheless mediated through our four-dimensional experiential lenses. 
This point can be illustrated in more tangible terms by looking at Gadamer’s own life and 
context. For centuries, the “horizon” was itself seen as the asymptotic limit of our knowledge. 
This point was perfectly encapsulated in a recent TED talk given by Carter Emmart, the Director 
of Astrovisualization at the American Museum of Natural History. In describing his three-
dimensional digital illustration of the universe, Emmart states, “The flat horizon that we’ve 
evolved with has been a metaphor for the infinite, unbounded resources and unlimited capacity 
for disposal of waste. It wasn’t until we really left Earth, got above the atmosphere and had seen 
the horizon bend back on itself that we could understand our planet as a limited condition.”121 Of 
course it is well known that the idea that our planet is a sphere is nothing new and was held even 
in ancient Hellas. That is not the point, however; due to the nature of our embodied cognition, the 
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horizon is a visceral and compelling image which impresses itself upon us. It represents an 
asymptotic boundary in a very palpable and tactile way. So even if one can intellectually distance 
oneself from this, it is only with the advent of space travel that the full force of the horizon losing 
something of its flat character can truly influence and effect one, that it can disrupt or even 
challenge the previous received metaphor.122 
Researchers in various fields over the last few decades have noted the way in which 
embodiment figures prominently in cognition and leads to the generation of complex 
metaphorical systems,123 such as that according to which Knowing is seeing.124 As Gibbs writes, 
 
cognitive linguistic analyses maintain that some of the meanings of polysemous words are 
motivated by conventional metaphors such that the meaning of “see” referring to knowing or 
understanding is motivated by an enduring conceptual metaphor “Understanding is seeing.” 
A major trend in cognitive linguistic analyses of polysemy is showing the large extent to 
which these words’ meanings are historically derived from conceptual metaphors that are 
still active parts of human conceptual systems (Cuykens & Zawada, 2001; Lakoff, 1987; 
Sweester, 1990). Under this view, the lexical organization of polysemous words is not a 
repository of random, idiosyncratic information, but is structured by general cognitive 
principles, like conceptual metaphor, which are systematic and recurrent throughout the 
lexicon.125 
 
The content of the metaphor itself is at least partially derived from the experiential analogue, the 
phenomena of which are re-presented in the metaphor.126 As Gibbs notes, “recurring bodily 
experience” plays a key role in shaping conceptual metaphors.127 What I want to suggest is that 
the embodied experience of the horizon is behind Gadamer’s use of this image, which can be seen 
as a variation on the Knowing is seeing framework. However, new developments and experiences 
since Gadamer’s time have come to show that the intuitive appeal to a horizon is itself a prejudice. 
Gadamer published his WM when the space race was well and truly getting underway. The initial 
images returned from the outer reaches of earth’s atmosphere challenged the preconceived notion 
of the true limits of our perception. In other words, the full force of the concept of the horizon can 
only be felt when one is confined to a terrestrial setting, in which the horizon really marks in a 
palpable way the extent of one’s vision. 
The upshot is that scientific exploration has caused us to re-examine our own 
hermeneutical situation, which has in turn enabled us to foreground the very concept of the 
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horizon as itself a prejudice of our terrestrial habitation, not to mention what it means to “see” 
(the horizon). Our hermeneutical confrontation with the Sache of the universe in novel terms has 
forced us back on ourselves and caused us to re-evaluate our preconceived notions about our place 
in the cosmos and what that means for our understanding of reason and of ourselves. With 
contemporary advances in science, John Donne’s renowned lamentation, ’Tis all in pieces, all 
coherence gone, written in response to astronomical discoveries of Galileo is just as meaningful 
now as it was when he composed “The Anatomy of the World” in 1611. 
 
8.1.3 Augustine on corporeality 
 
In Part I of this enquiry, I discussed Augustine’s conception of time and space, and how 
these are ineluctable characteristics of corporeal, material creation. In fact, Augustine’s 
understanding of time finds its basis in the two creation narratives of Genesis. In one, creation is 
given to be, whereas in another it gradually comes to be over the course of a “week.” In virtue of 
being created, material entities are expressed in material form. As they move, grow, and suffer 
change and decay, time itself arises, indeed, is constituted by this corporeal motion. We of course 
are material beings, and so we experience space and time in such a way that it impinges upon our 
very being, our cognition and our capacity for knowledge. In virtue of being situated spatially, 
our perspective is conditioned and limited. This is not only true of our “physical” sense of sight, 
but also of our knowledge in general, insofar as our knowledge is mediated through the material 
world. Furthermore, in virtue of being spatial, we are also temporal. Especially in his conf. the 
temporal nature of our being comes to the fore, insofar as we are in tension, torn apart as a result 
of our call to the eternal whilst situated within time. Augustine’s description of corporeality and 
the epistemic implications it entails resonates with Gadamer’s understanding of prejudice and 
horizon, insofar as in virtue of being constituted as material beings we are afforded access to the 
world, indeed, biases of openness towards the world, and yet in virtue of these same biases we 
stand in danger of being blinded from truth. 
We are led to the conclusion that our four-dimensional world of time and space, and time 
and space themselves, are not the defining characteristics of the real. Our creaturely status 
constitutes an inherent limitation on us.128 Augustine himself suggests such a position when he 
quotes Paul (2 Cor 5:6), stating “As long as we are in the body we wander away from the Lord.”129 
According to Ripanti, the term peregrinatio in Augustine refers to the human situation in the 
grand scope of salvation history, in particular in existential and moral terms.130 The reason for 
this distance from God is that in this world we must combat constant assaults of the flesh. Even 
if we resist them successfully, they nonetheless enervate us: “If however we may be victorious 
by not consenting, we nevertheless suffer trouble by resisting delights.”131 Augustine also 
suggests that the mere bodily necessities of our quotidian existence exert some limiting effect on 
us, which could be realised in an epistemic way.132 Moreover, as I see it, in addition to the 
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quotidian vexations of our corporeal existence, our spatio-temporal situation inherently 
conditions our epistemic perspective, a limitation that an incorporeal being would not suffer. 
Hence man and his measures are not the measures of all things.133 This is a weighty proposition 
in itself, but must also be taken into consideration in the revision of one’s hermeneutical 
framework. A major challenge to our prejudices is the concept of the incorporeal, the timeless, 
the eternal, the implications of which are discussed by Augustine, especially as pertains to human 
knowing and finite being-in-the-world. For Augustine, the active initiation of God is required for 
transcendence to be realised.134 But this is mediated through the material world.135 One’s 
prejudices are not only challenged by new objects; a series of different objects is insufficient 
without divine aid, re-orienting one’s perspective.136 
In this respect, Augustine lauds the virtue of continence, in particular because of its 
unifying and ordering effect on the soul, which rescues one from the snares of division and 
separation in the distention of spatio-temporal existence. As Augustine writes, “through 
continence we are collected and returned into one, from which we have flowed out into many 
things.”137 Augustine employs the term for collecting (colligimur) and describes the effect of 
virtue as a return to inner unity (unum).138 Drawing a contrast between the many things of 
temporal existence as opposed to the enduring unity of the eternal (inter [Deum] et nos multos),139 
Augustine claims that the soul’s task is to recollect itself, to be collected and made a unity, indeed, 
the unity which reflects God’s eternity and which allows one to contain a serene sight within 
oneself.140 As Nightingale explains, the power of continentia is to pacify bodily desires, that is, 
desires for material things, for the sake of unification.141 The virtue of continence (continentia) 
plays a key part for Augustine. Though it is often viewed in terms of avoiding some sort of act, 
usually sexual, Augustine’s approach to this character trait is far deeper and more 
comprehensive.142 Rather, continence is that virtue which enables us to be reunited, as we have 
been scattered and torn apart in the multiplicity of material reality.143 The need for this virtue 
stems from the fact that memoria alone is not sufficient for the task of attaining sapientia; 
continence therefore is needed to counteract the debilitating and distracting effects of various 
thoughts.144 One can then hope for the complete integration of the self in eternity, improving and 
working gradually here on earth towards that goal.145 
Though he does not use ipsissima uerba, Augustine here invokes a notion found in other 
writings of his, namely the simplex cor, by which he means to designate the unity of the mind’s 
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faculty of willing and knowing the good. The heart is pulled hither, thither, and yon by 
multifarious (corporal) desires, preventing one from focusing on the timeless, eternal goal of 
union with God in heaven, challenging and competing with the divine voice in one: “But how 
will [the heart] be simple, if it serves two masters, if it does not purify its vision by the one focus 
on eternal things, but clouds it by the love of mortal and fleeting things?”146 When Augustine 
famously discusses time in the latter books of his conf., one of the points he is considering is the 
way in which corporal things distract the soul from its ultimate destiny in the immutable and 
eternal God. The distentio of the soul, its condition of being stretched, is caused by the unrelenting 
flow of time in which man is implicated. This entire process of re-collecting oneself tends towards 
the acquisition of truth, and hence one’s participation in God’s beautiful ordo, which begets peace 
in the soul.147 Perhaps Augustine was inspired in this respect by Plato, who in his Timaeus 
described time as the moving image of eternity.148 Thus the task of the soul was to “synchronise” 
the clock of one’s own incarnate life with that of the celestial cycles, to discern how heaven is 
reflected on earth.149 
 Augustine’s psalm example from the conf. serves to illustrate his theory of “four-
dimensional” cognition. Before he begins to recite, the entirety of the psalm is held in his memory 
(in totum expectatio mea tenditur) in a sort of timeless way, all together, yet losing none of its 
inherent variations.150 As he begins to recite it, the synthetic concept of the song must be stretched, 
as that is simply the way in which a song is sung or a poem recited in time.151 As he proceeds, the 
psalm gradually extends into the past and the future, the former, as this is the memory of what 
Augustine has just recited (cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, 
tenditur et memoria mea),152 and the future, in the preparation for what must follow (in 
expectationem propter quod dicturus sum).153 This linear process ultimately concludes when the 
entirety of the recitation has gone from the future to the past via the present, so to speak, and is 
thus contained in the memory as a past event entirely.154 
Furthermore, he writes that this description can apply at the macro- as well as the micro-
level. In addition to the overall song itself, Augustine sees this process at work with respect to the 
smaller constituent parts, even to the individual syllables (quod in toto cantico, hoc in singulis 
particulis eius, hoc in actione longiore, cuius forte particula est illud canticum).155 Moreover, 
Augustine’s understanding of time as a stretching or distention is intended to encompass all 
human activity, whether the recitation of a song or any other aspect of one’s life. Augustine’s 
song illustration is very deliberate. He believes that the description of the mind’s activity in 
reciting this psalm reflects its overall activity in a temporal world: “This in the whole life of a 
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person, the parts of which are all the actions of a person, this in the entire age of the children of 
men, the parts of which are all the lives of men.”156 Augustine’s identification of the example of 
the song as illustrative of a broader human reality implies a re-description of time as distentio, 
which is ipso facto a foregrounding of the ontological prejudice of temporal extension. 
From a philosophical perspective, therefore, Gadamer’s thoughts on prejudice can help 
us both to articulate further the intuitions Augustine presents in the Confessiones, as well as 
further disclose their significance. That is, reading Augustine with Gadamer in mind allows one 
to see the fuller significance of the former’s thought implicitly contained in his text. In a sense, 
what Augustine is outlining in conf. 10 and 11 is a programme for challenging and ultimately 
transcending those spatio-temporal prejudices which constitute our directedness with respect to 
the world around us. Augustine enables us to see that space and time are not some absolute 
realities, in the sense that though they condition us and provide us with our initial openness to the 
world, they can nonetheless obscure and obfuscate the truth as well. Our epistemic faculties are 
blocked due to a variety of factors, whether sin or human finitude. Furthermore, and as a result of 
this, we are “prejudiced” in favour of physical and material conceptions of God, trying to fit him 
into our finite categories.157 Those enslaved to the carnalis consuetudo are only capable of 
conceiving of God according to a spatio-temporal logic.158 In order to think God truly, one cannot 
think of him as spatial (nullus cogitetur per locorum spatia).159 Augustine realises this, and thus 
also delineates a path whereby one can counteract, challenge, and potentially overcome the 
inherently limiting effects of the four-dimensional characteristics of human existence, yet passing 
through them at the same time. This “horizontal” description of time prepares us for a vertical 
treatment of the same theme. In other words, we have only begun to bracket our spatio-temporal 
conditions, as Augustine thinks that this activity of coming to recognise our finitude and our 
corporeality is propaedeutic to if not constitutive of (self-)transcendence. 
 
8.2 TRANSCENDENCE 
 
At this point we have foregrounded the prejudice of our spatio-temporal finitude; but we 
can go further still. As Gadamer states, the next step in the hermeneutical process is to interrogate 
one’s prejudices and to examine one’s situation. This is what I shall seek to do now, taking 
Augustine as a guide. In this respect, we can focus on his appropriation of the Platonic schema 
which moves from the exterior to the interior to the superior. To this point, we have completed 
the first step on this path to transcendence, having surpassed the exterior, the world. But for 
Augustine, we can distance ourselves not only from time and space, but ultimately from our very 
selves, i.e., the interior, en route to God, who is infinitely superior. But what does it mean, what 
could it mean,160 to transcend or go “outside of” oneself? It is to this paradoxical question that we 
now turn. 
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The question of self-transcendence for Augustine cannot be explored apart from 
considerations of his vocabulary. A major problem is that Latin does not exactly have a word for 
“self,” and so one must recognise that the very term “self-transcendence” already represents a 
fairly significant gloss, about which more anon. In my estimation, the term ipse and its various 
forms come close, though these terms usually carry more of an indexical or intensive force than 
anything existential. Augustine uses a spectrum of terms to denote what we might call the self, in 
particular in relation to transcendence. These include mens, anima, personal pronouns (e.g., tu), 
and especially animus. As the historian of ideas R. Wiseman notes, the ancient Romans used 
anima and animus to denote the principle of life in the person, and that which remains after bodily 
death.161 The term animus appears frequently in contexts in which Augustine is discussing 
interiority, identity, and transcendence. One such example is located in book ten of the 
Confessiones. When he is discussing the transcendent truth of number, Augustine recounts that it 
was he himself who saw and cognised this form. This brief passage shows that animus carries for 
Augustine a sense of personal identity, an intellectual centre, and some contact with the divine.162 
As for the act of transcendence, Augustine uses various forms of the verbs transcendo and 
transeo,163 both of which in their literal definitions denote a primarily spatial sense of movement 
across or beyond some boundary. However, the context of Augustine’s assertions and even the 
qualifications he himself includes show that this form of movement is not spatial but rather mental 
and conceptual, as we shall see presently. Indeed, the movement of transcendence is one which 
moves from the exterior to the interior to the superior. 
A second but related problem to the linguistic divide is the historical conceptual divide. 
After Descartes, and especially the Enlightenment, the Romantic reactions against it, and the 20th 
century turn to the self, it is all too easy to read Augustine in terms of our radically different 
categories. For example, scholars such as N. Harmon and D. Peddle have both exposed Charles 
Taylor’s reading of Augustine as a proto-Cartesian as problematic.164 C. Mathewes admonishes 
the reader of Augustine not to superimpose modern categories on him, as his ideas simply are not 
congenial to these distinctions.165 In fact, Mathewes goes so far as to claim that “the terms 
themselves need to be transformed, if not transcended”166 (no pun intended). For Augustine, one 
is never alone within oneself. For him, interiority is not an exercise in mastery in the modern 
sense, whereby the place which God previously held within the theological picture of the soul is 
replaced, but not altogether dismissed.167 In contrast to the Cartesian version of autonomy, 
Augustine does not envision the mind as a totally closed reality. To read Augustine this way 
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would be anachronistic and ahistorical. Rather, on his view, God and the soul are intimately, 
integrally connected.168 The self is always already turned towards God, and in turning towards 
him is illumined and becomes more itself, what it was intended to be.169 
Some of the paradox of self-transcendence dissolves when we remember this basic fact 
of historical distance. As Chrétien explains,  
 
A la différence de la philosophie contemporaine, ‘autrui’ n’est pas pour la pensée antique le 
titre d’une question majeure, précisément parce qu’il va de soi, et que nous sommes toujours 
avec lui. La ‘subjectivité’ leur étant inconnue, les penseurs de l’Antiquité ne se demandent 
pas comment je peux sortir de la mienne pour aller vers celle d’autrui, et saint Augustin à cet 
égard est en continuité avec eux.170  
 
Antiquity knew not the concept of “subjectivity,” nor the sharp contrast between “self” and 
“other.”171 Furthermore, as Cilleruelo explains, Augustine “divides” our interiority between the 
citerior and the ulterior, the “nearer” and the “farther.”172 God resides in the “ulterior interior,” 
and hence for Augustine the move to the inside is never a merely subjective move which draws 
one away from some communal, shared being.173 The result is that God is “interioridad 
trascendente.”174 In a sense, therefore, Augustine sees one as already beyond oneself by being 
with(in) oneself. 
Furthermore, commentators on Augustine rightly emphasise that the turn inward is a 
means to an end and not an end in itself: “Le retour en soi,” writes Chrétien, “est une étape 
nécessaire, moment inaugural qui a la force d’une aurore, en vue de la rencontre de Dieu, mais ce 
n’est qu’une étape, et non le but lui-même.”175 Were this to become an end in itself, then such a 
movement would be circular and vain.176 The goal rather is to surpass even oneself, such that one 
can be opened to a divine encounter: “Le but est de se dépasser, de se transcender pour 
s’accomplir. Qui se franchit seul se trouve, car il se laisse exposer à la rencontre sans laquelle il 
ne ferait que se consumer circulairement, et vainement.”177 God resides within, and when we 
forget him it is as if we are leaving ourselves and closing the door behind us, even to the point of 
forgetting that this inner locus of encounter even exists.178 
Interestingly, we find thoughts in hermeneutics which are at the very least congenial to 
the idea that the subject is not an autonomous, self-enclosed entity. The sharp lines drawn by the 
Cartesian dispensation between subject and object are elided by Gadamer’s understanding of the 
hermeneutical circle.179 The other is constitutive of finitude itself, but finitude understood as 
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representing a constant summons to transcendence.180 Di Cesare suggests that our limits are 
constitutive of who we are, and yet are not purely ours.181 Gadamer envisions the limit of human 
existence as located in “the other.”182 The limit becomes a locus of encounter with alterity.183 For 
hermeneutics, the limit is provisional, and constitutes a summons.184 Limits, in a sense, are meant 
to be crossed.185 Hence one is already “beyond,”186 or as Di Cesare writes, “To be hermeneutical 
means to be outside oneself.”187 
 
8.2.1 De uera religione 
 
An early work contains a brief discussion of self-transcendence which can provide some 
initial guidance on the question at hand. In uera rel., Augustine seeks to plot a course whereby 
the soul may turn back to its creator, whence it has absconded.188 According to Van Fleteren, uera 
rel. punctuates Augustine’s early Christian career, insofar as his reflection on biblical sources is 
only nascently present, Platonism is still prominent, and aspects of his later anthropology are 
coming into view.189 Lössl situates Augustine’s uera rel., which was composed between 388 and 
391, within the context of prior works on the concept of religio, in particular the De natura 
deorum of Cicero and the Diuinae institutiones of Lactantius.190 Though there has been a tendency 
to read this work according to a thematic structure of ascent, Lössl questions this interpretation.191 
Instead, he examines how the concept of the One forms the basis for this work. According to 
Lössl, the concept of the One provides a logical framework according to which to interpret uera 
rel., a concept in Augustine’s work represents a fusion of both Platonic and Biblical sources.192 
In a sense, Augustine seeks to reconcile Athens and Jerusalem in uera rel. In other words, 
Augustine is attempting to understand the meaning of true worship, and he construes this in both 
philosophical and biblical terms.193 Augustine envisions the unity of salvation and knowledge in 
God.194 As Lössl writes, uera religio “is at the same time philosophy and religion, which is true 
wisdom (sapientia), wisdom incarnate.”195 
In uera rel. we find a set of familiar themes which ground Augustine’s argument. As in 
Gn. litt., Augustine asserts that God made all things through his wisdom, or his Son, and in the 
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love of the Spirit.196 God is the supreme fullness of being, whilst all other creatures are limited in 
their being and are hence mutable.197 The One is also described as truth itself (ueritas ipsa).198 
However, Augustine never separates sapientia from the practical and the incarnate, even if this is 
ultimately more than that.199 Augustine holds that the One becomes incarnate in order to direct 
the fallen world back to its source.200 The opposition of being and nothingness forms the basis for 
a discussion of epistemic matters.201 As Lössl explains, it is a return from the abyss and the 
unintelligibility of sin to God, the fullness of light, life, and being.202 
In a phrase which has now become famously associated with Augustine, he writes, Noli 
foras ire, Do not go outside, but return into yourself (redi in teipsum), for “truth dwells in the 
inner man.”203 Immediately after the call to turn inward, Augustine writes that even this is 
insufficient, suggesting that one should also transcend oneself. If one discovers that one’s nature 
is mutable (which of course, it is), one must transcend that as well. Augustine is careful to note 
that in doing this, one even transcends the reasoning soul (ratiocinantem animam).204 One must 
realise that one is not the truth, even if the truth dwells within one. Rather, one must seek the 
truth, which is itself superior and absolute, and need not move or go anywhere in search of truth, 
for it is itself truth. One arrives at this truth not in a spatial way (non locorum spatio) but by a 
mental movement (mentis affectu).205 Hence the completion of the search for truth is the interior 
person’s dwelling with its neighbour, the truth, who is Christ.206 As we shall see, this trajectory is 
replicated in the Tractatus, in which John is cited as one who actually accomplished this; the 
admonition to self-transcendence is therefore not “merely” theoretical. 
One lesson that we can derive from the foregoing passage is that transcendence, aside 
from being a mental and a non-physical process, is not so much about leaving something behind, 
namely the soul. Indeed, pursuant to the principal sense of illumination, truth dwells within the 
soul, so to transcend the soul or one’s interiority does not mean to go beyond it or leave it behind. 
Rather, it seems that transcendence can be understood more in terms of an acknowledgement, an 
appreciation, a recognition, allowing oneself to be open to the truth within. Hence transcendence 
acquires a character which is simultaneously active and passive. The interior dwelling of God is 
at the basis of the admonition to return within oneself. But Augustine continues, urging one to 
transcend the self if one finds that it is mutable. Ultimately one arrives at the realisation that the 
inner self has a permanent guest as it were.207 Moreover, Wetzel suggests that the realisation of 
the conversion experience in Augustine consists in recognising what is already there, namely God 
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and his providential presence to the soul (“his recognition that the divine presence had been there 
all along.”)208 As Chrétien writes, “pour Augustin, la ‘vérité’ et un nom divin, comme le montrent 
ses preuves de l’existence de Dieu, et le chemin vers l’intérieur, vers le centre de soi, loin de 
conduire à se reconnaitre comme source, invite à dépasser ce que j’ai de plus haut ou de plus 
profond, à me découvrir, au sens fort, habité ou habitable par une autre présence que la mienne.”209 
 
8.2.2 John as transcender 
 
In Part I, we saw the significance that Augustine locates in the Johannine prologue, and 
what it implies for what was revealed to John. In his tractates on John’s Gospel, Augustine 
describes the evangelist as one who successfully transcended all of creation, including himself. 
Now we are prepared to see the further meaning which Augustine derives from the fourth gospel. 
In the twentieth tractate, Augustine elaborates upon the transcendence of John broached in the 
first tractate. Here he outlines a path of ascent to God, which proceeds from the exterior to the 
interior to the superior.210 One can examine corporeal creation, and realise that it is inherently 
mutable, finite, transitory, and unstable.211 From this one proceeds to think about celestial bodies 
(coelestia corpora) which, though of far greater beauty and radiance than the former, are still 
nonetheless finite bodies.212 One must transcend even these things (transi et ipsa).213 This is the 
point at which one moves from the exterior to the interior. Augustine raises the question of how 
one considered the foregoing corporeal realities.214 The agent of the consideration of these things 
was none other than the mind (animus) which, although spiritual and not bodily, is nonetheless 
finite still (animus ergo iste spiritus est, non corpus: transi et ipsum.).215 Despite the fact that the 
mind is superior to the foregoing corporeal objects (quamuis melior sit omni corpore) and a great 
thing itself (magna ergo res est animus),216 it is nonetheless mutable.217 As we have seen, the 
mark of the real is not so much that which is seen or not seen with the corporeal eyes, but that 
which does not admit of (the possibility of) change.218 Even a spirit or a spiritual being admits of 
change and flux, even in living eternally, whereas God alone is truly unchanging and 
unchangeable.219 Hence Augustine encourages one to “Therefore go beyond all mutability, not 
only everything which is seen, but also everything which changes.”220 Having moved through all 
corporeal creation, we arrive at our soul, the interior. Yet even here, having discovered mutability, 
which does not pertain to God in any way, we must also transcend it.221 As Augustine explains, 
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“For now that these things have been accomplished, you had come to your mind, but you also 
discovered there the mutability of your mind. Is God mutable? Surely not. Therefore surpass your 
mind as well. Pour your soul over yourself, so that you may touch God.”222 In other words, here 
Augustine describes the second moment of the process of transcendence, the movement from the 
interior to the superior. 
Augustine states that the mind or the soul is superior to the corporeal creation it 
considers.223 Not only is it able to manage and contain these things within itself, but its operations 
of discursive thought are not bound by the activities of the bodies themselves.224 In other words, 
one can call to mind immediately the sun and the moon, or their heavenly gyres, without having 
to wait for them to perform these in time and space.225 Our soul or our mind occupies a middle 
ontological position. The corporeal world is below, and God is above.226 The first step which is 
necessary is to move ourselves away from the carnal world.227 Yet even still, this is not sufficient, 
as we are occupied with mental images rather than God himself.228 Hence Augustine emphasises 
the importance of exceeding even the mind itself in order to know God: “Transcend the body, and 
taste the mind; transcend the mind as well, and taste God. You do not touch God, unless you will 
have also transcended the mind.”229 Hence Augustine encourages one with the following words: 
“Take yourself from the body, transcend even yourself.”230 This process of “self-transcendence” 
is described in Psalm 41:4-5, in which the soul pours itself out over itself.231 Augustine treats of 
this passage, writing that “I have not poured my soul over my flesh, but over me: I have 
transcended myself, so that I might touch him. For he who made me is above me; no one attains 
to him, except who will have transcended themselves.”232 This demarcation of the soul with 
respect to created reality shows that for Augustine, self-transcendence is tantamount to 
transcendence of all creation. For by means of the mind or the soul, one can transcend all of the 
corporeal world outside of oneself. It remains to transcend spiritual created reality, that is, one’s 
own mind. 
What may seem like a hopeless or quixotic task is nothing of the sort for Augustine, for 
in the following paragraph, he proceeds to counter such a thought with an example of someone 
who has successfully transcended all of created, mutable reality, and arrived at God himself.233 
As he states in the first tractate, Augustine claims that John transcended himself and all creation 
(hoc fecit ipse Ioannes euangelista).234 John’s transcendence is described in terms of the foregoing 
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ascent from and through corporeal reality, ultimately arriving at his own mind, the inner part of 
himself: “he transcended all spirits which are not seen, he transcended his own mind by the very 
reason of his mind.”235 Paradoxically, John’s mind supplies and sustains the means by which he 
can exceed it, namely ratio.236 The operation of the rational mind opens it to that which exceeds 
and conditions it, a movement enabled by the presence of the divine within the soul already.237 
John had ceased to be “merely” human and had begun to be angelic in the way he 
perceived reality.238 Of course elsewhere in Augustine’s voluminous corpus we read that the 
angels see God without any passage of time, that they perceive in an eternal way which is not 
subject to the spatio-temporal extension that we experience on earth.239 Augustine seems to 
recognise the surprising nature of this claim, but does not back down. Rather, he substantiates this 
by appeal to Ps 81:6, in which we are called “gods, and sons of the most high.”240 God calls us 
above and beyond ourselves, lest we remain (“merely”) human.241 In order to transcend our human 
nature, we must first acknowledge it.242 As we shall see more fully in due course, we rise to God 
by humility.243 We must recognise our creaturely finitude and our dependence upon God.244 
Paradoxically, when we transcend ourselves we are most human and yet cease to be human; we 
acknowledge our finitude, from which we can begin to recognise the need for assistance in the 
quest for transcendence and attaining to God.245 Paradoxically, one becomes worthy by confessing 
one’s unworthiness. 
In tractate 18, Augustine states, as he does elsewhere, that Christ dwells within one. He 
makes clear that he understands Christ as somehow present in virtue of one’s creation in the image 
of God. This point grounds the imperative to return within oneself, an admonition which has its 
basis in Isaiah. This movement again reflects a Neoplatonic framework, as one moves away from 
the exterior and to the interior en route to the superior. We see here something of the schema of 
illumination as well, insofar as the soul overcomes darkness and blindness and perfects itself by 
means of God’s assistance.246 
One must keep in mind that for Augustine, transcendence is a mental activity, and not a 
spatial or physical one (non carne transis, sed mente).247 This point is crucial for Augustine’s 
thought: In its essence, the mind is immaterial and hence offers us a step to transcendence.248 If 
one is able, one perceives the incorporeality of God by the mind itself (ipsa mente conspicere 
ualeatis).249 Elsewhere in the Tractatus, Augustine similarly suggests that it is by means of one’s 
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thought that one does this (ut excedas cogitatione tua omne quod factum est).250 Hence it becomes 
clear that Augustine sees self-transcendence as a mental process whereby one comes to 
acknowledge the finitude and mutability of all reality, in contrast to God.251 Going beyond the 
self therefore comes to mean not so much an “out-of-body experience” or have anything to do 
with movement or motion, so much as one comes to realise the fact, so obvious that it is hidden, 
of our created-ness, that is, being created by and grounded in God.252 We come to see what is 
already there.253 This is what one might call the “Augustinian reversal”254; it is not truth which is 
difficult, obscure, or opaque, but we.255 Put another way, it is not as if one must go somewhere so 
much as remove the obstructions in oneself, to cleanse the doors of perception256 and thus re-
orient one’s vision so as to see what was already present to one.257 A crucial point follows from 
this, as such an acknowledgement would require one to exceed the “merely” intellectual and lead 
to a confession of one’s dependence. As Drever writes, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo essentially 
means that one is not the source of one’s being, but rather that this is rooted in God.258 This 
doctrine carries certain implications for how one understands the human person.259 When one 
transcends all created things, that is, by recognising their source in the infinite God, one is said to 
pour oneself out over oneself as John did (transcendens ista omnia, super se effundens animam 
suam),260 for it is in this act of recognition that one surrenders oneself to God.261 Here we again 
encounter the aforementioned idea that confessio enables illumination. 
 We see a similar point made in another tractate, number 38. Augustine argues that the 
acknowledgement of Christ as the only-begotten Son of God, born from all eternity, is a necessary 
step in order to transcend all of creation, as John did. As Augustine claims, “Therefore receive 
Christ as from the heavens, so that by your thought you may exceed everything which was made; 
the entirety of creation altogether … and everything mutable in whatever way: exceed the whole, 
just as John did, so that you may reach: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with 
God, and the Word was God.”262 Again we see the link between the divinity of Christ and one’s 
intellectual and affective acknowledgement thereof as enabling one’s transcendence. 
According to Augustine, John’s theophanic experience serves as an aid for those of us 
who are not gifted in the way the Evangelist is.263 Even still, one needs help in order to interpret 
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or understand his words, for which we require divine assistance.264 John himself did not 
accomplish this great intellectual feat by his own efforts. Rather, he was illumined by God, and 
received special revelations when he rested his head on the Lord’s chest at the Last Supper.265 
The transcendence of the self is a gift, indeed, a grace from God.266 Later in this same work, 
Augustine confirms that John’s perception of the principium was a divine gift, and that it was a 
direct revelation of the Holy Spirit.267 God’s incorporeality is one of those truths which the 
disciples “could not bear” when Christ was with them, but which he taught them through the 
Spirit.268 
As Berrouard reminds us, Augustine’s discussion of transcendence should not be 
separated from its pneumatological and ecclesial context. Berrouard writes that a major theme of 
the Tractatus is the renewal of the soul by means of the Spirit’s caritas, which enables one to 
understand spiritual things.269 The Holy Spirit is seen as an agent of interior teaching and re-
orientation, whose mission becomes clear on Pentecost.270 More specifically, the Spirit teaches 
one that God is incorporeal, which is to say everywhere and always whole and complete.271 As I 
see it, what this means is that Christ promises that the Spirit will teach everything that he has 
(presumably already) taught them. In other words, the Spirit will allow the apostles to “see what 
is already there” in their experiences with Christ and in his teachings. The Holy Spirit becomes 
the agent of transformation for Augustine, in particular changing the formerly carnal disciples, 
providing them new insights in order to understand the revelations Christ preached to them.272 
The mark of the disciples’ carnal attachment is demonstrated by their abandonment of him in the 
midst of his passion.273 As Berrouard explains, the disciples were too attached to their worldly 
way of perceiving things, and therefore only saw Christ according to his human nature.274 The 
lack of understanding on the part of Christ’s followers, the fact that they could not bear the truth 
at that moment, was directly linked to the fact that they were unwilling to follow Christ to his 
death.275 For Augustine, Pentecost marks the point at which the disciples received a spiritual lens 
through which to view reality and their experience of Christ.276 From then on they not only 
understood him as a man, but as the co-eternal Son of God.277 The marked change between the 
disciples prior to Christ’s passion and then at Pentecost demonstrates the profound efficacy of the 
Spirit’s inner and transformative illumination and teaching.278 Furthermore, the love of the Spirit 
provides one with the ability to cling to immaterial truths over and above the joys of the flesh.279 
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Finally, this illumination is a simultaneous revelation of one’s finitude and one’s limitations.280 
One realises the limits of one’s knowledge, but is nonetheless encouraged to seek as a normative 
goal the knowledge that is promised in the eschaton.281 
 
8.2.3 Upshot 
 
Augustine’s discussion of transcendence brings us to a place at which the enquiry as a 
whole can come into focus. Certain key passages of en. Ps. 41 encapsulate the themes I have been 
discuss thus far in Augustine, and also provide a bridge to the subsequent discussion of 
transvaluation. In this location, Augustine reflects on the immutable God, grounding his 
understanding of the world as a reflection of the divine in a theory of creation. The familiar themes 
of creation, incorporeality, and vision figure prominently here. Furthermore, Augustine engages 
in an interrogatio of the world, one which conducts him from the exterior to the interior, and then 
above, as he pours his soul out over himself. This act of kenosis provides Augustine with the 
reconfigured framework in order to see the world as a result of creation in sapientia, and leads 
him to judge and value things in relation to their source. In a word, en. Ps. 41 reveals the 
connections amongst the prominent themes in Augustine upon which I have touched so far, and 
also show how they are logically linked with what will constitute the final part of this enquiry, 
namely learning to “read” the text of the universe. 
Augustine’s reflection on creation as an “apophatic” testimony to God (my gloss) in en. 
Ps. 41 closely parallels that which he gives in sources such as conf. 10 and s. 241.282 Augustine 
delivered his enarratio on Psalm 41 as a sermon in Hippo sometime after 410. Here we encounter 
familiar themes of divine incorporeality. Augustine emphasises that the things of the world which 
he sees by (means of) his carnal eyes are not like God: “My God who made these things which I 
see with the eyes [of the body] is not to be sought by these eyes.”283 Furthermore, even spiritual 
creation is not like God, for he is immutable, a sine defectu substantiam, whereas the soul is not, 
even if it is spiritual.284 The light of truth is described as an indefatigable and incorporeal sort of 
light which illumines the soul from within.285 This light facilitates understanding, and is missing 
in those who lack understanding.286 In addition to being a different form of light, Augustine also 
suggests that some preparation of the inner sense is required in order to perceive it clearly: “a 
certain light the type of which your eyes have not known, for the seeing of which the interior eye 
is prepared.”287 
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Augustine also broaches the topic of inner vision. Aside from the implied distinction 
between inner eyes and the eyes of the body,288 he discusses the relationship between these, as 
well as the objects which one can perceive and the mode in which one can perceive them. In a 
passage redolent of the themes especially of Gn. litt. 12, Augustine stresses the inseparability of 
the soul and the body, for although certain activities are proper to the mind or the soul, they rely 
upon the previous input of the senses.289 For instance, he describes the eyes of the body (oculi 
membra sunt carnis) as the windows of the soul (fenestrae sunt mentis).290 The primacy of the 
mind is maintained, however, since the sense perceptions of the body rely upon the activity and 
the direction of the mind.291 As he states in locations such as ep. 147, in en. Ps. 41 Augustine 
holds that the mind can perceive something in itself (aliquid etiam per seipsum animus ipse 
conspiciat).292 In addition to other objects, the soul also sees itself by means of itself, a task which 
requires the soul to remove itself from the bodily senses.293 Seeing interiorly could mean 
perceiving something which does not admit of the qualities of sensible things, that is, the things 
perceived through or by means of the five senses.294 Augustine holds that there are objects of 
interior vision, things which the soul perceives by itself, and which do not rely on the senses in 
order to be seen, and likewise do not admit of any sensible qualities.295 A key example of this 
inner object is sapientia which, suggests Augustine, is not a sensible, corporeal entity.296 
Augustine goes one step further, stating that what the soul sees through itself is superior to that 
which is seen through the body and its senses, in other words, the “servant” (per seruum suum) 
to the soul.297 Augustine still draws a line of demarcation between seeing the mind or the soul by 
means of the same on the one hand and seeing God by means of the mind or the soul on the 
other.298 That is, just because God is seen by means of the mind does not mean he is of the same 
type of substance as the mind.299  
 The account of divine incorporeality and human intellectual vision prepares the way for 
a discussion of seeking God in and through nature, the movement to transcendence, and ultimately 
the ethical imperative derived from it, which I believe can be couched in hermeneutical terms. In 
this enarratio, Augustine also notes his inability to see God and the procedure he undertakes in 
order to find him.300 He begins by considering the beauty of natural and heavenly bodies, and the 
affective response they engender in him, namely one of wonder and awe.301 Yet still, his search 
is not complete, as his thirst for God is not yet sated.302 Having considered first terrestrial and 
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then celestial things, he turns to himself, his own soul.303 Augustine reports that the result of his 
inward turn, this self-examination, is to distinguish his body from his soul, and to state that the 
latter not only rules and guides the former, but that the enquiry in which he is engaged, namely 
seeking God, is proper to the latter.304 Having searched for God both outwardly and inwardly and 
not finding him, Augustine reaches the conclusion that God is something greater than or above 
his soul (aliquid super animam esse sentio Deum meum).305 In order to reach God, Augustine 
concludes, he must pour his own soul out over itself.306 Only in this way can it reach that which 
is above and beyond it: “When would my soul attain to something which it seeks over my soul, 
unless my soul were to be poured out over itself? For if it would remain in itself, it would see 
nothing other than itself. And when it would see itself, it would surely not be seeing its God.”307 
Here the link becomes apparent. Augustine suggests that this spiritual action of pouring 
the soul over oneself introduces within one the appropriate hermeneutic in order to perceive the 
signs of God’s presence in the created world.308 Without this meditative mental move, the soul 
presumably is incapable of perceiving invisible, intellectual properties instantiated in physical 
reality.309 As Augustine states, 
 
I seek my God in every body, whether terrestrial or heavenly, and I do not find him. I seek 
his substance in my soul, and I do not discover it. Nevertheless I meditated on the search for 
God, and desiring to perceive the invisible things of God understood through those things 
which were made, “I poured my soul over myself,” and now there remains nothing that I may 
touch except my God.310 
 
This kenotic action appears to be the final step of preparation in order to facilitate contact with 
God.311 Furthermore, Augustine suggests a sort of double action which is necessary in order to 
discover truth, namely to eliminate within oneself that which is against truth: “Destroy in yourself 
whatever is contrary to truth.”312 Augustine makes a similar point in s. 159, in which he calls for 
a complete reversal of one’s prior sinful ways; one must love righteousness as intensely as one 
once loved sin (amate iustitiam, quomodo amastis iniquitatem).313 Likewise, in order to arrive at 
truth, one must move with the desire and the alacrity of a thirsty deer (inuenimus enim insigne 
uelocitatis in ceruo).314 
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We transcend ourselves, and yet due to the frailty of our finitude, we descend.315 But the 
descent allows us to see the world anew. Once we have returned to the world, we can begin to see 
it in its true form, as a reflection of the divine. The discussion of transcendence started from uera 
rel., and now we can introduce the full significance of this work with respect to the theme of 
reading the universe. Boersma reads uera rel. in terms of coming to acknowledge the world as a 
reflection of its source, divine Wisdom.316 Boersma presents his treatment in terms of the imago 
Dei in the human soul, which is oriented ultimately to Wisdom and rest with God.317 As Boersma 
argues, Augustine defines the ascent of the soul (in uera rel. at least) in terms of imago, and more 
specifically one’s intentional approach to it.318 One of the major themes of uera rel. is the 
possibility of arriving at the One, especially through a unified, tranquil aspect.319 In other words, 
Boersma suggests that the ascent of the soul consists in perceiving imago in a different way; it is 
not a movement or a discovering of something new.320 It is a matter of seeing the imago according 
to a different aspect, coming to see what is already there. 
Boersma notes the important difference between knowledge or understanding on the one 
hand and judgement on the other. The former pertains to the descriptive recognition of a fact, 
whereas the latter pertains to the normative evaluation of this fact with respect to a (superior) 
standard.321 For Augustine, this standard is none other than sapientia, the source of all being, 
present to the human mind.322 Furthermore, the emphasis on understanding an image as derived 
from its source underscores the importance of Augustine’s overarching view of participation, that 
individual existents must be understood within the broader framework in which they obtain and 
participate. This framework is that of creation in sapientia.323 Judging the flux and multiplicity of 
material reality according to the eternal standard of oneness and unity engenders in the soul that 
state required for perceiving the world in its proper order.324 As Boersma pithily explains this 
point, “The task of true philosophy” for Augustine “is to judge all material images in light of this 
unity.”325 The act of properly judging material reality in light of its source just is contemplation.326 
The things of the world, when recognised for what they are, act as so many steps (gradus) to 
eternal and immutable things (immortalia).327 
The theme of unity and multiplicity is fundamental to Augustine’s view of ascent. By 
becoming more unified, we grow closer to God, imitating his unity.328 In contrast, the multiplicity 
of individual created things overwhelms one and pulls one apart in a continuous stream of flux, a 
process accelerated and exacerbated by the fall: “For the multiformity of temporal forms has split 
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fallen man through the carnal senses and multiplied his affect in a changeable variety.”329 In uera 
rel., Augustine anticipates his later explanation of the morally debilitating effects of time as 
distentio, suggesting that the vicissitudes of time cause a certain attachment to temporal things 
within the soul.330 One must purify oneself of the tendency to take the spatial and the temporal as 
the mark of the real.331 
In addition to the sense of imago which is positive and pertains to the intrinsic being of 
an image, Augustine also speaks of the darker aspect of imago as that which is not real or 
derivative.332 He uses simulacrum as a synonym for this sense, and relates it to the soul’s 
attachment to the created world.333 “The problem with this second, negative sense of image,” 
according to Boersma, “is that it absolutizes material, temporal existence.”334 The result is that 
the very purpose and function of an image is frustrated, as it comes to block rather than facilitate 
access to its source.335 To invoke a familiar Augustinian theme, it is not that the material world is 
itself evil, but rather the mind itself which judges it incorrectly (=falsitas), forgetting its 
ontological relation and dependence on something other than itself.336 Cupiditas and falsitas are 
two different ways of viewing the same problem for Augustine, or they are two different 
manifestations of one and the same (false) judgement, namely mistaking a temporal, finite, 
material good for one which is eternal, infinite, and immutable.337 Put another way, Augustine 
envisions the same remedy for both vices, namely the correct judgement of material reality.338 For 
Augustine, Boersma argues, the soul is led astray when it takes a temporal, transient, finite, 
created good, and clings to it as if it were infinite; one attempts to enjoy it rather than to use it.339 
Boersma relates this activity of intellectual and moral judgement to the uti and frui discussion of 
doct. chr., in a sense mapping the former onto the latter.340 
 This Augustinian tenet is also reflected in hermeneutical thought. As S. Hannan writes, 
Heidegger views temporality as an essential aspect of Dasein’s situation within the world. In 
one’s confrontation with reality, one must always recall one’s finitude and temporal situation. 
Hence it is a mistake to attempt to “univocalise” some particular object, treating it as if it were 
somehow permanent or eternal. Rather, one should let things come and go in their own order. In 
this way, one becomes a “shepherd” of being(s) and becomes attentive to the natural order and 
harmony of being.341 In Hannan’s words, “As shepherds of Being, not of beings, it is not our role 
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to preserve beings in their particularity (thus risking adikia), but to instead remember the rhythm 
in which they arise and pass away.”342 
It seems to me that the recognition of our finitude and the interrogation of all that it 
implies is what is necessary in order to advance in sapientia. A sapiential-hermeneutical theology 
requires us to challenge our ontological prejudices, and these insofar as they impede our epistemic 
and spiritual progress. In particular, Augustine asks us to leave behind our familiar world of time 
and space, of three spatial dimensions and one temporal one. According to Menn, “we wrongly 
think that the concept of truth is unclear and that we would understand it better if we could picture 
it, and this attempt to fill out our knowledge of God by means of sensory images is just what 
conceals God from us. And this dissatisfaction with a purely intellectual grasp of God is in turn 
rooted in an affective turning away from God and toward the ‘accustomed earthly things’ […].”343 
One turns from God by immersing oneself in the transience and the multiplicity of the world.344 
Knowing God implies going beyond the mutable order of things and recognising their dependence 
upon the immutable God.345 Augustine invites us to think in a way which is at odds with the 
capacities of our physical (and indeed, fallen) human nature. Nonetheless, as we straddle reality, 
we can make use of our mind to assemble a variety of elements and view them simultaneously by 
the mind’s eye in a way that we never could with corporeal sight. Such a perception would not be 
synthetic in the sense that it would eliminate internal differentiation, but would rather be analytic, 
providing distinctions within the unity of the content.346 Here we can also find the answer to why 
Augustine sees memory as so important: it is that capacity, animal though it may be, which allows 
us as rational beings to aspire to something of that atemporal way of knowing, by viewing the 
whole, not corporally, for that would not be possible, but according to the vision of our hearts, 
assembling the various threads of memories which will enable us to reproduce the whole they 
constitute, a whole which transcends the sum of its parts. 
Just as the soul is stretched within space and time, in such a way that it is susceptible to 
valuing images of God over God himself, there is a sort of counter-stretching which occurs when 
the soul is “set on fire” by divine love. As Ayres explains, a fervent “desire for God stretches the 
soul away from the spes saeculi, the hope for worldly possessions and place.”347 Such a desire 
breaks one’s prejudice for the things of created reality.348 The denouement of the foregrounding 
of this prejudice is to realise that the goal of the investigation of nature with respect to its divine 
origin is ultimately eschatological in character, a point documented in Part I.349 Augustine 
suggests the possibility that when we are perfected, that we shall not see and know within a 
framework of temporal extension, but see all things together, in a way similar to how God sees 
them: “Perhaps our thoughts will not be going and returning from certain things into others, but 
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we shall see all our knowledge together in one aspect.”350 Yet even if this is the case, he writes, 
such unity of vision should not be equated with that of God (coaequanda [creatura] non erit illi 
simplicitati), who is neither changed nor in principle capable of being changed, in stark contrast 
to his creation.351 
God’s seeing is simple and perfect; he sees all things together, without any one object 
monopolising his attentive aspect. We who are in the flux of time and space are bound to its logic 
when we see or look. In Part I we saw how as Augustine states in lib. arb., the bodily senses can 
only sense so much at one time, and one’s sensation of a particular object has ramifications for 
how others experience that object.352 But for the spiritual means of perception, that is not so, 
especially for God, who sees perfectly and eternally, and is not reliant on anything of sense in 
order to see.353 Augustine’s explanation is worth quoting at length. Speaking of the persons of the 
Trinity, he writes,  
 
Each of them [=the members of the Trinity] sees together all things which are in their 
knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence. It does not see things partially or one by one, 
as if its vision in an alternating way sees there from here and here from there, and in turn 
from one place or another in one thing and another, such that it would not be able to see 
certain things unless it were not seeing others. But, as I have said, it sees all things together, 
of which there is nothing which it does not always see.354 
 
Our Interlocutor demurs: This is the very point which a hermeneutical mind finds so 
objectionable in theology, and seems to flaunt every qualification you made before. It seems that 
you have attempted through a sneaky way to re-introduce the concept of infinity and 
transcendence into theology. You have ignored the hermeneutical admonition to recall human 
finitude and incorporate this into your theory of knowledge as a fundamental principle. Are you 
not aware that a hermeneutic understanding of language implies the exclusion of any “ultimate 
foundation”?355 You have simply re-presented premodern naïveté in a more sophisticated form, 
but thereby no less misguided. Taking hermeneutics seriously means rejecting any notion of the 
infinite, at least as it pertains to human reason. We are finite; we cannot think the infinite, or 
claim some knowledge of that type for ourselves. To do so is simply to relapse into the arrogance 
of past ages, in which we fail to appreciate the importance of our inherent human limitations. 
Ironically, your epistemic sin is none other than that original fault of pride, as you seek to Ascend 
to Heav’n, by merit thine,356 thereby mimicking Satan, Affecting all equality with God.357 
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I appreciate your objections. However, you fail to perceive a fundamental difference 
between a simple appeal to eternal ideas, and the position I present, namely that the knowledge 
of God’s infinitude, transcendence, and incorporeality, is the result of a divine gift and represents 
something adventitious to reason. As I have intended to demonstrate, Augustine and Gadamer 
especially wish to reframe reason and knowledge by what I have called a reversal: rather than 
thinking in post-Cartesian terms about the human mind plundering nature for her secrets, secrets 
disclosed from a purely active investigation, my view holds that reason is first addressed, and 
only in virtue of being addressed comes to question and discover. Gadamer stresses the priority 
of the text or the Sache addressing us. We find ourselves addressed first and subsequently 
responsive,358 mainly in virtue of our situation within (a) tradition.359 Now if reason is understood 
hermeneutically, as initially responsive and from there initiating a conversation, then this 
passivity of listening must be taken seriously. By passivity I mean that the message has priority 
over one. One receives it first and must be truly receptive to it. According to Chrétien, theology 
itself constitutes a response to a summons. It is given a content of which it must make some sense. 
Most importantly, however, it does not have the prerogative to choose its (types of) gods.360  Now 
on the basis of hermeneutics alone, there is no reason to suppose that a message regarding God’s 
infinitude or his transcendence, for example, should be excluded. According to Romele, Gadamer 
was informed by the (Protestant) notion that a word from without can truly surprise us.361 
Zimmermann echoes this point, claiming that Gadamer’s exclusion of revelation as a basis for 
philosophy does not necessarily follow from his hermeneutics.362 In fact, the a priori exclusion 
of such a message would not only be against the principles a hermeneutical consciousness 
espouses, but would also subtly fall prey to the very modern view it wishes to critique, namely 
one according to which transcendence and immanence are mutually exclusive de iure. True, the 
message is always received according to the mode of the recipient. But even the reception of this 
message challenges those very categories of reception. One is caught between knowing and not 
knowing. Indeed, this is why a distinction between comprehension and vision is so crucial.363 
Without this you would likely be correct. One who would want to maintain the place of 
transcendence within a contemporary hermeneutical theology would need to motivate and 
maintain a distinction of this type. 
 In addition, the work of Di Cesare on Gadamer suggests that the matter is far more 
complex that you suggest. Rather than excluding transcendence, hermeneutics and its conception 
of finitude makes transcendence an essential feature of its thinking: “Where there is a limit, there 
is also transcendence.”364 Transcendence is realised in our encounter with otherness, a point in 
which Gadamer is distinguished from Heidegger.365 Finitude implies infinity, and the infinite only 
comes to be by becoming finite.366 The finite and the infinite cannot be understood apart from one 
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another.367 Hermeneutics requires a concept of the infinite, as it represents something other and 
beyond.368 In virtue of the claim to reconcile the finite and the infinite, hermeneutics, according 
to Di Cesare, becomes philosophy.369 
Within a hermeneutical mind-set, to experience means to be confronted with one’s 
limits.370 This could take place in a number of ways,371 but the essential point is that the interstices 
of understanding and non-understanding constitute our individual limits.372 The limit becomes a 
locus of encounter with alterity.373 So the other is a limit but not merely a limit; the other becomes 
a doorway to the infinite: “the other is the encounter and the part in the encounter that overcomes 
finitude and opens the way to the infinite.”374 Transcendence can only be accomplished in the 
midst of otherness.375 Transcendence represents a response to a summons from otherness.376 
Transcendence requires otherness, not only in practice, but also as a matter of logic.377 Gadamer 
draws upon the image found in Plato according to which human persons were originally spheres, 
and due to their pride were severed in two. Gadamer reads this as meaning that the infinite is 
contained within the finite.378 
In speaking we begin to participate in an infinite dialogue, and hence overcome our 
finitude.379 In speaking with the other, we enter a shared plane of existence.380 “Insofar as it is 
destined to be an infinite dialogue, it is not surprising that hermeneutics, in its eschatological 
aspirations, declines itself again in the word and conjugates itself in the dialogue. Precisely at the 
most extreme limit, hermeneutics speaks of the reciprocal connection of the finite and the 
infinite.”381 The infinite becomes real for us in terms of its articulation in our finite reality.382 The 
finite word calls to mind its complement, the indeterminate depths of meaning remaining to be 
articulated.383 In this way, a word is always an opening to the infinite and to novelty.384 The nature 
of the word is such that it summons other words; thus the nature of dialogue and conversation.385 
In the unending dialogue of speaking in the middle, finite and infinite meet.386 
We also catch a glimpse of this from the other direction, namely Gadamer’s critical views 
on Heidegger’s approach to the infinite. Di Cesare suggests that a finitude defined in terms of a 
negation of the infinite can be problematic, especially if that finitude arrogates to itself the 
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erstwhile features of the infinite, styling itself a new absolute.387 Contra Heidegger, Gadamer is 
wary of rejecting the infinite in order to secure the finite.388 Gadamer sees the infinite as a 
normative guide for thought.389 Futhermore, he believes that Heidegger is not sufficiently radical 
in his treatment of finitude, as he misses a more sustained enquiry into why our finitude is linked 
with our encounter with otherness, and why we can have no hope of self-transcendence without 
this experience of our limits via the other.390 
Our prejudices are most fruitfully challenged through an encounter with a particular 
content which somehow conflicts with or produces tension with our pre-understanding. And for 
Augustine, in my estimation, the ultimate answer to our prejudices, which frees us from the 
darkness of ignorance, is none other than Christ. Perhaps this is a way forward for thinking 
theologically and philosophically, that is, by applying hermeneutical methods to the text-analogue 
of nature. As I see it, Augustine’s theory of knowledge is not ultimately about trying to reason to 
something, but rather enabling oneself to see what is already present before one, in much the same 
way that concentrated study would allow one to make sense of a difficult text which one reads 
again and again.  
The entire foregoing enquiry assumes the radical, incommensurable difference between 
God, the eternal and immutable Creator, and everything else, namely creation, things which came 
into existence out of nothing. Sans God’s assistance, this ontological gulf is absolute and 
unbridgeable. In a paradoxical way, we are unable to realise the fullness of our own calling and 
identity, which as we have seen, is to rest in the eternal, immutable, incorporeal Creator. It is 
through him and him alone that we can hope to escape from the vicissitudes of our spatio-temporal 
vale of tears. 
This objection does however allow me to speak about the other side of the coin of ascent, 
namely descent. We see this described in conf. 9 within the context of Augustine’s ephemeral 
contact with the divine. In the famous depiction of the mystical ascent with his mother, Augustine 
discusses rising to the heights of heavenly Wisdom, which admits of no temporal succession. As 
he writes, “[Wisdom] does not become, but it is, just as it was and ever shall be. Indeed, it is not 
in it to have been and to be about to be, but only to be, for wisdom is eternal: for it is not eternal 
to have been and to be about to be.”391 Augustine states that the strength of the divine light was 
too much for him to bear, and so his ascent was limited in its success (reuerberasti).392 There is 
certainly clear textual evidence to support this reading (repulsus; repercussa infirmitate).393 The 
more one enters the divine light, the more one sees one’s frailty.394 However, King complements 
this emphasis with a broader awareness of the ontological vision of Augustine. Even though 
Augustine’s ascent is far from perfect, it is not thereby insignificant. One always descends with 
new insights and indeed, as a new person. As he approaches nearer the light, Augustine is able to 
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discover certain critical truths which will help him to continue this journey, in particular an 
awareness of his own finitude with respect to the ultimate immutability of God, and the epistemic 
implications it entails. What is ultimately responsible for Augustine’s inability to gaze on the 
divine light is his finitude and temporal situation. Greater moral or spiritual fortitude, though 
helpful, would not be sufficient to overcome the ontological gap which obtains between Creator 
and creature.395 
Once again we arrive at Heidegger’s understanding of human be-ing as human non-being. 
To possess oneself for Heidegger is to recognise oneself in one’s nihility.396 Likewise for 
Augustine, as it is only when the soul draws near to God that it is, paradoxically, intrinsically 
complete.397 This model is appreciated by theorists of hermeneutics and expressed in musical 
terms. “Emanation,” Eberhard writes, “resembles the sound a well-played musical instrument 
projects into the surrounding volume; in this process, the instrument does not lose anything of its 
being but rather fulfils it.”398 When a cello is played, it realises its nature in virtue of emitting 
mellifluous sounds,399 and thereby transcends itself. This image, so evocative of Plato’s treatment 
of the soul in his Phaedo, captures something of the dynamism of the self, as something which is 
continuously in flux, and in a sense constituted by this very indeterminacy and dynamism.400 For 
Augustine, the proximity of the soul to God generates the spiritual resonance which allows the 
soul to become what it is intended to be. R. Williams captures this point when he writes, “The 
image of God, in short, is realized when we come to be in conscious relation to the divine act that 
establishes the possibility of relation […].”401 In a post-Cartesian the world the reified self (what 
Taylor famously calls the “buffered self” in A Secular Age),402 against which Heidegger so 
strenuously reacted, is taken for granted. But for Augustine the self is not a particular, defined or 
reified thing.403 This point can be seen in his understanding of conscientia as well. For Augustine, 
the conscience is a locus of contact between God and the soul, a place in which God is intimately 
and innately present to one’s mind, always speaking to and communicating with one.404 Hence 
the tensile relationship between God and man just is constitutive of the conscience, or rather, 
conscientia is not so much a thing but the echoes of the divine voice in the heart.405 One cultivates 
this interior space by means of prayer, a response to the silent call of God already present within 
one.406 Hence for Augustine, “la prière est génératrice d’intériorité, elle la fait surgir, l’entrétien 
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et la développe.”407 Creatures perfect their natures by turning to God, their light and source of 
being. In a sense their creation is continuously unfolding,408 a movement encapsulated in 
Augustine’s pithy prayer, that “he who founded the earth may draw near to our minds.”409 
 
 8.2.4 Complementarity as a result of finitude 
 
Following Fishbane, we can note a further epistemic implication which arises from the 
foregoing discussion of finitude, which is demonstrated by the plurality of cultures and 
hermeneutical frameworks in our world.410 The realisation of diversity impels us to conversation 
and dialogue, to learn from others and to collaborate in the search for truth.411 The Jewish tradition 
allows for the maintaining of several truths simultaneously.412 For example, various peshat 
readings will differ but can nonetheless complement one another.413 The call to co-operation, 
rooted in an authentic appreciation of our finitude, leads us to see God’s presence even in the 
most mundane realities.414 Fishbane’s eloquent description is worth quoting at length: 
 
But such a reality [i.e., of plurality and diversity of cultures] is dialectical as well; for it also 
drives home the rich infinity of possibilities that abound among our cowalkers on the earth–
the unfinished dialogues of the sayable with this or that speech partner, who faces us looking 
in a different direction; the diversity of voices of the debatable from one or another contestant, 
who weighs the truths of experience with other scales and balances; and also the impenetrable 
depths of the truly unsayable, darkly refracted in a vast forest of symbols–whose own 
configurations conceal conundrums of the sacred. We therefore need one another–so that 
more of the fullness may be realized in deed and in thought; so that something further of the 
obscure may be brought to light and awareness; and so that the regency of our viewpoints 
may be qualified and more broadly shared.415 
 
Here Fishbane isolates a particular aspect of the Jewish tradition which is consonant with the 
hermeneutic approach that I wish to propose. Gadamer himself suggests the possibility of a 
complementarity of a number of perspectives and approaches to one and the same subject 
matter.416 The commitment to a hermeneutical understanding of human finitude results in a 
methodological approach which is conversational and complementary. “Such a method,” 
Wachterhauser writes, “could never be discovered by one person, however brilliant, but rather it 
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must represent the accumulated wisdom of a community of inquirers […].”417 What is suggested 
here is a theory of knowledge which integrally includes aspects of conversation and 
complementarity. For example, on this view, death does not represent the dualistic, “Manichaean” 
antithesis to life. Life and death together reveal something of the full reality of God. Together 
they speak of infinity, as both area essential components in the mystery of creation.418 
Augustine also suggests a similar approach to complementarity in terms of his (biblical) 
hermeneutics. In the twelfth book of conf.,419 Augustine concerns himself with the various 
possibilities for interpreting and understanding the term in principio.420 Here Augustine endorses 
the idea that a variety of interpretations of a particular passage may be apt.421 This position is 
grounded in two particular arguments. The first concerns the nature of the biblical text itself. In 
virtue of being composed by God, scripture can be said to be “overdetermined,” which is to say, 
filled with an inexhaustible depth of meaning.422 In fact, Augustine claims that this was God’s 
intention in the first place.423 The basic reason for his position is the idea that God is the author 
not only of Scripture but also of history, and so in his providence the Bible comes to admit of the 
susceptibility of indefinite true interpretations.424 Augustine adopts a fundamentally 
hermeneutical approach to scripture; like literature, it admits of the possibility of an indefinite 
number of valid interpretations, though that is not to say that just any interpretation is valid.425 
Augustine claims that God ordained it such that many interpretations would be possible, though 
not all thereby equal.426 Again, the positing of multiple meanings present in Scripture is rooted in 
the idea that its source is ultimately divine.427 Augustine’s hermeneutic for Scripture is a broad 
one, welcoming an indefinite number of readings de iure.428 Dutton’s treatment of Augustine 
leads him to express Augustine’s position in the following way: “Plenitude of Meaning Thesis: 
for any written declarative sentence, S, that is contained in Scripture, if (a) a reader takes S to 
express a certain proposition, P, and (b) P is true, then the author intended S to express P.”429 In 
my estimation, this leads to an interesting result: In addition to being the author of scripture, God 
is the principle behind the universe, sustaining within it the plethora of potential truth which can 
arise out of it.430 
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Our finitude implies that we must seek complementarity, but not thereby a misplaced 
egalitarianism, according to which one point of view is ipso facto seen as just as good as another. 
Hermeneutics also requires hierarchy, order, and parsing. Hence we arrive again at a task of 
fundamental importance for hermeneutics, namely the relationship between part and whole as 
encapsulated in the conception of the hermeneutical circle. 
 
8.3 SIN: PRIDE AS PREJUDICE 
 
We have seen how every movement of ecstasy also involves a descent, a return. Yet this 
return is always with new eyes, for instance, which allow us to re-orient our perspective on the 
world. One way in which this occurs is through realising how our spatio-temporal situation 
constitutes a prejudice, which in turn leads us to such actions as engaging in a dialogical search 
for truth. A further implication is identifying another hindrance to our acceptance of truth, what 
Augustine would call pride or sin. 
In my treatment of Augustinian illumination, I identified two aspects to the gradual sense 
of reason, that is, two ways in which our ability to know is limited, conditioned, or hindered. Now 
in Part III I have construed both of these, namely sin and finitude, as prejudices in Gadamer’s 
sense of the term. I have already dealt with finitude. Now I wish to deal with sin, or more 
specifically its source in Augustine’s mind, namely pride. Unlike finitude, which is basically good 
or neutral, sin is an inherently obstructive prejudice, the sort that Gadamer identifies as a constant 
impediment to knowledge if it is not foregrounded, critiqued, and ultimately jettisoned. In the 
following section I elaborate upon my glossing of “pride as prejudice,” blending Augustine and 
Gadamer. 
Our minds fail to comprehend God’s grandeur, not least of all when we are led to think 
in ways which exceed our spatio-temporal categories.431 In order to do this, we need God’s help, 
and Augustine states that this help comes in the form of illumination, an enlightenment which 
allows us to have some understanding of God.432 As Augustine explains, “Who may explain this? 
Or who may worthily contemplate what has been said, ‘And of his understanding there is no 
number’? If only he would pour himself into you, and where we fail, because he is powerful, may 
he illumine your minds, so that you may know what it is, ‘Of his understanding there is no 
number.’”433 When it comes to understanding things which are truly, radically transcendent, 
Augustine states that the proper attitude for approaching them is not one of understanding.434 
From the outset one is in error if one presumes that all objects of cognition are somehow 
comprehensible to a human mind, in particular a human mind bound to finite categories.435 Rather, 
one must approach them in a spirit of silence (conticescant humanae uoces), reservation 
(requiescant humanae cogitationes), contemplation, and participation; one must enter into them 
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in order to engage with these truths or these ideas.436 Some things are de iure beyond human 
capacity to comprehend, and so rational minds “ought not reach out to incomprehensible things 
as if they are about to understand, but rather about to participate.”437 At this point we hardly need 
to be reminded of Augustine’s position that God is beyond all change and mutability, in contrast 
to creation.438 Whilst we cannot comprehend this, we can and are even summoned to participate 
in it.439 In particular, we are made partakers in God’s immortality and eternity in virtue of Christ’s 
Incarnation and all which it entails.440 Augustine sees a fitting symmetry here, insofar as Christ 
takes on our nature so that ultimately, we may take on something of his.441 (In fact, what is 
suggested here is a variation on the theme of re-creation.) A necessary condition for such 
participation is not so much philosophical speculation per se, as this is in principle ineffable (Non 
ergo exigatis quod apte dici non posse).442 Augustine rather encourages confession and penance 
performed for sins, which will allow God further and further to direct and heal the soul and restore 
it to health.443 The key is that with God’s help, things which were once considered impossible for 
the human soul will no longer be so (non erunt iam impossibilia nobis, quae modo impossibilia 
sunt).444 
 If objects of this sort exist, then one’s engagement cannot be one of univocal, 
“mathematical” reasoning. Faith works especially against the pride of philosophical thinking, that 
is, thinking detached from the grounding principle of the Word.445 Faith also enables the humility 
necessary to grow in truth.446 Faith for Augustine is an existential act, and not merely an external 
confession. One does not really have faith until one realises one’s utter nothingness or “nihility” 
before God and one’s dependence on him. Only such a realisation can lead one to the intellectual 
“hermeneutic” of humility which is so necessary to reason.447 In this way, one recognises the order 
established in creation by God.448 Pride comes to be seen as an intellectual fault as well, insofar 
as one fails to appreciate one’s epistemic situation. This is the fault that Heidegger ascribes to the 
modern reification of the self, a forgetfulness of one’s “nihility.”  
Humility is like a weight of sorts, keeping one’s feet on the path of faith and sustaining 
one in one’s journey, leading to wisdom and truth.449 Similarly, Augustine describes the 
opposition between caritas and superbia as the difference between sustaining one on the path and 
making one fall.450 Pride causes one to think that one is in a different place than one actually is. 
Clearly this can assume multiple senses. Just as one trips and falls on steps when one thinks one’s 
foot is in a place that it is not, so too does pride cause one to falter epistemically, as one thinks 
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that one is in a different conceptual location than one actually is.451 Hence Augustine encourages 
one to be humble, which is to think in accordance with the truth of one’s own situation.452 In this 
way, one’s foot will not be moved.453 Humility provides a sure support against temptation, and 
sustains one in the ascent to God.454 
One must acknowledge and appreciate one’s own limits, and the fact that one is not the 
source of one’s own happiness or satisfaction.455 Augustine intimates that when we acknowledge 
the superiority of God, we are able to situate the constituents of reality in their proper normative 
setting.456 This lesson is as much epistemic as it is spiritual.457 This becomes clear when 
considerations of light are introduced into this same paragraph of this enarratio. Even the montes, 
those of great faith and intellect, are not the source of their own light but are illumined from 
beyond. However, when one prefers oneself as a source of light, it only results in one’s becoming 
darkness.458 Those who are truly humble and happy are those who realise that they are not the 
source of their own good.459 The acknowledgement of our dependence on God can amount to a 
confession which solidifies the heart: “That confession forms the heart and makes it a foundation 
of love.”460 
Augustine recognises in creation a hierarchy of goods; not all things are created equal.461 
The enquiry into creation moves through images, yes, but there is an inherent hierarchy of images, 
according to Augustine’s schema. The movement from creatures to the Creator passes through 
the creature who, though not God, is nonetheless given the gift of knowing itself, a gift it possesses 
in virtue of being created according to that divine image to which it is summoned to return.462 In 
order to find truth it is essential that we know how to perceive this hierarchy of beings and then 
interpret and relate them appropriately to one another.463 In my estimation, Augustine is claiming 
that our sense of values influences the judgements we make, as well as the way in which we 
interpret the relationships between particular things. In turn, these judgements then influence our 
hermeneutical frameworks. This relies upon an “intentional” way of looking, and one which is 
able to recognise, as Heidegger would say, that there is more present than meets the eye.464 This 
tends toward questions which are ultimately metaphysical, normative, and theological. 
A major error according to Augustine can be explained by appeal to the gospel passage 
in which Christ tells his followers not to let the left hand know what the right one is doing. 
Augustine interprets this to mean that we should not confuse a temporal good (sinistra) with an 
eternal one (dextera): “Whatever we possess temporally is called our left hand; whatever eternal 
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and unchangeable which the Lord promises to us is called our right.”465 Indeed, it is a great error 
to reverse the understanding of these goods, a belief which influences the rest of one’s 
commitments, such that one requires only temporal goods in order to attain beatitude.466 As 
Augustine puts it, “That man is foolish and perverse, who makes his left hand his right.”467 
Augustine posits a key dividing line between the world of creation, of time and space, change and 
flux, being and becoming, and the eternal, immutable reality of God in his divine nature. Within 
the former there is still a hierarchy, of course, but without this basic starting point, Augustine 
suggests, one will not even be able properly to assess and parse the differences within the created 
realm.468 Here we see another facet of the importance of Augustine’s theory of creation as the 
grounding of his theory of knowledge, an observation which can be cast in a new light after our 
examination of Gadamer’s thought. What I want to suggest is that Augustine is discussing here a 
misuse of prejudice, according to which we take the temporal as the mark of the real, the true, the 
valuable, and in doing so, we fail to interpret correctly or foreground our ontological prejudice in 
favour of the spatio-temporal world.469 In fact, the failure to do this could even result in the refusal 
to understand or countenance the possibility of something eternal or incorporeal.470 
 Augustine locates in his own life some form of “hermeneutical” error. According to 
Ayres, in conf. 4 Augustine is discussing this theme with respect to the social implications it 
entails. That is, in certain socio-cultural settings, certain types of things are valued over others, 
and Augustine laments how in his own culture, certain standards of value were presented to him, 
despite the fact that they only led to vanity and pride.471 Augustine also laments his excessive 
grief over the death of a friend, claiming that he did not know how to love people in a proper way 
(O dementiam nescientem diligere homines humaniter).472 At this point Augustine recalls that he 
was seriously lacking in the proper perspective of viewing creatures in relation to their Creator.473 
 As we have seen throughout the foregoing enquiry, a key factor to seeing truth is the 
purification of one’s mental vision through proper simplicity of heart, which is to say that one 
sets one’s focus firmly on eternal things, the very act of which is both purgative and leads to 
cordial simplicity.474 Augustine describes his thoughts as being torn apart in multifarious things, 
a process counteracted by the purgative effects of God’s love (uarietatibus dilaniantur 
cogitationes meae, intima uiscera animae meae, donec in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne 
amoris tui), at which point purged can remain firm in God’s truth.475 Augustine suggests that one 
becomes “heaven” by ridding oneself of earth and its desires (terrenas concupiscentias): “Do you 
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wish to be heaven? Purge the earth from your heart.”476 The expulsion of temporal desires from 
the soul enables one to bear the simplicity of the divine light by the sight of one’s heart: “There 
is a purgation of the inner eye in the turning itself, when those things which were being desired 
temporally are excluded, so that the sight of a simple heart may be able to bear divinely the simple 
light.”477 The reverse of this is the clouding of the eye by its immersion in corporeal things.478 
In contrast to those who confuse temporal goods with eternal ones, Augustine provides 
the counter-example of Job.479 What I want to suggest is that Job serves as a type for someone 
who has a properly adjusted hermeneutical framework, who is able to “read” the world more 
clearly and effectively than his materialistic counterpart. Though Job enjoyed temporal goods 
(sinistra), he recognised that these goods were merely temporal, bearing in mind that only God 
could provide him with lasting happiness.480 Job possessed a “heart filled with God,”481 and took 
the Lord himself as his right hand: “This was his right hand, the Lord himself, eternal life itself, 
that possession of light, font of life, light in light.”482 Augustine also speaks to this “hermeneutical 
hierarchy” when he exhorts his audience to let temporal things be temporal, and to situate them 
appropriately with respect to the rest of one’s life.483 For example, one’s faith in Christ must take 
priority with respect to all temporal goods: “Subject all temporal things to your faith, and place 
your faith before all temporal things.”484 Speaking of one’s intentio, Augustine describes it in 
terms of one’s underlying reasons or motivations for action (noli facere nisi propter uitam 
aeternam).485 When one performs a good action for the sake of some temporal good, one allows 
the left hand to know what the right hand is doing; one should only live from the desire for eternal 
life and for unchangeable goods.486 Even when one does a good work for the sake of the kingdom, 
but is distracted by concerns about worldly gain, one mixes (miscet) the left and the right, a 
situation which God forbids (hoc uetat Deus).487 One divides or doubles one’s heart, and becomes 
like those who with devotion’s visage and pious action do sugar o’er the devil himself.488 
A similar opportunity Augustine provides for thinking about his theological programme 
in a hermeneutical modality is according to the notion of the soul and its loves. In ep. Io. tr., he 
speaks of two loves (duo sunt amores), of God and of the world (mundi et Dei), respectively.489 
These two loves are mutually exclusive; those who possess the love of the world will prevent that 
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of God from entering them.490 As Augustine states shortly thereafter in the same tractate, “If the 
love of the world is there, there will be no love of God there.”491 When one rids oneself of earthly 
love (amore terreno), God’s love may take its place.492 As in ciu., Augustine suggests in ep. Io. 
tr. that one’s love determines one’s habitation. So whilst everyone we meet dwells here on earth, 
some are citizens of the earthly city in virtue of the love of the world, whereas others inhabit 
heaven already here on earth, because their hearts are set on higher things.493 (There is a great 
similarity here to C. S. Lewis’ The Great Divorce.) The decision to love pulls one in a particular 
direction, influences what one sees as valuable and significant, and determines the system of 
relations in which one places those things.494 In a sense, one becomes the things that one loves, 
and so if one loves temporal things, the kinds of things which are inherently limited and ultimately 
fade, one will suffer a similar fate.495 When we use created things intemperately, we fail to love 
God, worshipping his creation rather than the Creator.496 
In contrast, if one loves eternal things, one will become eternal (utrum amare temporalia, 
et transire cum tempore; an mundum non amare, et in aeternum uiuere cum Deo).497 Indeed, we 
shall become like gods.498 The goodness of created things ought to lead us to love the Creator.499 
Augustine makes clear that we should not reject or condemn worldly, temporal things, as they are 
good in themselves. Rather, one must recognise that they have their source in God, their maker, 
who possesses all of their good qualities in himself beyond degree:500 “May the Spirit of God be 
in you, so that you may see that all these things are good. But woe to you if you love the things 
which have been made, and you abandon the Maker. They are beautiful to you; but how much 
more beautiful is the one who formed them?”501 When we realise that God alone is to be loved 
and worshipped, we shall not be troubled by lower desires, and we shall be able truly to love 
God.502 For Augustine, the life of sin and dissolution can be couched in epistemic and 
hermeneutical terms. As Menn writes, 
 
Augustine stresses in particular that we cannot search for God effectively unless we are 
purified, where the requisite purity is in part moral purity, but also purity of imagination–we 
cannot search for God effectively if we are so immersed in the senses that we cannot think 
any object without an accompanying sensory image. But we cannot achieve this purity of 
morals and imagination without the help of God, and specifically without praying to God for 
his help […].503 
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In other words, the soul makes an error in judgment concerning the worth of particular things. 
One erroneously treats temporal things like eternal ones, and attempts to enjoy them accordingly. 
This error for Augustine is simultaneously moral and epistemic.504 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 We have begun to read the universe, with Gadamerian hermeneutics as our guide. In 
particular we have foregrounded and interrogated the prejudice of our finitude, of our spatio-
temporal extension. Furthermore, once we realise, with Augustine’s help, how our knowing is 
fundamentally temporal and spatial, we are enabled to overcome these boundaries. We saw an 
exceptional example of this in the discussion of transcendence, whereby following John the 
Divine, we mentally move beyond all creation whatsoever, to a fleeting contemplation of the 
incorporeal divine essence. This is something that the mind cannot bear. So we are cast down 
again, returning to the earth whence we came. Yet our ascent was not in vain, as we return with 
new eyes, indeed, with a new perspective on the entire world. This enables us propertly to read 
and interpret the cosmos, understanding it as a reflection of the divine Wisdom. This realisation 
makes us sensitive to another prejudice of ours, pride, which inverts the proper categorisation of 
the world which would allow us to read and understand it. This hermeneutical encounter with the 
world has left us in a queer place, as we can no longer return to our original starting point, but we 
have also not found a permanent home, a final destination. Such is the state of Adam and Eve in 
exile. We enter ever deeper into truth, continuously called by it until we are able to encounter it 
in its fullness in eternity. 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION: METHOD REVISITED 
 
As we come to the end of your enquiry, I feel justified in raising a question which has 
been implicit throughout the entirety of this project. In other words, what are you trying to prove? 
Who is your audience? What are the success conditions or the standards which you apply to 
arguments, whether yours or someone else’s? 
I am familiar with the anti-modern polemics of those of a traditional metaphysical or 
Christian persuasion.1 This mind-set relies on pointing out the supposed flaws in a post-Cartesian 
framework and attempting to show the illogical conclusions thereof. I think that there are 
compelling and important arguments here. However, I would like to take another approach, for 
the reason that there is something about an argument for a particular philosophical or theological 
position which can easily strike one as unconvincing; the proponent of a particular position seems 
quite likely to want to hold that position anyway, and hence to construct a “pre-packaged” 
argument which will keep any nagging doubts or questions at bay.2 The problem with this 
approach is that, as Trakakis puts it, “Such arguments resemble more ex post facto rationalizations 
than unbiased and disinterested attempts to follow the evidence wherever it leads.”3 As an 
alternative, one may simply acknowledge one’s sympathies and attempt to provide a broader 
illustration of the intellectual setting in which a particular point makes sense; in a sense, it is a 
more “holistic way”4 of arguing not merely for a particular claim but a way of seeing the world.5 
One characteristic of this approach is to explain and define concepts in terms of 
interconnections, being reciprocally illumined by their relations to other ideas, rather than 
presenting an exhaustive, intrinsic definition.6 The result is an argument from a relation of items 
within a broader structure, such that the meaning and significance of the individual parts are 
understood as greater than their sum. Trakakis’ explanation of this idea, which he derives from J. 
Malpas, is worth quoting at length:  
 
Malpas, instead, characterizes his investigation as “topographical” and “transcendental,” by 
which he means that concepts such as “place” and “space” are illuminated not by reductive 
analyses, but by surveying connections between these concepts and the rest of our beliefs and 
practices, and by looking for the very conditions that make our grasp of these concepts 
possible in the first place. This approach – followed by both analytic and Continental 
philosophers, from Wittgenstein and Davidson to Heidegger and Derrida – looks for 
understanding rather than justification, an understanding afforded by viewing things as 
interconnected wholes and in their concrete contexts, with the overall aim of not so much 
proving a specific point as of showing how an entire way of thinking and living is even 
possible.7 
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Arthos suggests that Augustine himself argued in this manner, such as in his trin.8 The former 
characterises Augustine’s argument as “rhetorical,” in contrast to the strictly logical.9 What I 
would like to do is present a certain way of viewing and interpreting certain key aspects of human 
experience, and giving them a particular interpretation. Then I can invite someone to see whether 
and to what extent one sees something true or valuable therein. 
My position is motivated by the observation that the method I am suggesting here 
represents a rehabilitation of a form of reasoning which has been historically eclipsed. In addition 
to thinking of truth in terms of absolute, indisputable proofs, there is also a way of reasoning 
which aims at a different standard of truth, a defeasible form of reasoning which can never be 
totally proved beyond all reasonable doubt, but which can nevertheless be endorsed on some 
rational basis. The motivation for this more nuanced form of reasoning is none other than the 
reality we experience around us, which is not always “black and white” but admits of various 
shades of grey. 
In addressing the question of the extent to which Aquinas was a philosopher as opposed 
to a theologian, D. Burrell introduces a distinction between two forms of reasoning present in the 
former’s thought. One pertains to proof in the strict sense of the term, an indefeasible 
demonstration of the truth of something beyond the point of doubt (insofar as it is humanly 
possible). However, Burrell draws attention to an aspect of Aquinas’ thought often neglected by 
his most ardent followers, namely that of what he calls “sufficient reason” or “fittingness.” This 
second form is in his mind most appropriate to the human sciences, or to avoid anachronism, 
theology proper. Burrell illustrates this more defeasible, counterfactual form of reasoning by 
appeal to C. S. Peirce’s concept of abduction. In other words, one takes note of observations 
around one, and hypothesises about what renders them most intelligible.10 
Burrell argues that in his lectures on the Gospel of John, delivered ca. 1270 shortly before 
his death, Aquinas employs reason not to argue for the “absolute” certainty of the testimony of 
revelation found in John, but rather to show that it is not completely incredible. As Burrell lucidly 
explains this point, “the lectures [on John] do not proceed from reason to truths of faith, but rather 
use reason to show the plausibility of the revelation of John, as well as to clear a path for the 
proper understanding of that revelation.”11 In his distinction between two forms of reason in 
Aquinas, Burrell suggests a link here with our own day and age. In other words, the insight of 
figures such as Gadamer and Wittgenstein, Burrell writes, is that the entire reasoning process 
itself is a form of fides quaerens intellectum, that some presuppositions will form the basis for 
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and enable scientific enquiry, and will subsequently determine the way in which that enquiry 
develops.12 
In an interview given shortly before his own death, Gadamer spoke of these two forms of 
reasoning as well, explicitly defending the legitimacy of an approach to truth not in terms of 
absolutes. This view of his is based the observation that “experiences open up in texts that are 
much closer to art, religion, and philosophy than they are to science.”13 Gadamer locates in Plato’s 
The Statesman an interesting and compelling insight for the present day. Here Plato describes two 
forms of measurement, one which pertains to what we might call scientific forms of knowing, and 
the other which pertains to ancient rhetoric.14 Drawing inspiration from classical Greek thought, 
Gadamer wishes to say two distinct but related things as it pertains to method and the sciences. 
For one, he questions the seat of absolute superiority to which the sciences pretend. Ultimately 
the notion of an absolute proof can only be properly discussed within mathematics, and the 
sciences as a whole are largely based on experience, experiences analysed critically, granted, but 
experience nonetheless. But if the ultimate foundation is experience, then there can be no 
“absolute” knowledge, according to Gadamer, due to our inherent limitations. This is the second 
point, namely the inherently finite nature of the human knower. There are certain things which 
exceed our grasp simply because we are human. This is not something negative in itself, but 
something we must learn to accept. As Gadamer states, “In this realm, not everything is provable. 
In it, what must be accepted as true aims at what is believable.”15 
Gadamer also finds inspiration in theology, in particular that of Augustine and the latter’s 
take on the Trinity. Augustine held that in principle, the human mind cannot comprehend the 
triune God. However, one can approach it and come to some non-trivial understanding of this 
mystery through the use of analogies and other images, provided one is sensitive to the multivalent 
use of language taking place.16 Gadamer argues for the criterion of probability, believability, and 
plausibility, over against some form of indubitable proof. He provides the example of ethics, in 
which field “there can be no proof with the compelling power of mathematics.”17 Hence Gadamer 
encourages one to return to the rhetorical approach of the Greeks, who prized “believable 
statements and not compelling proofs.”18 
But even our more mundane knowledge testifies to the fact that control or dominance is 
not the sole mark of knowledge. Gadamer suggests a key distinction here between familiarity and 
intellectual control. Indeed, this is the very spirit behind Augustine’s somewhat 
phenomenological approach to the Trinity. We are implicitly aware of something, it is familiar to 
us, and yet foreign at the same time. We cannot be said to be totally ignorant or unaware of it.19 
We see further evidence of this view of Augustine in terms of his discussion of faith in his Sermo 
ad populum 43. Though it is often assumed that Augustine endorsed some form of fideism, in this 
homily he states that there is always some rational basis for one’s faith, and that faith is first and 
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foremost a summons from without; it is very much a free response to a call. Those who are 
implicated in a conversation about some point of faith, for instance, are already grasped in a 
certain way by that very same faith. As Augustine explains, “For if they would have believed in 
no way at all, they would not be here. Faith has led them, so that they might hear. Faith has made 
them present to the word of God.”20 Faith has spoken to them in some way, has already silently 
grasped them, such that they are led to place themselves within the context of God’s word. Here 
we see a message which is at the same time familiar to one, as one hears and responds to a call, 
and yet not under one’s complete comprehension and control. Here a binary logic does not apply, 
but rather one of degrees. 
According to G. McCullough, Heidegger suggests that technology introduces a logic of 
knowledge into contemporary society which predisposes one to think of the true as that which is 
available to us immediately and under our direct control.21 Technology is characterised by 
Bestand, a standing at the ready, and being at one’s beck and call.22 Thinking in terms of Bestand 
implies that things are completely under human control.23 Heidegger calls knowledge proper to 
this realm Herausfordern, a calling forth, and this is what he sees as distinctive of science in the 
modern world.24 That is, an approach to knowledge as “challenging-forth” is taken to be the 
distinctive and even exclusive mark of knowledge in our day and age.25 
 McCullough follows Milbank and Gillespie in tracing the source of “desacralisation” to 
Ockham and the nominalists of the late middle ages. The details of that genealogy are not the 
issue here, but rather the intellectual results. According to McCullough,26 modern forms of 
scientific knowing are characterised by the attenuation of what Desmond calls the 
“overdetermined” nature of being, according to which things in the world “reveal themselves 
poetically as more than they are.”27 In other words, particular entities could bespeak something 
greater than themselves. Therefore, in McCullough’s words, “To the scientific mind, objects no 
longer pointed beyond themselves by gathering and presencing their causal indebtedness.”28 Such 
a view is also exemplified by Francis Bacon’s approach to nature as putting it on the rack and 
forcing it to confess its secrets.29 Once nature came to be divested of meaning, only the “scientific” 
form of knowing was deemed necessary. In contrast to this ethos, as McCullough explains, “The 
infinite shines out of finite being. If ontology is understood apart from God, however, then we 
come to understand being as fully contained within the human contemplative grasp. There is no 
longer any depth or mystery to it. This gives humans the sense that we have complete control over 
created being, and leads to that technological knowing as ‘challenging forth’ nature.”30 
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Even in his latter years, Gadamer remained under the influence of Heidegger’s critique 
of the technological mind-set and its promotion of Bestand.31 For example, in an interview given 
in 1993 to Die Zeit, Gadamer suggests that his thought envisions a certain tension between 
“information” on the one hand and rationality on the other.32 Echoing the sentiments of Heidegger, 
Gadamer notes how in this day and age we have made remarkable progress with technology and 
our ability to understand the world, yet we have not complemented this with a sense for the correct 
use (die richtige Anwendung) of our newfound devices.33 This is especially interesting 
considering that Gadamer died prior to the rise of smartphones, smartwatches, and the 
proliferation of social media. In thoughts reminiscent of Heidegger’s critique of the results of 
technology, Gadamer laments the advance of “das fürchterlich technische amerikanische Ideal.”34 
At a tangible level, one of the main results of the Industrial Revolution is that things become 
obsolete more and more quickly.35 Gadamer suggests that the advance of a technological mind-
set, especially after the Industrial Revolution, has had serious repercussions for the way in which 
we think about thinking, and hence exacerbates the already formidable obstacles to our perception 
and discernment of truth. The reason for this, Gadamer states, is that in the current “technocratic” 
(my gloss) world, it is difficult if not impossible to have experience in the strong sense of the 
word Erfahrung.36 Gadamer sees the increase in computing technology as tending to change 
experience into something over which we have absolute control, something we can manipulate.37 
The world as it is becoming increasingly constituted allows less and less for spontaneity and play, 
imposing a pre-given order on the rational subject.38 An increase in information does not 
necessarily facilitate a growth in knowledge, since it can stifle one’s capacity for critical thinking 
and true experience.39 Hence we see again a tension between true knowledge, or that which 
facilitates it, and the proliferation of data.40 Within the context of his discussion of the task of 
philosophy as facilitating the asking of ever-further questions, Gadamer pithily suggests a 
distinction between information on the one hand and truth or meaning on the other.41 Information 
neither requires nor brooks any further thought or interrogation. Without the guidance of a proper 
question, or better still, the questioning mind, information leaves one in a fairly static location.42 
(This point concerning information evokes the discussion of interpretation as being applied to that 
which is unclear in the work of Finan and Auerbach, respectively.) 
Despite his criticism of post-Galilean method, Gadamer does not wish to reject science, 
nor does he even wish to reject its influence on philosophical thinking. Gadamer thinks it is 
mistaken to believe that philosophy should replace any particular scientific discipline, aspire to 
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its norms of certitude, or even to become a “science” itself in the same sense.43 Rather, he wants 
to make clear that without a much more basic intellectual capacity, it is impossible for science to 
function. As evidence for this, one can look to Gadamer’s assertion that language does not and 
cannot function according to the prescriptions of logic, and challenges thinkers of a different 
background to accept this: “Die Logiker sollten akzeptieren, dass Gespräche nie ganz logisch 
funktionieren und funktionieren können.”44 Similarly, Gadamer stresses that “absolute certitude” 
or “proof” (Beweisbarkeit nach wissenschaftlicher Methode) is not proper to philosophy.45 This 
is because the sorts of questions which constitute the Sache or the substance of philosophy can 
neither be raised nor answered from the perspective guided by (mere) information or fact: “Diese 
Frage lässt sich nicht etwa durch Informationstheorie beantworten.”46 Gadamer’s concern is that 
the growing dominance of science (mit dem Fortschritt der Wissenschaften) could elide or even 
eliminate the consideration of such questions, an example of which is the definition and the 
meaning of consciousness (Bewusstein).47 
Your response raises a further question which I have had in mind for some time. Ad 
hominem, one wonders whether and to what extent your own programme, compelling though it 
may be, is completely credible. Regardless of your own confessional sympathies, your main 
conversation partner in this enquiry has been perhaps the greatest representative of Catholic 
dogmatism, which does not bode well for the “scientific integrity” of your work. In fact, one was 
rather amused in Part II when you blithely mentioned Heidegger’s claim that a Catholic could 
not be a true scholar.48 In a word, what do you say to the objection that your conclusions were 
“predestined” (excuse the pun) from the beginning of your enquiry? 
 Believe it or not, I am sympathetic to the gist of your argument. Let me illustrate this by 
way of example. Recently I had a conversation with a colleague based in Rome. He recalled how 
a priest had recently defended his PhD on a question of the historical authenticity of certain 
documents used to substantiate claims of apostolic succession. From all accounts, it was an 
excellent thesis and received condign praise. However, one cannot help but wonder whether a 
Catholic priest can be totally impartial and objective, that is, scientific, in his approach to such a 
question. I can see a point to this line of critique. 
 However, I do not think that such a critique would be ultimately damning for such a 
scholar. Rather, I think it would underscore the importance of foregrounding one’s own biases, 
as Gadamer would say. The extent to which this is feasible or permitted in certain cases is another 
question, and I suspect that thoughts of this kind are behind Heidegger’s scepticism. However, I 
also think we would be jejune to envision dogmatism as the privilege and the prerogative 
exclusively of the religious; ignorance is very democratic. 
 As for my own enquiry, as I have already stated, I have tried to avoid questions of 
confessional polemics, not out of some misplaced sense of irenicism or relativism, but simply 
because I do not find such discussions to be particularly interesting at an intellectual level. Indeed, 
my very project is motivated by the idea that such discussions are improperly framed from the 
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start. I would much rather present a particular way of viewing the world, and allow one to use 
one’s own reason and insight in order to adjudicate truth accordingly.  
This is what Kuhn has in mind regarding “intuition.” According to Kuhn, in the final 
analysis, the presence or the demonstration of facts or proofs does not suffice in order to settle a 
debate between two paradigms. Let us tarry a wee moment on Kuhn’s thought. It is one thing for 
a theologian to question the presuppositions of modern science. There is, ad hominem, a 
motivation for a theologian or a philosopher to react against certain interpretations of science. 
However, greater credence is lent to the foregoing views when one realises that a scientist, or at 
least someone steeped in that milieu, comes to a similar conclusion. Like Gadamer, Kuhn also 
questions notions of “method” which deliver univocal results, viewing the search for truth in terms 
of confronting experience with one’s theoretical expectations and then continually revising them 
accordingly.49 Bernstein sees a great deal of continuity between Gadamer’s understanding of the 
interpretive element of all science, not simply in identifying a subject matter but also in terms of 
“interpreting” the truth content thereof by balancing a number of pieces of evidence, insights, 
concerns, etc., and Kuhn’s understanding of a paradigm shift, insofar as Kuhn believes that the 
option for one paradigm over another cannot be reduced to the demonstration of a proof.50 Despite 
these continuities, however, philosophers of science were not directly influenced by 
developments in hermeneutics, but were rather pursuing the logical outcomes of the procedures 
and assumptions within their own field.51 
Kuhn does not believe that there is any conceptually neutral language in which to think 
about the world or in which to frame scientific hypotheses. “The decision,” according to Kuhn, 
“to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another.”52 The movement 
to a different paradigm does not represent, as Kuhn writes, “some hypothetical ‘fixed’ vision, but 
vision through another paradigm.”53 For this reason, he argues that changes in scientific theory 
are not felicitously described as mere differences in opinion or interpretation.54 Interpretations of 
observations arise within and presuppose a paradigm. But the anomalous readings and the 
conclusions drawn from them do not suffice for switching to a new paradigm entirely. For this, 
Kuhn sees “intuition” as necessary which, though it relies upon the previous results of scientific 
investigation, nonetheless is not “logically linked” in the same way as interpretations are.55 
 In addition to recognising the inherently perspectival nature of science and the 
presuppositions thereof, Kuhn also questions the absolute status of the sciences, viewing them 
more in terms of a collection of theories meant to approach truth collectively. As Kuhn writes,56  
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What has been said so far may have seemed to imply that normal science is a single 
monolithic and unified enterprise that must stand or fall with any one of its paradigms as well 
as with all of them together. But science is obviously seldom or never like that. Often, 
viewing all fields together, it seems instead a rather ramshackle structure with little coherence 
among its various parts. 
 
Within this collection of fields of enquiry, Kuhn holds, particular exemplars come to gain the 
status of a paradigm, which encapsulates the principles, methods, and expectations of a particular 
field. Sometimes these expectations or predictions are frustrated by the facts. Questions are often 
occasioned by a sense of surprise, confusion, or some other anomalous experience of the universe. 
In a sense, our “fore-understanding” of the world leads to the formulation of a certain reading or 
interpretation which, when confronted with certain experiences, is shown to be somehow 
infelicitous or inadequate. In fact, Kuhn states that this tension between the world and one’s 
expectation constitutes the beginning of one’s growth in knowledge: “Discovery commences with 
the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the 
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science.”57 
Anomaly as such is not a sufficient reason for the precipitation of a crisis. This only 
happens when the exception begins to become the rule, in which case the paradigm comes into 
serious question.58 Persistent and pervasive anomaly is what ultimately undermines a particular 
paradigm and leads to its eclipse and replacement. At first, minor anomalies need not lead to any 
major concerns for a paradigm, but over the course of time, as it cedes more and more explanatory 
capacity, so too does it lose purchase on the rational mind.59 Paradigm change in science is 
generated, according to Kuhn, when a particular paradigm is called into serious question, which 
in turn leads to a lowered trust in its tenets and a more critical adherence to its prescribed 
methods.60 
One can summarise Kuhn’s view as follows. A scientist is concerned with accounting for 
the phenomena of human observation, especially observations which occur as a result of 
experiment and similar scientific activity. Because of the pre-conceived theories and frameworks 
which inform this type of research, certain types of answers or observations are expected and 
predicted, which in turn will be consistent with and thus support and confirm the established 
theory. However, at times, observed phenomena will conflict with theory. Anomalies are always 
an issue, but there comes a point, Kuhn suggests, at which the observed anomalies become too 
great to maintain the theoretical framework in which they are situated, at least not without 
compromising even more fundamental scientific principles like that of parsimony. 
Scientific revolution in the normative sense of the term really gets going when one 
paradigm loses its monopoly on the community of practitioners of a particular form of rational 
enquiry. The alternative paradigm then challenges its rival for the allegiance of this community.61 
Kuhn emphasises the qualitative shift involved in a scientific revolution; the term revolution itself 
is deliberately selected in order to convey the radical nature of paradigm change, in which the 
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very fundamental principles and methods of a field are reformulated, changed, and at times 
jettisoned altogether.62 For Kuhn, “the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree 
about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve. Their standards or their 
definitions of science are not the same.”63 Therefore the risk arises of begging the question by 
excluding one particular paradigm or form of evidence on the grounds that it is “unscientific.” 
Addressing the epistemological paradigm, which he traces to Descartes, he notes that 
despite its virtues, its well-motivated bases, and its perceptive intuitions, it nonetheless admits of 
various faults. However, as he sees it, no alternative candidate has yet emerged to respond to it.64 
At this point we see an opening for thinking about “science” in a way separate from the 
specifically modern dispensation. What I want to suggest is that science, understood in a broader 
and problematised sense, has been struggling with the “anomalous readings” generated by a 
particular metaphysical and epistemic view of reality. This philosophical worldview, one could 
argue, has arrived at a crisis point, at which it can no longer brook additional anomalies, and must 
be placed in competition with another theory or set of theories. This is what we see not only with 
Kuhn’s own method, but also with respect to Gadamer who, standing at a liminal point in the 20th 
century, articulated a theory of knowledge which challenged views that had been established for 
decades, indeed centuries before him. What made a project such as WM possible was the 
“anomalous readings” generated by an epistemology informed by Enlightenment. Since Gadamer, 
other figures have seized more precisely upon these anomalies, and in critiquing and questioning 
them have started the process of revolution with respect to knowledge. 
 Due to natural limitations, a paradigm is not considered to be decisive in virtue of being 
“verified,” that is, of being subjected to every conceivable test, but rather in relation to a 
competing paradigm; the question is which has the greater explanatory capacity.65 This greater 
explanatory capacity can be understood as being Janus-like, in that it promises to solve the past 
problems which another paradigm has hitherto failed to resolve, and to the future in the sense that 
it offers great upside for one’s fiducial investment.66 A paradigm “wins” by producing a 
“synthesis” (Kuhn’s term) which holds significant epistemic purchase on the other practitioners 
in the field.67 The standard for a valid or competitive paradigm is its capacity to account for 
observed phenomena, according to Kuhn. This does not mean that it accounts for all the data or 
all the facts. Quite the reverse: In a sense, the mark of a respectable paradigm is that it does not 
provide a completely exhaustive account of the facts. One framework bests another in virtue of 
its superior explanatory capacity, not because it provides a complete account, whereas the others 
do not. No theory is perfect or absolutely complete, nor is it expected to be.68 Once we dispense 
with this notion of absolute proof, even in the empirical sciences, it opens a host of possibilities 
for philosophy and theology, which by their very nature rely upon another logic or notion of 
reason and proof. In other words, the philosopher or the theologian would say, This is one way of 
seeing and interpreting the world. 
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To put the point somewhat poetically, one would think in terms of different ways of 
seeing the world, and select which one is more “beautiful.” This of course sounds like some vain 
form of romanticism or aestheticism. But I mean “beautiful” in the sense that the great 
mathematician Paul Dirac noted, that is, parsimonious and elegant.69 Gadamer adopts a similarly 
Platonic conception of beauty when he confronts a similar objection, namely that his approach to 
science and knowledge borders on the obscurantist or the anti-intellectual. In other words, he 
seeks to minimise the importance of science and introduce something less tangible, less objective. 
In response to this, he first makes clear that the “aesthetic” sense of truth in hermeneutics should 
not be taken in a vain sense of prizing what merely appears or feels beautiful over truth. Gadamer 
very clearly understands himself as saying that that which is beautiful is also true ipso facto.70 
Furthermore, he states that knowledge itself is not the problem but the way that we situate it and 
understand the significance thereof. According to him, “the true blindness does not reside in this 
knowledge itself [=scientific knowledge] but in the fact that one regards it as the whole of 
knowing.”71 Here we see a Gadamerian position which is congenial to Augustine’s critique of 
sapientia superba. I would gloss Gadamer’s insight in the following way: In the situation 
described, one opts for fact over and against an interpretive framework within which the facts 
gain significance and meaning. Of course fact and theory cannot be totally separated. The point 
rather is that those who harp upon facts neglect the broader epistemic situation in which their 
knowledge is enabled and becomes meaningful. This sort of forgetfulness concerns Gadamer very 
deeply, as it ultimately threatens the foundations of science itself.72 For as much as we look for 
the certainty of science and the “purely empirical,” Gadamer reminds us that any scientific 
enquiry relies upon “imagination,” or the capacity to see that which is intelligible, that which is 
question-able.73 Hence it becomes clear that the eclipse of this more defeasible form of reasoning 
or its elimination by scientific forms of knowing risks severing any and all forms of knowledge 
from their original source. And what is this but the very essence of anti-intellectualism. 
 The foregoing analysis brings us to the following choice. One option is to continue to 
engage in polemics, trying to disprove or negatively assess the credibility of another position. 
Another is to concern oneself with generating credence in one’s own position, arguing for the 
plausibility of one’s claims and presuppositions, and aiming for a higher level of credence. Rather 
than engage in polemics, I find it far more interesting to present the intrinsic content of a particular 
view, rather than beginning from a point of reactionary defensiveness and internecine conflict. 
De facto these approaches may overlap, but in principle the starting point will be entirely different. 
Winners would therefore be determined in a “Darwinist,” free market way; it would be the 
survival of the fittest. Of course what is necessary for this idea to work is some notion of what 
Kuhn calls “intuition,” a more basic, “objective” sense of reason, as well as the possibility of what 
Gadamer calls Horizontsverschmelzung. My approach would also be consistent with the 
programme of “foundational thinking” in which Gadamer himself engaged.74 I argue that such an 
approach, far from begging questions or representing some mere velleity, is grounded in sound 
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scientific principles and is therefore not anti-intellectual but worthy of consideration by 
philosophers and theologians, inter alia. I suggest the following: Let philosophers and theologians 
present their views alongside others, and let the rational agent make a decision about which model 
is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory capacity. Let us stop pretending that one 
particular view is “objective” or “impartial.” Let informed rational agents make more decisions 
for themselves. There is no such thing as an ontological free lunch, and scientists for too long 
have been able to avoid critical discussion of their tendentious interpretations with impunity. 
Simply put, I suggest we compare paradigms; you show me yours, I’ll show you mine. 
I applaud your novel attempt to justifie the wayes of God to men.75 Yet your constructive 
engagement with hermeneutics leaves another question, that is, concerning its scientific 
relevance. In fact I think it is a species of a broader problem with theologians who seem to be 
happy to dwell in the clouds and feel justified in not really knowing anything about the real world. 
All that you say about the fundamentally hermeneutical aspect to science is all well and good, but 
of merely “academic” value, if I may use that term. Your ideas are only for you and a small select 
group of like-minded thinkers; the rest don’t care because they don’t have to. Take the following 
example. If I were a surgeon, I may listen with interest to your mellifluous voice as you lecture 
me about the insight required in order to discern the epistemic value of one paradigm as 
compared with another. I may even avidly read your monographs and your articles with rapt 
attention, and keep my significant other awake as I read the whole night long. But when I am 
making an incision in a patient, when I am cutting through flesh and tissue, I frankly don’t care 
about anything you or anyone else has to say about hermeneutics and the logical foundations of 
science, whether my field or anyone else’s. Your work is not going to help me make a proper cut 
in a patient, it is not going to help me diagnose an illness or suggest a form of treatment. It is not 
going to help me when my patient is straddling the gulf between life and death. And so I think that 
in a sense, but a very real one, your programme is ultimately unsuccessful, for the specific reason 
that you have failed to get anyone to listen to you who should be listening to you. Your thought 
says something to science in an abstract way, but has nothing salient to say to practitioners of its 
various forms and modalities. 
 It may well be true that what I say has nothing to do with certain forms of science as it is 
“actually” practised in the real world. It is also true that my work is in some cases highly abstract, 
for which I make no apologies. This is not to say that I am disinterested in or ignorant of the world 
as it actually is, or if I am, it is not an essential part of my programme. As a side note, I would 
sympathise to a certain extent with you when you say that theologians tend to dwell in “blissful 
isolation.” There are certain pockets of theology which feel entitled to criticise certain affairs in 
the world from an abstract moral perspective, while being completely ignorant of the actual 
situation. It is amazing, for example, to listen to a lecture by a liberation theologian criticising 
capitalism when he knows absolutely nothing about capitalism or how basic economics works, as 
if money just falls from the sky. It rather reminds one of Bastiat’s famous quip that if socialists 
truly understood economics they would no longer be socialists. That being said, that is not the 
main point here. Rather, I think our hypothetical surgeon would need to locate the importance of 
hermeneutics at a different level. There is of course the formal component, namely the perception 
of certain entities or body parts as those things. In addition to recognising this formal identity, 
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there is also the issue of the relations between different parts of the body, of cause and effect, and 
other such interactions which a properly trained mind can discern. I think the surgeon would also 
do well to recognise that his art is imbued with not only intentional but also normative aspects. 
 In fact, my response here can serve as a microcosm of the entire foregoing project, namely 
to acknowledge and reflect on the implications of the claim that all knowledge involves an 
interpretive element.76 This was a point which was gradually acknowledged and brought to the 
fore in various discplines in the 20th century, notably in response to the perceived inadequacies of 
post-Enlightenment thinking. In a sense, we can look at my entire argument in reverse: I take this 
recognition of the primacy of interpretation as a point of departure for thinking about knowledge 
and reason in the present day. In the attempt to articulate more clearly the implications of this 
recognition, I first look to Gadamer, not least of all because of his profound engagement with and 
updating of hermeneutics. Given the fact that one of his major sources of inspiration was 
Augustine, we are further motivated to converse with the latter, especially in order to document 
more completely the epistemic and metaphysical implications of the hermeneutical turn, a task 
which is of particular interest to philosophers and theologians. For the purposes of the question at 
hand, the crucial point is that the “universality” of hermeneutics is motivated by findings within 
the empirical sciences themselves, and not by mere abstract speculation.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 I have already pointed the way forward methodologically speaking. As I see it, the 
findings of my research also open other avenues. Here I shall note a few of the research questions 
which arise as a result of the foregoing study, and then seek to summarise and discuss the 
significance of the material itself. 
This study has raised a number of compelling questions which invite further study and 
enquiry. For example, in my discussion of intellectual vision and transcendence in Augustine, I 
only barely touched upon the famous vision at Ostia that he shared with Monnica. This is an 
unusual episode in Augustine’s life, and much more can be said about the way in which it relates 
to other facets of his corpus. We also encountered the importance of metaphor for both Augustine 
and Gadamer, and how contemporary linguistic and neurological studies can be useful in 
uncovering the meaning implicit in classical texts. Furthermore, I have realised especially with 
Gadamer that his concepts of Horizon and Erfahrung, respectively, are highly loaded, and also 
steeped in the history of German thought. A further avenue of research I would like to pursue is 
to explore the concept of Erfahrung with respect to Hegel, among others.1 One point I would like 
to explore further is the importance of the horizon as a concept, as well as how it relates to light. 
The discussion of the cosmic horizon and the event horizon are relevant here. In other words, 
science suggests that the more we learn about our universe, the more developed our understanding 
of the horizon becomes. I believe that Gadamer is a prime source for thinking further about the 
epistemic questions raised by such advances. Both Gadamer and Augustine are thinkers who are 
steeped in thinking about finitude, a topic which is current in other philosophical circles.2 I have 
not dealt at length with the aporiai raised by the consideration of the infinite, the sorts of issues 
which troubled classical Greek philosophers, nor have I yet brought the thought of figures such 
as Augustine to bear on contemporary discussions of this issue. 
I began this project by discussing how Augustine’s understanding of knowledge admits 
of two asymmetrically related components, namely the principal and the gradual. Generally 
speaking, the former pertains to the basic capacity for reason, which for Augustine consists in the 
initial concepts and categories, as well as the general norms and rules which enable rational 
activity in the first place. However, not all exercise their reason in the same way, nor is knowledge 
pre-given. Rather, one must work to grow in knowledge, and in so doing overcome the limitations 
that prevent one from arriving at truth. This discussion laid the groundwork for a more focused 
discussion of sapientia, which Augustine identifies with Christ. 
 Then I spoke of wisdom according to the various ways in which Augustine employs the 
term. As we have seen, it admits of various senses throughout Augustine’s oeuvre, whether 
positive or negative, divine or human. With the help of G. van Riel we were able to discern the 
hierarchy in Augustine’s understanding of this concept, as well as how after 392, it took a 
decidedly Pauline and Christological turn. Among other implications of this turn was the fact that 
in order to speak about knowledge for Augustine, one had to speak about Christ, which introduced 
considerations of eschatology, soteriology, and such like. I also spent some time discussing the 
                                                          
1 See Luis Eduardo Gama, Erfahrung, Erinnerung und Text: Über das Gespräch zwischen Gadamer und 
Hegel und die Grenzen zwischen Dialektik und Hermeneutik, Epistemata: Würzburger Wissenschaftliche Schriften, 
Band 415 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006). 
2 E.g., Quentin Meillassoux, Après la finitude: essai sur la nécessité de la contingence (Paris: Seuil, 2006). 
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“counterfeit double” of Christ as the true wisdom, namely sapientia superba. Here the point was 
to show how Augustine views reason as not reducible to factual knowledge whilst not opting for 
obscurantism. Augustine’s identification of Christ with sapientia set the stage for the next chapter, 
in which I discussed the “Johannine logic” of his theory of wisdom. 
 Citing scholars such as F. van Fleteren and G. Madec, I situated Augustine’s discussion 
of wisdom in a Johannine context. Here I argued that a Johannine theology of creation in the 
Word and re-creation through Christ characterises Augustine’s elaboration of his theory of 
wisdom. Of course, such considerations of Christ as the wisdom of God are never separable from 
his theory of knowledge. In sources such as De Genesi ad litteram, we saw how Augustine 
grounded his theory of creation in the divine Word, from which one derives the basic capacity for 
reason. We also saw how Augustine speaks of sin and human finitude as weaknesses in human 
reason which must be overcome by gradual effort and purification. 
 During the course of the discussion of the Johannine theology of Augustine, two 
particular issues of epistemic interest recurred. These could be united under the term 
“incorporeality” which, as R. Teske and others have noted, was a major contribution by Augustine 
to Latin Christian thought. In other words, in his exegesis of the Johannine prologue, Augustine 
is led to speak of the eternal sapientia as invisible, unchangeable, beyond time and space, as well 
as the difficulty involved in knowing God. These observations led me to look at the implications 
of Augustine’s “wisdom Christology” for human knowledge, in particular as regards time and 
vision. As for the first, Augustine is concerned with how we as finite, corporeal, temporally 
extended creatures, subject to the vicissitudes of time and space, can know something of the 
eternal and immutable God. Likewise, if God and his wisdom are invisible, how can we see him 
or signs of him within the world? These two difficulties occasion a series of reflections in 
Augustine’s corpus, grounded in a scripturally-based form of reasoning. We saw how Augustine 
seeks to “re-describe” his temporal situation, as well as how he posits a three-tiered theory of 
vision. The resources uncovered in these enquiries were then applied in Part III’s constructive 
project. 
 As a way of summarising the major upshot of Part I, I spoke of viewing the world, in C. 
Taylor’s terms, as a “text-analogue,” that is, as somehow possessed of meaningful intentional 
properties that must be gradually disclosed through sustained enquiry. This set the stage for Part 
II and the exploration of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Here we saw that Gadamer 
follows Heidegger in viewing hermeneutics as the finite rational being’s way of existing in the 
world, in particular in the modality of understanding. That is, reason as such is seen as interpretive 
and hermeneutical. This implies that the world comes to one, and comes to one in the form of 
language, as possessed of meaning and content which one initially apprehends by some intuitive 
rational ability, and subsequently uncovers further in the process of reasoning itself. This led to a 
discussion of the key concepts of prejudice, horizon, and the hermeneutical circle in Gadamer, 
which reflect the gradual sense of reason. From these, we were prepared to take a further step, 
and place Augustine and Gadamer in direct dialogue with one another. 
 This is what I sought to do in Part III. In other words, if, as Augustine suggests, the world 
is like a text, how are we to read it? An initial answer comes from Gadamer, and his “ontological” 
version of hermeneutics. I also structured this part again according to the principal-gradual 
schema I enumerated at the beginning. In dialogue with contemporary scholars who work on 
pertinent issues, I noted how a sapiential-hermeneutical theology involves being addressed by the 
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world, and perceiving it in terms of its deeper layers. In the engagement with the world, one’s 
prejudice of finitude is foregrounded. In other words, we noted how it is all too easy to think of 
the mark of the real as the extent of time and space, what W. Desmond calls “postulatory finitism.” 
This calls on one to interrogate the way in which one’s spatio-temporal biases frame one’s 
knowledge and experience. Here we see one of the virtues of a sapiential-hermeneutical theology, 
namely is inherently interrogative approach that it proposes. Another way of describing this 
insight is in terms of a reversal: both Augustine and Gadamer suggest a theory of knowledge 
which involves removing the obstructions within ourselves such that we can see what is already 
present but unrecognised. Grounding reason in a directed but open-ended form of questioning 
balances two desiderata, namely a receptivity to something truly novel on the one hand, and some 
form of definition and truth on the other. This approach to questioning preserves reason’s true 
scientific character and prevents it from becoming circular or question-begging. Furthermore, the 
foregrounding of a prejudice enables one to overcome it, or at least counteract its negative effects. 
We see this for example in Augustine’s discussion of self-transcendence which, although it 
involves a rising to a new level of awareness, always includes descent within this created world. 
Nonetheless, one never returns from an ascent the same way, just as once a prejudice is 
foregrounded and critiqued, one sees the world in a new and more nuanced way. This led us to 
the conclusion that complementarity must be held as a key principle of a theory of rationality 
which appreciates our finitude but which, in the words of F. Lawrence, is “undogmatically open 
to the infinite.”3 
                                                          
3 Lawrence, “Ontology of and as Horizon,” 389. 
